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ABSTRACT
This thesis examines and seeks to understand the formation 
and operation of housing markets in Greater Soweto, an 
agglomeration of black townships on the outskirts of 
Johannesburg, South Africa. The thesis falls into six parts: 
1) a description of the demographic, socio-economic and 
settlement characteristics of Greater Soweto, drawing on a 
household survey and on original source material which has 
not previously been subjected to analysis; 2) an historical 
study which examines the development of housing markets from 
the 1820s to the late 1970s, paying particular attention to 
the progressive depriving of African people of their rights 
in housing and land, including rights to reside or even be 
present in an urban area; 3) a study of the machinery for 
providing housing and how it operated (1930 to the early 
1980s); 4) an examination of the allocation policies of 
successive administrations and tenure markets (1930 to the 
early 1980s); 5) a study of the privatisation of council- 
built housing (the late 1970s to 1994); and 6) a case study 
of private sector finance for house purchase and the role 
played by Meadowlands purchasers in safe-guarding their 
newly acquired property rights (mid-1980s to 1994).
Particular attention has been paid to the mechanisms of 
housing market formation and operation, using ideas 
contained in theories developed by academics in developed 
countries and originally applied to those countries. This 
study shows that it was the conjunction of economic, racial
and housing policies and measures (the desire for cheap 
labour, the priority attached to extraction of mineral 
resources and the systematic depriving African people of any 
property stake) which shaped housing and population in 
Greater Soweto over the years. Fundamentally, however, this 
thesis shows that it was through pressure from grassroots 
movements that housing policies today (whilst still being 
driven by the needs of capital) have come to be based on the 
mechanism of giving people enforceable and tradeable housing 
rights and choice.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
"There shall be houses, security and comfort ... 
Residential segregation is the order of the day 
throughout South Africa, with massive shortage of 
and bad housing for non-whites, and huge homes and 
flats most of which are either empty or not fully 
used, for the White minority ... The Democratic State 
established after the victory of the revolution shall 
ensure the right of people to live wherever they 
choose, to be decently housed, and to bring up their 
families in comfort and security ... Slums ... shall be 
eliminated ... New suburbs shall be built where proper 
facilities shall be provided for transport, lighting, 
playing fields, creches and social centres. The aged, 
the orphans, the disabled and the sick shall be cared 
for by the State ... Fenced locations and ghettos shall 
be abolished and laws which result in the break-up of 
families shall be repealed.M1
1.1 Greater Soweto
Greater Soweto2 is a low density3 'urban sprawl1 situated 
between 15 kilometres (at the nearest) and 30 kilometres (at 
the furthest) from Johannesburg, a metropolitan city of the 
Pretoria, Witwatersrand and Vereeniging (PWV and now
1 African National Congress 1985. Selected Writings On 
The Freedom Charter, 1955 - 1985, p.13. A Sechaba
Commemorative Publication, African National Congress, 
London.
2 The term Greater Soweto is here defined as a 
geographical unit representing the old race-based township 
administrative areas of Soweto, Diepmeadow and Dobsonville. 
By early December 1994, these areas (together with other 
former race-based authorities of Johannesburg, Sandton, 
Alexandra, Randburg, Roodepoort, Ennerdale and Lenasia 
South-East) had been integrated into a transitional 
administrative structure, The Greater Johannesburg 
Transitional Metropolitan Council (GJTMC).
3 In the sense of the land layout averaging 17 
buildings/houses per hectare, but high density in terms of 
house overcrowding.
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Gauteng) region and a financial capital of South Africa. The 
development of Greater Soweto (as will be shown in Chapter 
4) is inextricably linked to the development of the 
capitalist mode of production in conjunction with a white4 
racial ideology, and also to the emergence and subsequent 
expansion of the city of Johannesburg (figure 1.1).
The housing provided in Greater Soweto, as in other black 
residential areas across urban South Africa, is of poor 
quality compared to formerly 'white1 residential areas. 
However, poor quality and the undersupply of adequate 
housing are not unique to black townships of South Africa, 
but a feature of the housing situation in most developing 
countries. Even in the 'developed' countries there is 
evidence of shortage, inequality in the allocation process 
and problems of affordability.5 As people throughout the 
whole world (notably in developing countries) continue to 
move and settle in towns and cities, 'the housing problem' 
is continually formulated and reformulated.
What is different, however, and of particular significance 
to Greater Soweto, the area under study, is that the 
characteristics of the housing situation can be seen to stem
4 This term is not used to refer to all white people in 
this study. Instead, it refers to the 'white' political and 
economic power.
5 See Bourne, L.S. & Hitchcock, J.R. 1978. "Housing 
Research and Policy Development: Themes from the 
Conference". In L.S. Bourne and J.R. Hitchcock (eds), 
Markets, p. 1. University of Toronto, Toronto.
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Figure 1.1: Map of Gauteng showing Soweto in relation to 
Johannesburg
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directly also from the physical and socio-economic policies 
underpinned by a particular ideology commonly known as 
'apartheid1. An investigation of the impact of these 
policies forms a major part of this study.
In Greater Soweto the present-day housing structure (house 
types and their spatial distribution) is characterised by 
many physical and visual characteristics inherited from the 
past. In addition, the present-day housing situation is also 
characterised by the lack of infrastructural and other 
services provision and by the difficulties faced by the 
majority of black residents with respect to access to 
finance. Hundreds of township residents continue to live in 
dilapidated housing which is overcrowded, and in backyard 
and informal shacks which lack basic amenities such as water 
and energy supply, sanitation and drainage.
The impact of the policies applied under apartheid6 is 
captured in the African National Congress (ANC) housing 
policy objectives presented at the beginning of this 
chapter. The extent of the residential patterns, for 
example, who lives where, in what type of housing, with what 
security of tenure and at what cost (as will be shown) are
6 The term 'apartheid1 refers to the official 
government policy of racial segregation which was legislated 
following the election to power of the Nationalist Party in 
1948. Apartheid as the official government policy was 
superseded by similar policies, notably 'separate 
development' or 'residential segregation'. In this thesis 
the term 'apartheid' is used as a shorthand description of 
the post-1948 regimes up to 1994 when the Government of 
National Unity assumed power.
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in part consequences of policies embarked on by successive 
governments which sought to protect the socio-economic and 
political interests of the white group, at the expense of 
the African7 people. This situation has changed very little 
since the first multi-party elections of 1994 and the 
assumption into power of the ANC-led Government of National 
Unity (GNU).
However, in recent years there has been a shift in 
Government policies from government provision of housing 
through local authorities to the promotion of private tenure 
(which paradoxically has been inherited and continued by the 
GNU). One of these policies relates to the sale and free 
transfer of council-built houses from local authorities to 
individual households. The other is concerned with the 
promotion of home-ownership through private sector finance 
for housing. Private sector finance for housing is a recent 
development which can be seen to have led to the development 
of houses built by private developers. Both these policy 
areas are important to this study as they are primarily 
concerned with the privatisation of housing in the townships 
of Greater Soweto.
1.2 The aims of the research and this thesis
The subject of this thesis is a two-fold phenomenon: a) the
7 The term 'African1 is used in this thesis to refer to 
black people.
formation and operation of housing markets in Greater 
Soweto, especially the variety of tenures (different rights 
in housing and land); and b) the process by which this has 
come about, given the dominance of policies and measures 
under the apartheid regime that had the effect of depriving 
Africans of rights in housing and land. This implies 
achieving a deeper and fuller understanding of the formation 
and operation of present-day housing markets in Greater 
Soweto.
The process by which the present housing situation, 
characterised by a diversity of rights in housing and land, 
had come about is particularly interesting given that no 
such rights were conferred to Africans from the 1930s when 
the first townships were established, until the early 1980s. 
The time dimension is very significant in this study. 
Essentially it chronicles how, over a long period, African 
people were deprived of rights in housing and land including 
rights to reside in an urban area, and how, in recent years, 
they have regained such rights. It is an account of a 
people, told through their struggles for housing rights.
Six approaches were followed. The first approach is a 
contemporary description of the demographic, socio-economic 
and settlement characteristics of Greater Soweto, drawing on 
a household survey and on original source material that has 
not previously been subjected to analysis.
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The second approach is a historical study which examines the 
development of housing markets from the 1820s to the late 
1970s, paying particular attention to the progressive 
depriving of African people of their rights in housing and 
land including rights to reside or even be present in an 
urban area. This period covers the rise of the mining 
industry, intensive capitalist urbanisation, the growth of 
manufacturing, and the imposition of racial segregation and 
apartheid. It also chronicles the progressive removal of 
housing rights to the lowest point following the evictions 
of Africans from the Johannesburg areas of Sophiatown, 
Newclare, Martindale and other areas in the mid-1950s. It 
pays particular attention to the operations of the economic 
system and the housing policies of successive governments.
The third approach is a study of the machinery for providing 
housing and how it operated from 1930 to the early 1980s. 
This approach comprises an in depth examination of the 
development of the stock and the diversity of the housing 
situation (including backyard and informal units) paying 
particular attention to the financing mechanisms, costs of 
housing production, the size, age, type, distribution of the 
stock and rate of change in (additions of new units to) the 
stock in the different local housing areas of Greater 
Soweto.
The fourth approach is an examination of the allocation 
policies of successive administrations and tenure markets
21
from 1930 to the early 1980s. This approach examines the 
policies for allocating houses to Greater Soweto residents 
with particular emphasis on the tenure structure and how 
these tenures were differentiated from and connected to 
another. It also documents the rise of backyard and informal 
tenures since the 1980s and examines existing housing policy 
proposals.
The fifth approach is a study of privatisation of council- 
built housing from the late 1970s to 1994. This approach 
comprises an examination into the role played by grassroots 
campaigns and rent boycotts in the transfer of housing from 
state ownership to private tenure resulting in the rise of 
markets (different rights in housing and land).
The sixth approach is a case study of private sector finance 
for house purchase and the role played by Meadowlands West 
Zone 9 purchasers in safe-guarding their newly acquired 
property rights from mid-1980s to 1994. These approaches pay 
particular attention to the changing nature of social, 
economic and political processes.
A growing body of academic research literature on black 
townships has been generated over many years. Much of this 
literature is historical and tends to concentrate on the 
broad socio-economic 'exploitation' and political
22
'repression' of apartheid.® In 1982, Beavon9 called on 
urban geographers in South Africa to concern themselves with 
'scholarly studies of Black townships'. When this call was 
made by Beavon, there were only two entries of articles10 
on Soweto by geographers in the South African Geographical 
Society's cumulative index spanning a period of 63 
years.11 Very few empirical studies have examined housing 
in Greater Soweto. These analyses have tended to examine the 
relationship between: the shaping of housing policy and 
capital accumulating activities,12 housing and the
8 See for example, Bozzoli, B. 1979. "Popular History 
and the Witwatersrand". in B. Bozzoli, (ed.), Labour, 
Townships and Protest, pp. 1-18. Ravan Press, Johannesburg; 
see also Lemon, A. 1991. "The Apartheid City". In A. Lemon, 
(ed.), Homes Apart, pp. 1-25. David Philip, Cape Town; 
Parnell, S.M. and Pirie, G.H., "Johannesburg", A. Lemon, A. 
(ed.), (op.cit.pp. 129-145); Mandy, N. (1984) A City 
Divided: Johannesburg and Soweto, Macmillan, Cape Town; 
Payne, R., (undated). The Social History of Soweto, paper 
presented for IDASA, Urban Research Services, Braamfontein. 
For background information on Soweto, see Morris, P. 1980. 
Soweto: A Review of Existing Conditions and Some Guidelines 
for Change, Urban Foundation, Johannesburg; see also Carr, 
W.J.P. 1991. Soweto: Its creation, life and decline, South 
African Institute of Race Relations, Johannesburg; 
Mashabela, H. 1987. Townships of the PWV, South African 
Institute of Race Relations, Johannesburg.
9 Beavon, K.S.O. 1982. "Black Townships in South 
Africa: Terra Incognita For Urban Geographers", South
African Geographical Journal, Vol. 64. No. 1. pp. 3-20.
10 Lewis, P.R.B. 1966. "A City within a City - the 
creation of Soweto", South African Geographical Journal, 48, 
pp. 45-85; Mashile, G, and Pirie, G,H, 1977. "Aspects of 
Housing Allocation in Soweto", South African Geographical 
Journal, 59, pp. 139-149.
11 Beavon, K.S.O. 1982. (9, op.cit.)
12 See Hendler, P. 1987. "Capital Accumulation and 
Conurbation: Rethinking the Social Geography of the 'Black' 
Townships", South African Geographical Journal, Vol. 69, 
No.l, pp. 60-85
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reproduction of labour power,13 and rent struggles and the 
distribution of resources.14
None of these studies has examined the formation and 
operation of housing markets in Greater Soweto in terms of 
the diversity of housing, locality, type, the rise of 
different tenure markets and such matters as movement and 
other connections between these markets, pressure points for 
housing where demand exceeds supply, housing for first, 
second and third generations, and housing of last resort. 
Thus, little attention has been paid to the residents who 
occupy different positions in the Greater Soweto housing 
markets.15
A major weakness in the growing body of literature that has
13 See in particular, Pigott, M.J.D. 1985. Townships
For African Workers: A Study of State Intervention in South
Africa, 1945 to 1965, Unpublished doctoral thesis. School of 
Oriental and African Studies, University of London; see also 
Wilkinson, P. 1981. A Place to Live: The Resolution of the 
African Housing Crisis in Johannesburg, 1944 to 1954. 
African Studies Seminar, African Studies Institute, 
University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, July.
14 See Seekings, J. 1988. Why Was Soweto Different? 
Urban Development, Township Politics, and the Political 
Economy of Soweto, 1977-1984, African Studies Seminar Paper, 
African Studies Institute, University of the Witwatersrand; 
see also PLANACT, 1989. Soweto Rent Boycott, A Report by 
PLANACT Commissioned by The Soweto Delegation, Yeoville.
15 These limitations have led to the treatment of
housing as if it were a monolithic whole, comprised of
uniform tracts of state housing. See for example, Mather, C.
and Parnell, S. 1990. "Urban renewal in Soweto". In D.
Drakakis-Smith (ed.), Economic Growth and Urbanization in
Developing Areas, p. 239. Routledge, London; see also 
Hendler, P. 1991. "The Housing Crisis". In M. Swilling, R.
Humphries and K. Shubane (eds), Apartheid City in
Transition, p. 202. Oxford University Press, Cape Town.
24
focused on the black townships has been the lack of any 
systematic documentation of housing markets in Greater 
Soweto.16 I have attempted to draw from what literature 
there is those aspects that are relevant, and analysed the 
useful background information contained in the literature. 
What is new is that housing is a central focus.
1.3 Research questions and hypotheses
The phenomenon which this study seeks to understand is the 
formation and operation of housing markets in Greater 
Soweto, which imply the existence of different kinds of 
rights in housing and land and entrance qualifications or 
eligibility criteria. This situation has come about over a 
long period of time. More than 40 years ago, following 
clearances and evictions of black people from Johannesburg 
areas of Sophiatown, Newclare, Martindale and others, there 
was one type of housing tenure (specifically state/council 
rental) and people's rights were minimal. The central 
research question for this thesis is: how has this change 
come about? Specifically, why are housing markets in Greater 
Soweto as they are today?
The present housing situation, characterised by a diversity 
of markets, also presents other important research questions 
for this study. In what ways are these markets connected to
16 The lack of references with a specific focus on 
housing is disturbing, especially because of the place which 
housing occupies in the South Africa political struggle.
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and differentiated from another? In what ways has the 
housing policy in which private tenure dominates been 
established? What are the driving forces for this change and 
what factors have enabled or facilitated it?
The central hypothesis is that contemporary housing 
situation has come about via a multiplicity of mechanisms: 
social, political and economic, the latter embracing not 
only housing markets but the associated markets in land, 
finance capital, materials and labour, and the complex 
interactions between population, housing and employment.
The research on which this thesis reports is designed to 
discover these mechanisms.
1.4 Research methodology
The major instruments employed in this study were of both 
field and desk research. With regard to the field research, 
two household surveys were conducted, one in Orlando West 
and one in Meadowlands West Zone 9, between January and July 
1994. These two townships were chosen because they had 
similar housing conditions and both are characteristic of 
the Greater Soweto area.
Questionnaires and personal interviews were used for 
collecting information from a total sample of 236 households 
(151 in Orlando West and 85 in Meadowlands West Zone 9). The 
questions contained in the questionnaires were piloted
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between mid-November and early December 1993 in Naledi 
township. The single biggest problem revealed by the pilot 
survey concerned a climate of suspicion and mistrust arising 
from the political situation at the time. For example, some 
of the respondents and potential interviewees thought that I 
had been sent by a local authority. Others suspected that I 
belonged to a political organisation. In this respect the 
question of income proved to be the most intractable, for 
example, some respondents suspected that the only reason I 
asked that question was because of the continuing rent 
boycotts. Others were simply reluctant to answer this 
question. Thus in this case revealing one's income appeared 
to be a personal matter which residents were not prepared to 
talk about.
Other respondents wanted to know if I was capable of solving 
their problems with the local authorities, particularly with 
respect to the poor conditions of their houses, including 
the persistent interruption of their water supply and 
blocked toilets. But since I could not promise them anything 
other than telling them that the purpose of my research was 
purely an academic exercise aimed at providing general 
information, some of these respondents simply could not 
believe that they were being asked questions which would not 
result in the improvement of their conditions.
This was not helpful considering not only the climate of 
fear and mistrust generated by the turbulent history of
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Soweto, but also the relatively recent violent struggles
waged between township residents and local authorities. 
Seeing that this exercise would result in failure, I 
explained my problems to one of the top leaders of the South 
African National Civic Organisation (SANCO), Mr Sandy
Mgidlana who suggested that I contact a local (Naledi)
representative Mr Pat Lepunya. After several attempts to 
reach this man but without any success I eventually enlisted 
the help of an influential member of the local civic branch, 
Mr Glega Mokgele in seeking to find ways through which I 
could allay residents’ fears.
Mr Mokgele suggested that it would be very difficult for me 
to conduct interviews due to the level of mistrust caused by 
various factors such as the so-called 'third force1
activities carried out by 'vigilante groups' composed mainly 
of unknown men with guns carrying out violent murders and 
acts of intimidation in the townships. None the less, he 
subsequently helped inform the civic branches in Naledi of 
my presence and the nature of my research. But this meant 
that I could only conduct a survey in Naledi where Mr 
Mokgele was known locally.
Moreover, from these trials I became convinced that the 
townships were very unstable for any man to go about asking 
questions about whatever issue without risking being shot. 
Townships had recently undergone a traumatic period in which 
children as young as 15 had demonstrated that they were
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capable of killing. As a result of these conditions which 
posed a certain amount of physical danger to myself, 
including the dangers to me posed by taxi wars, I became 
convinced that the hostility towards women was less 
pronounced and decided to adopt different strategies. It was 
therefore for me to see how I could take advantage of the 
gender bias.
As one of the investigative methodologies, I employed a 
recently qualified local teacher, Hlale Hilda Mohlala, whom 
I trained in Naledi at Mr Mokgele's civic branch community 
as my research assistant. Not that I was an experienced 
researcher myself, but the practical training I offered her 
included the importance of flexibility and the avoidance of 
leading questions in favour of discretion in order to give 
residents more confidence. I had decided to employ this 
local teacher following the meeting I had with Professor 
Ronald Mears at the Vista University in Soweto to discuss my 
research problems.
Professor Mears had told me that in his 1993 Demographic 
Study of Greater Soweto he had used his students as 
fieldworkers in areas where they lived, and there were some 
areas into which these students were not prepared to go. In 
my case I had been away from Soweto since 1976 and a lot had 
changed since then. Since Hlale Hilda Mohlala had come to 
live in Naledi since 1992 from Orlando West, I decided that 
we should conduct interviews at her original area to see if
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the situation would be different.
The problems regarding the climate of mistrust still 
remained, particularly because some of the residents of 
Orlando West had been victims of violence (in the past) 
carried out by some unknown people believed to be residents 
of the nearby Dube and Lifateng hostels. Nevertheless, the 
fact that the area chosen for the interviews was centrally 
located and therefore visited by all sorts of different 
people, and characterised also by a major presence of taxi 
operators persuaded me to ask my research assistant to 
conduct trial interviews within that area.
Surprisingly, my assistant did not encounter the problems I 
had experienced in Naledi, although she did face the problem 
that respondents felt invited to talk about several issues 
which tended to deviate from the set questions and prolonged 
the interview schedules. Hence I was persuaded that with 
proper guidance my research assistant would do a good job. 
It was on this basis that I decided that she became 
responsible for conducting all the interviews at Orlando 
West, while I concentrated on the interviews at Meadowlands 
West Zone 9.
The Meadowlands West Zone 9 interviews were very different 
from the experiences I had encountered at Naledi in that 
they involved individual home-owners who had already formed 
into a strong residents' group around specific housing
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problems. These problems concerned the poorly constructed 
houses erected by private developers (some of which were 
already falling apart or had serious cracks and a range of 
other defects). These home-owners had formed into a pressure 
group in order to force the developers and financial 
institutions (the issuers of their mortgage bonds) to 
rectify the defects. I had been introduced to this group by 
Dr Patrick Bond of Planact (a non-governmental organisation 
which was investigating and publishing on housing issues 
regularly).
The research strategies I used at Meadowlands West Zone 9 
involved both the questionnaire-based method of collecting 
information and action research. The action research 
involved attendance at all the workshops held by the 
residents' group at which strategies were designed, 
including the campaigns to improve their housing conditions. 
Also, this research entailed attending networking activities 
between the Meadowlands West Zone 9 residents' group and 
other organisations and agencies involved in campaigns 
designed to improve housing conditions in the townships.
However, it was difficult to obtain unbiased information 
from the respondents. In addition, as it was difficult to 
conduct interviews after hours as a result of the fear of 
violence from whatever source in the Greater Soweto area, 
both Hlale and I conducted most interviews during the day 
and also on weekends. As far as possible I would ensure that
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Hlale returned (made a second visit) to the same house after 
the first visit in cases where the household was not 
available. However, Hlale was to interview the immediate 
neighbour if after those two visits the head of the targeted 
household was still not available, as well as in cases where 
members of a targeted household refused to be interviewed. 
In the Orlando West survey, my research assistant was
refused an interview by only 4 targeted respondents. In
Meadowlands I encountered no refusals. After each visit to 
Orlando West I would meet with my research assistant at home 
in Naledi to discuss the problems we encountered.
I had also been trying hard to follow through the contacts
which I had made with the Dube Civic Association. I tried to
see Mr Issac Mogase (then President of the Soweto Civic 
Association, and from December 1994 elected Chairman of the 
Greater Johannesburg Transitional Metropolitan Office) but I 
had no success in gaining an interview with him. I was
informed by members of staff at Dube Civic Association that
broadly, the civic and community leaders were too busy, 
mostly investigating housing issues and other concerns
regularly at workshops, conferences and housing forums, at 
the metropolitan chamber and at other venues.
During the period of my field research the political 
environment in South Africa was going through a rapid
transition. The first multi-party democratic elections were 
held in April 1994, halfway through my field work: heated
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debates with regard to the restructuring of power and the 
reorganisation of local authorities were taking place at the 
time. Under these conditions it was generally difficult to 
find these people.
A range of other research methods were employed, including 
unstructured interviews with local authority managers and 
interviews with heads of departments (deeds offices and 
surveyor general’s office) at the Central Government 
Building in Pretoria and also at offices located in 
Johannesburg.
The employed council officials in the local authority 
offices were even more elusive. I had to track down some of 
them by physically waiting for them at their offices until 
they showed up. Not only would these council officers fail 
to return my calls, but whenever I managed to find them they 
would undertake to furnish me with the information I needed 
and then fail to supply it. For example, on five occasions 
one of these officials told me to come and collect the 
information (once from his wife, an estate officer, who also 
works with him at the same office, and four times from his 
secretary) but all to no avail.
I concluded that these council officials had previously not 
been exposed to research investigations, and also, that they 
perceived any member of the township community as a 
potential enemy. Nevertheless, after persistent efforts I
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eventually managed to get valuable information from these 
council officials.
My field research also entailed collecting housing and 
mortgage bond figures from the local authorities in Greater 
Soweto and the Deeds Registry Office in Pretoria. This data 
has been collated: the first time that such an analysis has 
been carried out.
The desk research on the other hand examines the literature 
related to the study. Thus a range of documents including 
books, memoranda, housing policy documents and statistical 
reports, surveys, journals, financial mail, and newspaper 
reports were identified and relevant information extracted. 
It is important to emphasise that this research has been 
directed at uncovering the dynamics of the housing situation 
as a whole and to gain insights: generalisations about 
households are made only where it appears safe to do so.
1.5 Overview and thesis structure
A total of nine chapters make up this study. Chapter Two 
summarises the theoretical perspectives employed in this 
thesis. Chapter Three addresses the contemporary 
demographic, socio-economic and settlement characteristics 
of Greater Soweto and the findings of the household survey 
in Orlando West and Meadowlands West Zone 9. The historical 
development of housing markets in Greater Soweto from the
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1820s to the late 1970s is discussed in Chapter Four.
The machinery for providing housing and how it operated is 
the main focus in Chapter Five. In this chapter housing 
supply is analysed in terms of the financing and production 
mechanisms, and the rate of additions to the housing stock 
in Greater Soweto. Chapter Six examines the allocation 
policies of successive administrations and tenure markets 
from 1930 to the early 1980s. Chapter Six also provides a 
background of the shift in housing policy from building by 
the councils to privatising housing in the 1980s and 1990s 
that the local authorities had built in the past.
The privatisation of council-built housing from the late 
1970s to 1994 is examined in detail in Chapter Seven. 
Chapter Eight is a case study of private sector finance for 
house purchase and the role played by the Meadowlands West 
Zone 9 purchasers in safe-guarding their recently acquired 
property rights from mid-1980s to 1994. In this chapter the 
campaign against the role of private developers and 
financial institutions by the Meadowlands West Zone 9 (97 
Residents' Community) is examined in detail. The mortgage 
bond housing market situation in Greater Soweto (presented 
in tabular form in Appendix Al) is also assessed and 
analysed in Chapter Eight.
The significance of the Meadowlands West Zone 9 case study 
(in Chapter Eight) to the objectives and structure of this
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thesis is that it chronicles the importance to the 
residents, of the recently acquired property and housing 
rights, hence their campaign for social justice against poor 
construction standards of private developers and the failure 
of financial institutions (as financiers) to exercise a 
monitoring role over private constructors. The concluding 
chapter, Chapter Nine, returns to the subject of mechanisms 
generated from theoretical arguments presented in Chapter 
Two of this thesis in order to test their relevance and 
applicability to the special case of Greater Soweto. It also 
draws together the salient conclusions from the empirical 
study showing how African people were deprived of 
enforceable and tradeable rights in housing and land, and 
how, in present-day Greater Soweto, they have regained those 
rights, including freedom of movement and choice.
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CHAPTER TWO
THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES
2.1 Introduction
This chapter sets out approaches to housing markets 
developed by academics in advanced capitalist countries and 
applied to those countries, in order to make explicit the 
mechanisms that they imply and generate questions that I 
could ask in looking for these mechanisms in Greater Soweto. 
This is important because never before has the housing 
question in Greater Soweto been analysed in terms of market 
processes, hence this study breaks new ground.
The housing question has been approached from various 
perspectives,1 all of which have generated different ways 
of understanding housing markets. What makes these 
perspectives different, however, is that they posit 
different mechanisms: human ecology, neo-classical
economics, Weberian sociology and historical materialism 
(table 2.1). It is to these that this chapter now turns.
2.2 Housing markets and housing tenures
Precise definitions of housing markets are problematic 
because of the particular characteristics of housing.
1 See for example, Malpass, P. and Murie, A. 1990. 
Housing Policy and Practice, Third Edition, Macmillan, 
London.
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The conventional western view is that housing markets are 
differentiated from those in other economic goods by the 
conditions of exchange and the unusual characteristics of 
housing which include 'its high cost of supply, its
durability, its heterogeneity and its immobility1.2
Housing is seen as a durable and fixed good lasting a long 
time in relation to, for example, the family cycle (20-30 
years) and an individual's working life (40-50 years) and 
providing stability of occupation and a range of other
consumption services. The 'durability1 of housing also 
implies that houses are built in accordance to certain 
building and safety standards in order to avoid shoddy
building practices and other short-run construction
decisions whose effects would impact on the health of
residents.3 Housing is also seen as a necessary and 
commodity good.
The stock of housing built over a long time is said to be
many times larger than any housing units built in any given 
year. Therefore, housing markets have a tendency to be
characterised by the dominance of the existing housing 
stock. The stability of occupation of dwellings by 
individual households is seen to be evident particularly
2 Bourne, L.S. and Hitchcock, J.R. (eds), 1978. Urban 
Housing Markets, University of Toronto Press, Toronto.
3 See Goldberg, M.A. 1983. The Housing Problem: A 
Premier on Housing Markets, Policies and Problems, 
University of British Columbia Press, Vancouver.
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where only a small proportion of the existing stock is 
exchanged (bought and sold) in the market in the short term. 
Housing is also said to be characterised by a 
'disequilibrium' (an imbalance) between housing supply and 
demand in a given area.4
The conventional western view also views housing as being 
'fixed' in location. According to this view, houses, unlike 
other goods, cannot be moved or transported, even if there 
is excess demand in one area and excess supply in another. 
Moreover, in buying a house one also buys access to jobs, 
schools, health facilities, and other services. The 
fixedness of housing implies that housing markets are 
localised5 and therefore segmented according to size and 
physical configuration. It is primarily in reference to size 
and physical arrangements that housing is seen to be 
'heterogeneous'. According to the conventional western 
approach, the 'heterogeneity' of housing also denotes 
qualitative and quantitative differences of the stock of 
housing.
Housing is also seen to be 'expensive16 in relation to a 
household's income. This in turn implies the existence of
4 Ibid.
5 Bourne, L.S. and Hitchcock, J.R. 1978 (2, op.cit.); 
Le Grand, J., Propper, C. and Robinson, R. 1993. The 
Economics of Social Problems, Third Edition, Macmillan, 
London.
6 Ibid.
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different supply or seller markets (financial, developers 
etc.) and demand or buyer markets. According to Randolph,
"Housing markets posses distinctive structures that 
reflect the autonomous processes underlying the nature 
of housing production and supply, for example, tenure 
structure, dwelling type...These processes largely 
determine the form in which housing is supplied and have 
their own impact on housing market structure, quite 
distinct from those processes operating in the labour 
market. Any theorization of housing market structure, 
therefore, needs to accommodate the distinctive roles of 
both housing consumption and production processes."'7
Housing markets are also seen as consisting of different 
independent local submarkets in terms of the diversity and 
character of the existing stock, the determinants of supply 
and demand, and the nature of housing problems found in each 
urban area. Thus housing markets are seen to be different in 
terms of the demographic settlement characteristics of the 
population and growth, household size and income, type, 
size, age, structure, price, quality, location and rate of 
change in the stock. According to Quigley, housing markets 
comprise a:
"collection of closely related, but segmented, markets 
for particular packages of underlying commodities, 
differentiated in size, physical arrangement etc., and 
location. These submarkets are connected in a complex 
way."3
It is important to recognise that housing markets are much
v Randolph, B. 1991. Housing markets, labour markets
and discontinuity theory, p. 30. In J. Allen and C. Hamnett,
(eds), Housing and Labour Markets: Building the Connections,
Unwin Hyman, London.
8 Quigley, J.M. 1978. Housing Markets and Housing 
Demand: Analytical Approaches, p. 25. In L.S. Bourne and
J.R. Hitchcock (2, op.cit.)
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more than structures of housing production and supply, and a 
set of price signals. Whilst they involve the key decisions 
of policy makers (central, regional and local governments) 
financial institutions (banks and building societies), 
developers, builders, exchange agents, buyers and sellers, 
landlords, and others, they are inherently characterised by 
a system of rights of use, control and disposal.
Central to the analytical departure which this study makes 
is that the question of tenure and rights is not clearly 
established in conventional western approaches but implied. 
This distinction is important in two specific ways: a) in
order to avoid strictly economic definitions where 
transactions in the housing market are viewed in terms of 
the 'efficiency' considerations, for example, those who 
benefit and those who lose from the workings of the market; 
and b) to clarify the conceptualisation of housing markets 
used in this thesis. Thus, according to Ball and Kirwan,
"...the housing process within an urban area can be 
described simply as the means by which the flow of 
housing services from the stock of dwellings in the area 
is allocated between the households living in that area, 
and the responses, and consequential adjustments, 
occurring in both the stock of dwellings and the 
population as a result of these allocation procedures 
and of changes in other parts of the urban system. These 
mechanisms ... operate within a well-defined set of 
procedures, property rights and institutional rules ... 
the most difficult features of the market to abstract 
from ... are existing tenure relationships and the 
property rights conferred on households living in 
dwellings in different tenures."9
9 Ball, M. and Kirwan, R. 1975. The Economics of an 
Urban Housing Market, Bristol Area Study, pp. 12-13, Centre 
for Environmental Studies, Chandos Place, London.
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The conceptual focus of housing markets used in this thesis 
is on tenure and transactions taking place in terms of 
enforceable, tradeable, saleable and rentable rights. Thus 
the different tenures are defined by different sets of legal 
rights which are simultaneously enabled and constrained by a 
system of rules. According to Maclennan,
"The concept of tenure essentially relates to the legal 
arrangements existing between properties and their 
owners and inhabitants. Thus tenure differences are 
essentially variations in property rights and 
obligations of property owners and inhabitants. That is, 
tenure may influence the ways in which households 
acquire, use, alter and then ultimately dispose of 
housing ...li:LO
It is important to recognise that housing markets comprise 
the buying and selling of ownership rights and rental rights 
to occupy a dwelling, the duration of those rights and the 
right to transfer those rights. As Saunders put it,
"Minimally these may be identified as the right to 
exclusive use and benefit for as long as title is held, 
the right to control and the right to dispose ... rights 
are never absolute. The same law which grants rights to 
property holders also limits them. The same case or 
statute which establishes the right to keep people out 
of one's home also establishes the right to various 
police officers, meter readers and sundry inspectors to 
enter it. Recognition of the right to sell the house as 
one chooses is at the same time prohibition of the right 
not to sell it to someone on the grounds of their 
race. "x:L
The importance of rights is that they are set down in the 
law of the land ('de jure'), and are enforceable through the
xo Maclennan, D. 1982. Quoted from Saunders, P. 1990. A 
Nation of Home Owners, p. 98, Unwin Hyman, London.
11 Saunders, P. 1990 (10, op.cit. p. 99)
42
courts if there is access to them, or may be enforceable in 
practice ('de facto')/ for example, where the law 
enforcement agents (such as the police, bailiffs and others) 
do not act to evict squatters. A statement of 'rights' 
commonly specifies (a) what an individual may enjoy and have 
use of, (b) how long an individual may continue enjoying/ 
using into the future (duration), (c) under what conditions 
an individual may transfer his/her rights to enjoy. It is 
differences in rights that distinguish the different
tenures.
It is important to recognise that the commodity in housing 
markets is 'rights'. It is rights (as described above) that 
are bought and sold. It follows that tenure sectors
comprised of particular transactions taking place (housing 
rights being bought and sold or rented in the market place) 
correspond to distinct markets because the commodity is 
(rights are) different. The tenure divisions define sectors 
and within those sectors there are common occupational 
rights. Thus each of these tenure sectors confers different 
rights and rules of entry, implies different costs and 
allocation mechanisms to a household seeking accommodation. 
These tenure differences also define submarkets which are 
characterised by distinct sectors of demand and supply. 
Questions generated by the importance of rights for Greater 
Soweto are: what rights exist in Greater Soweto? How can
they be distinguished? Are they acknowledged/traded with or 
without a formal legal basis?
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2.3 Ecological approach
The human ecology approach was developed by a group of 
sociologists based at the Chicago school early this century. 
According to Dunleavy, the human ecology model entailed a 
study of the city as an independent unit or object with 
'human qualities' where the 'struggle for survival' in the 
cities favoured the 'fittest' (rich) over the 'weak' 
(poor).12
Competition, domination and invasion-succession processes 
postulated an ecological order.13 Within this ecological 
tradition, E.W.Burgess developed the 'zonal or concentric' 
model of urban growth. According to this model the 'core' of 
cities comprised a central business district (CBD) with the 
market responsible for causing change in the area of 
transition through a number of invasion-succession 
processes. The expansion of the CBD due to the growth of 
businesses and other industries necessitated the invasion of 
the zone of transition which was characterised by old 
dilapidated houses. In turn the zone of transition found 
itself surrounded by that of working-class families who had 
been pushed from dilapidated and subdivided homes in the
12 Dunleavy, P. 1982. Perspectives on Urban Studies. In 
A. Blowers, et al, Urban Change and Conflict: An 
Interdisciplinary Reader, The Open University Press, London.
13 Ibid.
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zone of transition.14
However, these working-class families could not be pushed 
furthest away from the zone of transition and employment in 
the CBD. Beyond the zone of working-class families lay the 
residential zone characterised by spacious apartments and 
single-family housing for the upper-classes. These dwellings 
in turn were encircled by the commuters zone for the elite 
suburbs.15 Consequently, the expansion of the CBD squeezed 
more housing units in the zone of transition, setting in 
motion a chain reaction of various processes of competition 
for residential space and invasion of other residential 
spaces, culminating in the eventual displacement of existing 
by new households.
Burgess's concentric theory based on the human ecological 
model also suggests that people move out of working-class 
areas as they acquire the resources that enable them to 
compete in middle-class and elite markets. The ecological 
approach suggests competition, domination and invasion- 
succession mechanisms. The questions generated by these 
mechanisms for Greater Soweto are: where do immigrants to 
the city settle? Is there a ladder of opportunities up which 
people move? If so how did it come about?
14 Ibid., see also, Johnson, J.H. 1972. Urban 
Geography, Pergamon Press, London.
15 Ibid.
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Table 2.1 Four approaches to housing and residential 
structure
Approach Wider social 
theory
Areas of 
inquiry
Exemplar
writers
ecological human ecology spatial 
patterns of 
residential 
structure
Burgess
(1925)
neo-classical neo-classical
economics
utility
maximisation,
consumer
choice
Alonso
(1964)
institutional Weberian
sociology
managerialism gatekeepers,
housing
constraints,
housing
classes
Pahl
(1975)
Rex and
Moore
(1967)
locational
conflict
power
groupings,
conflict
Form
(1954)
Marxist historical
materialism
housing as a 
commodity, 
reproduction 
of labour 
power,
urban social 
movements
Harvey
(1973),
Castells
(1977)
Castells
(1976)
Source: Bassett, K. and Short, J.R. 1980. Housing and
residential structure: Alternative approaches, Routledge &
Kegan Paul, London, p. 2.
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2.4. Neo-classical economics approaches
A long established tradition of neo-classical economics has 
been to view societal and economic organisation in terms of 
individual preferences. Neo-classical economics treats 
households as economic units. According to this perspective, 
the 'utility maximization1 on the part of individual 
households' preferences is characterised by their demand for 
goods and services.16 It is within this context that this 
approach has been viewed as both a 'description of the 
private market system' as well as providing 'justifications 
for it'.lv
Thus, under perfect competitive market conditions, 
individual households are said to 'trade-off' accessibility 
to the 'centre' against living space. Depending on the 
particular trade-off mechanisms and their personal 
circumstances, better-off households locate away from the 
central business district. Conversely, high-income earners 
are also likely to remain in high density areas paying more 
for their housing, if they value time and leisure more than 
space. Low-income households, on the other hand, locate 
close to the central business district because of their low 
income-elasticity of space demands. Thus, they pay more for 
housing in higher density areas, but less in transportation
16 Bassett, K. and Short, J.R. 1980. Housing and 
residential structure: Alternative approaches, Routledge & 
Kegan Paul, London.
17 Ibid.,
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costs to their work.xs The trade-off model also presumes 
that both the high-income and low-income households are 
distributed in relation to a single urban labour market 
which is in the central business district.
The 'new urban economics approach1 provides further 
extensions to the 'standard model' (trade-off model) of 
residential location. In addition to space demands, this 
model suggests the importance of 'environmental quality, 
housing quality and social prestige' to the household 
decision-making process. Thus these premiums are also seen 
to be declining from the centre. In this case residential 
differentiation reflects an amalgam of 'neighbourhood 
premiums' .X9
The 'individual choice model' which is inherent in the old 
and new urban economics models, implies housing allocation 
by household decision. In a way, it represents a further 
elaboration on the standard model (discussed above) in so 
far as the distinction between the location patterns of 
high-income and low-income households is concerned. Its 
departure from the standard model, however, is its emphasis 
on perceptions of individual households in relation to the 
structure of the housing system. Thus this model suggests 
that 'residential mobility' of individual households within 
the housing market is a consequence of households'
13 Ibid.; see also Quigley, J.M. 1978 (8, op.cit.)
19 Bassett, K. and Short, J.R. 1980. (16, op.cit.)
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'perceptions' in relation to the structure of the housing 
system.20
Within the neo-classical tradition there is also the 
filtering model which suggests that an adequate supply of 
new high quality housing for higher-income brackets makes 
the need for building lower-income housing unnecessary. This 
is because as the high-income groups move up the housing 
ladder to occupy new 'quality' housing, the vacated units 
filter downwards to the next income bracket, and the houses 
at that level in turn filter further to accommodate 
eventually the lowest stratum of households.21
According to Goldberg, other factors such as effective 
demand, finance, land costs, building materials, investment 
risks and government regulations determine profitability in 
housing for developers and investors. If the combination of 
all these factors is perceived to yield a worthwhile profit, 
developers will provide more houses. The supply of housing 
will also be stimulated when there are equilibrium 
conditions between rising costs and falling prices. But 
rising interest rates, rent controls and falling rents will 
make housing less profitable for developers and reduce 
additions to the stock, but not have the same effect as
20 Ibid.
21 Weicher, J.C. and Thibodeau, T.G. 1988. "Filtering 
and Housing Markets: An Empirical Analysis", Journal of
Urban Economics, 23, 21-40.
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demolitions.22
There are a number of mechanisms suggested by the neo­
classical approaches: a) individual choice within limits of 
what is available; b) competition against others who are 
better-off, in similar position and worse-off; c) profit- 
motivated behaviour of landowners, developers and financial 
institutions; d) competition drives up prices; and e) 
filtering. These mechanisms in turn generate the following 
questions for Greater Soweto: how much making choice is
there? What kinds of trade-off mechanisms are there? What is 
valued? How do supply and demand influence each other? How 
much segregation is there? At what point in the family life 
cycle do people move? Do they move when about to start a 
family or when they have one child and another on the way? 
Do they move at all? Is filtering visible?
2.5 Institutional approaches
The state is said to intervene in the housing market in two 
important respects. Firstly, through legislation governing 
'real property' transactions and the behaviour of various 
agents in the housing market from the national level down to 
the regional and local levels. These rules comprise of the 
following regulatory framework: fiscal and monetary
policies, zoning, subsidies, mortgage policies, employment, 
building standards (safety inspection, fire protection
22 Goldberg, M.A. 1983 (3, op.cit.)
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etc.)/ deeds registry laws, real property and land laws, 
leasehold rights, ownership rights and others. Also, the 
regulatory framework is said to be concerned with the role 
of agents who are responsible for effecting transactions 
between buyers and sellers in the housing markets such as, 
property estate agents, lawyers, conveyancers, local 
authority managers, landlords and the institutions involved 
in housing production and supply.23
Secondly, the state is said to intervene in the housing 
market through the direct provision of housing. This form of 
intervention in the housing market, for example, became 
prominent after the second world war in most advanced 
capitalist countries. The governments of these countries 
identified a need for greater state involvement in the 
provision of housing in order to meet the needs of those 
least able to afford housing at market driven rates.24
This approach represents a fundamental departure from the 
ecological and neo-classical frameworks of housing market 
analysis. It recognised that a household's location was 
decided administratively, not by its own choice (albeit 
fettered). According to this approach, the housing market 
was influenced by the state, notably housing departments and 
policy makers. The housing market was also constantly being
23 Ibid., p. 47).
24 Ball, M. 1988. Housing Provision and Comparative 
Housing Research. In M. Ball, et al, Housing and Social 
Change in Europe and the USA, Routledge, London.
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shaped by private sector 'agents' (builders, developers, 
investors, financial intermediaries, landlords, estate
agents) all of whom had different aims and objectives and 
were able to exercise discretion in their administrative 
decision-making.
Therefore any study of housing market structure had to start 
with the key decision-making processes of producers and 
suppliers of housing rather with housing consumers. In 
particular, it had to recognise the distinction between 
decisions to do with supplying housing in terms of
development and redevelopment and those to do with
allocating people over the housing stock (for example,
letting decisions).
The 'housing classes' approach of Rex and Moore draws from 
both the ecological framework documented above and Weberian 
sociology. Max Weber was concerned to show that 'social 
classes' were not only a manifestation of the position of 
individuals in the labour market, but included the common 
positions and interests shared by groups under any market 
conditions. Society, according to Weber, was stratified in 
terms of inequalities resulting from the distribution of 
opportunities at the levels of the socio-economic and 
political power structures.25
25 Bassett, K. and Short, J.R. 1980. (16, op.cit.); see 
also Dunleavy, P. 1982. (12, op.cit.)
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The access differentials to 'life chances' were seized upon 
and qualified by Rex and Moore to include the position of 
individuals and groups in the urban residential structure 
and housing markets. For Rex and Moore, desirable housing in 
the suburbs is scarce, therefore, urban residents are 
differentially situated in 'competition and conflict for 
it'. This competition and conflict for housing is partly a 
reflection of the 'class struggle in industry', but with 
considerable differences particularly with regard to 'access 
to housing'.
Individuals or groups may share the same position in the job 
market and yet have varying degrees of access to housing, 
depending on allocation factors such as race, access to 
finance, length of residence and others. Rex and Moore 
identified 'housing classes' in Britain along the main lines 
of tenure divisions in the following hierarchy of status:
(1) the outright owner of a whole house;
(2) the owner of a mortgaged whole house;
(3) the council tenant -
a) in a house with a long life;
b) the council tenant in a house awaiting demolition;
(4) the tenant of a whole house owned by a private landlord.
(5) the owner of a house bought with short-term loans who 
were compelled to let rooms in order to meet his/her 
repayment obligations.
(6) the tenant of rooms in a lodging house.26
The criterion of income suggests that better-off people have 
easy access to desirable housing while those without income 
are subjected to varying conditions of access. Accordingly,
26 Rex, J. and Moore, R. 1967. Race, Community and
Conflict, p. 274. Oxford University Press, London.
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the outright winners in this competitive struggle for 
housing are the elite who need not satisfy any qualification 
requirements because of their wealth or capital. The rest 
are subjected to varying degrees of entry requirements by 
mortgage lenders, local authority bureaucrats, landlords and 
others.
Rex and Moore's 'housing classes' are further differentiated 
from those of class relations in the workplace by an element 
of bureaucratic control. In their study of Birmingham, they 
showed how the 'five year residence rule' graded applicants 
into various degrees of suitability for different qualities 
of council housing.2"7 Thus they drew attention to people's 
different positions with respect to 'bureaucratic' rules. 
This approach laid the basis for further theoretical 
exposition with regard to housing allocation policies in 
both the public and private sectors.
Pahl developed the thesis of 'housing classes' to include 
the role of managers.28 He saw urban inequalities as 
resulting from the world of employment. He also saw the 
distribution of opportunities for individuals and
accessibility to urban resources to be dependent primarily 
on the market and bureaucratic factors.29 Thus the state
27 Saunders, P. 1981. Social Theory and the Urban
Question, Hutchinson, London.
28 Pahl, P.E. 1973. Patterns of Urban Life, Longman,
London.
29 Ibid.
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through the distribution of 'public resources' contributed 
to the distribution of opportunities for individuals. 
According to Pahl, access to vital urban resources was 
controlled by different managers or 'gatekeepers'. In this 
context, urban managers by virtue of their position in 
relation to the distribution and allocation of urban 
resources were the 'controllers' of the urban system.
Moreover, according to Dunleavy, Pahl argued that an 
understanding of the distribution of urban resources 
required a study that focused on urban managers as an 
'independent variable'.30 Pahl later refined his framework 
of managerialism which, he said, played an important role in 
the provision of goods and services at the levels of the 
state, local authority and industry.31
The mechanisms suggested by the institutional approaches are 
decision-making, class struggle within the housing system, 
access and allocation, and gate-keeping. These mechanisms 
have generated the following questions for Greater Soweto. 
What has the state done? Who are the 'agents1? What 
positions do they occupy? What 'rules' do they operate? How 
is access and allocation of housing determined? To what 
extent is continuing to stay in one's house dependent on the 
decisions of urban managers? Can 'housing classes' be
30 Lambert, J., et al, 1978. Housing Policy and the 
State, Macmillan, London.
31 Ibid.
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distinguished? In what ways do housing opportunities of the 
residents reflect the inequalities in employment?
2.6 Marxist approaches
This framework draws attention to the structure of the 
system within which bureaucrats, gatekeepers and others 
operate and in particular to the interacting social, 
economic, physical and political/government structures. This 
approach represents a significant departure from all the 
theoretical work reviewed above. The marxist approaches have 
been concerned with the general conditions of the capitalist 
system of economic organisation.
The production and pattern of housing consumption are said 
to be closely linked to the requirements of finance capital. 
Thus housing is seen both as a commodity and source of 
profits for developers and financial institutions.32 
Unlike other commodities which are normally produced in the 
factories, some housing is assembled on site from factory- 
produced components. Because of these peculiar features of 
housing, its production is sometimes subjected to stoppages, 
as a result of potential interruptions in the flow of 
finance and building materials, labour problems and others.
32 Larmache, F. 1976. Property development and economic 
foundations of the urban question. In C.G. Pickvance, (ed), 
Urban Sociology: Critical Essays, Tavistock Publications,
London.
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According to the marxist approaches, the high cost of supply 
compels the majority of households to borrow money from 
financial institutions to purchase and pay for housing over 
an extended period of time. This process rewards developers 
with immediate profits which are then ploughed back to the 
production of more houses, and by extension, profits. In 
turn, financial institutions realise their profits by 
charging interest on loan-financed housing.
According to Harvey,33 the relation between housing and 
capitalist production is integrated and corresponds to the 
'power relation1 between the capitalist sector and the work 
force, and can only be understood in terms of its historical 
context. This power relation, argues Harvey,34 may be 
viewed primarily as a 'force of class structuration' in 
capitalist societies particularly because of its importance 
in shaping 'class' or 'social configurations' as a result of 
the dynamics of the capitalist mode of production.
The integration of social relations (authority relations, 
property relations, tenure divisions, family relations, 
including attitudes) with the wider consumption patterns, 
according to Harvey, is vital for the stability and 
functioning of the capitalist system. In this respect the 
appropriation of surplus value by different capitalist
33 Harvey, D. 1989. The Urban Experience, Basil
B1ackwe11, London.
34 Ibid.
sectors through the provision of different types of housing 
reinforces attitudes that are designed to reproduce certain 
patterns of housing consumption and social relations. In 
turn this leads to segmentation in housing markets and 
residential differentiation based on class cleavages. In 
this respect the fragmentation of society into different 
residential communities and the fragmentation of the 
workforce become entrenched and perpetuate capitalism.35 
At the level of the family, adequate housing is vital for 
the socialisation of the future workforce.
These social relations are seen to be affecting changes in 
the structure and operation of housing markets, which are 
increasingly controlled by 'financial and government 
institutions'. These public and private market institutions, 
according to Harvey, form a hierarchy characterised by 
authority relations whose function is to coordinate 'housing 
market behaviour' from the national level downwards to the 
regional and local levels, and thus influence the 
reproduction of certain 'consumption classes' or 'groupings' 
and perpetuate residential differentiation. Under these 
conditions individuals are left with no choice but to 
conform and adapt to the imperatives of advanced 
capitalism.36
According to the marxist approaches, the state intervenes
35 Ibid.
36 Ibid., pp. 118-124.
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(ideologically, economically, legally and politically) to 
resolve a moment of crisis in the process of capitalist 
expansion and accumulation by maintaining social cohesion of 
capitalist formations, but also as a consequence of the 
pressure exerted by 'urban social movements', while at the 
same time directly enforcing the domination of the workforce 
by the capitalists. But this intervention does not lessen 
the class conflicts which are rooted in the contradictions 
of capitalism, rather it actually exacerbates them.37
Urban social movements38 are said by Castells to be an 
important part of the housing system. These urban movements 
have become increasingly organised and have politicised and 
engaged in direct action on such issues as deteriorated 
neighbourhoods, rents and rising housing costs. In seeking 
to influence the housing system they have extended urban 
conflict from the sphere of production to the sphere of 
consumption and thus revealed the integrated nature of the 
relationship in urban problems between the state and 
capital.
The Marxist approaches suggest the following mechanisms: 
profit-driven behaviour of developers and financial 
institutions, class conflicts, and mobilisation, campaigning 
and negotiating of urban social movements. These mechanisms
37 Ibid.
38 Castells, M. 1977. The Urban Question, Edward 
Arno1d, London.
have generated the following questions for Greater Soweto. 
What is the relationship between housing and labour markets? 
Are spheres of production and consumption linked? What forms 
of capital are there? How has the state intervened? On whose 
side? What urban conflict is there? What profit-driven 
behaviour is there? What urban movements are there? What 
were the levers by which pressure was exerted?
2.7 Summary
In this chapter, I have reviewed the major approaches to 
housing markets which have been developed by academics in 
the advanced capitalist countries. In addition, the 
mechanisms implied by these approaches have also been noted 
throughout this chapter. These mechanisms have generated 
questions which will be applied to see whether they are 
sufficient in bringing out the salient features of housing 
markets in Greater Soweto and their historical development; 
secondly, by seeing whether actual patterns of residential 
location and movement in Greater Soweto fit (conform to) 
them.
It is also important to stress that this study builds where 
appropriate on the substantial factual information presented 
in tabular form in chapters below. This study uses theories 
as guides for collecting information and for analysing it. 
At the one level this is an empirical study of housing 
markets in Greater Soweto. At another carrying out the study
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has involved making an empirical examination of theoretical 
perspectives for what they yield in terms mechanisms at 
work.
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CHAPTER THREE
PEOPLE AND HOUSING IN GREATER SOWETO TODAY
3.1 Introduction
This chapter provides a description of the Greater Soweto 
population and housing situation in 1994. It concerns itself 
with the distribution of the population spatially and across 
the present stock of dwellings. It describes the area under 
study and thus provides a basis for the analysis set out in 
later chapters. Greater Soweto covers an area of just over
8,000 hectares1 and comprises Soweto, Diepmeadow and 
Dobsonville (see figure 3.1).
3.2 Population in Greater Soweto
The present size of the population in Greater Soweto is not 
known accurately. The readily available population figures 
on Greater Soweto comprise a variety of estimates (table 
3.1), which vary widely. For example, in 1989 alone, seven 
different estimates were recorded, ranging from a lower 
figure of 888,443 to a higher figure of 3,500,000 people 
(table 3.1). Similarly, also presented in table 3.1 are five 
different estimates for 1990: the lowest of these is
1 See Mashabela, H. 1988. Townships of the PWV,, South 
African Institute of Race Relations, Johannesburg. See also, 
Mandy, N. 1991. Local government finance and institutional 
reform. In M. Swilling, R. Humphries and K. Shubane (eds), 
Apartheid City in Transition, Oxford University Press, Cape 
Town.
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Figure 3.1: Map of Soweto
Source: South Africa, Lonely Planet travel survival kit,
Lonely Planet publication, 1996.
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1,033,000 and the highest is 2,169,000. In addition, two
different estimates for 1991 (891,000 and 1,300,000) are 
shown in table 3.1, with a single estimate of 969,236 for 
1992 and a further two estimates of 811,974 and 888,210 for 
1993.
It appears from these estimates (table 3.1) that not only is 
the size of the Greater Soweto population not accurately 
known, but that current estimates are inadequate, unreliable 
and confused. In the light of the uncertain and unreliable 
population figures shown in table 3.1 and for the purpose of 
this thesis, I have used the 1994 local authority occupation 
rates for the Diepmeadow area (as there were no local 
authority figures for the whole area) to estimate the
population of Greater Soweto. According to the Diepmeadow 
statistics for 1994 a total number of 291,857 residents were 
accommodated in the 29,309 formal houses (table 3.2). Of 
these 79,958 were accommodated in 8,711 formal houses in 
Meadowlands East, 68,150 were housed in 7,977 formal
dwellings at Meadowlands West and a further 143,749 occupied 
12,621 formal units in Diepkloof. Furthermore, 139,166 
Diepmeadow residents were housed in the backyard and
informal shacks (44,795 at Meadowlands East, 12,916 at 
Meadowlands West and 73,140 in the Diepkloof area).
Thus the mean occupation rate in the formal housing sector 
in the Diepmeadow area was 9.9 (table 3.2) and 4.0 persons 
per shack (table 3.3) in the backyard and informal shacks
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sector. On the basis of both these averages I was able to 
estimate the total population of residents who are housed in 
the formal and backyard/informal housing sectors for 
Dobsonville and Soweto municipalities, based on the actual 
number of units in each sector.
According to the data presented in table 3.2, there are 
6,148 formal housing units and an estimated population of 
60,865 in Dobsonville, while Soweto has 85,466 formal 
dwellings and an estimated population of 846,113. Based on 
these figures the total estimated population of those who 
are accommodated in the 120,923 formal units in Greater 
Soweto is 1,198,835 (table 3.2). However, an additional 
estimated population of 306,938 (139,166 in Diepmeadow,
11,412 in Dobsonville and 156,360 in Soweto) is housed in 
the backyard and informal shack sectors (see table 3.3). 
Moreover, there are approximately 37,697 people who are 
accommodated in the hostels (table 3.4). Based on all the 
figures presented above (see tables 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4) the
combined estimate of the entire population of Greater Soweto 
in 1994 used in this thesis (see table 3.1) was 1,543,470 
(440,929 in Diepmeadow, 76,760 in Dobsonville and 1,125,781 
in Soweto).
On the basis of the 1,543,470 estimate used in this thesis, 
the townships of Greater Soweto (covering an area of 8,000 
hectares as stated above) have a mean population density of 
193 persons per hectare. In comparison, the white municipal
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areas of the Central Witwatersrand: Johannesburg, Randburg, 
Roodepoort and Sandton have a mean population of 16 persons 
per hectare. These areas measure over 86,654 hectares and 
accommodate an estimated population of 1,350,000.2
As explained above, there are no known-to-be accurate 
figures on the population of Greater Soweto. Mashabela 
(table 3.1), for example, reckoned the population of Greater 
Soweto to be 1,542,000 (261,000 for Diepmeadow, 86,000 for 
Dobsonville and 1,195,000 for Soweto) in 1988. The Soweto 
Rent Boycott report commissioned by the Soweto Delegation in 
1989 noted Mandy's figure of 1,740,000, which it considered 
'to be the most reliable1, but without actually showing how 
reliability was ascertained or gauged (table 3.1).
Mandy (table 3.1), in his 1989 report for the Centre For 
Policy Studies, used a number of estimates which ranged from 
a low figure of 728,000 for 1985 to a high figure of 3 
million for 1988. Mather and Parnell (table 3.1) noted a 
figure of approximately 2 million for 1990, whilst the 1994 
Soweto City Council's estimates for Soweto (excluding 
Diepmeadow and Dobsonville) was 3,5 million (see table 3.1). 
In 1993, Professor Mears of Vista University estimated the 
population of Greater Soweto to be 811,974 (table 3.1). 
Therefore, although unquestionable accuracy cannot be 
claimed for the population figures used in this thesis, they 
are consistent with what is known of the population and of
2 Mandy, N. 1991. (1, op.cit.)
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Table 3.1: Population estimates for Greater Soweto
Mashabela, H. 1988* 1 542 000
Centre For Policy Studies 1989+ 3 000 000
The Soweto Rent Boycott 1989# 1 740 000
UNISA BMR 1989 1 022 768
Market Research Africa 1989 888 443
Black Towns of the PWV 1989: low 1 500 000
Black Towns of the PWV 1989: high 3 500 000
JOMET 1989 966 443
Development Bank 1990 1 253 026
JOMET 1990 1 033 406
Black Demographic Handbook 1990 2 169 000
Urban Foundation 1990 1 140 000
Mather and Parnell 1990** 2 000 000
1991 Census Figures*** 891 000
SA Township Annual 1991 1 300 000
Soweto Housing Department 1992 969 236
1993 Census Figures 888 210
Professor Mears' Estimates, 1993++ 811 974
Soweto Housing Department 1994## 3 500 000
My Own Estimates for 1994@ 1 543 470
Source: Mabin, A. and Hunter, R. 1993. Report of the Review 
of Conditions and Trends Affecting Development in the PWV, 
Unpublished Report Prepared for the PWV Forum, University of 
the Witwatersrand; *(Mashabela, H. 1988. Townships of the 
PWV, South African Institute of Race Relations, 
Johannesburg); +(Mandy, N. 1989. Research Report: 
Johannesburg and Soweto, Centre for Policy Studies, Graduate 
School of Business, University of the Witwatersrand, 
Johannesburg); #(PLANACT 1989. The Soweto Rent Boycott, A 
report by Planact Commissioned by the Soweto Delegation, 
Johannesburg); **(Mather, C. and Parnell, S. 1990. Upgrading 
the 'matchboxes': urban renewal in Soweto, 1976-86. In D.
Drakakis-Smith, (ed), Economic Growth and Urbanization in 
Developing Areas, Routledge, London); ***(Central 
Statistical Service, 1991. Demographic Statistics, 
Pretoria); (Soweto Housing Department, Soweto City Council 
figures for Soweto, excluding Diepmeadow and Dobsonville); 
++(Mears, R. 1993. Demographic Characteristics of the 
Population in Greater Soweto, Unpublished paper, Economics 
Department, Vista University, Soweto). ##(Soweto Housing 
Department, Soweto City Council estimates for the Soweto 
area (i.e. excluding Diepmeadow and Dobsonville); @(These 
estimates are based on calculations derived from the 
extrapolation of Diepmeadow figures (as already discussed) 
and the average occupation rates both in the formal and 
informal sectors, which I then used to calculate estimates 
for the whole of Greater Soweto - see also tables 3.2, 3.3 
and 3.4).
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Table 3.2: Estimates of people accommodated in the formal
sector in Greater Soweto
Area Total number 
of formal 
houses
No %
Population
No %
Average
occupancy
rate
Diepmeadow+ 29 309 24.2 291 857 24.2 9.9
Dobsonville* 6 148 5.1 60 865 5.1 9.9
Soweto** 85 466 70.6 846 113 70.6 9.9
Total 120 923 100 1 198 835 100 9.9
Source: +Diepmeadow (Meadowlands East, Meadowlands West and 
Diepkloof) Statistics, 1994; *Dobsonville housing figures 
have been adapted from Davies, Bristow & Associates, 1990. 
Black Towns of the PWV, Property Consultants, Durban; 
**Soweto Statistics, 1994.
Table 3.3: Estimates of people accommodated in Greater
Soweto's backyards and informal shacks
Area Backyard
informal
No
and
shacks
%
Population
No %
Average
occupancy
rate
Diepmeadow+
Dobsonville*
Soweto**
34 194 
2 853 
39 090
44.9
3.7
51.3
139 166 
11 412 
156 360
44.9
3.7
51.3
4.0
4.0
4.0
Total 76 137 100 306 938 100 4.0
Source: +Diepmeadow Statistics, 1994; *Adapted from Davies, 
Bristow & Associates, 1990. Black Towns of the PWV, Property 
Consultants, Durban; **Soweto Statistics, 1994.
Table 3.4: Estimates of people accommodated in Greater
Soweto1s hostels
Area Number of 
beds
No
hostel
%
Population
No %
Diepmeadow 9 906 26.2 9 906 26.2
Dobsonville 4 483 11.8 4 483 11.8
Soweto 23 308 61.8 23 308 61.8
Total 37 697 100 37 697 100
Source: +Diepmeadow Statistics, 1994; *Adapted from Davies,
Bristow & Associates, 1990. Black towns of the PWV, Property 
Consultants, Durban; **Soweto Statistics, 1994.
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the formal and informal sectors, as well as with most other 
estimates,
3,3 Population structure
The information regarding the population pyramid used in 
this study is based on the household survey undertaken by 
Professor Ronald Mears of Vista University in his 1993 study 
of the demographic characteristics of Greater Soweto 
involving 800 households. The findings of Professor Mears' 
study on the demographic composition of Greater Soweto's 
population are shown in table 3.5. As table 3.5 shows, 51.5 
per cent of Greater Soweto's population were females and 
48.5 per cent males. According to this data, it appears that 
the ratio of males to females has normalised, a significant 
change from the past where the urban population was 
predominantly males (see Chapter 4).
About 26.8 per cent of Greater Soweto's population consists 
of children aged between 0 to 15, and this age group is 
larger than the total of those aged 46 and above (table
3.5). A further 34.5 per cent comprises young adults and 
potential new households aged between 16 ad 30. Those aged 
between 31 and 45 make up 19.6 per cent, while those aged 46 
and above comprise 19.1 per cent. This data (table 3.5) 
appears to be clear evidence of a permanent population. A 
town composed of migrant workers would not have so many 
young and old people who are economically inactive, a large
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Table 3.5: Age-gender structure of Greater Soweto
Age
category
Percentage
males
Percentage
females
Total 
number of 
sample
Total
percentage 
of sample
0-5 4.2 4.0 344 8.2
6-10 4.6 4.8 395 9.4
11-15 5.2 4.0 389 9.2
16-20 5.8 5.9 491 11.7
21-25 5.1 6.3 479 11.4
26-30 5.6 5.8 479 11.4
31-35 4.1 4.1 343 8.2
36-40 3.0 3.5 272 6.5
41-45 2.3 2.6 204 4.9
46-50 1.8 2.3 171 4.1
51-55 1.8 2.1 162 3.9
56-60 1.8 1.8 153 3.6
61-65 1.0 1.7 116 2.7
66-70 0.9 1.0 79 1.9
71 + 1.3 1.6 120 2.9
Total 48.5 51.5 4 197 100
Source: Adapted from Mears, R. 1993. Demographic
characteristics of the population in Greater Soweto,
unpublished paper, Economics Department, Vista University, 
Soweto, p. 12, Table 11.
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percentage of whom represent a potentially active 
population, and possibly a male: female split so close to
50:50. The population structure of Greater Soweto is also 
graphically illustrated in figure 3.2.
3.4 Local administration areas
Greater Soweto comprises three principal townships which are 
further subdivided into thirteen local administrative areas: 
nine in Soweto, three in Diepmeadow and one in Dobsonville 
(figure 3.3). Soweto alone comprises the following local
housing areas: Chiawelo/Protea, Mofolo/Zondi, Senaoane,
Pimville/Klipspruit, Tladi, Orlando East, Orlando West,
Moroka/Jabavu and Zola local administration areas.
Diepmeadow on the other hand is comprised of Meadowlands 
East, Meadowlands West and Diepkloof.
Each of the thirteen local housing areas in Greater Soweto 
is differentiated from the other by location, the size, type 
and age of the housing stock (table 3.6). For example, there 
are 420 flats in the Chiawelo/Protea housing area, but none 
in the Orlando East; there are 2,093 new additions to the 
Pimville/Klipspruit housing area (constructed by private
developers with private sector finance since 1982) compared 
to 183 in the Mofolo/Zondi housing area (table 3.6).
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Figure 3.3: Structure of Greater Soweto's local housing 
areas
Local administration areas Housing area structure
Chiawelo Chiawelo Extensions 1-5, 
Dlamini,
Dlamini Extensions 1-2; 
Protea, Protea North, 
Protea South, and 
Protea South Extension 1
Mofolo/Zondi Mofolo Central, Mofolo 
North, Mofolo South; Zondi; 
and Central Western Jabavu
Senaoane Senaoane; Phiri, Mapetla; 
Mapetla Extension and 
Molapo Extension
Pimville/Klipspruit Pimville Zones 1-7; 
Klipspruit and Klipspruit 
Extensions 1-2
Tladi Tladi; Moletsane; Jabulani 
Extension; Jabulani Flats; 
Naledi and Naledi 
Extensions 1-2
Orlando East Orlando East Extensions 1-3
Orlando West Orlando West Extensions 1-3 
and Dube
Moroka/Jabavu Moroka; Moroka North; 
Central Western Jabavu; and 
Jabavu Extensions 1-3
Zola Zola North; Zola South;
Zola Buffer; Jabulani; 
Emdeni South; Emdeni 
Extension and Emdeni Buffer
Meadowlands East Meadowlands East Zones 1-5
Meadowlands West Meadowlands West Zones 6-10
Diepkloof Diepkloof Zones 1-6, and 
Diepkloof Extension
Dobsonville Dobsonville, and 
Dobsonville Extensions 1-3
Source: Compiled from Greater Soweto Statistics (Soweto,
Diepmeadow and Dobsonville), 1994; see also Greater Soweto 
map above
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3.5 The housing stock and types
In 1994 there were a total of 120,923 formal housing units 
in Greater Soweto. Of these 85,466 were in the Soweto area, 
29,309 in Diepmeadow and 6,148 in Dobsonville. Thus, as 
table 3.6 shows, apart from 2,638 pre-1982 self-built
houses, 874 flats, 440 manses and caretaker cottages, there 
were 102,018 houses built by the white municipalities (the 
Johannesburg City Council, Native Resettlement Board and 
Roodepoort City Council) in Greater Soweto (71,257 in 
Soweto, 26,461 in Diepmeadow and 4,297 in Dobsonville). The 
remainder (14,953 units) were added to the Greater Soweto 
housing stock from the mid-1980s by private developers with 
financing from the banks (table 3.6). The types of privately 
built houses vary widely (figures 3.4 and 3.5).
The data on council-built housing types were not available 
for the whole of Greater Soweto. The available data on house 
types are examined in this chapter with respect to the 
Soweto area alone. However, the house types (in terms of 
number of rooms) that are described below also predominate 
in both Diepmeadow and Dobsonville. Table 3.7 shows the 
variations of house types in terms of number of rooms and 
the size of each type in the overall Soweto housing area. It 
should be noted that the data presented in table 3.7 are for 
houses built by the JCC, and exclude self built houses, 
flats, manses, caretaker cottages and dwellings built on 
trading residential sites (table 3.6).
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Figure 3.4: Private sector house types: accommodating the
elite market
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i!
Figure 3.5: Private sector house types: accommodating the
middle-income market
->— -
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The figures presented in table 3.7 are self-explanatory in 
terms of the distribution of the Johannesburg City Council 
(JCC) housing types. For example, in the Soweto area, there 
are 7,548 2-roomed units (11 per cent of the total), 7,450 
3-roomed dwellings (10 per cent of the total), 52,611 4- 
roomed units which constitute 74 per cent of the housing 
stock and only 3,295 5-roomed units representing 5 per cent 
of the stock.
It is important also to emphasise that the housing units are 
characterised by substantial variations in both qualitative 
and quantitative terms. For example, the 2-roomed unit 
comprises two key categories. The first type is a 'pre-cast 
concrete' dwelling all round, including the roofing. Its 
whole shape is characteristic of a concrete tank and as a 
result has acquired the term 'elephant' house. Internally, 
this type is very small and lacks insulation against heat 
and cold, and its roofing has a tendency to leak (figure
3.6). Furthermore, it cannot be improved nor altered under 
any circumstances. A total of 188 of these 2-roomed 
'elephant' units are located in the Mofolo/Zondi housing 
area and a further 1,700 are situated in the Moroka/Jabavu 
housing area (see table 3.7 and figure 3.6).
The second type is the conventional unit built with bricks 
but is comprised of four different sub-types. The first sub- 
type was originally constructed as a semi-detached 4-roomed 
unit, but later subdivided in order to house four different
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Table 3.6: The formal housing stock in Greater Soweto
Local
housing
area
Council
-built
houses
S/B MC,
CC,
TR.
Flats Built
by
P.D.**
Total
Chiawelo 6,698 292 33 420 4,965 12,408
Mofolo/
Zondi 6,451 301 46 12 183 6,993
Senaoane 7,366 139 45 — 261 7,811
Pimville 5,583 1130 30 4 2,093 8,840
Tladi 9,699 141 53 434 742 11,069
Orlando
East 5,913 48 44 9 6,014
Orlando
West 7,393 246 40 393 8,072
Moroka/
Jabavu 10,248 341 95 — 724 11,408
Zola 11,909 — 54 4 884 12,851
Med. East* 8,314 397 8,711
Med. West* 7,482 495 7,977
Diepkloof* 10,665 — — — 1,956 12,621
Dob'ville+ 4,297 — — 874 1,851 6,148
Total 102,018 2638 440 14,953 120,093
Source: Soweto Statistics 1994; *(Diepmeadow Statistics,
1994); +(Dobsonville figures were adapted from Davies, 
Bristow & Associates, 1990); S/B (Self-built houses, 
constructed before 1982 by individual residents under the 30 
year leasehold scheme - see Chapter 6 for further discussion 
of this scheme); MS (Manses), CC (Caretaker cottages); TR 
(houses built on trading residential sites); **(Houses 
constructed by private developers with private sector 
finance from financial institutions).
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Figure 3.6: The 'elephant' house type: comprised of 2- 
roomed, 3-roomed and 4-roomed units located in the 
Mofolo/Jabavu and Orlando West housing areas
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families. There are a total of 600 subdivided 2-roomed units 
all of which are located in the Senaoane housing area. The 
second sub-type is continuous 'row' housing (208 units) with 
2 rooms each and is concentrated in the Pimville/Klipspruit 
housing area (see table 3.7). The 'row' housing type is 
similar to most of the 'train' or 'coach' units found in the 
Meadowlands East and Meadowlands West housing areas (see 
figure 3.7).
The third sub-type is a 'matchbox' (51/6) 2-roomed single 
(detached) unit which is similar to the 4-roomed detached 
'matchbox' unit (see figure 3.8). There are 777 2-roomed 
'matchbox' dwellings located in the Tladi housing area. The 
fourth sub-type consists of 2-roomed units (known as type J) 
which are found in the Orlando East housing area. These are 
comprised of both single and semi-detached units. Sub-type J 
is 39 sq/ft in floor area and comprises the entire 2-roomed 
housing stock of Orlando East (table 3.7). Thus, of the 
total 4,075 2-roomed units in the Orlando East housing area 
(table 3.7), 3,572 are single units and 503 are semi­
detached dwellings. Moreover, as table 3.7 further shows, 
not only is the 2-roomed housing unit the most dominant in 
the Orlando East housing area, but it also represents the 
largest share (60 per cent) of the entire 2-roomed housing 
stock in the whole of Soweto.
The 3-roomed 'matchbox' unit is also comprised of different 
sub-types. In Orlando East, for example, the 3-roomed
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Table 3.7: The Council-built house types (according to
number of rooms per unit) in Soweto.
Local
housing
market
Number 
of 2 
rooms
Number 
of 3 
rooms
Number 
of 4 
rooms**
Number 
of 5 
rooms 
**
Total
number of
units per
local
housing
market
area
Chiawelo
/Protea 5,898 800 6,698
Mofolo/
Zondi 188* 373* 5,696 194 6,451
Senaoane 6000 — 6,715 48 7,363
Pimville 208+ 55 + 5,181 139 5,583
Orlando
East 4,075 1,815 21 2 6,013
Orlando
West 1,806# 4,104 1,483 7,393
Moroka/
Jabavu 1,700* 3,401* 4,608 539 10,248
Tladi 777 — 8,832 90 9,699
Zola — — 11,909 — 11,909
Total 7,548 7,450 52,964 3,295 71,256
Source: Calculated from Soweto Statistics, 1994. *(Elephant 
types); **(Matchbox types); 0(Row, coach or train types); 
0(Subdivided semi-detached types); #(600 of these are 
elephant and the rest matchbox types). In addition those in 
columns 2 and 3 which are not highlighted with any symbol 
are the matchbox (K and L) types found in Orlando East and 
Orlando West. Furthermore, the 777 units shown in column 2 
and row 9 are also matchbox types.
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Figure 3.7: The 'row', 'train' or 'coach' house type:
comprised of 2-roomed, 3-roomed and 4-roomed units, common 
in the Pimville and Meadowlands housing areas
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Figure 3.8: The 'matchbox1 house type: comprised of 2-
roomed, 3-roomed and 4-roomed single (detached) and semi­
detached units.
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'matchbox' unit consists of sub-types K and L. Sub-type L is 
532 sq/ft in floor area and comprises 1,109 detached units 
with three rooms including a kitchen. Sub-type K on the 
other hand is 512 sq/ft and comprises 443 detached dwellings 
and 263 semi-detached units. Of the 1,806 3-roomed housing 
units situated in the Orlando West housing area, 331 are
semi-detached units of the K sub-type (similar to the
Orlando East K sub-type described above), 616 are semi­
detached 'elephant' houses (similar to those shown in figure
3.6) and 859 are detached dwellings (table 3.7). In
addition, apart from the 'elephant' sub-type all the 3- 
roomed units in Orlando West are larger than those of 
Orlando East. For instance, the average floor area in
Orlando West houses is 714 sq/ft. None of the houses were 
provided with internal doors and windows when they were 
first constructed, but they were provided with external 
doors, internal steel door frames and steel window frames. 
Neither were floors nor ceilings provided. These were to be 
provided at the expense of the resident occupants 
themselves. All that was constructed was the core/shell 
structure of the house. The roofing consisted of corrugated 
iron.
There are a further 3,774 3-roomed 'elephant' housing units 
in the Soweto housing area. Of these 273 are located in the 
Mofolo/Zondi housing market and 3,401 are situated in the 
Moroka/Jabavu housing area (table 3.7). Moreover, as table
3.7 further shows, the 'elephant' sub-type is the single
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largest representing 51 per cent of the total 3-roomed 
housing stock in Soweto.
The 4-roomed unit is also characterised by three categories. 
The first is the 'elephant1 sub-type consisting of 353 semi­
detached dwellings which are located in the Orlando West 
housing area (table 3.7 and figure 3.6). The second sub-type 
is the 51/6 detached unit and the third sub-type is the 51/7 
semi-detached dwelling shown in figure 3.8 (both commonly 
known as ’matchboxes'). Apart from being a semi-detached 
unit, the 51/7 sub-type is basically similar to the 51/6 
unit. Of the total 52,964 4-roomed dwellings (table 3.7), 
31,597 are detached 51/6 units, 21,014 are semi-detached 
51/7 dwellings and 353 (as already explained) are 'elephant' 
semi-detached units located in the Orlando West housing 
market. Both the 51/6 and 51/7 units are approximately 40,4 
sq/m in floor area, consisting of 4 rooms including a 
kitchen. The exterior and interior are characterised by a 
steel outside and inside door, the provision of internal 
steel door frames without doors and the absence of an 
internal water system, internal bathroom and lavatory. Water 
is drawn from a tap attached to the outside lavatory. Again, 
most of these units were provided with no floors or ceilings 
and virtually all of them have asbestos roofing (figure 
3.9).
The 4-roomed (51/9) unit on the other hand represents an 
improved version of the 51/6 'matchbox' housing type (figure
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3.6). The 51/9 unit in turn represents relatively the best 
quality ever to be constructed by the JCC in Soweto. It is 
characterised by 44 sq/m in floor area, better internal 
finishes with respect to the provision of ceilings, doors 
and contains also an internal bathroom. But very few units 
were built in Greater Soweto.
Further variations in terms of the size of the housing stock 
and the dominant type of dwelling in the local housing areas 
are shown in table 3.7. For example, not only is the Zola 
housing area the largest representing 17 per cent of the JCC 
built housing stock, but it is also comprised of only 4- 
roomed dwellings. It is also significant that the Chiawelo 
housing area is comprised of only 4-roomed and 5-roomed 
units, whilst the Tladi housing area is characterised by the 
lack of any 3-roomed dwellings, and with an insignificant 
number of 5-roomed units (only 2) located in Orlando East 
housing area (table 3.7).
3.6 Other formal housing types
Apart from the housing types which are shown in table 3.7, 
other formal housing types that characterise the Greater 
Soweto housing stock include flats and hostels. The flats 
were added to the Greater Soweto housing stock during the 
early 1980s. There are a total of 874 flats shown in table
3.8 above (434 are located in Tladi, 420 in Chiawelo, 12 in 
Mofolo/Zondi, 4 in Pimville and 4 in Zola). These flats are
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also comprised of different types (see figure 3,10). They 
are further differentiated by the number of rooms per unit. 
Information regarding the size of the stock of flats in 
terms of the number of rooms per unit in each local area was 
not available. However, in Chiawelo there are 1-roomed, 2- 
roomed and 3-roomed flat units. In Mofolo/Zondi and 
Pimville/Klipspruit housing areas there are 1-roomed and 2- 
roomed flats, while Tladi and Zola are comprised of only 2- 
roomed and 3-roomed flats, Thus none of the Greater Soweto 
flats has more than 3 rooms.
The Greater Soweto housing area is also characterised by 
council—buiIt hostels which were constructed during the 
1960s (figure 3.11). There are a total of 10 hostels in 
Greater Soweto, Of this total the breakdown according to the 
administrative areas can be seen in table 3.9: 6 in Soweto 
with a total of 23,308 beds, 2 in Diepmeadow with a total 
9,906 beds and 2 in Dobsonville with a total of 4,843 beds.
The Soweto hostels comprise the following: Dube, Jabulani,
Mapetla, Nancefield, Lifateng and Orlando West. Meadowlands 
and Diepkloof hostels are located in the Diepmeadow area. 
Sikhele and Wilford hostels are situated in Dobsonville. 
Apart from the Orlando West Women's hostel, all the others 
have historically housed men, mostly migrant labourers.
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Tahle 3.8: Flat unit types
Local housing 
area
Number of flats Percentage of 
total units
Tladi 434 49.6
Chiawelo 420 48.0
Mofolo/Zondi 12 1.3
Pimville 4 0.4
Zola 4 0.4
Total 874 100
Source: Adapted from table 3.6
Table 3.9: Hostel unit types
Area Number Number
beds
of Percentage 
of total 
number of 
beds
Soweto 6 23 308 61.8
Diepmeadow 2 9 906* 26.3
Dobsonville 2 4 843* 12.8
Total 10 37 697 100
Source: Compiled from Soweto statistics, 1994; *(Davies,
Bristow and Associates, Black Towns of the PWV, 1990).
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Figure 3.10: Flat unit types
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Figure 3.11: The hostels
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3.7 The backyard3 and informal shacks
Since the early 1980s, there has been a substantial growth 
of backyard and informal units. These units have been 
constructed from whatever building materials are available, 
for example, the conventional brick, corrugated iron and 
cardboard box structures. They are also characterised by a 
wide range of sub-types and conditions. These include on the 
one extreme shacks, and on the other 2-rooms and garage 
units built of bricks. The figures of the backyard and 
informal shacks are presented in tables 3.10 and 3.11.
It is noteworthy that some 28.4 per cent of backyard 
rooms/shacks are located in the Diepkloof area, 22.5 per 
cent in Orlando East and 14.7 per cent in Meadowlands East 
as all these three areas are located relatively closer (in 
terms of distance and transportation costs) to the city of 
Johannesburg compared to other local areas of Greater 
Soweto. Some 68.1 per cent of informal shacks (33.2 per cent 
at Protea South, 20 per cent at Chicken Farm and 14.9 per 
cent at Race Course) developed 'illegally1 on open land 
without the owner's permission indicating the availability 
of land in those areas than proximity to the city. The data 
on informal shacks may in fact represent an underestimate of 
present figures as some of these shacks are built overnight.
3 Backyards are differentiated from informal shacks by 
their location (at the backyard of residents' homes) and 
some of these are quality units built with bricks and with 
financing from the banks.
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Table 3.10: Backyard rooms/shacks in Greater Soweto
Area Number of backyard 
structures/shacks
Percentage of 
total number of 
shacks per area
Chiawelo 1 640 2.4
Mofolo 1 744 2.6
Mofolo/Jabavu 3 057 4.5
Orlando East 15 295 22.5
Orlando West 1 534 2.2
Pimville 1 596 2.3
Senaoane 880 1.3
Tladi 1 023 1.5
Zola 3 310 4.8
Meadowlands East 10 049 14.7
Meadowlands West 5 543 8.4
Diepkloof 19 302 28.4
Dobsonville© 2 853 4.2
Total 68 026 100
Source; Compiled from Diepmeadow and Soweto statistics, 
1994. @(Figures for Dobsonville were compiled from Davies, 
Bristow and Associates, Black Towns of the PWV, 1990).
Table 3.11: Informal shacks in Soweto
Local area Number of informal 
structures/shacks
Percentage of 
total number of 
informal shacks
Dlamini Camp 1 284 3.1
Dlamini Camp 2 346 3.8
Chiawelo Camp 1 452 5.0
Fred Clark 359 3.9
Naledi Camp 1 524 5.8
Naledi Camp 2 354 3.9
Naledi camp 3 29 0.3
Mshenguville 513 5.6
Chicken Farm© 1 804 20.0
Race Course© 1 346 14.9
Protea South© 3 000 33.2
Total 9 011 100
Source: Compiled from Soweto statistics, 1994. ©(Illegal 
squatters on open land)
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*Figure 3.12: Informal shacks
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3.8 The household survey
In order to gain some understanding into the position of 
individual households within the housing markets of Greater 
Soweto, a household survey was undertaken in each of two 
townships, Orlando West and Meadowlands West Zone 9. 
Interviews at which the questionnaires were completed with 
heads of households were carried out in both townships. The 
research methodology and reliability of results and the 
question of how far they may be safely generalised from, 
have been discussed in Chapter 1.
The Orlando West survey sample comprised 151 heads of 
households of whom 52.3 per cent (79) were males and 47.6 
per cent (72) females. A household head is here defined as a 
head of a family unit responsible for providing income for 
the living expenses of members of that particular household. 
The age profile of this sample is presented in table 3.12. 
Thus only 1.3 per cent of the sample interviewed fell below 
the age of 30 compared to 13.9 per cent who were more than 
70 years old. The age groups of 30-39, 40-49 and 60-69 years 
were evenly matched with 19.3 per cent each, while 25.1 per 
cent of heads of households aged between 50-59 were the most 
numerous of the 10-year cohorts. Of the 151 surveyed sample 
in Orlando West, 33.8 per cent were pensioners (i.e. a large 
proportion of the 60 year over 70 year old cohorts), 31.8 
per cent were in formal employment, 27.8 per cent were self- 
employed and 6.6 per cent unemployed (table 3.13).
95
Table 3.12: Characteristics of Orlando West sample of
household heads (sample number: 151 (79 males and 72
females)
Age group 
(years)
Number of 
respondents
Percentage of 
total respondents
20-29 2 1.3
30-39 30 19.8
40-49 30 19.8
50-59 38 25.1
60-69 30 19.3
70-79 21 13.9
Total 151 100
Table 3.13: Employment status of Orlando West sample of 
household heads
Employment
status
Number of 
household 
heads 
in formal 
housing
Number
of
household
heads
in
backyard
shacks
Total
number
of
heads
of
house­
holds
% of 
total 
number 
of
heads
of
house­
holds
Pensioners 51 __ 51 33.8
Formal employment 30 18 48 31.8
Self-employed 23 19 42 27.8
Unemployed 8 2 10 6.6
Total 111 40 151 100
Table 3.14: Pensioner household heads and number of adults
over 60 of Orlando West sample
Pensioner 
households 
with 
adults 
over 60
No of 
Pensioner 
households 
over 60
No of 
Pensioners 
over 60
Percentage of 
total number 
pensioner 
households
1 adult 36 36 70.5
2 adults 15 30 29.5
Total 51 66 100
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Table 3.13 also shows the employment situation of the sample 
of household heads in Orlando West according to the type of 
housing they occupied. Thus of the 31.8 per cent who were in 
formal employment 19.8 per cent (30 heads of households) 
were accommodated in the formal housing sector while 11.9 
per cent (18 heads of households) were accommodated in the 
backyard shacks (table 3.13). Of those in self-employment
15.2 per cent (23 heads of households) were accommodated in 
the formal housing sector while 12.5 per cent (19 household 
heads) were accommodated in the backyards of residents' 
homes. Of those who were unemployed 5.2 per cent (8 
household heads) were accommodated in the formal housing 
sector while 1.3 per cent (2 heads of households) occupied 
backyard shacks (table 3.13).
The Orlando West sample comprised 51 pensioner households 
aged 60 and above, 61 households aged under 60 and 
accommodated in the formal housing sector and 39 households 
(also under 60) who were accommodated in the backyard 
shacks. Of the 51 pensioner households aged 60 years and 
over, 70.5 per cent were headed by a single adult (of whom 
26 heads of households were female and 10 males) compared 
with 29.5 per cent of households (i.e. 15 households) with 
two adults and the male household head (table 3.14). None of 
these pensioner households had an adult aged under 60 years 
(see also table 3.12).
Of the 61 households aged under 60 and accommodated in the
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formal (council-built) housing sector in the Orlando West 
sample (i.e. those aged 20-59 as shown in table 3.12), 37.0 
per cent (37 households) were headed by a single female 
adult, 22.0 per cent (22 households) had two adults with the 
male as head of the household (table 3.15). Of the 39 heads 
of households in the backyard sector 9.0 per cent (9 
households) were headed by a single female adult, 14.0 per 
cent (14 households) by a single male and 20.0 per cent (20 
households) had two adults with the male as head (table 
3.15).
Among the 151 sample, 73 respondent households had children 
under 15 years of age. Of these households 49.3 per cent had 
1 child under 15, 30.1 per cent had 2 children, 8.2 per cent 
had 3 children, 9.6 per cent had 4 children and 2.7 per cent 
had 5 children or more (table 3.16).
The income profile of the surveyed heads of households in 
Orlando West is presented in table 3.17. The Orlando West 
sample as table 3.17 shows, consisted of predominantly low- 
income earners: 2.1 per cent of the sample had monthly
incomes of up to R199, 13.4 per cent had incomes of R200- 
R299, 44.6 per cent had incomes of R300-R399, 9.9 per cent 
had incomes of R400-R499, 4.9 per cent earned R500-R599,
11.3 per cent earned R600-R699, 2.8 per cent earned R700-
R799, 5.6 per cent earned R800-R899, 2.8 per cent earned 
R900-R999 and 2.1 per cent had incomes totalling R1,000 and 
above per month. According to the South African Institute of 
Race Relations, the household subsistence level (HSL) for a
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Table 3.15: Heads of Households aged between 20 and 59 years
Type of
household
head
Formal
housing
Backyard
shacks
Total % of 
number total 
of number 
heads of 
of house- 
households hold 
heads
Single female 37 9 46 44.0
Single male — 14 14 14.0
Male with 2 adults 22 18 40 44.0
Total 61 39 100 100
Table 3.16: Orlando West sample of heads of households with
children under 15
Household Number of Number of Percentage of
with heads of children total number of
children households under 15 heads of
under 15 households
1 child 36 36 49.3
2 children 22 44 30.1
3 children 6 18 8.2
4 children 7 28 9.6
5 children + 2 10 2.7
Total 73 136 100
Table 3.17: Monthly income profile of the surveyed heads of 
households in Orlando West
Income per month 
(Rand)
Number of 
households
Percentage of 
total number 
of households
0 - 199 3 2.1
200 - 299 19 13.4
300 - 399 63 44.6
400 - 499 14 9.9
500 - 599 7 4.9
600 - 699 16 11.3
700 - 799 4 2.8
800 - 899 8 5.6
900 - 999 4 2.8
1000 + 3 2.1
Total 141 100
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'lower income family of six' for Johannesburg in 1993-1994 
was R906.69 per month.4
Of the 44.6 per cent who had incomes of R300-R399 per month,
36.1 per cent (table 3.17) comprised pension incomes 
averaging R370 per pensioner household per month. Apart from 
the incomes derived from the pensions, the rest of the 
incomes were generated elsewhere both within the formal 
sector economy and informal sector activities. Thus 31.7 per 
cent heads of households who were employed in the formal
sector had occupations which consisted of a range of low-
income paid activities: domestic work in white residential 
areas, general work, cleaning, hair dressing, working as 
labourers in stores, warehouses and in the manufacturing 
sector, and professional driving in the city.
The activities of the 27.8 per cent of heads of households 
who were self-employed also varied: selling fruits (see
figure 3.13) and vegetables, selling sweets, soft drinks and 
carrier bags, street cooking for taxi drivers and the 
general public, casual work in the coal yards, selling beer 
(shebeens), street mechanics, doing small time building, 
electrical and plumbing work, knitting, hair dressing, 
repairing radios, televisions and cars within Orlando West. 
The unemployed 6.6 per cent heads of households depended on 
help from the extended family network and from friends.
4 SAXRR 1993/94. South African Institute of Race 
Relations, Johannesburg.
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Figure 3.13: The informal sector economy
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The length of residence of respondents in Orlando West
varied widely. There are, for example, respondents who had
maintained continuous residence since the area was first 
established as a township in the 1940s and those who had
moved in not very long ago. The data in table 3.18 shows 
numbers and percentages of household heads with different 
length of residence. A substantial number of respondents 
(31.7 per cent) first occupied their houses as new migrants 
to the city between 1940 and 1949. This first entry into the 
Orlando West housing market is consistent with the date in 
which this township was first constructed (see Chapter 5 
table 5.6). Between 1950 and 1960 the rate of entry into the 
Orlando West housing market had declined. The sharp decline 
(table 3.18) between 1960 and 1969 with only 4.6 per cent of 
respondents entering the Orlando West housing market is
indicative of the stringency of 'influx' control during this 
decade (see Chapters 4, 6 and 7).
A significant 27.8 per cent heads of households had migrated 
to occupy their present dwellings from within Orlando West, 
indicating mobility (housing moves) within the local housing 
area. It is also noteworthy that the largest percentage 
(36.4) of the sample migrated to Orlando West from within 
Greater Soweto (table 3.19). The respondents had moved out 
of their former accommodation into Orlando West because of a 
combination of pull and push factors. The single biggest 
factor cited by respondents related to quality in spatial 
terms and housing conditions.
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Table 3.18: Length of residence in Orlando West of sample of 
heads of households
Year of 
arrival in 
Orlando 
West
Length of 
residence 
(years)
Number of 
heads of 
households
Percentage of 
total number of 
heads of 
households
1940-49 45-54 48 31.7
1950-59 35-44 12 7.9
1960-69 25-34 7 4.6
1970-79 15-24 24 15.9
1980-89 5-14 34 22.5
1990-94 0-4 26 17.2
Total --- 151 100
Table 3.19: Migration (moves) of sample of heads of
households to Orlando West (analysed according to where 
respondent heads of households came from. 1940-94)
Area Number of 
heads of 
households
Percentage of 
total number 
of heads of 
households
From within Orlando West 42 27.8
From Orlando East 33 21.8
From other areas in Greater
Soweto 55 36.4
From outside Greater Soweto 21 13.9
Total 151 100
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Thus 50.3 per cent of respondents moved into Orlando West in 
order to obtain a bigger and better house. Overcrowding 
(17.8 per cent) was the second factor. New household 
formation as a result of marriage (5.9 per cent) was the 
third. The fourth concerned preference for renting own 
accommodation (5.2 per cent). The desire to own a house was 
the fifth factor (3.9 per cent). And a further 3.9 per cent 
of residents had been pushed out of their former homes by 
the incidence of crime (table 3.20). When asked about the 
choice of residence, some 68.8 per cent of respondents 
indicated a preference for their current homes, 15.5 per 
cent would prefer to live in Diepkloof Extension, 7.9 per 
cent chose Dube and 3.3 per cent indicated a preference to 
live anywhere outside Greater Soweto (table 3.21).
In comparison to Orlando West, the Meadowlands West Zone 9 
sample comprised 85 heads of households of whom 88 per cent 
were males and 12 per cent female (table 3.22). The sample 
age profile ranged as follows: 0.6 per cent fell below 30 
years, 24.5 per cent were aged between 30-39 years, 22.5 per 
cent comprised those aged between 40-49, 7.9 per cent were
aged between 50-59 and 0.6 per cent were aged 60 years old 
and above (table 3.22).
The employment status of the Meadowlands West sample is 
shown on table 3.23. Thus 85.8 per cent were in formal 
employment, 9.4 per cent were self employed and 5.8 per cent 
unemployed. Table 3.24 illustrates the migration patterns
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Table 3.20: The reasons of the heads of households for 
moving to present home in Orlando West
Reasons No of Percentage of
heads of heads of
households households
For bigger and better house 76 50.3
Overcrowding 27 17.8
Marriage 9 5.9
To rent own home 8 5.2
To buy own home 6 3.9
Too much crime 6 3.9
Owner sold house 5 3.3
Access to employment 4 2.6
Family problems 4 2.6
Dispute with owner 3 1.9
Wanted change of residence 2 1.3
Former house set on fire 1 0.6
Total 151 100
Table 3.21: Preferred choice of Orlando West sample of heads
of households of other residential areas within Greater
Soweto
Township No of Percentage of
heads of heads of
households households
Remaining at present home 104 68.8
Diepkloof Extension 19 12.6
Dobsonville Extension 12 7.9
Outside Greater Soweto 9 5.9
Dube 5 3.3
No preference 2 1.3
Total 151 100
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Table 3.22: Characteristics of Meadowlands West Zone 9
sample of heads of households (sample number: 85 (75 males 
and 10 females)
Age Group Number of Percentage of
heads of total number of
households heads of
households
20-29 1 0.6
30-39 37 24.5
40-49 34 22.5
50-59 12 7.9
60-69 1 0.6
Total 85 100
Table 3.23: Employment status of Meadowlands West Zone 9
sample of heads of households
Employment Number of Percentage of
status heads of total heads of
households households
Formal employment 73 85.8
Self-employed 8 9.4
Unemployed 5 5.8
Total 85 100
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in terms of housing moves) of the sample of household heads 
before they moved to Meadowlands West Zone 9. Thus 38.8 per 
cent had formally occupied a formal dwelling elsewhere 
within the township housing market before moving to 
Meadowlands West Zone 9. 21.3 per cent had moved from a 
formal dwelling to a backyard shack within Greater Soweto 
before buying a home in Meadowlands West Zone 9. 24.7 per 
cent of the sample had moved from a formal dwelling and 
moved twice within the backyard sector before moving to
Meadowlands West Zone 9, and 14.1 per cent of heads of
households had moved three times within the backyard sector 
(after their initial move from the formal sector) before 
purchasing a house in Meadowlands West Zone 9 (table 3.24).
The migration (moves) of the Meadowlands West Zone 9 sample 
of respondents to their present homes are shown in table 
3.25. Of the total sample of household heads in Meadowlands 
West Zone 9, 58.8 per cent were resident elsewhere within 
the Meadowlands housing areas before moving to occupy 
present dwellings, 25.8 per cent moved from other housing 
areas of Greater Soweto, while 15.3 per cent migrated from 
other areas outside Greater Soweto (table 3.25). Of the
total household heads, only 2.3 per cent had lived in the
Greater Soweto housing area for less than 14 years, 49.4 per 
cent had been born within the township housing areas, 14.1 
per cent had been resident within the townships for a period 
of between 45-54 years, and 4.7 per cent for a period of 15- 
24 years (table 3.26).
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Table 3.24: Migration (number of housing moves) of sample of 
heads of households to Meadowlands West Zone 9 (analysed 
according to last housing type)
House type
Number of moves of heads of 
households to Meadowlands West 
Zone 9
1 2 3 Percentage 
of total 
heads of 
households
Formal housing 33 — — 33
Percentage 38.8 38.8
Backyard shacks 19 21 12 52
Percentage 22.3 24.7 14.1 61.1
Total frequency 51 21 12 85
Total percentage 61.1 24.7 14.1 100
Table 3.25: Migration (moves) of Meadowlands West Zone 9 
sample of heads of households to present home (analysed 
according to where respondents came from. 1987-1994)
Area Number of 
heads of 
households
Percentage of 
heads of 
households
From within Meadowlands 
From other areas in Greater
50 58.8
Soweto 22 25.8
From outside Greater Soweto 13 15.3
Total 85 100
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Table 3.26: Length of residence in Greater Soweto of heads
of households sample before they moved to present home in 
Meadowlands West Zone 9
Year of 
arrival 
in Greater 
Soweto
Length of 
residence 
in Greater 
Soweto 
(years)
Number of 
heads of 
households
Percentage of 
total heads of 
households
Born in GS0 Since birth 42 49.4
1940-49 45-54 12 14.1
1950-59 35-44 18 21.1
1960-69 25-34 7 8.2
1970-79 15-24 4 4.7
1980-89 5-14 2 2.3
Total --- 85 100
0 Greater Soweto
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3.9 Housing tenures
In Greater Soweto there are the following housing tenures:
a) council renting, b) owner-occupation of council-built 
housing, c) renting backyard rooms/shacks, d) owning and 
renting informal shacks, e) renting privately built housing 
and d) owner-occupation of housing built by private
developers with private sector finance.
The tenurial patterns of the surveyed heads of households in 
Orlando West are shown in table 3.27. Council tenants 
comprised the largest category, 46.3 per cent of respondents 
rented their accommodation from the council, while 27.8 per 
cent had bought their homes from the council. Backyard 
tenants who rented rooms in the backyards of residents' 
houses constituted some 25.8 per cent of the sample (table
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correlations in the Orlando West sample between tenure and 
other variables such as age, household size of respondents 
and length of residence. The following sections examine the 
findings on each of the tenure submarkets.
Table 3.27: Tenure categories of Orlando West sample of 
household heads
Tenure of Number of Percentage of total
respondents respondents respondents
Council renting 70 46.3
Purchased from council 42 27.8
Renting backyard rooms 39 25.8
Total 151 100
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3.9.1 Council renting
Table 3.28 shows correlations between housing tenure (the 
numbers and percentages of those who continue to rent their 
accommodation from the council, those who purchased their 
dwellings from the council and those renting rooms/shacks at 
the backyards of residents' homes) and the age of heads of 
households. There were considerable variations between 
renting a council-built dwelling and the age of household 
heads in Orlando West. As table 3.28 shows, of all household 
heads (46.3 per cent) who continued to rent their homes from 
the council in Orlando West, a significant 23.1 per cent 
were between 50-59 years old. It is also noteworthy that a 
further 10.5 per cent of heads of households were aged 
between 40-49 years, compared to the 2.6 per cent who were 
aged between 30-39 years and the significant absence of 
opportunities for young couples or heads of households aged 
between 20-29 years renting council-built housing.
There were also some interesting variations between tenure 
and length of residence in the council-rented sector. As can 
be seen in table 3.29, of all household heads residing in 
Orlando West the highest percentage (14.5) was for those who 
had rented their council accommodation for 5-14 years. A 
further 12.5 per cent of the Orlando West sample had 
continued to rent their dwellings from the council for 15-24 
years, compared to the percentages of those who had been 
council tenants for 25 years or more.
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Table 3.28: Age of household heads by tenure (sample: 151)
Age of
household
head
Head of 
household 
still 
renting 
counci1- 
built 
housing 
no %
Head of
household
who
purchased 
the council- 
built 
housing 
no %
Head of
household
renting
backyard
rooms/
shacks
no %
Total
number
h/head
20-29 — — — — 2 1.3 2
30-39 4 2.6 1 0.6 25 16.5 30
40-49 16 10.5 4 2.6 10 6.6 30
50-59 35 23.1 1 0.6 2 1.3 38
60-69 12 7.9 18 11.9 _ _  _____ 30
70 + 3 1.9 18 11.9 ---------  --------- 21
Total 70 46.3 42 27.8 39 25.8 151
Table 3.29: Length of residence of household heads by tenure 
(sample: 151)
Year of 
arrival 
of
h/heads
in
present 
home in 
Orlando 
West
Length of 
residence 
of
h/heads
in
Orlando
West
(years)
H/head
still
renting
counci1-
built
housing
no %
H/head
who
purchased 
counci1- 
built 
housing
no %
H/head
of
house
renting
backyard
rooms/
shacks
Total 
no of 
h/
heads
1990-94 0-4 2 1.3 2 1.3 22 14.5 26
1980-89 5-14 22 14.5 _  — 12 7.9 34
1970-79 15-24 19 12.5 _  — 5 3.3 24
1960-69 25-34 6 3.9 1 0.6 _____  _____ 7
1950-59 35-44 8 5.2 4 2.6 _____  _____ 12
1940-49 45-54 13 8.6 35 23.1 —  — 48
Total —  — 70 46.3 42 27.8 39 25.8 151
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3.9.2 Owner-occupation of council-built houses
As with council renting, the distribution of numbers and 
percentages of those who bought their homes from the council 
and their age groups is shown in table 3.28. The comparison 
between this form of owner-occupation and continued renting 
of council-built housing suggests that the former tenure has 
been monopolised by pensioner households (those age 60 and 
above) of the surveyed sample in Orlando West (table 3.28). 
The relative significance of this is demonstrated by the 
evidence of a considerable 11.9 per cent of heads of 
households aged between 60-69 who bought their houses from 
the council and an equal percentage of those aged 70 years 
or more, compared to those aged under 60 (table 3.28).
Of all household heads aged 60 and above, 36 out of 51 have 
purchased. But of all the 50-59 household heads, only 1 out 
38 has purchased (see table 3.28). Owner-occupation of 
council-built housing by pensioner households is also 
correlated to the length of residence of household heads 
(table 3.29). The considerably more households (23.1 per 
cent of the total) who bought their houses from the council 
had been resident in own homes for between 45-54 years 
compared to fewer household heads who had occupied their 
dwellings for shorter periods (table 3.29). This shows how 
seized up the housing market is. Thus, whether a household 
has purchased or continues to rent a council-built dwelling 
is correlated with age and length of residence of heads of
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households. Moreover, correlations between housing tenure 
and age (table 3.28) and between tenure and length of 
residence (table 3.29) of heads of households are
complicated when there are no transactions taking place 
(people staying put and not moving out) and when there is 
the demand which is not met by supply.
Overall the tenure sectors of the surveyed sample within the 
council-built housing were different (62.5 per cent rented 
and 37.5 per cent owned) from those in the whole of Orlando 
West (41.1 per cent of the council-built units were rented 
while 58.8 per cent were owned), but similar to those in the 
whole of Greater Soweto: 60.7 per cent of the council-built
stock was rented and 39.3 per cent owned (table 3.30).
The distribution of tenures within the council-built 
dwellings in other local housing areas of Greater Soweto is 
shown in table 3.30. There were considerable differences 
both between the rented and owner-occupied sectors and
within each sector. The highest owner-occupation rates 
(apart from Orlando West) were in Mofolo/Zondi (65.5 per 
cent) and Dobsonville (53.5 per cent). The lowest owner- 
occupation rates as shown in table 3.30 were in Meadowlands 
East (26 per cent), Moroka/Jabavu (27.5 per cent) and 
Diepkloof (32.3 per cent).
It is also noteworthy that the rented sector was the higher 
in ten of the thirteen local housing areas (table 3.30). The
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Table 3.30: Tenurial patterns within the council-built
housing stock in Greater Soweto
Local housing 
area
Rented 
no % of 
of units 
units per 
area
Purchased 
no % of 
of units 
units per 
area
Total 
no % of 
of total 
units units
Pimville/
Klipspruit 3 209 57.4 2 374 42.5 5 583 5.4
Orlando East 3 611 61.0 2 302 38.9 5 913 5.7
Orlando West 3 044 41.1 4 349 58.8 7 393 7.2
Moroka/Jabavu 7 428 72.4 2 820 27.5 10 248 10.0
Mofolo/Zondi 2 224 34.4 4 227 65.5 6 451 6.3
Chiawelo/
Protea 3 820 57.0 2 878 42.9 6 698 6.5
Senaoane 4 360 59.1 3 006 40.8 7 366 7.2
Tladi 6 286 64.8 3 413 35.1 9 699 9.5
Zola 8 008 67.2 3 901 32.7 11 909 11.6
Meadowlands
East 6 152 73.9 2 162 26.0 8 314 8.1
Meadowlands
West 4 394 58.7 3 088 41.2 7 482 7.3
Diepkloof 7 215 67.6 3 450 32.3 10 665 10.4
Dobsonville* 1 995 46.4 2 302 53.5 4 297 4.2
Total 61 746 60.7 40 172 39.3 102 018 100
Source: Statistics for Soweto and Diepmeadow 1994. *(Adapted 
from Davies, Bristow and Associates, 1990). See also table 
3.6.
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average cost of the counci1-buiIt houses for those who moved 
into owner-occupation (private tenure) was R2,000 (see 
Chapter 7, table 7.4), while council tenants paid average 
rents of R45.00 per month in the different submarkets of 
Greater Soweto. The significant point to be established here 
is that the council-built housing stock developed primarily 
as a rented sector housing the transient labour required by 
capital, but since the mid-1980s, its role has changed as 
some of the stock (table 3.30) has moved into private 
ownership.
3.9.3 Backyard renting
The growth of backyard rooms/shacks (see section 3.7) has 
changed the overall pattern of provision and tenure 
structure of housing in Greater Soweto. As with council 
renting and owner-occupation of council-built housing, there 
were significant variations between age of household head of 
the surveyed sample in Orlando West and tenure, and between 
length of residence and tenure (see tables 3.28 and 3.29 
above).
In the Orlando West sample backyard renting was dominated by 
25 out of 39 heads of households aged between 30-39 years 
(16.5 per cent), while those aged between 40-49 represented 
the second largest group (6.6 per cent) compared to the 
considerably fewer household heads aged 20-29 and 50-59 who 
had an equal 1.3 percentage share (table 3.28). There was
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also a strong correlation between backyard renting and the 
low rate of residence in Orlando West. Thus some 14.5 per 
cent of heads of households had rented backyard rooms/shacks 
for up to 4 years compared to the 3.3 per cent who had been 
backyard tenants for over 15 years (table 3.29).
Backyard renting can be seen as a mode of provision
fulfilling several roles. First, it constitutes a source of
income to the landlords who provide this form of housing 
stock specifically for renting. Second, it provides a first 
home for newly formed households. Third, it provides 
accommodation for the new immigrants to the city and for the 
employed who are also mobile. Fourth, it houses those who 
have not gained access to the council rented sector and 
owner-occupation of council-built housing. Fifth, it 
provides accommodation to those who want to make minimum 
expenditure on housing to assist their envisaged entry into 
the owner-occupied tenures (both within the council-built 
stock and the houses built by private developers with 
financing from financial institutions) and acts as tenure of 
last resort.
Allocation in the backyard rented sector is on the basis of 
the ability and willingness of tenants to pay rent
(effective demand). In the case of the surveyed sample of
heads of households in Orlando West, the monthly rentals for 
backyard tenants was R60 per month.
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3.9.4 Owning and renting informal shacks
The different roles played by the backyard sector were also 
evident in the informal shacks sector. The importance of the 
informal shacks sector was that it provided accommodation 
both to the homeless and to those who were unable to find 
accommodation in the other tenures. It also played a crucial 
role as a first step before movement and entry into the 
backyard sector and to the owner-occupied tenures.
Allocation in this sector was on the basis of invasion of 
available piece of land. However, where the invasion of a 
piece of land and the subsequent erection of a shack had 
been undertaken by a potential landlord who was interested 
in speculative activities or who wanted to make a rate of 
return through renting, allocation was both through 
effective demand and by agreement between the landlord and 
the tenant. In the latter case the overriding objective was 
the prevention of the invaded piece of land being taken over 
by potential land invaders, hence a tenant in this situation 
may or may not pay rent to the landlord.
3.9.5 Owner-occupation of privately built housing
In addition to the tenure changes affecting the council- 
built housing stock, there has also been a total of 14,953 
houses constructed in Greater Soweto since the mid-1980s by 
private developers with financing from banks and other
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financial institutions (table 3.31). The conditions through 
which these units originated are examined in Chapters 7 and 
8. As table 3.31 shows, there are considerable variations 
both in terms of the location and size of this stock in the 
Greater Soweto submarkets. Thus, 33.2 per cent of these 
units are located in the Chiawelo/Protea local housing 
market, 13.3 per cent in Pimville/Klipspruit, 12.3 per cent 
in Dobsonville and the rest are scattered through the other 
local housing markets of Greater Soweto (table 3.31). These 
units only represent 26 per cent of the entire formal 
housing stock in Greater Soweto that is privately owned (see 
also table 3.29). As has already been shown (see table 
3.29), there are 40,172 council-built units (out of a total 
of 102,018) in Greater Soweto that have moved into the 
owner-occupied sector.
The privately constructed houses (table 3.31) were built by 
private developers specifically for owner-occupation. Two 
specific forms of tenure submarkets and associated property 
rights exist within the owner-occupied sector of privately 
built housing: a) outright owner-occupation of a house and
b) owner-occupation of a dwelling which is bonded or 
mortgaged to a financial institution and paid for over a 
long period of time. Unfortunately, there are no known 
figures on these tenure submarkets. However, in Orlando 
West, only 3 heads of households out of the surveyed sample 
of 42 owner-occupiers bought their houses outright. The rest 
had mortgage bonds with financial institutions (see
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Table 3.31: Owner-occupied housing built with private sector 
finance
Local housing 
area
Number of houses Percentage of 
total number of 
houses
Pimville/
Klipspruit 2 093 13.9
Orlando East 9 0.06
Orlando West 393 2.6
Moroka/Jabavu 724 4.9
Mofolo/Zondi 183 1.2
Chiawelo/Protea 4 965 33.2
Senaoane 261 1.7
Tladi 742 4.9
Zola 884 5.9
Meadowlands East 397 2.6
Meadowlands West 495 3.3
Diepkloof 1 956 13.0
Dobsonville 1 851 12.3
Total 14 953 100
Source: Soweto, Diepmeadow and Dobsonville statistics, 1994. 
See also table 3.6, column 6.
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also Appendix Al, table A.2). The ability to pay determined 
allocation of privately built housing within these owner- 
occupied tenure submarkets.
3.9.6 Renting privately built housing
Although the private sector housing was built for the owner- 
occupied tenure submarkets described in the preceding 
section, not all household heads owned their dwellings. Some 
of these dwellings had been repossessed by the mortgage bond 
lenders (banks and other financial institutions) as a result 
of the problem of mortgage bond arrears. To secure a 
commercial rate of return to bonded houses, mortgage bond 
lenders have responded by selling repossessed properties or 
providing rental arrangements to the owner-occupiers who 
were in arrears and could not afford to maintain monthly 
mortgage bond repayments. The effect of this was to change 
the tenure status of households from owner-occupiers to 
tenants of mortgage bond lenders.
Renting from mortgage bond lenders is illustrated well by 
the Meadowlands sample of heads of households all of whom 
occupied privately built housing constructed by private 
developers. Thus, of the surveyed heads of households, 10.5 
per cent were renting their accommodation from mortgage bond 
lenders (financial institutions), while 89.4 per cent owned 
their homes (table 3.31). These tenure divisions (renting 
from mortgage bond lenders, owner-occupation tied to
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mortgage bonds and outright owner-occupation) constituted 
different housing and property rights in the different 
submarkets of Greater Soweto.
The rental costs for those renting their homes were R400- 
R499 per month, whilst the mortgage/bond repayments ranged 
from R500 to R1,000 per month (table 3.32). Of the 89.4 per 
cent owner-occupiers (table 3.32), 5.8 per cent paid R500- 
R599, 14.1 per cent R600-R699, 43.5 per cent R700-R799, 15.2 
per cent R800-899 and 4.7 per cent R1,000 per month for the 
occupation and use of their dwellings.
Table 3.32: Monthly bond repayments for owner-occupiers and 
rentals for properties in possession
Monthly repayments 
(Rand)
Number of
households
heads
Percentage 
of total 
household 
heads
400 - 499@ 9 10.5
500 - 599 5 5.8
600 - 699 12 14.1
700 - 799 37 43.5
800 - 899 13 15.2
900 - 999 5 5.8
1000 + 4 4.7
Total 85 100
@ Monthly rentals for properties in possession.
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3.10 Housing conditions and market externalities
A striking feature of the Greater Soweto council-built 
housing is the regularity of the layout of the areas, 
described by one visitor as a 'severe barracks-like 
order1.5 Another feature of the council-built housing units 
is that they are characterised by an outside lavatory 
(toilet). The age characteristics of the housing units 
varies widely. Notably, the entire housing stock of Orlando 
East is approximately 60 years old or more, whilst half of 
Orlando West is approximately 50 years old and 58,533 
dwellings in the Soweto area alone are more than 30 years 
old. Of the 12,723 dwellings built by white municipalities 
in Soweto since 1962, only 1,715 units were constructed 
during the early 1980s (see Chapter 5).
Moreover, housing decay in the council-built units has been 
exacerbated by the absence of any maintenance of the stock 
since it was first constructed. Not only were resident 
occupants expected to instal the necessary fittings which 
were not provided by the councils when the houses were first 
constructed, such as floors, doors and window panes: they 
were expected to address the maintenance problems 
themselves. But this could only be done by relatively few 
residents. The majority of residents were either constrained 
by the income realities (as demonstrated by the income
5 See Gorodnov, V. 1983. Soweto: Life and Struggles of 
a South African Township, p. 63. Progress Publishers, 
Moscow.
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profile of the Orlando West sample) or simply had no need to 
maintain these houses, particularly because of the temporary 
urban status conferred on them (see Chapter 4). As a result 
a substantial repairs problem has become a characteristic 
feature of the housing stock.
The provision of services in Greater Soweto is poor and 
inadequate. The nature of service provision is characterised 
by the persistent problem of interruption (cuts) to the 
water supply and burst water pipes (see figure 3.14), the 
absence of stormwater drainage (hence stagnant pools of 
water everywhere during the rainy season), lack of street 
lighting (criminals and vigilante groups exploit these 
conditions), the prevalence of garbage on almost every 
street corner and open space because of the absence of 
organised removal, and high levels of pollution produced 
mainly by the use of charcoal cookers and dust from 
deteriorated gravel roads.6
The hostels lack the most basic facilities found in the 
council-built houses.7 Informal shacks also lack service 
provision, such as electricity, water supply and proper 
sanitation facilities. The stench caused by the sewerage 
overflows in most townships of Greater Soweto, and the
6 See for example, PLANACT, 1989. The Soweto Rent 
Boycott, A Report by PLANACT, Commissioned by The Soweto 
Delegation, PLANACT, Yeoville.
7 See Morris, P. 1980. Soweto: A Review of Existing 
Conditions and some Guidelines for Change, Urban Foundation, 
Johannesburg.
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Figure 3.14: Burst water pipes
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blocked overloaded sanitation system has led some residents 
to keep their windows and doors shut. Some of these 
residents are forced to relieve themselves under the cover 
of reeds or on open land.8
Market externalities include the ever present reality of 
violence, particularly expressed through so-called 'taxi 
wars' which characterise the transportation problems of 
township residents. In this respect nobody is safe until 
they have arrived at their intended destinations. Choosing 
to travel by train instead of a taxi exposes one to the 
dangers of being attacked by unidentified men. There is an 
over-capacity of taxis operating between local areas and 
between local areas and Johannesburg. The conflict is often 
triggered by this fact alone, that is, the supply of taxis 
exceeding demand from customers.
It is within this context of competition for scarce 
customers that guns are fired in anger. Travelling in a taxi 
could mean the possibility of being killed (in cross fire 
involving a shootout between the taxi owners) or forcibly 
removed from one's taxi by rival owners and forced into 
their own, being beaten up in the process. The hijacking of 
cars through the use of guns is another feature of Greater 
Soweto. All car users have to live with the fear that they 
could actually be forced to give up their cars or possibly 
be killed if they resist. This affects potential development
8 Sunday Times, 22 January 1995.
126
projects because project officers, road engineers, and other 
such personnel are often targeted for their cars. Some have 
actually been killed. It is these externalities which also 
make the Greater Soweto housing markets different.
3.11 Summary
This chapter has shown how the population is distributed 
spatially and across the housing stock. In view of the 
limitations of accurate population data, it was found 
necessary to utilise various estimates for the purpose of 
understanding the distribution of people in different 
sectors of the housing system: the formal housing stock,
hostels, backyard and informal units. The age-gender base 
was shown to have significantly narrowed towards a 50:50 
male-female split.
The findings of this chapter have shown that Greater Soweto 
comprises a diversity of housing situations, and by 
extension, a proliferation of tenures. This chapter has 
shown the structure of housing markets in terms of the 
administration and composition of different local housing 
markets: size of local areas, size of the housing stock,
geographical location of the housing stock and housing 
types.
The position of households within the housing structure: 
pensioner households, households headed by a single adult
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and households with young children was also shown. The 
occupation and income profiles of households, and the cost 
of housing in different sectors was assessed and described. 
Also shown in this chapter was the part played by Orlando 
West in the Greater Soweto housing market as a whole, as a 
place both for long term residents and newcomers. The 
findings of this chapter suggest also that the Greater 
Soweto housing markets are today characterised both by 
stability and mobility within and between the different 
sectors.
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CHAPTER FOUR
THE DEVELOPMENT OF HOUSING MARKETS, 1820-late 1960s
4.1 Introduction
Any inquiry into present day housing markets in Greater 
Soweto will be assisted by being placed within an account of 
the emergence and subsequent development of the capitalist 
mode of production that was imposed in South Africa in the 
course of its colonisation by Europeans. This is important 
because it is the long term processes of the development of 
capitalism in South Africa that have led to the existing 
social-spatial structure and the present-day position of 
African people in the housing system and the economy.
4.2 Settler colonisation and the development of mining
Until the late 1820s, the 'settler colonial' economy was 
dominated by agricultural and mercantile activities of 
farmers and merchants concentrated in colonial towns, 
notably Cape Town and Port Elizabeth. During this period 
there also existed a number of indigenous states such as the 
Pedi, Mpondo and Zulu kingdoms. From the 1830s colonial 
towns were characterised by a rapid growth of 'commercial 
and financial institutions'.1 The expansion of colonial
• 1 Mabin, A. 1992. Dispossession, exploitation and 
struggle: an historical overview of South African
urbanization. In D.M. Smith, The Apartheid City and Beyond, 
Routledge, London and New York.
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settlers in the mid-1830s from coastal colonial towns into 
the interior sparked off conflict with indigenous 
inhabitants, resulting in the loss of rights in land and 
housing for African communities, forced labour for 
colonialists and the growth of a commercial sector 
characterised by 'exchange relationships1.2
An expanding trading and export industry of wine and wool 
products began to develop by the late 1840s. These economic 
changes began to pressure Africans (rural-to-urban 
migration) to enter the wage economy in colonial ports and 
towns: on docks, railways, warehouses and the emerging 
manufacturing industries. Africans wielded bargaining 
advantages because they could rely on the indigenous economy 
for alternative employment and could leave an employer for 
better wages and conditions elsewhere. As a result some 
employers paid higher wages to attract workers.3
Economic activity from the 1850s was characterised by both 
the growth of foreign investment and a rapidly expanding 
export of diamonds (discovered in Kimberely in 1867).
Between 1869 and 1870 several minor gold fields were 
discovered in the Transvaal Republic (a Boer state formed in 
1858).4 These mineral discoveries wrought an aggressive
2 Ibid.
3 Freund, B. 1988. The African Worker, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge.
4 Marks, S. and Trapido, S. 1979. "Lord Milner and the 
South African State", History Workshop, 8. pp. 50-80.
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recruitment drive for the mining sector. Alongside the 
mineral discoveries were rapid changes (both in scale and 
character) in other economic and urban activities: 
agriculture, commerce, transport and construction. In turn 
these economic changes had a huge impact on rural-to-urban 
migration as African communities found themselves pressured 
to tap into the growing wage-labour economy.5
From the 1870s onwards the British imperial and mining 
interests grew rapidly. In 1871 the British annexed the 
diamond fields at Kimberly. In 1877 the British annexed the 
Transvaal Republic (also referred to as Zuid Afrikaansche 
Republiek (ZAR) or South African Republic SAR). Although the 
British withdrew from the SAR in 1881 following the Boer 
uprising: they insisted on being recognised as the paramount 
power in the region.6 In 1886 deep-level gold fields were 
discovered on the Witwatersrand in the Transvaal, from where 
Johannesburg was founded. By 1889 De Beers Consolidated 
Mines had monopolised the diamond mining industry."7
By then not only was the scale of economic changes 
unprecedented, but a number of indigenous states such as the 
Pedi, Mpondo and Zulu kingdoms had already been destroyed
(depriving Africans of rights to their land) and replaced by
the British-controlled Cape Province and the Afrikaner
5 Mabin, A. 1992. (1, op.cit.)
6 Marks, S. and Trapido, S. 1979. (4, op.cit.)
 ^ Ibid., see also Mabin, A. 1992. (1, op.cit.)
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Republics following the wars fought between 1879 and 1902: 
the Zulu war of 1879, the Anglo-Boer wars in 1880 and 1881 
and the Gun (frontier war) of 1881 in the Cape. But it was 
the Jameson Raid of 1895 and the Anglo-Boer war of 1899-1902 
which marked a decisive shift from the previous wars. The 
Anglo-Boer war (including the imperial war propaganda which 
stressed British guardianship of African political rights), 
for example, appears to have been designed to make mining 
investments safe, as well as creating the necessary 
conditions for the development of the capitalist mode of 
production. As Marks and Trapido argued,
"The goal of British policy in Southern Africa ... had 
little to do with granting Africans political rights, or 
with 'freedom and justice1. Imperial goals are 
determined by the interest of imperial ends: in the case 
of southern Africa, there was no intention to change the 
[colonial] property relations already existing in the 
region, though the war and the reconstruction that 
followed it were intended to transform the nature of the 
class structure of the territory by hastening the 
development of a capitalist state, which would be more 
capable of fulfilling the demands of the mining 
industry.118
Prior to the Anglo-Boer war, President Kruger's SAR was 
characterised by both an agrarian economy (landholdings and 
agriculture) and the existence of merchant capital. During 
the early 1880s, however, Kruger's concessions policy9 (to 
financial investors who included mine magnates) had already
8 Marks, S. and Trapido, S. 1979. (4, op.cit. p. 52)
9 Production, distribution, exchange and trading rights 
specifically granted to commercial monopolies, notably the 
dynamite monopoly and the concession granted to a railway 
commercial company. The existence of these monopolies had 
the effect both of adding to the costs of mineral production 
and of preventing free trade.
132
stimulated the growth of a labour- and capital-intensive 
mining industry, construction (railways and roads) industry, 
goods and transport industry (cabbies and later electric 
trams), domestic industry (washerman and later laundry), 
factories, breweries, offices and shops.10
The Rand had already been linked by rail with the Cape in 
1893 and with Delagoa Bay (Mozambique) and Natal in 1895. 
The recent discovery of the vast seems of deep-level gold 
had also brought into the Witwatersrand region (the Rand) 
European financial and technological capital and waves of 
immigrants. These immigrants included speculators, skilled 
labour, prostitutes and pimps attracted from Europe and
America, poor whites pushed out from the agricultural 
sector11 and Africans from the rural hinterlands displaced 
by white settlers. Dispossession (depriving Africans of
rights to use land) had labour supply consequences.
Kruger's government had been determined to assist the
gradual growth of an independent industrial base which would
largely be sustained by the agrarian economy. Kruger's 
concession policy which had assisted the growth of the above 
industries appears to have been designed to facilitate 
(rather than displace and destroy) the growth of an export- 
led agrarian economy. It was to this end that Kruger's
10 van Onselen, C. 1982. Studies in the Social and 
Economic History of the Witwatersrand 1186-1914, Vol. 1 New 
Babylon, Longman, New York.
11 Ibid.
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tariffs (taxation policy) on the mining sector were 
directed. The success of the brewing industry, for example, 
which had converted agricultural produce into distilled 
liquor products (accruing substantial profits as a result) 
was important to the Kruger government, hence the policy of 
protecting agricultural producers. This industry had 
produced mixed results. On the one hand the mine-owners 
(with financial interests in the industry) had benefitted 
from the profits, on the other hand alcohol consumption was 
considered to be detrimental because of its perceived 
lowering of the productivity of the workers.12
Furthermore, some of the industries mentioned above 
frequently offered higher wages. Workers were still free to 
move between employers in search of better wages. A 
significant percentage of African workers in these 
industries also worked as 'target113 or temporary workers 
often for shorter periods under the 'togt system' (casual 
labour). Under this system Africans could decide when to 
work and not to work, aided in this by the fact that there 
also existed employers offering only casual work, demanding 
low paid labour only for specific jobs. The 'togt'system and 
the consumption of alcohol by black workers became 
unacceptable to the mining magnates as they made it
12 Ibid.
13 See for example, Newbury, C.W. 1975. Historical 
Aspects of Manpower and Migration in Africa South of the 
Sahara, in Colonialism in Africa 1870-1960: The Economics of 
Colonialism, Vol. 4, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
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difficult to meet the labour needs of the mines. This was at 
a time when the exploitation of low grade ores at deeper 
levels of between 4,000 ft and or more entailed substantial 
production costs to the so-called 'Randlords* (mine- 
owners).14 In order to cut labour costs and ensure a ready 
supply of labour, the mine owners pressured the Government 
for a more coercive regime15 in controlling the black 
workforce in other industries besides their own.
The Randlords demanded government assistance in meeting the 
costs of materials (such as the dynamite, the supply of 
which had been monopolised) necessary for deep-level mining 
operations. Other demands from the mine magnates to the 
Kruger government were: as described by Marks and Trapido,
"the call for the transformation of the 
machinery of state for a modern bureaucracy, ... an 
effective police force and incorrupt judiciary ... the 
call for the elimination of the concessions policy and 
the operation of free trade with reduction and 
elimination of tariffs ... the calls for the mechanisms 
to control and direct labour ... the need to ensure the 
reproduction of the labour force both black and 
white ... the magnates themselves sought to reduce and 
eliminate competition among themselves and between 
themselves and commercial farming and commercial 
capital ... they sought institutions which would create 
ideological supports for the new economic order ... a 
compliant press as well as a suitably adapted 
educational system ... essential if the stabilization as 
well as the reproduction of the white working class was 
to be achieved.1116
14 Walshe, A.P. 1986. "Southern Africa". In A.D. 
Roberts (ed.), The Cambridge History of Africa, Vol. 7, 
1905-1940, pp. 544-601. Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge.
15 Marks, S. and Trapido, S. 1979. (4, op.cit.)
15 Marks, S. and Trapido, S. 1979. (4, op.cit. p. 63)
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Kruger1s government introduced some of the reforms demanded 
by the mine magnates, such as the total prohibition of the 
sale of beer to Africans and granted citizenship to British 
immigrants (uitlanders) who had been denied the vote.17 
However, the Kruger government did not concede to all the 
major demands noted above. According to Van Onselen, to have 
conceded to all the pre-war demands of the so-called 
Randlords, Kruger would have given away his country to the 
British.13 As a result, Kruger's government was seen by 
the Randlords to be remote,19 not capable of practising 
capitalism and devoid of economic, political and military 
control on the Rand.
This was also a period in which Britain's gold reserves were 
very insecure as demonstrated by the 1890 Baring crisis,20 
a situation which threatened Britain's 'monetary power in 
the world'.21 Moreover, there was also the Great 
Depression of 1873-1896, and British manufacturing markets 
now challenged by Germany and America,22 the British 
imperial army was at war in 1899 against the Boer
17 van Onselen, C. 1982. (10, op.cit.)
18 Ibid.
19 Marks, S. and Trapido, S. 1979. (4, op.cit.)
20 See Hobsbawm, E.J. 1989. The Age of Empire 1875- 
1914, Cardinal, London.
21 Ibid., see also Marks, S. and Trapido, S. 1979. (4, 
op.cit.)
22 Hobsbawm, E.J. 1989. (20, op.cit.)
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republic.23 At the outbreak of war in 1899 the Rand 
accounted for about 27 per cent of the world's gold output.
4.3 The subjugation of black labour
The development of the capitalist system and its 
considerable expansion in South Africa was both a 
violent24 and an unrewarding experience for black people. 
Although blacks had been forced to participate in its 
creation and subsequent expansion, they were excluded from 
its benefits. The forced recruitment drive of Randlords 
appears to have been designed to upset African pre-settler 
systems of production, distribution and exchange, deprive 
Africans of rights in land and housing, and prevent them 
from successful competition through extra-economic forces to 
increase the supply of cheap African labour.25
The way in which African became paid workers (in the labour 
market) was very different from that of whites. In 1870 a 
compound system was introduced to prevent illicit diamond 
trade.26 It became a means of producing and maintaining
23 See Marks, S. and Trapido, S. 1979. (4, op.cit.)
24 Legassick, M. 1975. "Capital Accumulation and 
Violence in South Africa", Economy and Society, 3:3, pp. 
253-291.
25 Wolpe, H. 1975. "Capitalism and Cheap Labour Power 
in South Africa: From Segregation to Apartheid". In Economy 
and Society, 1, pp. 425-455.
26 Turrell, R. 1982. Kimberley: labour and compounds, 
1871-1888. In S. Marks and R. Rathbone, Industrialisation 
and Social Change in South Africa, Longman, London.
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inequality between black and white workers. It also became a 
system of isolating and degrading black workers, who were 
searched and kept naked for several hours at the end of 
their shift. The pass system was introduced in 1896. It 
enabled the mining magnates to enforce a more effective 
compound regime (effectively a housing/residential location 
control).
The mine-owners had established the Witwatersrand Native 
Labour Association (WNLA) to unify labour recruitment 
policies. However, the tendency of competing mining 
interests to poach labour from other mines, which had the 
effect of raising the price of labour, continued. Because of 
this conflict and competition within the mining industry, 
the Robinson Group broke ranks with the WNLA in order to 
pursue its policies. The period leading to the outbreak of 
the Boer war of 1899-1902 saw the WNLA being replaced by the 
Chamber of Mines (representing diverse mining interests such 
as De Beers, Central Mining and Investment Corporation, and 
Eckstein and Company). In its attempt to unify African 
labour recruitment policies, hold down wages and prevent the 
free movement of labour between mines, the Chamber of Mines 
sought support from the Government. The Government gave way 
to the demands of mining magnates for labour recruitment 
policies designed to lower the costs of reproduction. 
Desertion from the mines was outlawed, strikes by Africans 
were prohibited, and a breach of a mining contract became a 
criminal offence.
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After the Boer war (1899-1902) demand for labour in mines 
exceeded supply. As a result, in 1904 the Chamber of Mines, 
with support from Lord Milner's2,7 administration, decided 
to import some 60,000 Chinese workers on three-year
contracts, with the specific purpose of replacing African 
labour in the mines. Despite the costs involved in
recruiting Chinese workers, the mining industry could still 
make substantial profits out of their labour. For example,
it was difficult for the Chinese to desert the mines as they
were banned from taking up any work outside the mines. With 
the introduction of a new regime of policing, these workers 
were forcibly kept within the limits of the mining compounds 
whenever they were not on duty. These workers acquired 
skills and experience to use the new technology introduced 
in the extraction of low grade ore at deeper levels of 
mining.20
These skills had been imparted to the Chinese workers by 
white skilled labour, who had been recruited from America, 
Britain, Australia and other countries. The period 1900-12 
witnessed the importation of white women domestics29 by 
the South African Colonisation Society (SACS) who would
2V Between 1897-1905 Lord Milner (formerly Sir Alfred 
Milner) was British high Commissioner in South Africa. 
During this period, he also held posts as Governor of the 
Cape and Transvaal.
28 See Marks, S. and Trapido, S. 1979. (4, op.cit.); 
Van Onselen, C. 1982. (10, op.cit.); Walshe, A.P. 1986. (14, 
op.cit.)
29 Marks, S. and Trapido, S. 1979. (4, op.cit.); Van 
Onselen, C. 1982. (10, op.cit.)
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release black male labour from the domestic industry to work 
in the mines. The presence of white women was also intended 
to stabilise the predominantly male white skilled section of 
the workforce. This white workforce possessed the knowledge 
necessary for the use of expensive mining machinery for 
deep-level mining which had been imported from Europe. 
Because of their skills they had been attracted by the offer 
of higher wages and placed in supervisory positions within 
the mines.
However, as soon as the African and Chinese workers had 
acquired these skills and experience the mine-owners decided 
to lower the production costs of white workers. When white 
miners went on strike in 1907 against these new conditions, 
mine-owners relied on the skills of the African and Chinese 
workers to break the strike. The Government intervened, 
sending imperial troops to protect strike breakers, and 
mine-owners also provided work to the unemployed Afrikaners. 
These poor unskilled Afrikaners were nevertheless placed 
into supervisory positions in the mines. There was agitation 
from unemployed Afrikaners against Chinese labour: they
demanded their repatriation and the Chinese workers were 
eventually repatriated back to China in 1908.30
African labour recruitment polices of mine-owners were 
consolidated under the Native Labour Regulation Act of 1911. 
Their impact was to increase the supply of forced labour and
30 Ibid.
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yet hold down the wages of Africans to a subsistence level. 
Africans were required by law to carry one or more passes 
which enabled employers to restrict movement of black 
workers in towns, the right to choose residential location 
and access to housing.
4.4 Politics, race and the capitalist economy. 1899-1939
When the 1899-1902 war ended, the British (who had annexed 
the SAR in 1901) had achieved economic, political and 
military control over the Africans and the Boers. The war 
years had disrupted production, supplies and dispersed 
labour. However, the capitalist economic foundations 
characterised by an emerging industrial development also 
occurred during and after the war.
Central to the post-war administration of Lord Milner was a 
reconstruction programme aimed at restoring profitability to 
capitalist investors and addressing severe labour shortages 
(hence the importation of Chinese workers). For the social, 
political and economic reconstruction programme to move 
forward, the Milner administration also began implementation 
of the pre-war demands of mine magnates (discussed in 4.2). 
In 1905, under the Milner administration, the report of the 
South African Native Affairs Commission (SANAC) made 
proposals for a racially defined society: strict segregation
141
of Africans by race, land ownership, residential location 
and political representation.31
The 'native policy1 contained in the SANAC report also 
proposed to forcibly squeeze out indigenous African 
producers from the land in order to create a workforce out 
of them (thus establishing in the long-term circular labour 
migration). A precedent of this racially determined order 
both in terms of race and land policy (dispossession of 
African land and the denial of individual tenure to Africans 
or title rights to urban property) was established in the 
Cape under the Glen Grey Act of 1894 by Cecil Rhodes.32
The post-war elections of 1907 brought self-government in 
the Transvaal to the defeated Afrikaner wartime leaders: 
Louis Botha and Jan Christian Smuts and their organisation, 
Het Volk (The People), and in the Orange Free State to Barry 
Munnik Hertzog and his organisation, Orange Unie33 
(Union). In 1910 a single capitalist state dominated by 
whites was established with the unification (Union of South
3X Freund, B. 1984. The Making of Contemporary Africa, 
Macmi11an, London.
32 Ibid.; See also, Dubow, S. 1987. Race, civilisation 
and culture: the elaboration of segregationist discourse in 
the inter-war years. In S. Marks and S. Trapido, The 
Politics of Race, Class and Nationalism in Twentieth Century 
South Africa, Longman, London; Davenport, R. 1991. 
Historical background of the apartheid city to 1948. In M. 
Swilling, R. Humphries and K. Shubane, Apartheid City in 
Transition.
33 Freund, B. 1984. (31, op.cit.); Marks, S. and 
Trapido, S. 1987. The politics of race, class and 
nationalism. In S. Marks and S. Trapido (eds), (31, op.cit.)
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Africa) of the colonies of the Cape, Orange Free State and 
Transvaal.
The Union government (with Louis Botha as prime minister), 
unlike the Kruger regime before the war, was prepared to 
compromise with mining capital and imperial interests, but 
failed to meet the challenge of the perceived social, 
economic and political aspirations of Afrikaners who formed 
the largest voting constituency: in particular, their
national identity, history, language and culture.34 
Factions began to emerge within the ruling strata when 
Hertzog broke ranks with Botha and formed the National Party 
in 1913 with emphasis on the Afrikaner language question. 
According to Marks and Trapido, there also emerged a new 
Afrikaner intelligentsia who
"called for the systematic revision of the vernacular to 
create a standardised respectable Afrikaans, purged of 
its lower-class and 'Coloured' associations and capable 
of holding its own against English. Its Dutch 
inheritance was to be strengthened to give Afrikaans a 
modern technical and professional vocabulary and link it 
with a European language ... no artefact was too 
substantial or too small not to have its Afrikaans 
version, no occupation too eminent or too humble, not to 
have its Afrikaans mutation."35
By 1914 about 40 per cent of the world's gold output was 
being produced on the Rand. Mining accounted for 27 per cent 
of national income, with agriculture generating 17 per cent 
and manufacturing 7 per cent. During the same year domestic
34 Marks, S and Trapido, S. 1987. (31, op.cit.)
35 Marks, S. and Trapido, S. 1987. (32, op.cit., p. 17)
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exports amounted to £64m36 (£43m worth in gold and the
remainder deriving from diamonds, wool and agriculture). The 
period 1914-1920 witnessed the consolidation of firms in 
these key extraction and production sectors. But, it was 
also a period in which the economy grew slowly: the decline 
in gold output in 1916 and the abandonment of the gold 
standard in Britain in 1919.3V
By the time of Louis Botha's death in 1919, blacks had 
become more skilled and semi-skilled both in the mining 
sector and the emerging secondary manufacturing industries 
(albeit still poorly paid), and employers had increasingly 
opted for their labour than that of whites. This had the 
effect of excluding unskilled white workers3® from 
employment who, because of the colour of their skin could 
only be employed at higher wages. Amongst the growing number 
of unemployed whites were recent Afrikaner immigrants to the 
city who had been driven off the land by the current 
depression.39
When Smuts succeeded Botha in 1919, his South African Party 
was seriously being challenged for power by the growth of 
Afrikaner nationalism. SANLAM, an Afrikaner insurance 
company had been established in the Cape, and a secret
36 Walshe, A.P. 1986. (14, op.cit.)
3V Ibid.
38 Ibid.
39 Ibid.
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society, Broederbond, based on Calvinist theology and 
ideological orientation was founded in 1919.40 The Labour 
Party (led by Frederick Creswell), with similar aspirations 
to the National Party (described above), had already been 
swept into power in the City Council of Johannesburg 
following the 1918 local elections.
Creswell had campaigned for the introduction of a job 
'colour bar' (also referred to as a 'civilised') labour 
policy41 aimed at protecting Afrikaner workers from the 
rationalisation of industrial and mining labour policies. 
These labour policies were seen to be responsible for the 
de-skilling and job fragmentation of white workers. Of the 
total 210,000 workforce employed in the mines in 1918, 
180,000 were black, 15,750 were Africaners and the remainder 
were white mineworkers from Europe and elsewhere.42 Most 
of the European skilled artisans who had earlier dominated 
the mining industry had gone on active service during the 
First World War, and the vacancies created had been filled 
by Afrikaners.43
In 1920 the Smuts government established the Reserve Bank, 
and by 1922 had set up the national supply commission
40 Walshe, A.P. 1984. (14, op.cit.); Marks, S. and 
Trapido, S. 1987. (32, op.cit.)
41 Lipton, M. 1986. Capitalism and Apartheid, Gower, 
Hants.
42 Walshe, A.P. 1986. (14, op.cit.)
43 Ibid.
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(ESCOM) and made plans for the creation of the national iron 
industry (ISCOR). With the growth of nationalised industries 
and the expansion of both manufacturing and commercial 
activities (including greater protectionism and subsidies 
for white agriculture), the dominance of foreign investment 
was gradually replaced by local investment. The Smuts 
government imposed taxes on profits made by mining 
companies. The revenue raised was ploughed back as 
investment into nationalised industries.44
In 1921 the Chamber of Mines proposed to reduce its wage 
bill for 21,000 white mineworkers by replacing 2,000 semi­
skilled whites with black labour. In response to the Chamber 
of Mines' proposals which were subsequently put into effect, 
white workers went on strike (the Rand Revolt) in 1922. The 
potential replaceability of white workers by black labour 
was underlined by this strike in that production in the 
mines continued much as before.45 This strike was 
repressed by Smuts.
In 1924, Smuts lost power to the nationalists. A 'Pact 
Government' (an alliance of the National Party and Labour 
Party) was formed, with Hertzog as prime minister and 
Creswell in charge of the new ministry of labour. The colour 
bar or 'civilised labour' policy became law. This policy had
44 Wilson, F. 1984. Southern Africa. In M. Crowder, 
(ed), The Cambridge History of Africa, Vol. 8, 1940-1975, 
pp. 251-330. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
45 Walshe, A.P. 1986. (14, op.cit.)
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serious implications for the African population. Thousands 
of skilled and semi-skilled black workers began to be 
replaced rapidly by white labour in all sectors of the 
economy.46 This policy further entrenched and consolidated 
class divisions between white and black working classes. 
According to Lipton,
"The 1924 election settled not only the struggle over 
the colour bar and civilised labour policy, but also the 
questions of protection and subsidy for White 
agriculture and manufacturing. It was a major victory 
for 'white' national interests against foreign capital, 
ensuring that a high proportion of surplus generated by 
the gold mines would be ploughed back into the 
development of the SA economy, rather than repatriated 
abroad, despite the fact that foreigners then held 80 
per cent of gold mining shares."4,7
The late 1920s were characterised by the world depression: a 
remarkable decline in economic activity, deteriorating 
agricultural base, rise in unemployment, poor wages and 
labour struggles waged between workers and employers. Mining 
investment during the 1930s had become to be dominated by a 
single conglomerate (in both diamonds and gold), Sir Ernest 
Oppenheimer's Anglo American Corporation.48 This 
conglomerate began to invest in other industries besides 
mining.
There was a rise in the price of gold after 1930 as a result 
of which Hertzog's government abandoned the gold standard in
46 Ibid.
4,7 Lipton, M. 1986. (41, op.cit. p. 366.)
48 Freund, B. 1984. (31, op.cit.)
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1932 and Roosevelt devalued the US dollar in 1934.49 The 
United Party was formed in 1933 when Hertzog's National 
Party was fused with Smuts' South African Party to meet the 
challenge of the depression. Divisions within the Afrikaner 
nationalist movement were created by this fusion. Hertzog 
was seen to have abandoned the interests and aspirations of 
Afrikaner nationalism. This split resulted in the formation 
in 1934 of the Purified Nationalist Party (PNP), led by Dr 
Daniel Francois Malan.50 From its formation, the PNP came 
to be dominated by Calvinist Broederbond intellectuals who 
stressed the destiny of their language and culture in 
relation to their service to God, their biological 
superiority over Africans and the dangers of a foreign 
capitalism.51 This set the stage in the long-term for a 
determined struggle waged for the control of the capitalist 
system by Afrikaaners against foreign interests.
The growth of manufacturing after 1935 marked a decisive 
shift (as a result of a boom created by soaring gold prices) 
from the dominance of mining, with introduction of new 
economic activities. ISCOR went into production in 1934. 
Between 1936 and 1958 the area of land with access to 
electricity supply rose from 20,000 sq. miles to 139,000 sq 
miles. In 1961 ISCOR's output of steel rose to 2.4 million
49 Wilson, F. 1984. (44, op.cit.)
50 Freund, B. 1984. (31, op.cit.); Marks, S. and 
Trapido, S. 1987. (32, op.cit.)
5X Marks, S. and Trapido, S. 1987. (32, op.cit.); 
Wilson, F. 1984. (44, op.cit.)
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tons and to over 5 million tons by 1975.52
4.5 Dispossession of land rights and African resistance
The 1913 Land Act was a consolidating one. This Act was used 
as a legal mechanism for the expropriation of 87 per cent of 
African land. It also became the major urban policy 
mechanism of forcing blacks off their land. Because of the 
forceful expropriation53 permitted by this Act, Africans 
became squatters on what had been their own land. They were 
now also prevented from buying and owning this land and 
prohibited too from sharecropping (renting land) from white 
farmers. The land rental arrangements currently in existence 
(between white farmers and African tenants) were immediately 
terminated by the Act. Instead, the compound system was 
extended to farms. The former tenants were now obliged to 
become farm labourers often at subsistence wages or under 
conditions amounting to slavery.
The 1913 Act also provided for setting up a system of 
1 reserves1. The reserves system would maintain the continued 
supply of migrant labour. Africans were required to work in 
the mines and to return to the land designated as 'reserves’ 
when their contracts had expired54 or to spend the rest of 
their lives in the reserves. The reserves were literally
52 Wilson, F. 1984. (44, op.cit.)
53 Legassick, M. 1975. (24, op.cit.)
54 Wolpe, H. 1975. (25, op.cit.)
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reservoirs of labour.
The pass system too had been designed to complement the 
reserves system. It also served as a mechanism for enforcing 
racial divisions in the work place. Africans were required 
to carry passes at all times. Passes entitled one to 
movement (albeit controlled) in designated areas and to 
employment subject to the availability of jobs. The failure 
to meet the requirements of the pass system attracted prison 
terms often to be carried out working for white farmers or 
in labour camps.
The creation of the reserves also involved the coercion of 
tribal authorities55 (chiefs). These tribal authorities 
were under threat of physical punishment to collect poll 
taxes, hut taxes and dog taxes in their respective regions. 
They were also obliged to carry out various policing duties 
on behalf of the Government, such as informing the local 
government officers of events in their areas, assisting with 
labour recruitment for the mines and the construction 
industry (roads and railways and other colonial and imperial 
projects). Failure to meet these obligations and resistance 
was regarded as treason punishable by death.56
55 Roux, E. 1978. Time Longer Than Rope, The University
of Wisconsin Press, London.
56 Ibid.
150
More than 4,000 Africans5"7 were put to death for failing 
to pay the poll tax. When Chief Bambata (acknowledged by 
Africans as a great leader whose heroism was later to 
inspire the liberation movements) was killed for rising 
against the poll tax, his head was cut off and displayed to 
his subjects. This was intended as a warning and deterrent 
against disaffection and resistance to the poll tax.58 We 
can learn something of the thinking of those in Government 
from the published contemporary writing of Lord Alfred 
Milner (then Administrator of the Transvaal) in 1903:
"Our welfare depends upon increasing the quantity of 
our white population, but not at the expense of its 
quality. We do not want a white proletariat in this 
country. The position of whites among the vastly 
numerous black population requires that even their 
lowest ranks should be able to maintain a standard of 
living far above that of the poorest section of the 
population of a purely white country...However you 
look at the matter, you always come back to the root 
principle - the urgency of that development which 
alone can make this a white man's country in the only 
sense in which South Africa can become one, and that 
is, not a country full of poor whites, but one in 
which a largely increased white population can live 
in decency and comfort. That development requires 
capital, but it also requires a large amount of rough 
labour. And that labour cannot to any extent, be 
white, if only because, pending development and 
subsequent reduction in the cost of living, white 
labour is much too dear."59
In 1912, the Native African Congress (later African National 
Congress) was set up. From its formation it tended to be 
reformist, basing its programme on constitutional methods
57 Ibid.
58 Ibid.
59 Quoted from Marks, S. and Trapido, S. 1979. (4, 
op.cit. p. 66.)
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and its faith in Britain. The ANC focused on defending 
existing rights, such as the 'property vote',60 and had no 
effective strategy aimed at gaining power, instead it was 
more concerned to see the Cape 1 property vote' extended to 
the whole of South Africa.61
Until 1918 African resistance to segregationist policies was 
minimal. By 1919, alongside the ANC had grown up the 
Industrial and Commercial Union (ICU). Under this union 
African workers began organising and engaging in various 
strike actions throughout the country. But it was the 1920 
African mineworkers strike which was particularly 
noteworthy. Provoked by the intransigence of mine-owners 
over demands for higher wages that would match those of 
white miners, this strike brought out more than 72,000 
African workers.62 White mineworkers refused to support 
the strike as it threatened their own survival. The strike 
was suppressed with brutality by the police and army, but it
60 Between 1853 and 1935 Africans qualified to vote in 
the Cape Province provided they could raise a property 
qualification and pass a literacy test. From 1936, however, 
the property franchise was replaced by an Advisory Native 
Representative Council (NRC) which comprised of three 
elected white representatives. The responsibilities of these 
white officials (with no executive power) were to represent 
the interests of those removed from the Cape franchise in 
the House of Assembly. In addition the establishment of the 
NRC also made provision of the entire African population of 
South Africa to elect four white senators who would 
represent their interests. See for example, Walshe, A.P. 
1986. (14, op.cit.); Freund, B. 1984. (31, op.cit.)
61 Lodge, T. 1983. Black Politics in South Africa since 
1945, Longman, New York.
62 Walshe, A.P. 1986. (14, op.cit.)
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registered resistance against both mining capital and the 
job colour bar policy.
It was after this strike that the ANC began identifying 
closely with the interests of African workers. By the early 
1940s, African resistance fundamentally shifted to include 
bus boycotts, the setting up of the Defiance Campaign and 
subsequent adoption of the Freedom Charter in 1955.63 
However, by the 1960s this resistance was effectively 
crushed through the suppression of political and trade union 
movements and the imprisonment of the leaders and activists 
of the organisations. The South African state at this time 
was characterised by unlimited police powers of arrest, 
detention without trial, disappearances and extra-judicial 
murders. The 1970s, however, saw the birth of a new African 
resistance which would in 1994 achieve a new beginning in 
South Africa. This fundamental reversal was triggered by the 
Soweto student revolt64 which contrasted sharply with the 
forms of resistance to the Government's repressive machine 
and capital of earlier decades.
63 ANC 1985. Selected Writing on the Freedom Charter, 
1955-1985, A Sechaba Commemorative Publication, African 
National Congress, London. See also, Walshe, A.P. 1986. (14, 
op.cit.); Lodge, T. 1983. (61, op.cit.)
64 There is a wealth of information on the Soweto 
students' uprising, see for example, Brooks, A. and 
Brickhill, J. 1980. Whirlwind before the Storm: The Origins 
and Development of the Uprising in Soweto and the Rest of 
South Africa from June to December 1976. International 
Defence and Aid Fund for Southern Africa, London.
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4.6 The growth of Johannesburg and the first evictions
Johannesburg started as a mining camp of gold diggers in 
1886, attracting waves of immigrants (colonialists, 
financiers, foreign labour migrants, prostitutes) all of 
whom gained a foothold in the housing market through various 
forms of private rental markets located in various suburbs 
of Johannesburg (see figure 4.1). According to Charles van 
Onselen,
"By 1896 the 3,000 diggers of the original digging 
camp were lost in a town of 100,000 residents and, by 
1914, the 100,000 men were in turn harder to find in 
a city with over a quarter of a million inhabitants.
The inexorable pressure exerted by people, houses, 
shops, offices, factories pushed back the municipal 
boundaries from five square miles in 1898, to nine 
square miles in 1901, and then - more ambitiously 
still - to an enormous 82 square miles in 1903.1165
The settlement patterns for indigenous Africans even at this 
stage (1900) were characterised by varying degrees of 
controls. In the mines black workers were accommodated in 
the compounds. Other workers had to provide for their own 
accommodation, which they did mostly through squatting on 
land owned by the Government and private land owners, as 
most of the surrounding land had either already been bought 
by the Randlords or belonged to the municipality.
As Johannesburg's boundaries continued to be pushed back, 
various clustered settlements of different characteristics
65 van Onselen, C. 1982. (10, op.cit. p. 2)
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soon developed.66 Within these compounds, there also 
developed conditions of squalor, overcrowding and disease 
resultant from the lack of services (stormwater drainage, 
water supply and sewerage system). The lack of a housing 
system that would cope with the rapid rate of urbanisation 
aggravated these conditions. Moreover, the pittance of 
African wages meant that they could not improve their living 
conditions. In 1904 there was an outbreak of bubonic plague 
in Johannesburg. This provided justifications for the 
removal of Africans from the cities. As Beavon has noted,
"Amongst the first, but not the only victims of the 
plague were Black workers. Under the Public Health Act, 
then in force, regulations were promulgated that 
empowered the authorities to remove Black people to a 
site or 'Location1 where they would no longer be a 
health threat to the community.116'7
But if the fear (on the part of the white community) of the 
spread of bubonic plague provided justification for the 
removal of Africans to distant locations and, as happened, 
their subsequent dumping at sites situated close to sewage 
farms and refuse dumps,68 the fact that the health 
syndrome was employed (whether as a pretext or not) in the 
removal of Africans, it allowed the authorities to escape
66 See for example, Moroney, S. 1982. "Mine married 
quarters: the differential stabilisation of the
Witwatersrand workforce, 1900-1920". In S. Marks and R. 
Rathbone (eds) (26, op.cit.)
67 Beavon, K.S.O. 1982. "Black Townships in South 
Africa: Terra Incognita for Urban Geographers", South 
African Geographical Journal, Vol. 64, No. 1, p. 6.
68 Lemon, A. 1991. The Apartheid City. In Lemon, A. 
(ed.), Homes Apart, David Philip, Cape Town.
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Figure 4.1: Map of Johannesburg and its suburbs, 1890-1914
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Economic History of the Witwatersrand, 1886-1914, Vol. 2 New 
Nineveh, p. 58, Longman, New York
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any obligation that they might otherwise have felt to 
rehouse Africans within the city. The bubonic plague had 
struck at a time when both the Government and the Randlords 
had just begun intervening in the housing market by building 
houses for the white working class. Rather than extending 
this intervention to address the housing needs of Africans, 
the white ruling elite instead chose to remove Africans from 
the cities. This laid the basis for later removal strategies 
of Africans from the cities adopted by successive 
governments in South Africa.
In 1904 blacks were forcibly removed from Johannesburg areas 
of Brickfields and Coolie Location and dumped next to a 
sewage site at Klipspruit (figure 4.2), a farm owned by the 
Johannesburg City Council (JCC) some 12 miles south west of 
the town. Klipspruit later became one of Greater Soweto's 
townships. These removals displaced the slum living 
conditions of Africans from Johannesburg's inner cities, but 
failed to improve them at Klipspruit. For no sooner had the 
residents begun to settle at Klipspruit than insanitary 
conditions developed,69 particularly exacerbated by the 
absence of a water-borne sewerage system. The only form of 
rented accommodation to be provided by the JCC was in the 
form of 99 former water tanks (corrugated tin shelters), 
which were cut in half and sealed at one end by a wall.
69 Carr, W.J.P. 1990. Soweto: Its creation, life and 
decline, South African Institute of Race Relations, 
Johannesburg.
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The JCC also leased stands to the residents on which they 
could built their own houses (often shacks) which varied in 
type and quality. The monthly tenancy for these stands cost 
individual residents 5s per month."70 The only difference 
between this form of settlement and informal settlements 
generally was that it had been sanctioned by the Government 
through the JCC, which also generated income from renting 
its own 'water tank1 houses"71 and the residential sites. 
This in turn had the effect of conferring some form of
housing rights to the residents of Klipspruit. It also meant
that those with the means erected bigger shack structures 
with more rooms, which they then rented out. The cost of
these ranged between £2 and £5 per month."72 The fact that 
landlords could earn so much when they themselves paid only 
5s per month to the JCC, suggests that there were some 
profits being made in the Klipspruit shack rental markets.
The removal of residents and their relocation at Klipspruit 
(12 miles away from the CBD of Johannesburg) also posed 
great transportation problems. At that time the public 
transport system had consisted of horse drawn carts
operating as 'cabbies' in the city. Demand for a transport 
service system had generally been sluggish because there was 
very little if any physical separation between workers'
70 Ibid.
71 Payne, R. (undated). The Social History of Soweto, 
paper prepared for IDASA, Urban Research Services, 
Braamfontein.
72 Carr, W.J.P. 1990. (69, op.cit.)
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homes and places of work."73 But the city continued to 
expand, and residence and work became increasingly 
separated, and an electric tram system began running in 1906 
in and around Johannesburg. This development did not benefit 
the residents of Klipspruit. Therefore, for most of this 
period Klipspruit residents had difficulties travelling to 
and from work in Johannesburg. It was not until 1905 that 
the JCC had negotiated with the South African Railways (SAR) 
for a subsidiary rail line off the main Johannesburg and 
Bloemfontein route1"74 (see figure 4.2) that the 
transportation problems of Klipspruit residents eased 
somewhat.
Even with this change, however, Klipspruit residents were 
faced with higher transportation costs than the city 
dwellers. Alongside these transportation costs, the living 
conditions of Klipspruit residents were deteriorating."75 
In 1918 Klipspruit, like other black residential areas 
across South African cities, was swept by an influenza 
epidemic which killed about 200,000 blacks'76 and about 400 
black babies out of every 1,000 lost their lives.
By 1919, confronted with the deterioration of living
73 Ibid.
74 Payne, R. (71, op.cit.)
75 Ibid.
76 Callinicos, L. 1987. Working Life, Ravan Press, 
Johannesburg.
Figure 4.2: Map of Pretoria and the Witwatersrand showing
Klipspruit in relation to Johannesburg in 1905
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conditions, the harassment of those in rent arrears by the 
JCC and rising transportation costs, the residents of 
Klipspruit resolved to take direct action against the 
authorities by attacking the superintendent and the 
administration police.7,7 Although the authorities 
responded to this first community resistance at Klipspruit 
by suppressing it, they also promised to address residents' 
grievances.78 However, the commission of enquiry 
subsequently established by the Transvaal Commission 
Administration (TCA) did not lead to any significant 
alleviation of the community's grievances.
Rural-urban migration had continued apace as a result of the 
impact of both wars (the Boer War and the First World War). 
During the First World War, wartime shortages had resulted 
in the diversification of the economy.79 Whereas most of 
Johannesburg's earlier African population were predominantly 
male migrant workers, after the First World War growing 
numbers of women and children were also drawn into the city. 
Most of these women found work as domestic workers.
However, wartime inflation was disastrous for black workers 
in all sectors of the economy: mines, the emerging
manufacturing industry, domestic industry and 'white' farms. 
Their wages were kept to the already low pre-war levels,80
77 Payne, R. (71, op.cit.)
78 Ibid.
79 Walshe, A.P. 1986. (14, op.cit.)
80 Ibid.; Callinicos, L. 1987. (76, op.cit.)
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and since they had no bargaining power, it is not surprising 
that so many Africans were killed by the influenza epidemic 
of 1918 as they could not provide for their food and 
medicines. Population growth combined with the very low 
wages of Africans also exacerbated overcrowding and 
insanitary conditions where they lived.
In 1921 the JCC's Parks and Estates Committee (PEC) (then 
responsible for the so-called native administration) 
established the Western Native Township (WNT). This 
township, like its predecessor, Klipspruit, was located near 
a sewage disposal site, at Newlands81 (see figure 4.2). 
The PEC built 227 houses for Africans at Western Native 
Township (formerly Brickfields). A further 1,000 units were 
added to Western Native Township by 1927. Also in 1927, 400 
units were constructed at Eastern Native Township. Together 
these townships provided accommodation for about 15,000 
people,82 at an average of 9,2 persons per house. This was 
less than 15 per cent of the total African population of 
Johannesburg, estimated at 96,000 in 1927 (excluding all 
those housed by the mining industry). Even by these 
conservative estimates, it is clear that of the 96,000 
population, a substantial number, 81,000, had to house
8X Proctor, A. 1979. "Class Struggle, Segregation and 
the City: A History of Sophiatown, 1905-1940". In B. Bozzoli 
(ed.), Labour, Townships and Protest, Ravan Press, 
Johannesburg.
82 Lewis, P.R.B. 1966. "A City within a City: The 
Creation of Soweto", South African Geographical Journal, 48, 
pp. 45-85.
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themselves, as a result of which slum living conditions 
became unavoidable.
Up to this time housing for Africans in Johannesburg 
comprised three key sectors: domestic servants' quarters, 
compounds (mining compounds, employers' compounds and 
disused compounds which were either bought or hired from the 
mining sector by the Parks and Estate Committee for housing 
Africans), and municipal townships. Entry into the townships 
was controlled by the criteria of employment and
bureaucratic rules. Only a few employed residents with a 
pass qualified for housing in these two townships. Access to 
mining compounds controlled by the PEC was along similar 
lines. In order to qualify for accommodation in the mining 
compounds one had to be employed in the mines. A similar 
qualification applied to domestic servants' quarters.
4.7. National policy mechanisms
From the preceding section it is clear that until 1921
successive national Governments had no urban policy which 
aimed at housing urban Africans in Johannesburg. But from
1921 the national Government, now largely under pressure
from emerging Afrikaners, enacted various pieces of 
legislation specifically designed to control the movement 
and settlement of Africans. A precedent had been supplied by 
the Native Land Act of 1913, under which (as pointed out 
above), blacks were prohibited from either owning or leasing
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land outside the so-called homelands. This was followed by 
the Native (Urban Areas) Act of 1923 (subsequently amended 
in 1930) which effectively institutionalised residential 
segregation in South Africa. Under the terms of this Act, 
local authorities were required both to segregate the urban 
residential land and to provide housing for employed 
Africans whilst at the same time regulating their entry into 
the cities and controlling their movement within the towns. 
If any local authority failed to implement these measures, 
the Act also empowered the central government to compel them 
to do so, and if this also failed, the state could then step 
in to effect these measures and then compel the local 
authority to meet its costs.33
However, in practice the central government increasingly 
used this Act to obstruct the JCC and the efforts to provide 
housing for urban Africans. Thus it employed various 
bureaucratic tactics, such as withholding loans and 
cancelling or delaying the approval of building contracts as 
a way of controlling the urban influx of Africans. Under the 
1923 Act, Africans could only be allowed entry into urban 
areas subject to their preparedness to serve their white 
employers, and they would have to depart from these areas 
once those tasks had been fulfilled.84 According to Lemon,
83 Carr, W.J.P. 1990. (69, op.cit.)
84 See Lemon, A. (ed), 1991. (68, op.cit.); Carr,
W.J.P. 1990. (69, op.cit.); Parnell, S.M. 1991. "The
ideology of African home-ownership: the establishment of
Dube, Soweto", South African Geographical Journal, Vol. 73, 
No. 2.
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the 1923 Act
"embodied the central principles of segregation (and 
hence relocation) and influx control. All these 
principles were developed and strengthened in 
subsequent legislation up to and in some respects 
including the Botha reforms of the 1980s."®5
The 1923 Act was followed by the Slums Act of 1934 which was 
ostensibly invoked as a mechanism for removing Africans from 
the slumyards of Johannesburg. The Native Laws Amendment Act 
of 1937, increased the administrative measures and policing 
mechanisms over the African urban population. Under the 1937 
Act, for example, Africans had 14 days from the day they 
entered the city to find work or face forced removal and 
deportation to the reserves. By 1945 they had only 3 days to 
find work. The Native (Urban Areas) Consolidated Act No. 25 
of 1945, more elaborately provided a framework for the 
grading and screening of housing applicants according to
their ethnicity, the urban influx qualification of the male,
his family and children, and their residential address (see 
Chapter 6). These 'urban fences186 (influx control 
mechanisms) were manipulated and tightened under the Group 
Areas Act No. 41 of 1950.
Prior to 1950, however, the Smuts government had been under 
pressure from various groups to relax segregation, and its 
own appointed Native Laws Commission (known as the Fagan
85 Lemon, A. (ed), 1991. (68, op.cit. p. 35)
86 See Giliomee, H. and Schlemmer, L. 1985. Up
Against The Fences, Poverty, passes and privilege in
South Africa, St Martin's Press, New York.
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Commission) published its report in 1947. It argued that:
"It should be clear, firstly, that the idea of total 
segregation is utterly impracticable; secondly, that the 
movement from country to town has a background of 
economic necessity - that it may, so one hopes, be 
guided and regulated but that it cannot be stopped or 
turned in the other direction; and thirdly, that in our 
urban areas there are not only Native migrant labourers, 
but there is a settled, permanent Native 
population.1187
This new thinking on the segregation question was however 
thwarted by the coming to power of the Purified Nationalist 
Party in 1948. The overriding objective of Dr D.F. Malan's 
PNP government was to establish a racially pure Afrikaner- 
controlled state. Moreover, potential investors and
industrialists were now required to establish their 
industries in the so-called homelands (bantustans) or
reserves in order to restrict the flow of blacks into the
so-called white cities. As the PNP government's appointed 
Tomlinson Commission reported in 1955:
"A choice will have to be made by the people of South 
Africa between two ultimate poles, namely that of 
complete integration and that of separate development of 
the two main racial groups. Taking all factors into 
consideration, the Commission recommends the later 
choice, namely that of separate development. The initial 
step towards the practical realisation of separate 
development of Europeans and Bantu lies in the full 
scale development of the Bantu Areas. The development of 
the Bantu Areas will have to embrace a fully diversified 
economy, comprising development in the primary, 
secondary and tertiary spheres."88
87 Mandy, N. 1984. A City Divided: Johannesburg and
Soweto, p. 94, Macmillan, Johannesburg.
88 Ibid., p. 95.
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Between 1950 and 1966 more than 80 pieces of legislation 
aimed at controlling aspects of urban living of Africans 
were passed (see tables 4.1 and 4.2).
4.8 The formation of Soweto
In 1927, there already existed three townships (as noted in
4.6 above) specifically for African residence: namely,
Pimville (formerly Klipspruit), Western Native Township and 
Eastern native Township. In 1928 the JCC's Department of 
Native Affairs DNA appointed a Committee on Native Affairs 
charged with the task of establishing an ’ordered and 
distinct housing1 for Johannesburg's African population.
The JCC had also bought 1,300 'morgen' of land (about 2,600 
acres) on the farm Klipspruit No 8 (some 15 km from 
Johannesburg), about 2 miles away from the Pimville 
location. Orlando East was established on farm Klipspruit No 
8 in 1930. Competitive layout and design tenders for a 
'model township' that would accommodate 80,000 Africans, 
with prizes of £500 (for the best), £200 (second best) and 
£100 (third), were invited from local architects.89 The 
houses built in Orlando East soon became a prototype for 
today's Greater Soweto housing stock. Orlando East was named 
after
89 Carr, W.J.P. 1990. (69, op.cit.); Payne, R (71,
op.cit.); Lewis, P.R.B. 1966. (82, op.cit.)
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Table 4.1: Acts of Parliament passed affecting the
administration of black people in South Africa, 1945-1956
Title of Act No of Acts
Natives (Urban Areas) Amendment Act, 1945 43 of 1945
Natives (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act, 1945 25 of 1945
Native (Urban Areas) Amendment Act, 1946 42 of 1946
Native Laws Amendment Act, 1947 45 of 1947
Native Laws Amendment Act, 1949 56 of 1949
Group Areas Act, 1950 41 of 1950
Immorality Act, 1950 21 of 1950
Population Registration Act, 1950 30 of 1950
Bantu Authorities Act, 1950 68 of 1951
Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act, 1951 52 of 1951
Native Building Workers Act, 1951 27 of 1951
Group Areas Amendment Act, 1952 65 of 1952
Native Laws Amendment Act, 1952 54 of 1952
Native Services Act, 1952 64 of 1952
Prevention of Illegal Squatting
Amendment Act, 1952 24 of 1952
Bantu Education Act, 1953 47 of 1953
Native Building Workers Act, 1953 47 of 1953
Native Labour (Settlement of Disputes)
Act, 1953 48 of 1953
Reservation of Separate Amenities Act, 1953 49 of 1953
Bantu Education Amendment Act, 1954 44 of 1954
Native High Court Abolition Act, 1954 13 of 1954
Natives Resettlement Act, 1954 19 of 1945
Native Trust and Land Amendment Act, 1954 18 of 1954
Representation of Natives Amendment Act, 1954 36 of 1954
Group Areas Amendment Act, 1955 6 of 1955
Group Areas Development Act, 1955 69 of 1955
Group Areas Further Amendment Act, 1955 68 of 1955
Land Settlement Amendment Act, 1955 31 of 1955
Native Administration Amendment Act, 1955 13 of 1955
Native Building Workers Amendment Act, 1955 60 of 1955
Native Labour (Settlement of Disputes)
Amendment Act, 1955 59 of 1955
Native (Urban Areas) Amendment Act, 1955 16 of 1955
Criminal Procedure Act, 1955 56 of 1955
Group Areas Amendment Act, 1956 36 of 1956
Native Administration Amendment Act, 1956 42 of 1956
Natives (Prohibition of Interdicts) Act, 1956 64 of 1956
Native (Urban Areas) Amendment Act, 1956 69 of 1956
Native Trust and Land Amendment Act, 1956 10 of 1956
Population Registration Amendment Act, 1956 71 of 1956
Riotous Assemblies Act, 1956 17 of 1956
Bantu Education Amendment Act, 1956 36 of 1956
Native Trust and Land Amendment Act, 1956 73 of 1956
Source: Lewis, P.R.B. 1966. (81, op.cit. pp. 77-78
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Table 4.2: Acts of Parliament passed affecting the
administration of black people in South Africa, 1957-1966
Title of Act No. of Acts
Group Areas Act, 1957 77 of 1957
Group Areas Amendment Act, 1957 57 of 1957
Housing Act, 1957 10 of 1957
Native Laws Amendment Act, 1957 36 of 1957
Native Laws Further Amendment Act, 1957 79 of 1957
Native Transport Services Act, 1957 53 of 1957
Wage Act, 1957 5 of 1957
Witchcraft Suppression Act, 1957 3 of 1957
Housing Amendment Act, 1958 24 of 1958
Native Taxation and Development Act, 1958 38 of 1958
Native Trust and Land Act, 1958 41 of 1958
Trespass Act, 1959 6 of 1959
Bantu Education Amendment Act, 1959 33 of 1959
Bantu Investment Corporation Act, 1959 34 of 1959
Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act, 1959 81 of 1959
Housing Amendment Act, 1959 72 of 1959
Native Affairs Act, 1959 55 of 1959
Native Building Workers Amendment Act, 1959 56 of 1959
Population Registration Amendment Act, 1960 30 of 1960
Reservations for Separate Amenities
Amendment Act, 1960 10 of 1960
Unlawful Organisations Act, 1960 34 of 1960
Bantu (Urban) Councils Act, 1961 79 of 1961
Bantu Education Amendment Act, 1961 55 of 1961
Group Areas Amendment Act, 1961 23 of 1961
Bantu Beer Act, 1962 63 of 1962
Group Areas Amendment Act, 1962 49 of 1962
Housing Amendment Act, 1962 5 of 1962
Native Laws Amendment Act, 1962 46 of 1962
Better Administration and Designated
Areas Act, 1963 51 of 1963
Bantu Laws Amendment Act, 1963 76 of 1963
Bantu Labour Act, 1964 67 of 1964
Bantu Laws Amendment Act, 1964 42 of 1964
Housing Amendment Act, 1964 53 of 1964
Bantu Special Education Act, 1964 24 of 1964
Bantu Homelands Development Corporation
Act, 1965 86 of 1965
Group Areas Amendment Act, 1965 56 of 1965
Housing Amendment Act, 1965 49 of 1965
Community Development Act, 1966 3 of 1966
Housing Act, 1966 4 of 1966
Source: Lewis, P.R.B. 1966. (81, op.cit. pp. 78-79.)
169
the Chairman of the Native Affairs Committee (formerly mayor 
of Johannesburg), Edwin Orlando Leake, who had played a 
decisive role in bringing it into being. The location of 
this township many miles away from Johannesburg met the 
primary requirement of residential segregation, ease of 
administration and control. Another important factor which 
influenced the siting of this location was that there 
already existed a subsidiary rail line to Pimville (as 
pointed out in 4.6 above) which passed through the site of 
Orlando East. Two major roads that passed near this new 
location (see figure 4.2) had also been constructed: the 
main Reef Road (to the north) and the Potchefstroom Road (to 
the south). Furthermore, access to water would be easy since 
there was a pumping station close by.
When the first 3,000 houses90 were completed in 1935, it 
housed approximately 18,000 (about 6 persons per dwelling on 
average). By the late 1930s another 2,890 units had been 
added to the Orlando East housing stock bringing its total 
to 5,890. Throughout this period Orlando East remained 
unpopular91 to its residents because of its distance (15 
km) from Johannesburg and consequent high transportation 
costs for those who worked in the city. As a result some of 
these houses had remained unoccupied as most Africans chose 
instead to live in the city. The slums of Johannesburg,
90 Lewis, P.R.B. 1966. (82, op.cit.)
91 Parnell, S.M. and Pirie, G.H. 1991. Johannesburg. In 
Lemon, A, (ed), 1991. (68, op.cit.); Payne, R. (71, op.cit.)
170
despite their insanitary characteristics, had over an 
extended period of time (30 years for some of them) become 
established communities. They became very popular places to 
live in and their close proximity to the city centre gave 
easy access to jobs and cheaper transportation costs.
The Department of Native Affairs had embarked on an 
intensive anti-slum programme92 (under the Slums Act of 
1934) of evictions and demolitions which affected mostly 
Africans, at the same time as South Africa was experiencing 
the depression of the late 1920s and early 1930s. As 
hundreds of Africans were being evicted from the areas of 
Johannesburg such as Doornfontein and Betrams (now 
proclaimed white-designated suburbs in terms of the 1923 
Urban Areas Act), this coincided with large numbers of 
Africans migrating to Johannesburg from the reserves due to 
the effect of both the increasing economic decline of the 
reserves and the depression.
As a result overcrowding and slum living conditions in the 
freehold ghettos of Sophiatown (see figure 4.1), Martindale, 
Newclare (also designated white areas under the 1923 Act) 
and Alexandra escalated. The effects of the depression also 
forced many whites within these freehold ghettos to provide 
rented accommodation93 (backyard rooms) for Africans. Some
92 Parnell, S. 1988. "Racial Segregation in 
Johannesburg: The Slums Act, 1934-1939", South African 
Geographical Journal, Vol. 70, No. 2.
93 Carr, W.J.P. 1990. (69, op.cit.)
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of these whites also resisted the eviction of the blacks 
(through the courts) because such action threatened their 
own economic survival. Although the courts subsequently 
validated the council's removal policy, many of these slum 
landlords continued to rent backyard accommodation 
(illegally) to Africans.
It is estimated that Johannesburg's African population grew 
from 96,000 in 192794 to 136,000 in 1936,95 an increase 
of 40,000 (41.7 per cent) over a period of nine years.
Between 1936 and 1939 (that is, within a three year period) 
it grew by a further 108,000 (79.4 per cent) to 244,00096 
at the outbreak of the Second World War. The percentage of 
total population urbanised between 1911 and 1946 is shown in 
table 4.3. The pressure on the limited existing 
accommodation in the freehold ghettos of Sophiatown, 
Martindale, Newclare and Alexander and the existing 
municipal locations of Pimville, Orlando, Western Native 
Township and Eastern Native Township thus became greatly 
increased. State tenants in these municipal locations began 
accommodating sub-tenants.
Throughout the war years the African population of 
Johannesburg increased yet further (through natural increase 
and migration from rural areas, increasing the proportion of
94 Lewis, P.R.B. 1966. (82, op.cit.)
95 Carr, W.J.P. 1990. (69, op.cit.)
96 Mandy, N. 1984. (87, op.cit.)
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women and children), yet very few houses (if any) were built 
during this period (see Chapter 5). Restrictions (pass 
laws), designed to limit entry of Africans into urban areas, 
were suspended during the war years due to the unprecedented 
demands for labour in manufacturing industry. Between 1933 
and 1939, employment in manufacturing industry increased by 
more than 60 per cent. It also increased by 50 per cent on 
the 1939 figure between 1939 and 1 9 4 5 . Housing shortage 
(due to the rapid population growth, slum clearance and lack 
of new building of municipal or other housing) became even 
more acute, as a result of which this period saw the growth 
of squatter settlements (as residents had no rights to land 
or housing, but tolerated) in various parts of municipal 
land which later became part of Greater Soweto.
Table 4.3: Percentage of each urbanised population group in 
South Africa, 1911-1946
Racial group 1911
%
1936
%
1946*
Q ,*o
African 12.6 17.3 24.3
Coloured 46.7 53.9 62.5
Asian 43.2 66.3 72.8
White 51.6 65.2 75.6
All races 24.7 31.4 39.3
Source: Lipton, M. 1986. (41, op.cit. p. 401.); *Freund, B. 
1984. (31, op.cit. p. 187.)
97 Freund, B, 1984. (31, op.cit.)
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4.9 The emergence of squatter markets
In 1944 under the leadership of James Sofasonke Mpanza, the 
squatter communities (mainly homeless people and sub-tenants 
who had either been removed from the slumyards of 
Johannesburg or had spilled out from the overcrowded 
municipal locations) set up 250 hessian and corrugated iron 
structures on municipal land adjacent to Orlando East and 
Pimville.98 These informal structures (shacks)
subsequently grew to number about 8,000 and provided 
accommodation for more than 20,000 people." By 1947 it 
was estimated that squatter settlements on open municipal 
land within the vicinity of Orlando, Pimville, and Dube 
accommodated approximately 90,000 people.100 In order to 
gain access into these informal settlements an individual 
was required to pay to the squatter administrator, an entry 
fee and administration costs.
From the very beginning of the formation of these informal 
shack markets, Mpanza's Sofasonke squatter movement became 
the sole political authority over them. For example, the 
Sofasonke movement not only allocated land, but it also 
imposed levies on its members which were then used for the 
provision and management of resources such as water and
93 See, Morris, P. 1980. Soweto: A Review of Existing 
Conditions and Some Guidelines for Change, Urban Foundation,
Johannesburg.
"  Ibid.
100 Ibid.
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refuse removal. Trading within these settlements was also 
regulated through the sale of trading rights to potential 
traders and levies on outside traders entering these 
settlements. Property and civil rights were also protected 
through a system of squatter justice developed and 
administered by the Sofasonke movement. According to 
Stadler, Mpanza's squatter organisation,
"established virtually a state within a state into 
which no whites could go except under a squatter 
escort; they had their own courts, police and 
administration, their leaders' political skills 
easily matched those of the officials."xox
Both the central government and the JCC viewed these 
developments with great unease. The JCC immediately began to 
establish its own controlled forms of squatting in the form 
of 'emergency camps'. In 1944 an emergency camp consisting 
of 4,042 shelters constructed of breeze blocks was 
established adjacent to Orlando East by the JCC.X°2 This 
area became known as 'Masakeni' or 'Shantytown' and was 
later named Orlando West after the JCC replaced the breeze- 
built shelters with council-built houses. Squatter 
communities continued to form elsewhere on municipal land in 
defiance of the JCC's attempts to evict them. They were led 
by different leaders, for example, Albert Ntoi in Pimville
xox Stadler, A.W. 1979. Birds in the Cornfields: 
Squatter Movements in Johannesburg, 1944-1947. In B. 
Bozzoli, (ed.), Labour, Townships and Protest, Ravan Press, 
Johannesburg.
102 Carr, W.J.P. 1990. (69, op.cit.)
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and Edward Khumalo in Jabavu.103
In 1947 another emergency camp was established by the 
council, at Moroka. This camp consisted of 11,200 sites 
measuring 20ft by 20ft each supplied with a pit latrine and 
refuse removal services.104 Residents were expected to 
build their own shacks which conformed with the JCC's 
minimum standards. Once these sites had been laid out the 
JCC began forcibly removing squatter communities, 
demolishing the shacks and relocating the inhabitants into 
these emergency camps. Entry into the JCC's emergency camps 
was refused to those who were unemployed and had no passes. 
The unemployed and those who failed to qualify under the 
1923 Act were either sent back to the reserves or 
accommodated in the municipal hostels.105 By late 1947 
the JCC succeeded in destroying the last of the 11 squatter 
camps that had grown since 1944.106
The JCC appears to have been concerned primarily to achieve 
racial residential separation (in accordance with the 1923 
Act) by removing Africans from Johannesburg. As in the 
previous decades neither the central government nor the JCC 
appears to have formulated a clear housing strategy apart 
from removing Africans and dumping them outside the city
103 Ibid.
104 Mandy, N. 1984. (87, op.cit.)
105 Morris, P. 1980. (98, op.cit.)
106 Carr, W.J.P. 1990. (69, op.cit.)
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limits. Throughout the period 1944-47 the JCC's exercise of 
control was threatened. By establishing its controlled 
emergency camps, the JCC appears to have accepted that 
housing was needed. This in turn suggests that the JCC began 
addressing the housing problems of Africans in Greater 
Soweto only as a way of preventing an 'alternative' local 
government system (organised squatter communities) from 
further development. It was effectively a motivation for the 
JCC to forestall squatting.
The site and services schemes (based on the JCC's controlled 
emergency camps) became national government policy after 
1948 with the assumption of power by the Nationalist Party 
dedicated to apartheid.10,7 Under these site and services 
schemes, residents built their own temporary shacks when 
they moved in. Between 1953 and 1960, 35,000 serviced sites 
measuring 12 metres by 22 metres (with a stand water pipe 
every 450 metres108 and pit latrines) were provided for 
the erection of shacks. Subsequently the JCC built permanent 
houses and as soon as these had been erected, it demolished 
the shacks. Thus virtually all the townships that were built 
after Orlando from the mid-1940s started life as informal 
settlements, later emergency camps and later still, site and 
service schemes before assuming their permanent form.
107 Ibid., Mandy, N. 1984. (87, op.cit.); Lewis, P.R.B. 
1966. (82, op.cit.)
108 Ibid.
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4.10 The final removals
In its determination to achieve its goals of expelling 
blacks from the urban areas (in accordance with the 
recommendations of the Tomlinson report) to the so-called 
homelands, on assuming power in 1948 the Malan government 
immediately implemented a programme of forcibly removing the 
entire African population of Johannesburg's western areas 
(freehold ghettos and slumyards of Sophiatown, Martindale 
and Newclare). They were relocated in the Diepmeadow areas 
of Meadowlands and Diepkloof. Although the JCC had approved 
the removal of these communities as early as 1937,109 it 
had not followed through this course of action for a number 
of reasons. First, the acute housing shortage for Africans 
was felt to militate against further destruction of African 
homes. Second, there was strong resistance from residents 
(who included the ANC, PAC activists, trade unionists, Anti- 
Expropriation Ratepayers' Association, Proper Housing 
Movement and others) to the proposed planned removal.
Third, the JCC had difficulties in providing adequate 
transportation from the proposed site to town and 
employment.
However, the national government had decided to implement 
its programme of separate development by purchasing land at 
Diepmeadow and establishing a Natives Resettlement Board 
that would forcibly remove Africans from the western areas
109 Parnell, S. and Pirie, G.H. 1991. (91, op.cit.)
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of Johannesburg. On 9 February 1955, more than 2,000 armed 
police and army reinforcements,110 moved into the western 
areas and began forcibly removing111 African residents to 
Meadowlands and Diepkloof (Diepmeadow area of Greater 
Soweto). To prevent reoccupation, the army also used 
bulldozers to demolish residents' homes.112 The scale and 
impact of the removals is described by one eyewitness:
"On the broad belt of grass between the European 
suburb of Westdene and Sophiatown a whole fleet of 
army lorries was drawn up: a grim sight against the 
grey, watery sky. Lining the whole street were 
thousands of police, both white and black: the former 
armed with rifles and revolvers, the latter with the 
usual assegai. A few sten guns were in position at 
various points ... In the yard military lorries were 
drawn up. Already they were piled high with the 
pathetic possessions which had come from the row of 
rooms in the backyard. A rusty stove, a few blackened 
pots and pans, bundles of heaven-knows what, and 
people soaked, soaked all over to the skin by the 
drenching rain.11113
The removals had far-reaching implications for the black 
urban population. Firstly, residents effectively lost 
whatever rights in housing and land they had possessed 
in the freehold areas and slumyards of Johannesburg. 
Secondly, it sparked a political struggle which contrasted 
sharply with the earlier subservient role played by 
Africans. Thirdly, the rights of residents to live close to
110 Payne, R. (71, op.cit.)
111 Parnell, S. and Pirie, G.H. 1991. (91, op.cit.)
112 Payne, R. (71, op.cit.)
113 Unterhalter, E. 1978. Forced Removal, p. 75. 
International Defence and Aid Fund for Southern Africa 
(IDAF) Publications Ltd, Cannon Collins House, London.
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the city and places of employment were taken away. Fourthly, 
the rights in housing and land which Africans lost in their 
former homes could not be conferred to them again in the 
townships because of official thinking which regarded blacks 
as 'temporary sojourners' in so-called 'white' cities. Thus, 
townships were to serve as labour reservoirs for the white 
cities. As the General Circular No. 25 of 1967 notes:
"It is accepted government policy that the bantu are 
only temporary residents in the European areas of the 
Republic, for as long as they offer their labour there 
in the labour market. As soon as they become ... no 
longer fit for work or superfluous in the labour market, 
they are expected to return to their country of origin 
or territory of the natural unit where they fit in
ethnically if they were not born or bred in the
homeland.111X4
Greater Soweto thus became the dumping ground115 and
certainly the largest labour reservoir for the majority of 
Africans who were forcibly removed from Johannesburg. The 
1960s saw the consolidation of apartheid policy. The
depriving of Africans of rights to housing and land, already 
in force in the townships of Greater Soweto, was intensified 
when housing Africans became to be seen as a temporary 
measure and the 'bantustans' as permanent areas of African 
settlement.116 Under such a situation, enforceable, 
tradeable and saleable rights in housing and land were 
absent by law, evictions and state control of the housing
114 Cited in Marks, R. 1990. Upgrading Alex: A Case 
Study of a South African Township, Oxford Polytechnic, 
Oxford.
115 Stadler, A.W. 1979. (101, op.cit.)
116 Payne, R. (71, op.cit.)
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situation. However, not all rights were removed entirely, 
rentable rights were available (albeit controlled) and 
subject to influx qualifications and bureaucratic rules. The 
consolidation of Government policy which saw Africans as 
'sojourners' (temporary residents or visitors) was continued 
during the 1970s.
The houses provided reflected the attitude towards Africans 
expressed in General Circular No. 25. Furthermore, the 
location of the townships between 15 and 30 kilometres away 
from white residential areas appears to have been aimed at 
containing any potential opposition from African residents. 
The zoning of the townships in Greater Soweto appears also 
to have been intended at ensuring total administrative 
control by the Government, including allowing easy access 
for the army and the police to shoot down demonstrators, a 
facility employed in the massacres of Sharpeville in 1960, 
Soweto in 1976-77 and Sebokeng in 1984-86.117
4.11 Conclusion
This chapter has shown how a progression and succession of 
measures (removing rights from Africans, first in land, then 
in housing, and rights to reside in a particular area or 
simply to be somewhere and lowering the status of Africans 
to that of 'temporary sojourners') have been an adjunct to 
economic policy, labour market policy and apartheid
117 See Unterhalter, E. 1978. (113, op.cit.)
181
(segregation) policy. The motivation for this progressive 
depriving of Africans of rights has been three-fold: a) 
economic development, b) a captive cheap work force, and c) 
the sustaining of privilege of white minority (common white 
interest) which transcended classes among whites.
Regarding the need for black labour, successive Governments 
could not remove rights entirely. Instead, they invented the 
status of ’temporary sojourner1, which did carry some 
rights. These Governments had military resources and control 
of the legislative process with which to remove and deprive 
Africans of rights in housing and land, and rights of 
movement. Africans were mostly poorly organised and they had 
no access to the legislative process.
Other opportunities with which to continue depriving 
Africans of a variety of rights also existed: a) the
availability of labour from other sources, notably Chinese 
workers, and b) labour in rural areas seeking employment. 
This gave employers the opportunity to keep wages low and 
impose economic conditions on African workers, for example, 
the existence of a pool of labour (always someone to take 
one's work). The existence of sites within commuting 
distance also gave the Government to enforce the relocation 
of Africans - somewhere to dump them.
This chapter has also shown that there was also a conflict 
of interest between white privileged workers (who were no
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longer prepared to do menial work) and capitalist employers 
who wanted to pay low wages. In the course of South Africa's 
capitalist development nothing either subtly or dramatically 
was to change from Milner's framework of white supremacy. 
This framework laid down the core principles of the violent 
exploitation and segregation of the African people which was 
continually reinforced by later legislation.
As Johannesburg became urbanised, the JCC was sensitive to 
the desire of employers for a workforce to live within 
access of employment and thus tolerated squatting. The 
significance of squatting is that even if there is no formal 
legal right to land and housing, toleration implies 
acceptance of a moral claim or material interest for whites 
in tolerating it. The division between the JCC and the 
Government is important. It reveals conflict of interests 
even 40-50 years ago.
The development of housing markets in Greater Soweto were 
thus largely influenced by the inter-relation between 
successive governments, society and the economy, and the 
lack of constraints on governments that were prepared to use 
violence against Africans. This set the stage for 
connections between the establishment of African residential 
locations and sewage disposal sites. This was consolidated 
by the introduction of the job colour bar policy which also 
established a separation of the residential space according 
to race.
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Apartheid (separate development) was a systematic and well 
constructed political theory of white superiority which went 
much further than anything previously experienced in 
depriving Africans of housing and property rights. This 
study has shown how Africans were deprived of their 
originality to develop their own economic system of 
production, and by extension, their own housing system. The 
important conclusion which this chapter draws is that 
Greater Soweto originally developed not as a result of the 
choice of residents, but that Africans in search of 
employment were forced to live in housing of last resort and 
of least desirability.
The pieces of legislation shown in this chapter suggest 
compelling evidence why the explanatory power of theoretical 
work reviewed in Chapter 2 of this thesis is limited. 
Instead, the legislative mechanisms shown in this chapter 
(see tables 4.1 and 4.2) suggest more compelling evidence of 
controls and constraints in the built environment which went 
far beyond anything experienced in the developed countries, 
and for that matter in totalitarian regimes.
There is evidence of voluntary immigration (ecological 
mechanisms) of Africans in search of employment, but no 
choice where to live, except squatting. The ecological 
models also implied competition, domination and invasion- 
succession mechanisms, but as this chapter has shown, there 
is no evidence of these mechanisms. However, the question
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about domination, reveals the role of state and agencies. 
Specifically, it reveals the domination and control by the 
central government of the legislative process and the
military, but also disagreements and conflict between 
central and local governments.
The neo-classical economics models depend on conscious 
choice, perceptions of individual households and trade-offs, 
but there is little evidence of these mechanisms in this 
chapter. Although some form of competition and invasion- 
succession mechanisms were evident in the squatter markets 
during the 1940s, they were very insignificant and were
forcibly prevented from developing. The institutional
approach draws attention to a regulatory framework of the 
state and the decision-making processes of management, 
'agents' (producers and suppliers of housing), but not
forced relocations and forced removals.
Marxism draws attention to class cleavages but not colour 
ones (black and white working classes). It is noteworthy, 
however, that this chapter has shown class cleavages in 
terms of how the interests of whites at times transcended 
class but also revealed divergences between interests of 
white capital (and between local and overseas capital) and 
white workers, and white householders needing to let rooms. 
In the case of compounds, landlord and employer interests 
were identical.
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Marxism also draws attention to urban movements. These as 
this chapter has shown were evident during the 1940s in the 
form of squatter movements. The role of Mpanza and other 
leaders of squatter movements is very significant in this 
chapter. This chapter has shown how these squatter (urban) 
movements made significant gains through organising, 
invading land and developing their own local government and 
administration (including rights in housing and land) and a 
system of justice, and how this motivated the JCC to 
forestall further development of this form of urban 
movement. Finally, it is important to recognise that the 
theoretical perspectives (reviewed in Chapter 2) do not 
yield any questions that highlight what was done about 
rights.
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CHAPTER FIVE
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE HOUSING STOCK. 1930-1994
5.1 Introduction
This chapter examines the mechanisms by which the housing 
stock in Soweto was provided by the Johannesburg City 
Council (JCC) between 1930 and 1972. Thus the role of the 
JCC in the development/creation of the housing stock is 
examined within the framework of housing finance, housing 
production, housing costs per individual units and changes 
in the rate of the stock produced. Finally, the effect on 
the overall housing system of (a) the role of the West Rand 
Administration Board (WRAB) in adding to the stock from 1973 
until the early 1980s and (b) the entry into the Greater 
Soweto housing building markets since the early 1980s of 
backyard shack developers and squatter or informal settler 
developers.
5.2 Housing finance
Housing construction was financed from the Native Revenue 
Account (NRA), created by the Johannesburg City Council 
under the Urban Areas Act of 1923. Funds for this account 
were raised from: Government loans; loans from the JCC's
Consolidated and Capital Development Funds; loans from the 
Native Service Levy Fund; grants from the Services Levy 
Fund; private sector loans from the mining industry; loans
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from the Soldiers' Housing Organisations (table 5.1); and 
rents and profits from beer sales (table 5.2).
The first form of funding involved loans raised by the JCC 
through the state funding body (the Central Housing Board 
(CHB) which was later replaced by the National Housing and 
Planning Commission (NHPC) in 1944). Apart from direct 
government loans (whose annual interests varied between 0.75 
per cent and 6 per cent),1 the JCC also advanced its own 
Consolidated Loans and Capital Development Funds in the 
financing of township construction (table 5.1). Interest 
charges on the latter loans depended on the total amount 
advanced as loans by the JCC each year. Subsidisation costs 
on losses were shared between the central state and the JCC 
in the ratio of 3:1 in terms of an agreed 'National Housing 
Formula'.2
In 1953 a second form of financing the construction of 
infrastructure and the provision of services was also 
established under the terms of the Native Services Levy Act 
(NSLA) which allowed white municipalities within their 
jurisdiction to extract a levy from local employers (table 
5.1). Also in 1953 the Native Transport Services Levy Act 
(NTSLA) was introduced to enable the subsidisation of the
1 Lewis, P.R.B. 1966. "A City within a City: The 
Creation of Soweto", South African Geographical Journal, 48, 
p. 73.
2 Carr, W.J.P. 1990. Soweto: Its Creation, Life and
Decline, South African Institute of Race Relations, 
Johannesburg.
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transportation of workers by their employers. This Act had 
the effect of reducing the transportation costs of the 
workforce, at the same time easing (but not eradicating) the 
access problems resultant from the location of townships 
furthest away (15-30 kilometres) from the city.
Both these Acts (the NSLA and NTSLA) were introduced by the 
apartheid regime as measures of influx control, alongside 
the forcible expulsion of blacks from the so-called white 
cities. Part of the cost of financing housing construction 
was passed on to the employers on grounds that they had 
attracted African labour into the white cities.3 This was 
done under the terms of the Native Services Levy Act of 
1953, which required white municipalities to extract weekly 
levies of 2s 6d4 from local employers of black labour who 
did not provide housing for their workers.
Once these funds had been collected they were then 
contributed to the Native Revenue Fund either as loans or 
grants (at the annual interest rate of 0.125 per cent). The 
JCC was not free to use the funds as it wished. Various 
restrictions were imposed by the state on local authorities 
in terms of bureaucratic delays as use of these funds was 
subject to Ministerial approval. As a result the JCC began
3 Lewis, P.R.B. 1966. (1, op.cit.)
4 Carr, W.J.P. 1990. (2, op.cit.)
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looking for funds from other sources.5
The third form of funding was through private sector loans 
during the mid-1950s. A loan of R6 million (£3 million), 
payable over a period of 30 years at a fixed annual interest 
rate of 4.87 per cent was granted to the JCC by Sir Ernest 
Oppenheimer's mining houses. The second loan of R96,000 from 
the Soldiers Housing Organisations was serviced at the 
annual interest rate of 1,25 per cent.6
The fourth form of funding was through rents and profits
from beer sales which were placed in the Native Revenue
Account (NRA). The profits generated from the brewing and 
sale of traditional sorghum beer were made possible by the 
fact that the white municipalities exercised a monopoly on 
the brewing and sale of traditional sorghum beer. Thus it 
was illegal for blacks in the 'white cities' to brew
traditional beer and they were also barfed from either
buying or consuming 'White liquor'. Furthermore, when the 
'White liquor' restrictions were lifted under the Bantu Beer 
Act of 1962, the sale of this form of liquor in the 
townships was also monopolised by the JCC.
As a result of the JCC's monopoly over the brewing and sale 
of beer, its beerhalls had grown into a substantial business
5 Personal Interview with Mr William Loots, Property 
Sales Director, Soweto City Council, 11 April 1994.
6 Lewis, P.R.B. 1966. (1, op.cit. p. 73)
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in the townships generating sales of R5,2 million and 
profits of R2,2 million in 1965 (see table 5.2). By 1969 the 
sales of the traditional sorghum beer in the townships 
amounted to R6,2 million with profits of R2,8 million.'7 
Also in 1969 the ’White liquor1 sales in the townships 
amounted to R4,6 million and generated profits of 
R430,000.8 Not only were profits used in the financing of 
housing construction in the townships but they were also 
applied in the balancing of the Native Revenue Account 
(table 5.2).
Table 5.1 illustrates the breakdown of the total capital 
expenditure in terms of the sources of funding raised from 
1918 to 1965 in the financing of township construction. 
These funds include Rl,050,746 which was used in the 
construction of a total of 2,625 houses between 1920 and 
1930 at Western Native Township and Eastern Native Township 
(see Chapter 4) and the provision of 3,400 hostel beds9 in 
the Johannesburg area.
Table 5.2 illustrates the cumulative capital expenditure per 
year between 1931 and 1965. From this sum, a total of 
Rl,050,746 (as explained above) had already been used by 
1930 out of a total capital expenditure of R53,488,569. The
7 Mandy, N. 1984. A City Divided: Johannesburg and
Soweto, p. 187. Macmillan, Johannesburg.
8 Ibid.
9 Ibid, p. 73.
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remainder, R52,437,823 was used in the purchasing of land 
and financing of township construction (including public 
buildings such as halls, schools, roads, bridges, railway 
sidings and in the provision of health services, lighting, 
water reticulation and stormwater and sewerage and other 
infrastructure). By 1968 when the government finally ended 
the state loan finance system, the total capital expenditure 
(including the building of local authority offices, schools, 
hostels, beer gardens, a library and community halls) 
amounted to R61 million.3-0 In 1967 a further loan of R750, 
OOO11 was granted to the JCC by the mining magnates for 
the provision of houses at Pimville.
State policy in the funding of housing provision through the 
white municipalities remained committed to enforcing the 
'urban fences' of control. Within the racially segregated 
urban forms in South Africa the financing of housing 
construction was fundamentally characterised by a system of 
'financial segregation'. Thus the provision of a Native 
Revenue Account under the 1923 Urban Areas Act effectively 
established a clear demarcation on the JCC's finances on 
racial grounds.
10 Carr, W.J.P. 1990. (2, op.cit. p. 49)
Ibid., p. 128.
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Table 5.1: Johannesburg City Council’s native revenue
account: Source of Funds, 1918-30 June 1965
Type of funds (Rand)
Government Loans
Advance from Capital Development Fund 
Advance from Council's Consolidated Loans 
Loans from Native Services Levy Fund 
Grants from the Services Levy Fund 
Private Sector Loans from Mining Houses 
Loans from Soldiers Housing Organisations 
Grants from the Services Levy Fund 
Loans Redeemed
22,794,261
423,060
4,308,602
1,691,251
9.940.085 
6,000,000
96,000
9.940.085 
8,890,593
Total 53,488,569
Source: Adapted from Lewis, P.R.B. 1966. "A City within a 
City: The Creation of Soweto", South African Geographical
Journal, 48, p. 73.
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Table 5.2: Johannesburg City Council's native revenue
account, 1930-1965
Year 
ended 
30 June
Cumulative Rents 
Capital Nett 
Expenditure 
(Rand) (Rand)
Deficit Kaffir Beer 
on NRA
to Rates Sales Profit 
(Rand) (Rand)
1930 1 050 746 108 145 35, 153
1931 1 161 528 119 626 41, 327
1932 1 222 650 121 965 47, 545
1933 1 507 908 126 974 51, 014
1934 1 716 682 167 804 36, 665
1935 1 881 532 209 782 6,486
1936 2 012 504 234 805 13, 288
1937 2 107 824 251 029 41, 393
1938 2 855 438 294 468 46, 262 31 068 14 186
1939 2 994 960 336 335 468 Cr. 118 500 65 536
1940 3 141 686 337 560 24,863 Cr. 188 894 127 504
1941 3 354 656 310 927 26, 418 255 534 125 094
1942 3 619 276 326 693 55, 609 203 038 107 398
1943 3 672 890 335 649 56, 673 201 892 94 544
1944 4 084 066 341 248 44, 212 339 560 198 122
1945 4 741 496 342 104 61, 441 458 970 242 954
1946 5 397 916 373 548 245, 299 256 978 114 552
1947 6 561 807 443 984 364, 862 417 558 95 904
1948 8 364 516 584 536 191, 798 573 378 243 674
1949 9 609 788 663 133 328, 404 654 094 362 430
1950 10 840 814 753 613 483, 916 744 890 349 448
1951 11 702 388 839 664 655, 523 828 046 350 261
1952 11 937 820 858 180 671, 810 998 840 403 152
1953 12 637 416 968 562 697, 225 1,229 660 479 670
1954 13 798 756 1,079 034 273, 517 1,403 068 732 460
1955 15 491 136 1,142 952 341, 716 1,646 406 854 312
1956 18 983 402 1,339 887 258, 104 1,784 392 815 692
1957 22 652 428 1,714 120 429, 401 2,058 082 1,050 202
1958 29 296 540 2,348 262 431, 820 2,217 056 1,079 076
1959 36 068 172 2,873 887 243, 160 2,589 712 1,290 990
1960 40 907 214 3,106 213 686, 250 2,691 090 1,299 768
1961 44 156 082 3,390 402 852, 209 2,189 873 1,239 913
1962 46 943 247 3,516 503 731, 357 3,027 558 1,468 791
1963 50 042 554 3,652 230 913, 481 3,228 043 1,464 418
1964 51 877 747 3,760 241 731, 905 4,215 378 1,824 974
1965 53 488 569 3,889 028 474, 520 5,204 233 2,223 296
Source: Lewis, P.R.B. 1966. "A City within a City: The
Creation of Soweto", South African Geographical Journal, 48, 
p. 73.
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5.3 Housing production and costs
This section examines the physical production process of 
housing. Given the mechanisms used in the financing of 
housing construction, how was the stock produced on the 
ground? What was the rate of change to the housing stock? 
How differentiated is the Greater Soweto housing stock?
Township houses in Greater Soweto were mass produced through 
the use of both bricks and concrete slab materials. The 
whole area was originally not planned in a town planning 
sense. This lack of planning cohesion is demonstrated by the 
lack of public facilities such as parks, play areas for 
children and recreational activities. In addition, surveying 
and land viability studies were not carried out beforehand 
to determine if the land was suitable (geologically, 
environmentally and locationally with respect to economic 
opportunities and social amenities) to be developed as a 
residential area.12 Everything, including the layout of 
townships was designed to make it difficult for black people 
to settle and be comfortable. Townships were constructed as 
places for Africans to sleep in and not to be comfortable in 
line with the influx control measures and the homeland 
policy.
In Soweto, the JCC was the primary agent of housing
12 Personal Interview with Mr Gladstone Mafoko, 
Assistant Housing Director, Soweto City Council, 23 November 
1993.
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production. In Diepmeadow, it was the Natives Resettlement 
Board (NRB), whilst the Roodepoort City Council was 
responsible for delivering houses in Dobsonville. Until the 
early 1950s the actual construction was undertaken mainly by 
private sector contractors who competed for building 
contracts from the JCC's Non-European Affairs Department 
(NEAD). Contracts were awarded to private building 
contractors who could offer the cheapest designs and methods 
on the building of mass housing in the townships (table 
5.3). The townships became a testing ground for a variety of 
house building experiments, but all of them were judged too 
costly to the white municipalities (local authorities), 
given the limited resources (as discussed above) at their 
disposal.
The construction methods used by some of the constructors 
(Laing and Roberts, Roberts Construction, Rumble 
Construction and Lewis Construction) who were awarded 
building contracts is described below. Thus according to 
Carr, Laing and Roberts used
"an all-cement method in which the walls were precast on 
the site and then lifted into position by a travelling 
crane, with the roof, also in cement, being cast in one 
piece over a steel umbrella which was removed when dry. 
Roberts Construction tried cement panels which formed 
the walls and which interlocked one on top of another. 
The roof was asbestos sheeting. Rumble introduced the ' 
'no fines' system in which small stone aggregate was 
wet-mixed and poured into steel forms, the roofing also 
of asbestos sheeting. Lewis Construction used a 
variation in the cement panel method".13
13 Carr, W.J.P. 1990. (2, op.cit. p. 48.)
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These construction methods resulted in the production of 
housing types which are commonly known as 'concrete domes' 
or 'elephant houses' and are found in parts of Orlando West 
and Jabavu (see Chapter 3). Whilst these production methods 
were relatively quick and cheap, most of these houses were 
constructed following the end of the Second World War when 
the country was experiencing a shortage of building 
materials and skilled labour, with consequent high prices.
Further costs were incurred by the employment of white 
artisans in accordance with the prevailing 'civilised labour 
policy' (discussed in the Chapter 4) which excluded blacks 
from this form of employment. These factors, together with 
the profit driven motivation of white private constructors 
combined to limit the finances of the JCC. The cost of 
houses built by private developers between 1944 and 1947, 
and the mechanism used in the funding of these housing 
schemes is shown in table 5.3.
The data in table 5.3 clearly shows that it took a process 
of negotiations between the central government and the JCC 
before Government loans intended to finance the housing 
schemes built by private contractors were approved. The 
construction costs of individual housing units are shown in 
table 5.5. This data shows that the production costs of most 
of the individual units in Greater Soweto were between the 
range of R300 to R370. The only differences are the lower 
production costs for the Orlando East houses which were
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below R300 and Pimville, Senaoane, Zondi, Mofolo, Dube and 
Central Western Jabavu which cost between R400 and R566. The 
higher production costs per individual units in table 5.5 
(R735 in Molapo Extension, R915 in Mapetla Extension, R905 
in Orlando West, Rl,998 in Senaoane, R3,250 in Pimville and 
R13,800 in Chiawelo Extension) are for the new houses built 
since 1980 (see table 5.7).
It was under the terms of the Native Building Workers' Act 
of 1951 (amended in 1953) that the JCC was finally able to 
reduce its housing construction costs. This act empowered 
the JCC to train and employ its own black workers as 
construction artisans to undertake the building of houses in 
the townships. Thus the introduction of the services levy 
policy, transport services levy policy and the building 
workers' policy had the effect of reducing the cost of 
housing construction.
In 1954, the JCC had created a separate Housing Division 
headed by A.J. Archibald14 (a town engineer) to undertake 
the recruitment and training of blacks in the townships.
Once they had been trained these black artisans were then 
required to train others in various skills such as building, 
carpentry, plumbing, drain laying and others. The cheap 
labour of Soweto residents was then utilised in the 
provision of services, water supply, roads, stormwater and
14 Ibid., see also Mandy, Lewis, P.R.B. 1996. (1,
op.cit.); Mandy, N. 1984. (7, op.cit.)
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sewerage.15 The use of black labour in the townships had 
the effect of reducing construction costs16 because blacks 
were paid low wages compared to their white counterparts. 
However, the houses which were produced were of poor 
quality, lacking a reasonable amount of living space, 
privacy, internal water supply, household energy supply, 
sanitary facilities and stormwater drainage, and were also 
incomplete, with no internal floors, internal doors or 
ceilings (see also Chapter 3). These were to be provided by 
the new occupants of the houses.17
The construction method differed from those of private 
constructors described above. It involved the use of bricks 
and lime (building houses with 'bricks on edge1) instead of 
cement and concrete blocks. This also had the effect of 
reducing costs as well as speeding up the construction 
process. As Carr observed
"At its peak, 40 houses were being completed every day 
and handed over to my department, so that tremendous 
progress was made in an astonishingly short time in the 
rehousing of people from informal settlements. The whole 
thing was a marvel of planning and organisation. 
Everything seemed to be going on at the same time... 
with the landscape changing from day to day with 
unbelievable rapidity".18
15 Personal Interview with Mr William Loots (5, 
op.cit.)
16 Ibid.
17 Ibid.
18 Carr, W.J.P. 1990. (2, op.cit. p. 124).
199
Whereas the private sector produced house types which are 
commonly known today as 'elephant houses' the public sector 
under the town engineer, A.J. Archibald, introduced 
relatively improved house types known today as 'matchboxes' 
(see Chapter 3), which were designed by the National 
Building Research Institute (NBRI) and the National Housing 
and Planning Commission (NHPC) in 1951. But the production 
of these house types was aided by the supply of building 
materials from the private sector. Table 5.4 shows that 
there were opportunities for white private building material 
firms, engineering firms and companies producing the 
infrastructural materials and other components for the 
provision of services to make profits. The transport policy 
also provided transport owners (such as railways and later 
buses) with rewarding profit-making opportunities in the 
townships.
Throughout the period of township construction until the 
demise of apartheid in the 1990s, the state's own 
contribution costs were in the form of advanced loans to the 
JCC which were paid with interest by the township residents 
themselves. Moreover, the use of cheap black labour in the 
construction of housing in the townships represented a 
subsidy form of finance (because of the lowering of 
production costs compared with employing white labour).
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Table 5.3: Costs of housing schemes built in Soweto by
private contractors, 1944-1947
Name of 
Scheme
Date/
est
propo
sed
No. of 
houses
Contractor Cost
Rm*
How
financed
Orlando West
1944
2 350 EA Sayle & 
Son 2,110
Govt
loan
Orlando
1945
250 Anderson
Coy 0,190
Govt
loan
Orlando
1946
1 000 - - Govt
loan
Orlando
1946
277 Anderson
Coy 0,210
Govt
loan
Orlando West
1946
684 Anderson fit 
Coy 0,750
not
approved
Orlando West
1947
160
semis
Anderson fit 
Coy
- negotia­
tions
Orlando
1946
289
semis
Roberts 
Cons Ltd 0,320
Govt
loan
Orlando
1946
132
semis
Rumble
0,150
Govt
loan
Denver fit 
Native 
Mens 
Hostel
1944
1945
1946
3 336 
beds
EA Sayle & 
Son 0,350
Govt
loan
Pimville
1944
111 - - Govt
loan
Pimville
1944
110 Dept fit CED
0,110
Govt
loan
Klipspruit
49 1947
5 100 Roberts 
Cons Ltd 1,730
Govt
loan
Source: Hendler, P. 1987. "Capital Accumulation and
Conurbation: Rethinking the Social Geography of the 'Black' 
Townships in The South African Geographical Journal, Vol. 69 
No. 1, Table 1, p. 75. *(Values not deflated)
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Table 5.4: Selected costs of privately tendered building 
material contracts in the building of Soweto, 1954-1964
Year Materials Successful
Tenderers
Cost R*
1954 Asbestos 
cement 
concrete 
sheets: 
Oregon/Balt 
deal; Doors;
139 842
1954 Fencing Messrs Jacks 
Fencing and 
Eng. Works 
(Pty) Ltd
10 468
1955 Bricks Various 168 000
1955 Asbestos 
cement corr 
sheets
Superconcrete 
Pipes SA Ltd
23 620
1955 Asbestos 
cement corrug 
sheets
Everite (Pty) 
Ltd
102 002
1955 Steel windows Wire
Industries 
Steel Prods 
and
Engineering 
Coy Ltd
43 066
1955 WC angle iron 
jambs & doors
F Gwilliam 
Ltd
7 840
1955 Oregon Pine WF Jonstone 
and Coy Ltd
52 234
1955 Window putty Gibson and 
McIntosh 
(Pty) Ltd
2 536
1955 WC Suites Morely (Pty) 
Ltd 24 684
1957 Breeze
concrete
blocks
SA Rapid 
Block Coy Ltd
50 000
1964 Clear sheet 
glass
Pilkington 
Bros (SA) 
(Pty) Ltd
7 000
Source: Hendler, P, 1987. (op.cit.), Table 2, p. 76.
*(Values not deflated)
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Table 5.5: Construction Costs of Individual Housing Units in 
Selected Townships of Greater Soweto
Township Construction
(Amount
Cost Range 
in Rand)
Pimville 400 - 3,250
Orlando East 153 - 230
Orlando West 324 - 905
Dube 465 - 566
Moroka 330 - 465
Mofolo 450
Senaoane 330 - 1,998
Jabulani 360
Molapo 350
Molapo Extension 735
Zola 360
Phiri 370
Zondi 450
Mapetla 330
Mapetla Extension 330 - 915
Central Western Jabavu 330 - 540
Dlamini 330
Moletsane 350
Emdeni 360
Tladi 370
Naledi 370
Chiawelo 330 - 371
Chiawelo Extension 13,800
Source: Calculated from undated Soweto Statistics obtained 
by me from the Soweto City Council in 1994.
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5.4 Rate of additions of new units to the housing stock
The first houses to be built by the Johannesburg City 
Council were at Orlando East in the early 1930s. However, 
the exact date at which construction began and the number of 
units produced per year is unclear. What is known, however, 
is that during the decade 1930-40 the JCC constructed 5,890 
houses at Orlando East (table 5.6). As table 5.6 also shows, 
it is noteworthy that it took another four years before the 
council added a further 3,703 units at Orlando West in 1944. 
The decline and virtual stoppage of council housing 
production during this four year period has been explained 
as having been caused by the outbreak of the second world 
war.19
After the war had ended it took another three years for the 
council to construct a further 5,100 units at Jabavu in
1947. Table 5.6 also shows that council house construction
dried up for five years after 1947. It was not until 1952 
that 2,796 houses were built (1,746 added to the Orlando 
West stock and 1,050 units at Dube). The explanation here 
appears to have been linked to the change of government. The 
immediate impact on council housing construction as a result 
of the victory of the Purified Nationalist Party in 1948 is 
clearly shown in table 5.6. The combined total number of 
state units produced between 1952 and 1954 compares well
with those produced in 1947, but less than the 5,890
19 Morris, P. 1980. Soweto: A Review of Existing 
Conditions and Some Guidelines For Change, Urban foundation, 
Johannesburg. 204
dwellings constructed at Orlando East in the 1930s.
From 1955 township expansion was aided by the contributions 
of the Services Levy funds, by loan finance from the mining 
sector, and by the reductions in the cost of labour made 
possible by the Native Workers Building Act (as already 
discussed above). This period saw the construction of 5,415 
housing units (1,306 at Central Western Jabavu (CWJ), 2,351 
at Mofolo and 1,758 at Senaoane). A further 9,897 dwellings 
(2,039 at Jabulani, 1,426 at Molapo, 5,563 at Zola and an 
additional 869 at Dube) were constructed by the JCC in 1956. 
In 1957, as table 5.6 further shows, 9,563 houses (2,191 at 
Phiri, 1,573 at Zondi, 1,502 at Mapetla and 4,297 at 
Dobsonville) were completed. However, there was a small 
decline in 1958 compared to the preceding two years.
But the biggest single construction of the council housing 
stock was in 1959. During this year a substantial number of 
9,027 housing units were constructed (2,697 at Emdeni, 4,041 
at Naledi, 2,289 at Chiawelo) and a further construction of 
new units was begun in the Diepmeadow area which resulted in 
the erection of 8,314 houses at Meadowlands East, 7,482 
houses at Meadowlands West and 10,665 houses at Diepkloof 
(table 5.6). However, there was a significant decline in 
terms of the council housing building supply in 1960 with 
only 3,028 units produced (1,948 at Chiawelo Extension 1 and 
1,080 at Mapetla Extension). This decline continued until 
1982 when the council housing supply ceased completely
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(table 5.7). Therefore, it can be seen from the data 
presented in table 5.6 that houses constructed between 1930 
and 1960 effectively constitute today’s townships of Greater 
Soweto.
The council housing construction that occurred between 1961 
and 1982 was in most areas minimal compared to the preceding 
period (see table 5.7). In most cases only additional units 
were being provided to the already existing stock in 
different townships. However, the figures on table 5.7 are 
primarily concerned with Soweto alone as data for the period 
1961-1982 on Diepmeadow and Dobsonville were not available. 
Between 1961 and 1982 only 12,723 houses were added to the 
Soweto housing stock. Of these, 2,260 were built at Moroka 
in 1961. Again, following the pattern of earlier periods the 
council housing supply then dried up, for five years. In 
1966, a further supply of 984 housing units were built at 
Klipspruit. No additional housing units were provided by the 
council throughout the whole of 1967.
Council house building in Soweto resumed in 1968 when 1,081 
units were completed at Naledi Extension 1. By 1969, 441
dwellings were completed at Pimville. Another 1,478 houses 
(table 5.7) were built at Emdeni Extension in 1970, and 514 
at Molapo Extension by 1971. In 1972 a total of 881 houses 
were also constructed (653 at Pimville Zone 1 and 228 at 
Pimville Zone 2). By 1973 the council constructed a total of 
1,615 dwellings (681 at Pimville Zone 4, 641 at Pimville
206
Zone 6 and 293 at Mapetla Extension). A further 940 units
were built in 1974 (887 at Pimville Zone 3 and 53 at
Pimville Zone 4).
There was a sharp decline during the following years. Only
358 houses were completed in 1975 (43 at Senaoane, 176 at
Klipspruit and 139 at Pimville Zone 1). As table 5.7 further 
shows, 351 units were built at Pimville Zone 5 in 1976. 
There was almost a virtual collapse of house building in 
Soweto between 1977 and 1980, with just 117 units 
constructed (21 at Orlando East and 96 at Pimville Zone 2) 
within a three year period (see table 5.7).
By 1981 the resumption of house building in Soweto resulted 
(as table 5.7 shows) in 848 new housing units (800 at 
Chiawelo Extension and 48 at Molapo Extension). However, the 
final intervention by the council in terms of house building 
(as table 5.7 further shows) came during the following year 
in 1982 with the completion of 867 dwellings (777 at Naledi 
Extension 1 and 90 at Naledi Extension 2). In the following 
section I examine self-built housing.
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Table 5.6: Council-built housing stock, 1930-1960 (analysed
according to the total number produced per year)
Year Township Number of 
Houses
Total Number 
Built Per 
Year
1932 Orlando East 5 890 5 890
1946 Orlando West 3 703
Pimville 88 3 791
1947 Jabavu 5 100 5 100
1952 Orlando West 1 746
Dube 1 050 2 796
1954 Moroka 2 389 2 389
1955 CWJ 1 306
Mofolo 2 351
Senaoane 1 758 5 415
1956 Jabulani 2 039
Molapo 1 426
Zola 5 563
Dube 869 9 897
1957 Phiri 2 191
Zondi 1 573
Mapetla 1 503
Dobsonville 4 297 9 563
1958 CWJ 256
Dlamini 1 663
Mofolo 2 176
Moletsane 1 884
Tladi 1 825 7 804
1959 Emdeni 2 687
Naledi 4 041
Chiawelo 2 2 289
Meadowlands East 8 314
Meadowlands West 7 482
Diepkloof 10 665 35 488
1960 Chiawelo Extension 1 948
Mapetla Extension 1 080 3 028
Total -  -  - 91 166 91 166
Source: Compiled from various pieces of undated Soweto
Statistics obtained by me from the Soweto Council in 1994
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Table 5.7: Council Built Housing, 1961-1982 (analysed
according to the total number produced per year)
Year Township Number of 
Houses
Total No 
Built Per 
Year
1961 Moroka 2 260 2 260
1966 Klipspruit 984 984
1968 Naledi Extension 1 1 081 1 081
1969 Pimville Zone 2 441 441
1970 Emdeni Extension 1 478 1 478
1971 Molapo Extension 514 514
1972 Pimville Zone 1 
Pimville Zone 2
653
228 881
1973 Pimville Zone 4 
Pimville Zone 6 
Mapetla Ext
681
641
293 1 615
1974 Pimville Zone 3 
Pimville 4
887
53 940
1975 Senaoane 
Klipspruit 
Pimville 1
43
176
139 358
1976 Pimville Zone 5 351 351
1977 Pimville 2 
Orlando East
11
21 32
1980 Pimville 2 85 85
1981 Chiawelo Extension 3 
Molapo Extension
800
48 848
1982 Naledi Extension 1 
Naledi Extension 2
777
90 867
Total 12 723 12 723
Source: Compiled from undated Soweto Statistics obtained by 
me from the Soweto City Council in 1994.
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5.5 Other forms of construction
The preceding section has described the basic model of 
council housing supply in Greater Soweto. It is also worth 
noting, however, that another integral part of the house 
building activity undertaken by the JCC involved the 
financing of self-built housing units. These units were 
built over several decades under the terms of the 30-year 
leasehold scheme (see Chapter 6). Although built as owner- 
occupier units, the construction of these units was financed 
by individual housing loans to occupiers from the local 
authorities.
Under these conditions, the white local authorities not only 
approved loans, building plans and allocated sites for this 
form of housing construction, but retained ownership of the 
land on which the house stood. Other dwellings which were 
built by the JCC in Soweto included units built on trading 
residential sites such as shops and those constructed 
specifically to provide accommodation to caretakers at 
schools, halls and for the benefit of other such employees 
(see Chapter 3, table 3.6).
5.6 Housing shortage
The shortage of housing in South Africa particularly for 
urban Africans has over the years been compounded by 
apartheid policies. This is not surprising since the housing 
policy was conceived within the ideological framework of
urban fences of containment (as explained in Chapter 4). 
After the Soweto revolt in 1976, the Riekert Commission 
(appointed by the state to investigate the conditions under 
which urban blacks lived) noted estimates in 1977 of a 
housing backlog of 141,000 family dwellings and 126,000 
hostel beds nationally, but excluding the so-called 
homelands.20 In 1978, the Urban Foundation estimated a 
shortfall of 400,000 dwellings nationally (including the 
homelands). By 1981 the Viljoen Committee's estimates were
168.000 for all the urban areas in South Africa (excluding 
the homelands).21 This same committee noted estimates of
35.000 family units needed for the Greater Soweto area 
alone, and indicated that the housing backlog there was 
growing at an annual rate of 4,000.22
In 1986 the Building Research Institute estimated the 
backlog of African housing throughout the country (excluding 
the homelands) to be 538,000.23 But despite these varying 
estimates, very few houses have been added to the existing 
stock in Greater Soweto. By 1992, Dr Joop Deloor's Task 
Group on National Housing and Strategy (appointed by the 
South African Housing Advisory Council) suggested a 
shortfall of 1,248,000 units for Africans nationally
20 Unterhalter, E. 1987. Forced Removal, p. 75. 
International Defence and Aid Fund for Southern Africa 
(IDAF), Cannon Collins House, London.
21 Ibid., p. 75.
22 Mandy, N. 1984. (7, op.cit. p. 222.)
23 Unterhalter, E. 1987. (20, op.cit.)
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(including the homelands).24
In the same vein Dr Joop de Loor's Task Group blamed the 
problem of housing shortage on the lack of ’available 
capital1 but failed at the same time to highlight the past 
injustices caused by the 'biased structure1 of the South 
African system of economic organisation which favoured 
whites over blacks (as discussed in Chapter 4). It will be 
remembered (as has already been explained in the preceding 
chapter) that from the very beginning of South Africa's 
capital formation, the ideology of segregation and later 
apartheid were continually invoked in order to remove the 
state's responsibility in the provision of decent houses to 
urban Africans. This time round it is the availability of 
capital which is invoked in order to justify the further 
lowering of standards.25 But as Bond26 has argued, the 
problem is not the lack of capital, but simply that capital 
is not released from 'financial markets down to the ground' 
in order to fund sufficient housing development of a decent 
standard.
24 SAIRR 1992/93. Race Relations Survey, Johannesburg.
25 See for example, Badenhorst, M.S. 1993. "Housing 
Provision in a Post-Apartheid Society: A Qualitative Review 
of Constraining Realities", in 21st International 
Association for Housing Science (IAHS), World Housing 
Congress, Cape Town.
26 Bond, P. 1992. "De Loor Report is off the mark", A 
Work in Progress supplement, Issue no. 6.
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5.7 Backyard and informal dwellings
The development of the backyard and informal dwellings 
attests to the overwhelming housing demand in Greater 
Soweto. It was during the growth of popular militant 
struggles (see Chapter 7) that backyard and informal shacks 
emerged in the townships. In an attempt to buy off rent 
protests (through the use of the Bantu (Urban Areas) Act 97 
of 1978 enacted following the Soweto revolt), the 'Great 
Sale1 of the council-built housing stock to township 
residents commenced in 1978 (see Chapter 7). By the early 
1980s the West Rand Administration Board (WRAB) acting 
through community councils, introduced a local authority 
loan scheme aimed at curtailing the growth of the backyard 
shacks, but framed within the context of enabling residents 
to improve their housing conditions. To obtain these loans, 
residents adopted a variety of strategies. For example, they 
would state in their house improvement applications that 
they needed to build an inside WC or a storeroom when in 
fact they intended to use the money for building outside 
rooms.
In this way the residents managed to get both their plans 
and loans approved by the local authorities. As local 
authorities increasingly became aware of the growth of the 
outside buildings (backyard rooms) they did not object to 
this development, because of the opportunities for revenue 
extraction represented by this sector, during an era in
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which the rent boycotts were growing in profile and 
intensity (see Chapter 7). For a building plan to be 
processed and approved by the Building Inspectors' 
department, it cost the applicant R242.50. Moreover, loans 
were granted only to the residents who were not in rent 
arrears.
In this regard the loan system was used: a mechanism for
extracting rents as well as of advancing loans. Because of 
these constraints, and affordability problems, many 
residents simple built their own outside rooms without 
seeking the approval of local authorities. Other residents 
took advantage of the Bantu (Urban Areas) Act 97 of 1978 
conferred on urban Africans (99 year leasehold rights) that 
could be mortgaged to financial institutions (see Chapter 
7), and applied for loans from private financial markets to 
build backyard rooms.
This led to the use in a variety of cases of private sector 
developers with private sector financing, specifically 
building outside rooms at residents' sites in the form of 
one-roomed and two-roomed units and a garage at a cost of 
between R5,000 to R25,000. The consequence of this 
involvement is that where residents have either lost their 
jobs or are in mortgage arrears for whatever reason, they 
not only lose the backyard shacks but their houses as well. 
There are many examples of foreclosures and repossessions by 
the financial institutions (see Chapter 8).
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Another activity was that of small time developers, who 
began selling the corrugated iron structures (usually 
assembled on the site) at the average cost of between a 
price of R1,000 and R3,000 for one and two-roomed units. 
Self-building in which the financing and construction is 
undertaken by the residents concerned and other family 
members is another activity that characterises the backyard 
sector. Another significant feature of this sector is that 
it is physically characterised by continuous growth and 
change. As is shown in Chapter 3 (table 3.10), the recorded 
backyard rooms had grown since the early 1980s to number a 
total of 68,000 units in Greater Soweto by 1994. If its 
present rate of increase should continue, it has the 
potential to outstrip the total number of all council-built 
houses in Greater Soweto and become the largest sector.
5.8 Conclusion
This chapter has examined the mechanisms through which 
houses in Greater Soweto were delivered on the ground. 
Within this context the financing mechanisms were identified 
and analysed. In this regard the housing construction was 
shown to have been financed from Government loans, private 
sector loans, grants and loans from the Native Services Levy 
Fund and loans from the JCC's consolidated funds. The 
Government through the councils managed and facilitated the 
process rather than contributing its own funds (as grants) 
for housing construction in Greater Soweto.
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The use of cheap labour in the construction process was
shown to have contributed to the reduction in the 
construction costs. Despite the growth of the stock over 
several years, housing demand has continued to exceed supply 
since townships were first constructed. The growth of 
backyard and informal shacks (see also Chapter 3) indicates
clearly the widening gap (disequilibrium) between housing
supply and demand. Housing shortages in Greater Soweto are a 
legacy of past policies which sought both to curtail the 
African urban population growth whilst at the same time
forcing them into crowded reserves. The significance of the 
council-built houses in Greater Soweto is that they allowed 
space for the later development of backyard rooms.
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CHAPTER SIX
POLICIES, ADMINISTRATION AND TENURE MARKETS. 1930-1994
6.1 Introduction
The preceding chapter has examined the physical development 
of housing in Greater Soweto in terms of the construction 
and the spatial distribution of the housing stock. This 
chapter examines the associated patterns of housing 
consumption. Thus, it is concerned with the management of 
the housing stock and allocation (how the stock was 
distributed, including access and control), and the market 
mechanisms.
6.2 Local government
Until 1972 the responsibility for the provision of housing 
and administration in Soweto fell under the Johannesburg 
City Council (JCC), while Diepmeadow was controlled by the 
central state's appointed Natives Resettlement Board (NRB). 
Dobsonville on the other hand was managed by the Roodeport 
City Council.1 Historically, not only did these white 
municipalities (local authorities) function as directing 
authorities in the construction of houses in the townships 
in line with the segregationist ideology: they were also 
charged with ensuring that central government policy (influx
1 See Mandy, N. 1984. A City Divided: Johannesburg and 
Soweto, Macmillan, Johannesburg; Payne, R, (undated). The 
Social History of Soweto, paper prepared for IDASA, Urban 
Research Services, Braamfontein.
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control) was effectively implemented. It was particularly 
during the 1960s that the state's policy of 'grand' 
apartheid (with the black opposition silenced) was
effectively consolidated. Hence the urban influx control 
policy emerged as an important mechanism of transferring the 
state budget for African expenditure in the so-called 'white 
cities' to the emerging peri-urban areas of the bantustans.
As the apartheid Government increasingly saw the bantustans 
as means of achieving its grand design of forcing Africans 
away from the 'white cities', it compelled local authorities 
not only to intensify the urban 'fences', but also to make
living within these cities for African residents as
uncomfortable and unattractive as possible.2 Not only were 
the so-called 'unproductive' African residents such as the 
unemployed, the old, the handicapped and orphans to be
discouraged from living in the townships,3 but the partial 
tenure rights previously conferred on residents were to be 
immediately abolished (see sections on tenure below). 
Moreover the municipalities would increasingly find it 
difficult to raise any loans from the state for the 
provision of more houses and services in the townships. 
Consequently, the relations between the central Government 
and some of the white municipalities which were regarded as 
being sympathetic to urban blacks (such as the JCC) became
2 Payne, R. (1, op.cit.)
3 Ibid.
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increasingly strained.4
Prior to 1967 the only local government representation which 
township residents had was through the appointed Advisory 
Boards established under the Natives (Urban Areas) Act of 
1923. But like the Natives' Representative Council which 
replaced the African franchise in the Cape (described in 
Chapter 4), the Advisory Boards (which consisted of people 
who collaborated with the apartheid regime from within the 
sections of the black community) had no significant power 
vested in them, instead they had been set up as a mechanism 
designed to implement various pieces of apartheid 
legislation in the townships.
The relations between the central government and the JCC 
increasingly became more antagonistic. The Advisory Boards 
were replaced in 1968 by the Urban Bantu Councils (UBCs) 
established under the Urban Bantu Councils Act passed during 
the same year. These councils were to function as advisory 
committees charged with the responsibility of facilitating 
links between the townships and the bantustans. Thus it was 
believed that these councils would serve as a mechanism of 
attracting African residents away from the 'white cities' to 
the bantustans where new economic opportunities would be 
created.5
4 Ibid., see also Mandy, N. 1991. Local government 
finance. In M. Swilling, et al, Apartheid City In 
Transition, Oxford University Press, Cape Town.
5 Ibid.
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In 1971 the West Rand (Bantu) Administration Board (WRAB) 
together with 13 other Administration Boards (charged with 
township administration elsewhere in the country) was 
created under the Black Administration Act of 1971.6 By 
1973 the WRAB replaced the white municipalities and assumed 
overall control over three administrative areas of Soweto, 
Diepmeadow and Dobsonville which comprise Greater Soweto. 
The WRAB functioned as the agent of the Ministry of Co­
operation and Development and became the dominant body 
charged with the administration of Greater Soweto. In this 
context the WRAB also inherited wide ranging powers from its 
predecessors, including the following:
(a) Power to buy, sell or rent property in the townships;
(b) Power to develop any land belonging to it and
responsibility for the provision of services and 
amenities;
(c) Power to donate land for any suitable use;
(d) Power to obtain loans for its projects;
(e) Responsibility for the administration and 
implementation of influx control and the collection 
of employment levies;
(f) Manpower recruitment and training and placement;
(g) Administration of hostels; and
(h) Provision of sorghum beer and liquor in the 
townships.v
Throughout this period these powers were executed through 
white urban managers appointed by the state. The role of 
these urban managers was such that "when the council did not
6 Ibid.
7 See Soweto. A Survey. Supplement to Financial Mail, 
March 25 1983, p. 11.
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own your property it owned a little less of your soul".8 It 
was also under this regime that the poor housing conditions 
in the townships had been exacerbated. The lack of financial 
resources and the continued treatment of residents as if
they were 'problems to be controlled, not as constituents to
be served1 under WRAB, was gradually leading to an 
unprecedented explosive situation in the history of South 
Africa as demonstrated by the Soweto revolt in 1976.
After this uprising the state appointed a commission of
inquiry (headed by Justice Cillie) to investigate the causes 
of the riots. The major findings identified by this 
commission concerned residents' deep seated anger with the 
entire apartheid system. In particular, influx control and 
the impermanent status conferred to African residents were 
cited as a major grievances. Other grievances included the 
system of local government management under the WRAB, acute 
shortages and poor housing conditions and services 
provision, and lack of funding and rents increase.9
Not surprisingly, the Soweto revolt (see Chapter 7) had 
targeted and destroyed state properties: administration
offices, beer halls, police stations and schools to show the
8 Proctor, A. 1979. Class Struggle, Segregation and the 
City: A History of Sophiatown, 1905-1940. In B. Bozzoli 
(ed), Labour Townships and Protest, pp. 49-89.
9 Mandy, N. 1984. (1, op.cit.); Mandy, N. 1991. (4, 
op.cit.); Payne, R. (1, op.cit.); Unterhalter, E. 1987. 
Forced Removal, IDAF, Canon Collins House, London; Soni, 
D.V. 1992. Black Housing Struggles. In D.M. Smith (ed.), The 
Apartheid City and Beyond, Routledge, London.
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deep seated frustrations of the rioters with the whole 
apartheid system. This uprising was significant in many 
ways. It was to have a major impact on the organisation and 
growth of militant struggles involving the combination of 
political, social, economic and housing issues.
Thus it had taken several years of severe repression for 
township residents to realise that they, too, could use the 
weapon of violence to achieve their goals. Widespread 
dissent from this period was to characterise the township 
built environment and continue to remain as feature of 
politics to this day (see Chapter 7). With the growth of 
militant and violent struggles, the apartheid government 
began thinking about ways of reforming apartheid.
This was the case, too, with the representatives of 
industrial capital, commercial capital, and commodity 
capital who launched the Urban Foundation in 1976 (following 
the Soweto riots) to influence the state's urban policy 
reforms. The modification of apartheid policy through 
reforms was conceived as yet another mechanism of extending 
political and ideological control over urban Africans. The 
needs of capital were also increasingly being affected by 
strikes, hence urban policy reform represented a new means 
of reproduction in the built environment. This was aimed at 
stabilising the situation in order to maintain and sustain 
the capital accumulation process.10
10 Soni, D.V. 1992. (9, op.cit.)
222
The establishment of the 99 year leasehold scheme was one of 
the Urban Foundation's big ideas, and was subsequently 
introduced by the state in 1978 (see Chapter 7 below). Also, 
in 1978 Community Councils were elected into office under 
the terms of the Community Councils Act of 1977. These 
councils had been established despite a low turnout at the 
polls.11 Although these councils represented an advance 
from their predecessors (Advisory Boards and UBCs), 
particularly with regard to the recognition of the 
permanence of blacks in the urban areas, they nevertheless 
lacked credibility as they were conceived within the 
framework of apartheid institutions simply as talking shops, 
and also lacking executive powers and financial viability.
The decision making process effectively remained rooted 
within WRAB management structures. As these councils 
increasingly began functioning as 'vigilante1 groups12 
representing their own interests and those of the state at 
large, pressure from the black community also began to mount 
against these councils given their increasingly perceived 
corrupt political practices and lack of legitimacy. The 
apartheid regime responded by creating new black local 
authorities (BLAs) in 1982 in terms of the Black Local 
Authorities Act of the same year. However, from their 
inception, the BLAs were also faced with worsening 
legitimacy difficulties (see Chapter 7).
11 Supplement to the Financial Mail (7, op.cit.)
12 Ibid.
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6.3 Allocation policies and tenure markets
Historically, successive apartheid governments had no 
intention of granting permanent tenure to African urban 
dwellers. Instead Africans were viewed as temporary 
residents in the so-called 'white cities'. Until 1978 access 
to state housing entailed the screening of Africans by local 
authorities in accordance with various pieces of legislation 
discussed in Chapter 4 above. Since urban Africans were 
considered to be permanent residents in the various so- 
called bantustans under the 1913 Land Act, eligibility for 
admission to 'white cities' was fundamentally based on 
'influx qualification' as opposed to housing need or choice 
or freedom of choice in employment or commercial markets.
Under the Bantu (Urban Areas) Consolidated Act No. 25 of 
1945, for example, migration of African people to the cities 
had to conform to certain influx control measures. Under the 
terms of Section 10 (l)(a) or (b) of this Act an employed 
male applicant qualified for rented housing in the townships 
only if he was born and had continuously resided since birth 
in an urban area or had worked for 10 years for one employer 
or 15 years for more than one employer.13 Moreover, a male 
over 21 years of age and married to a woman who also 
qualified (under Section 10) to be in the urban area could
13 Mashile, G.G. and Pirie, G.H. 1977. "Aspects of 
Housing Allocation in Soweto", South African Geographical 
Journal, No. 2, pp. 139-149.
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on that basis apply for housing.14
Section 10 of the 1945 Act not only sought to contain 
African urbanisation, but also limited applications for
housing to 'married men'. Female headed households were
eligible for housing only if they qualified to be in an 
urban area under the terms of the above Act, and they were 
divorced or widows with dependents.15 On the other hand, 
those who were not born in an urban area could only acquire 
accommodation in the hostels or as lodgers from state 
tenants16 under the terms of the same Section 10.
What forms of tenure were conferred to township residents? 
Historically, a general feature of households in all the 
townships of Greater Soweto has been of state rental. Even 
under the 30 year leasehold scheme ownership rights were not 
legally defined in that residents could not own the land on 
which their houses were situated. According to the 
principles of the Roman-Dutch common law (the prevailing law 
in South Africa), land property rights are inseparable from
those in actual property or building built permanently on a
particular piece of land;1-7 accordingly ownership of the 
property rests with the owners of the land.
14 Ibid.
15 Ibid.
16 Ibid.
17 Personal Interview with the Chief Registrar of 
Deeds, Central Government Building,Pretoria, 3 March, 1994.
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Since under the 30 year leasehold rights township residents 
could only occupy the buildings/houses: they had no rights 
in the land on which they stood and there could not actually 
own the their homes.10 In 1968 tenure rights available to 
urban Africans were repealed by Government Notice R1036 of 
196819 introduced under the Bantu (Urban Areas) 
Consolidation Act of 1945 (discussed above). The effect of 
Government Notice R1036 of 1968 was also to abolish the 30 
year leasehold rights which had been conferred on township 
residents by the JCC since the late 1940s. These new tenure 
configurations (discussed below) were intended as mechanisms 
for turning urban Africans into labour migrants (as already 
explained above in relation to the UBCs).
6.4 Site permits
These were issued in terms of Regulation 6 rights conferred 
by Government Notice R1036, and applied to township 
residents who not only qualified to be in the urban areas in 
terms of Section 10 (l)(a) or (b) of the Bantu (Urban Areas) 
Consolidated Act No. 25 of 1945, but who could also afford 
to build their own homes. These rights were extended to 
those residents who had previously been allowed to build 
their own houses under the 30 year leasehold scheme. 
Moreover, local authorities (white municipalities) had to be
18 Ibid.
19 Budlender, G. 1993. Urban Housing: The Legal 
Framework, Unpublished paper, Legal Resources Centre, 
Johannesburg.
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satisfied that potential applicants had financial 
resources20 for building a house before they could 
allocate sites to individuals for this purpose. Some of 
those who could not raise their own funds were given permits 
on the basis of local authority loans.21
Holders of site permits were not allowed to raise funds for 
this form of housing from mortgage lenders. To do so would 
not have been consistent with the influx control mechanism 
and the impermanence of Africans in the 'white cities'. 
Furthermore, the Regulation 6 tenure form conferred only 
partial ownership rights in that it also excluded ownership 
rights in the land on which the houses had been erected. In 
this case residents could only own the physical housing 
structures ‘ and could sell them, but not the land on which 
the houses were situated. As Mandy has stated,
"Such leases were not regarded by the Government as 
being contradictory to the policy of separate 
development because they did not confer security of 
tenure. If the Minister concerned decided to abolish 
a township compensation would be paid only for the 
loss of the dwelling".22
This is a point about duration: the lease could be held
as long as the landlord permitted.
20 See Emdon, E. 1993. "Privatisation of State 
Housing", in Urban Forum 4:2, pp. 1-13. Witwatersrand Press, 
Johannesburg.
21 Personal Interview with Johan Latsky, Senior Legal 
Official, EFK Tucker Legal Firm, Johannesburg, 26 January 
1994.
22 Mandy, N. 1984. (1, op.cit. p. 180).
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6.5 Certificates of occupation
These rights were conferred in terms of Regulation 8 under 
R1036 of 1968 and were not very different from those issued 
under Regulation 6 discussed above. Both regulations 
conferred partial ownership rights which excluded ownership 
rights in the land to township residents. The only 
difference between them was that Regulation 6 enabled 
residents to build their own houses,23 whereas Regulation 
8 allowed households to buy houses from either the local 
authority or from the holders of Regulation 6 rights (site 
permits). However, the land on which the houses stood, would 
continue to be owned by the state through the local 
authorities. Even in this case township residents still had 
to satisfy white municipalities that they qualified to be in 
the urban areas in terms of the influx controls stipulated 
under the 1945 Act.
Very few houses were actually built or bought from the 
state, whether in terms of Regulations 6 and 8 permits or 
the former 30 year leasehold scheme (table 6.1). 
Furthermore, under both Regulations 6 and 8 rights, permit 
holders could not mortgage their properties, neither could 
these act as security against financial loans.24 
Therefore, the process of exchange (buying and selling
23 Emdon, E. 1993. (20, op.cit.)
24 Personal Interview with Mr Johan Latsky (21, 
op.cit.)
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rights to a house as in the United Kingdom) within these 
partial ownership markets was severely restricted.
6.6 Residential permits
The third form of tenure was characterised by Regulation 7 
rights. As with Regulations 6 and 8 rights discussed above, 
Africans still had to qualify in the urban areas in terms of 
the 1945 Act. In addition, potential applicants qualified 
for Regulation 7 rights if they did not already hold 
Regulations 6 and 8 permits. Regulation 7 permits were based 
on a monthly rental scheme.
The holders of these permits (commonly referred to as state 
or council tenants) paid rent to the local authorities on a 
monthly basis for the use of a dwelling. This form of tenure 
was very insecure particularly because the white township 
urban managers (superintendents) could cancel these permits 
for a variety of reasons25 without any notice being given 
to the residents. It is in this context that these rights 
conferred to the residents some form of security of tenure.
The rights conferred under all the regulations (6, 7 and 8 
discussed above) ceased to exist once the permit holder had 
died. Although, the children of the deceased could claim 
preference in the reallocation of these rights, provided 
they qualified to be in the urban area. As one senior
25 Budlender, G. 1993. (19, op.cit.)
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official put it, "this was an integrated process with the 
birth right enshrined up to the reference book".26 Despite 
these tenure forms and constraints, however, the houses in 
Greater Soweto have always been regarded as family property 
where everyone has a stake in the dwelling.2"7
6.7 The lodger's permit
The chronic housing shortage in Greater Soweto meant that 
many residents were excluded from the tenure forms 
considered above. Consequently, the lodgers' permit issued 
in terms of Regulation 20 rights,28 became another 
prominent mechanism in allocating residential space in 
Greater Soweto. Basically this market comprised of room 
rentals in which holders of Regulations 6, 7 and 8 permits 
(described above) were allowed to sublet rooms if they so 
wished.29 In this case these households were required to 
apply to the local authorities for a lodgers' permit which 
could only be issued subject to the urban qualifications 
(the influx control criteria considered above) of the 
potential subtenants.
26 Personal Interview with Mr Gladstone Mafoko, 
Assistant Housing Director, Soweto City Council, 23 November 
1993.
2,7 Personal Interview with Mr William Loots, Property 
Sales Director, Soweto City Council, 11 February 1994.
28 Budlender, G. 1993. (19, op.cit.)
29 Personal Interview with Mr Gladstone Mafoko, 
Assistant Housing Director (26, op.cit.)
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The lodgers' permit was issued to the lodgers on a monthly 
renewal basis and was therefore very insecure. In effect the 
lodgers paid rents both to the local authorities (for the 
monthly endorsement on their permits) and to the 
householders for the rooms they rented.30 This private 
rental market of subtenants was characterised by a degree of 
exploitation, more so because it represented housing of last 
resort. Thus some of the householders of Regulations 6, 7 
and 8 charged their subtenants higher rents than those they 
themselves paid to the local authorities, there being no 
rent control within this private submarket.31
The fact that holders of Regulations 6, 7 and 8 permits were 
allowed by the state to take in subtenants (due to the 
exclusionary effects of the limited housing stock) is 
evidence of the existence of a class of landlords even under 
the draconian apartheid legislation. However, this class of 
landlords was mainly comprised of poorly paid, older 
residents, widows or widowers, and the unemployed. This 
would suggest that these landlords were not profit driven, 
rather the decision to sublet was governed by their need to 
pay the rents required by the local authorities and to 
support themselves.
Failure to pay rent and subletting without local authority 
approval resulted in the immediate cancellation of the
30 Ibid.
31 Ibid.
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tenure rights, subsequently followed by evictions.32 In 
addition the evictions policy was fundamentally against the 
vulnerable sections of the Greater Soweto community (the 
old, sick or disabled, orphans, widows or widowers and the 
unemployed) which also explains why this group used 
subletting as a survival mechanism. As Unterhalter has 
described,
"It was common place during Soweto funerals for the 
Administration Board to move in to repossess a house 
from a newly widowed woman while mourners were still 
gathered around the coffin."33
It had become apparent to the authorities that the draconian 
apartheid legislation had failed to curb (as discussed in 
Chapter 4) the rate of African urbanisation. In the light of 
the limited housing stock in Greater Soweto, it had become 
clear to the authorities that this urban influx was in many 
ways accommodated within the townships.34 Hence, the 
lodgers1 permit system emerged as a control mechanism aimed 
at preventing those who lacked the required urban 
qualifications from ever finding accommodation within the 
townships. Seen in this light, all these forms of tenure 
(the lodgers’ permit, and the occupation of units under 
Regulations 6, 7 and 8) constituted insecure tenure markets 
and the lodgers's permit most of all.
32 Ibid.
33 Unterhalter, E. 1987. (9, op.cit.)
34 Personal Interview with Mr William Loots, Property 
Sales Director (27, op.cit.)
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This highly insecure form of urban living was enforced 
through a specially recruited municipal police force (the 
'Blackjacks') which was accountable to the township 
superintendent but also worked closely with the South 
African police force. The role of the 'Blackjacks' was to 
carry out a continuous programme of harassment in the form 
of pass raids, liquor raids, house eviction raids, urban 
removal raids and others.35
The consequences of these raids were that many families, 
relatives and friends became separated from each other as 
some of their number were either condemned to the bantustans 
or ended up in prisons. The hostel dwellers too were issued 
with very insecure monthly permit rights, under Regulation 5 
of the Government Notice introduced in 1968 (see section 6.3 
above).
6.8 The tenure connections
The tenure policies had a huge impact on the housing 
opportunities of township residents. Home-occupation in 
Soweto was characterised by rights conferred under the terms 
of both regulations 6 and 8 discussed above. Much of the 
writing on home-ownership in Soweto has focused on Dube 
township.36 In most of this literature, Dube is portrayed
35 Ibid.
36 See Parnell, S.M. 1991. "The ideology of African 
home-ownership: the establishment of Dube, Soweto", South
African Geographical Journal, Vol. 73, No. 2, pp. 69-76.
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as the single most important model township representing 
class differentiation within the Greater Soweto housing 
market.3"7 However, as table 6.1 reveals, the home- 
ownership housing market (based on Regulations 6 and 8 
rights considered above) was also evident in other areas. 
Dube, in fact is a submarket of Orlando West (table 6.1). As 
the overall composition of Greater Soweto's local housing 
markets is revealed in Chapter 3, it need not detain us here 
(see figure 3.3 in Chapter 3).
What is of crucial importance, however, is that the total 
number of individually built houses and also those which 
were sold under the former 30-year leasehold scheme as under 
Regulations 6 and 8 rights by all accounts did not represent 
any significant departure from the urban fences of control 
(table 6.1). This is demonstrated by the fact that these 
units only represent 2,5 per cent of the total council built 
housing stock in Greater Soweto. Yet at the same time the 
existence of these units (table 6.1) in the townships 
represented significant, but not substantial divisions 
within the Greater Soweto housing markets.
The significance of these divisions related to aspects of 
class stratification among African residents in the 
townships. However, access to these units (table 6.1) was 
constrained not only by income factors, but also by the
37 See Lurie, D. "The great black hope", The 
Independent Magazine, 17 April 1993.
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Table 6.1: Houses built under the 30-year leasehold scheme
and in terms of Regulations 6 and 8 of 1968
Local housing 
market area
Number of 
houses
Percentage of 
total number of 
house
Pimville/Klipspruit 1 130 42.8
Orlando East 48 1.8
Orlando West 246 9.3
Moroka/Jabavu 341 12.9
Mofolo/Zondi 301 11.4
Chiawelo 292 11.0
Senaoane 139 5.2
Tladi 141 5.3
Total 2 638 100
Source: Adapted from table 3.6, column 2, in Chapter 3.
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acute shortage of this form of housing. Thus not every 
teacher, nurse, doctor, and business person had access to 
these units. This in turn inhibited the demand for this 
partial home-ownership market of those potential households 
who could afford to pay for their own housing from moving 
out of the council rented sector, which would have provided 
opportunities to the lower income and poor families to be 
housed in that sector that they vacated.
Consequently, the rented sector included households in all 
socio-economic categories: those with relative sufficient
resources to house themselves but unable to move out and 
those with insufficient resources to house themselves. As a 
result there was no spatial/residential segregation of 
socio-economic categories (groups) since a professionally 
qualified person (such a teacher, lawyer or businessman) 
would be living side by side with a street cleaner.
Furthermore, because of the location of the owner-occupied 
houses, those who had access to them experienced the same 
market externalities (described in Chapter 1) as those who 
did not have access to them, such as the deteriorated 
neighbourhoods, dilapidated living conditions, the 
inadequate supply of housing services, substandard 
educational facilities, poor transportation problems, crime 
and the impact of apartheid violence which characterised the 
whole Greater Soweto townships.
236
Consequently, the precise nature of tenure remained 
effectively confused: people were unable to ascertain
unambiguously what their rights were and rights could be 
withdrawn suddenly and arbitrarily. The implication here is 
that divisions within the tenure structure were 
administrative, instead of being rooted within the legal 
system or the market. As a result the only privileges which 
existed within this form of home-ownership was that the 
relatively few residents had access to this housing market 
because of their position in the labour market.
But this form of housing market did not serve as a vehicle 
for upward mobility, because of the tenure system. A housing 
ladder of opportunities did not exist in Greater Soweto. It 
is in this context that the tenure divisions and 
spatial/residential differentiation of tenures in the 
townships remained effectively blurred. Households in these 
two major tenures were severely restricted in terms of 
housing choices and mobility within the tenure structure. 
The majority of residents once accommodated simply could not 
move out from either the partial owner-occupied or council 
rented markets to equivalent accommodation in another area 
because of the critical housing shortage and the impact of 
the apartheid legislation.
Even within the partial home-ownership market potential 
moves and housing transfers could only be facilitated 
through the bureaucratic control of white urban managers.
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Further constraints were imposed in situations where the 
transfer of a house was allowed to proceed. In this case the 
potential seller could only dispose of the leasehold rights 
in the dwelling and not the land on which it stood, whilst 
the potential buyer would be subjected to various forms of 
screening through the influx control mechanisms.
The most important finding regarding the tenure connections 
suggests greater stability within the housing system before 
the reforms of apartheid dating from the late 1970s. This 
stability within the housing system is consistent with the 
conclusion that the tenure structure under apartheid 
inhibited mobility with respect to the filtering process and 
with what has been seen of the practical obstacles to moving 
1 upwards1.
However, it would appear that some filtering did take place 
being characterised by a form of succession with the house 
being passed to a tenant's child when he or she died (as 
explained in section 6.6 above), or when the original tenant 
was evicted from the house or deported to the bantustans. 
Filtering was also possible in cases where the elderly 
original households voluntarily left the city to settle in 
the rural hinterlands and their children took over the 
house.
But this did not imply transferring tenure to the children 
of the original tenant. It was usually done without the
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knowledge of the urban managers. Whenever such practices 
were uncovered the house was taken over by the authorities 
and those living in them evicted. The implication here is 
that unless evicted or removed by the authorities,
households remained registered as tenants until death or 
even after death.
It is in this context that the tenure system of Greater 
Soweto can be seen as having conferred on the residents 
partial permanent occupation rights. The tenure markets 
under apartheid were designed within a different system 
pertaining to property and occupation rights which aimed at 
curtailing the settlement of Africans in the cities. 
Therefore, Africans could not legally own any property in 
any urban area. Moreover the rights conferred to township 
residents were registered only with the Bantu Affairs 
Commissioners at the local authority offices and not with 
the Deeds Office in Pretoria in terms of the Deeds Registry 
Act of 1937 (see Chapters 7 and 8).
In South Africa, particularly with respect to black 
residential areas, transfer of property was registered 
through a process of endorsement. Endorsement is here 
defined as some form of a ' de facto’ recognition of 
leasehold title. The process of endorsement was based on the 
principles of the 1927 Land Survey Act and the Deeds 
Registry Act of 1937. Both these Acts had the impact of
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discrimination on the basis of race.38 As a result, the 
registration of property in white residential areas took the 
form of freehold or 'de jure1 leasehold title.
Throughout this period housing markets in Greater Soweto 
were thus very different in comparison to those of white 
areas in South Africa. In the townships, most of the housing 
and other building structures, including land were owned by 
the state. In contrast, most of the residential land in the 
white suburbs was privately owned. Here, transactions were 
between individuals, whereas in Greater Soweto the situation 
was different with everything dominated and controlled by 
the Government. In all the tenure systems discussed above 
the institutional arrangements and allocation practices were 
not merely different but fundamentally dominated by 
administrative rules and actions.
6.9 The backyard market
The backyard market represents housing of last resort39 (a 
'safety valve' for housing demand). This is because there is 
an excess of demand over supply. Historically, the delivery 
of council houses was not aimed specifically at meeting
38 Personal interview the Chief Registrar of Deeds (17, 
op.cit.)
39 In the United Kingdom one of the roles performed by 
private renting is that it provides tenure of last resort 
for those who have been unable to find accommodation in 
other tenures. See for example, Bovaird, A., Harloe, M. and 
Whitehead, C.M.E. "Private Rented Housing : Its Current
Role",Journal of Social Policy, Vol. 14. No. 1, pp 1-23.
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housing need.40 The backyard market emerged defiantly 
against the constraining influx control mechanisms, as a 
spontaneous response in the townships as people found 
themselves without anywhere to live. On the whole it serves 
two specific purposes: a source of addressing excessive
overcrowding within families and a potential for income 
earnings for the owners of backyard shacks, through 
subletting to the employed and those who can afford rents in 
this market (whether young or old, mobile, newly formed 
households and homeless) in Greater Soweto.
The development of the backyard market also provides
evidence of commercialisation and speculation through 
subdivisions. Speculation in land and housing markets is a 
worldwide phenomenon which tends to force rents and house 
prices to rise. In most cases speculators buy under-utilised 
land from whatever source and then carve it up for sale with 
few or no services.41 In 1995 the costs of renting
accommodation in this sector ranged between R90 for a single 
unit to R18042 for a two roomed unit and garage per month, 
depending on the actual unit rented. In other areas, (also
40 See Hendler, P. 1991. The Housing Crisis. In M.
Swilling, et al, Apartheid City in Transition, Oxford 
University Press, Cape Town.
41 Gilbert, A. and Gugler, J. 1982. Cities, Poverty and 
development, Oxford University Press, Oxford; on rental 
markets elsewhere, see also Gilbert, A. and Varley, A. 1990. 
"Renting a home in a third world city: choice or
constraint?", International Journal of Urban Regional 
Research, Vol. 14, No. 1, pp. 89-108.
42 These are the average renting costs in the Naledi 
backyard market.
241
in 1995) backyard tenants were paying between R150 to R200 a 
month.43
6.10 The informal market
The informal market has become of crucial importance in 
accommodating the homeless and poor in Greater Soweto. The 
informal market complements the backyard market as housing 
of last resort, in the sense that access to both these 
markets is not particularly determined by income and 
employment factors. However, as with the backyard market, 
some of the units within the informal sector are actually 
rented.
The extent to which the growing class of small-time 
landlords have participated in land invasions for the 
purpose of holding such land for future speculative activity 
is not known, but there is evidence that this is already 
happening. For example, once the land has been invaded, the 
small time speculators immediately erect a structure /shack, 
which is then provided to any person seeking accommodation 
with or without rent actually being charged to that tenant. 
Where rent is not charged to a tenant, such a tenant is in 
fact considered to be paying rent by virtue of living in 
that particular shack and thus preventing it being taken 
over by somebody else. As soon as opportunities to sell 
arise, these speculators quickly sell and move on to other
43 See "Low Cost Housing", Financial Mail, 26 May 1995.
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potential land invasion sites' to start the process all over 
again.
6.11 Existing policy proposals
In December 1994, the ANC led government issued a White 
Paper (WP) on "A new Housing Policy and Strategy for South 
Africa". According to the new housing policy proposals,
"Government is under a duty to take steps and create 
conditions which will lead to an effective right to 
housing for all...It is held that a person has a right 
to live in dignity, in habitable circumstances. 
Government therefore will vigorously promote an 
effective right to housing for all, within the 
resources and other limitations applicable to it. The 
challenge facing South Africa in housing, is to develop 
a strategy in the short term to direct resources 
together with the private, non-State resources, to 
ensure that all those in need (and particularly the 
poorest sector of society) are able to progress towards 
the realisation of an effective right in housing"44
To achieve its commitment to provide housing (not shacks) 
for all in the new South Africa, the Government has proposed 
a capital subsidy scheme (see table 6.2) that would enable 
residents to access housing. In the Reconstruction and 
Development Programme (RDP) the Government pledged to build 
one million new low-income houses over a period of five 
years.45 Estimates of housing costs are presented in table 
6.3. These estimates show that a decent four roomed house
44 White Paper: A New Housing Policy and Strategy for 
South Africa, Vol. 354, No. 16178, p. 22. Department of 
Housing, Pretoria, December 1994.
45 See Bond, P. 1996. Policies That Contradict The RDP, 
Briefing Paper, p. 2. National Institute For Economic 
Policy, Johannesburg.
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would cost a minimum of R25,000. The affordability levels of 
black households are shown in table 6.4. It is clear from 
the data contained in these tables that not only are black 
households constrained by the income difficulties, but that 
although more than 50 per cent of them (table 6.4) would 
qualify for the maximum R15,000 subsidy (table 6.2) they 
would still fail to access a minimally-decent house costing 
R25,000 (table 6.3).
However, it is not just the amount of housing subsidies or 
the provision of more dwellings that are needed but how 
these subsidies or additional units are allocated that any 
Government needs to address. The Government could probably 
meet the goal of providing one million new homes over five 
years but still fail to solve the housing shortage. The 
Government needs to state not only how much housing it is 
planning to build but how it will allocate the newly built 
stock.
A policy based on housing subsidies does not meet housing 
need. If those who live in the backyard and informal markets 
are the poorest, they will not benefit from the speculative 
capital subsidies which can only benefit the high-income 
earners. The backyard and informal shacks represent some 
kind of a 'safety valve1: they allow people to be housed
albeit in bad conditions. Some kind of 'safety valve1 has 
got to remain even though this might contradict the 
Government's stated commitment to the promotion of housing
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as a basic human right. The Government is faced with 
dilemmas. If it sticks to its commitment of housing as a 
basic human right and builds for backyard and informal shack 
dwellers, nothing will go to them. There may be pressure 
from established residents to occupy the new units. The 
Government needs to pay particular attention to the 
allocation mechanisms. Who will go to the top of the housing 
list for the new dwellings? Will the allocation of housing 
be based on a filtering mechanism? What kind of housing will 
the occupiers of the new dwellings leave behind? Is the 
allocation of housing going to be left entirely to the 
market? Who will be competing for subsidies and the new 
houses? These are some of the questions that ought to be 
asked before the policies are embarked on.
Table 6.2: Government's proposed capital subsidy levels
Joint spouse monthly income 
(Rand)
Subsidy 
(Rand)
0 - 800 15 000
801 - 1 500 12 000
1 501 - 2 500 9 500
2 501 - 3 500 5 000
Source: White Paper: A New Housing Policy and Strategy for
South Africa, Department of Housing, Vol. 354, No. 16178, p. 
46. Pretoria, December 1994.
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Table 6.3: Estimated housing costs
Different Housing Types Estimated Cost (Rand)
Toilet and a Pile of Bricks 12 500
One Room Core/Shell House 15 000
Two Room Core/Shell House 17 000
Four Room Core/Shell House 25 000
Source: PLANACT, 1994. Housing Finance Training Session, p. 
6. Unpublished Paper, PLANACT, Johannesburg; see also 
*Hanlon, J. 1994. Making People-Driven Development Work: A 
Report to the Commission on Development Finance, p. 28. 
South African National Civic Organisation, Johannesburg
Table 6.4: Monthly income profiles of white and black
households in South Africa
Income Group 
Rand Per Month
Whites 
Percentage Total
Blacks 
Percentage Total
1 _ 399 1.0 30.1
400 - 699 1.9 23.7
700 - 1 199 5.4 26.0
1 200 - 1 999 8.5 11.2
2 000 - 2 499 7.2 3.6
2 500 - 3 999 20.8 3.5
4 000 - 5 999 22.4 1.1
6 000 - 10 999 25.3 0.7
11 000 + 7.6 0.0
—  — —  — 100 100
Source: Adapted from the South African Institute of Race
Relations, 1993/1994, p. 484.
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6.12. Conclusion
This chapter has revealed the nature of the constraints 
governing the housing opportunities available to township 
residents under apartheid. Opportunities for mobility within 
the housing tenure markets were shown to be constrained. The 
residents had no opportunities as families grew within their 
existing dwellings without moving. Moreover township 
residents remained effectively insecure and experienced the 
same market externalities. The divisions within the tenure 
markets of Greater Soweto under apartheid were thus shown to 
be superficially significant but practically unreal and 
confused. The allocation mechanisms performed by local 
authorities blocked residents from moving. The development 
of the backyard and informal markets were shown to be 
playing important roles in the Greater Soweto housing 
markets. Proposals for the new housing policy of the ANC led 
government were also examined and analysed. Thus it was 
shown that the new proposed housing policy did not pay 
particular attention to the allocation mechanisms.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
THE TRANSFER OF STATE-OWNED HOUSING TO PRIVATE TENURE, mid 
1970S-1996
7.1 Introduction
Historically, the process and pattern of housing consumption 
in Greater Soweto had been strongly determined by the grand 
apartheid mechanisms of urban containment (as discussed in 
the preceding chapter). This major plank of the apartheid 
housing policy, began to change in 1978 (two years after the 
Soweto uprising) towards the promotion of home-ownership 
through the sale of state-owned dwellings.
During the mid-1980s the apartheid regime's housing policy 
shifted further still towards the acceptance of market- 
oriented mechanisms of housing provision in the townships. 
This period witnessed the beginning of construction of 
housing in the townships by private developers with private 
sector finance (see Chapter 8). By 1990 the state had also 
conceded in principle to the demands from township residents 
in Greater Soweto that all state-owned houses be transferred 
freely to the their occupants. This is different from 
approving private buildings.
This major shift implemented the privatisation of all state- 
owned houses in two specific, but different ways: first, the 
transfer through the sales policy; second, the free transfer 
at no expense to the beneficiaries. What kind of mechanisms
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were developed to give effect to the transfer-of-housing 
policy. To what extent have houses actually been transferred 
to the residents through the sales and free transfer 
mechanisms? In what ways has this policy shift led to the 
establishment of purchaser and seller housing markets? What 
are the significant effects of the transfer of housing 
policy? Why and how did this major shift in apartheid 
housing policy come about? There were various reasons for 
this change, to which this chapter now turns to survey and 
comprehend.
7.2 Background to the shift to privatisation
The assumption of control of Greater Soweto's local 
government by the West Rand Administration Board (WRAB) in 
1973 had disastrous consequences. Initially conceived as an 
urban influx enforcement agency aimed at transforming urban 
Africans into labour migrants in line with the homeland 
industrial decentralisation strategy (as explained in 
Chapter 4), the WRAB was established on a self-financing 
basis. This amounted to the loss to the WRAB of the 
subsidies received from the Johannesburg City Council's 
rates account (as discussed in Chapter 5). Consequently, the 
WRAB was dependent only on beer profits and rents.
This in turn heralded a new regime of increased rents on the 
township built environment, including the imposition of a 
lodgers' fee on eighteen year old children living with their
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parents, against the background of rapidly deteriorating 
living conditions in the townships,1 the growing fiscal 
crisis since the mid-1970s and a declining economic base 
nationally. The factors which contributed to the growing 
urban crisis included the international recession following 
the oil crisis of 19732, decline of manufacturing through 
lack of investment,3 high rates of unemployment, rising 
costs of basic foods and other essentials,4 continued 
apartheid violence, and changes in the ’Bantu1 educational 
system with respect to the introduction of Afrikaans as a 
medium of instruction in black schools.
It was against this background that the Soweto Students 
Representative Council (SSRC) was formed in 1976. Although 
the state responded to its demonstrations with a brutal 
programme of killings, detentions and the imprisonment of 
many students, the impact of this uprising was far reaching 
and it assumed greater significance in the formation of the 
formidable urban struggles. During the mid-1970s a campaign
1 Lodge, T. 1983. Black Politics in South Africa since 
1945, Longman, New York.
2 The background and extent of the South African 
economic decline during the 1970s is examined in a number of 
publications. See for example, Nattrass, J. 1981. The South 
African Economy: Its Growth and Change, Oxford University 
Press, Cape Town; See also An Economic Perspective on South 
Africa, Southern Africa Department, The World Bank, May
1993.
3 Marks, R. 1990. Upgrading Alex: A Case Study of a 
South African Township, Major Study Submitted for the 
Diploma in Architecture, Oxford Polytechnic, Oxford.
4 Lodge, T. 1983. (1, op.cit.)
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of resistance and confrontation was also seriously being 
expressed through the Black Consciousness movement.5
In the late-1970s and early-1980s there also took place a 
series of industrial strikes and the subsequent emergence of 
the trade union movement. In the townships violent tactics 
were also increasingly being employed such as preventing 
residents from going to work ('stay away1 from work 
campaigns), the closure of shebeens,6 the imposition of a 
system of street or mob justice, and instilling within the 
township community at large a new sense of discipline 
characterised by coercion. Furthermore, after the 1976 
events the exodus of young black South Africans leaving the 
country to join liberation movements began to mount and this 
helped to transform the character of the guerilla insurgency 
campaigns against the South African military. Meanwhile, 
councillors of the Urban Bantu Council resigned en masse 
following a march by students to those offices in 1977.7
Senior residents in the townships also began forming into 
community representative structures, such as the Soweto 
Committee of Ten in 1977 (formerly the Black Parents 
Association). The formation of this committee represented a 
serious attempt to articulate the needs of Soweto residents.
5 Ibid.
6 Ibid.
7 Payne, R. (undated). The Social History of Soweto, 
unpublished paper, Urban Research Services, Braamfontein.
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In 1979 this committee was transformed into a civic 
organisation (the Soweto Civic Association) with support 
from other social movements such as the Soweto Rate Payers 
Association and the Soweto Council of Justice.®
Nationally, the effectiveness of apartheid capitalism during 
the late 1970s and early 1980s was undermined by the impact 
of sanctions, credit restrictions resulting from the falling 
value of gold and the local currency (rand) on the 
international markets, and an increased military budget to 
underwrite military campaigns against liberation movements 
based in the neighbouring countries and the growing 
political struggles within the country.9 It is within this 
context that the specific issue of housing became 
increasingly tied up with the wider political struggle aimed 
at the complete eradication of apartheid. The immediate 
impact of these struggles took the form of a number of 
piecemeal reforms, which are considered below.
7.3 The 99-vear leasehold scheme
In 1978 the Government amended the Bantu (Urban Areas) 
Consolidated Act of 1945 to provide for granting 99-year 
leasehold rights to urban Africans with section 10 (l)(a) or
8 Ibid.
9 Marks, R. 1990. (3, op.cit.); See also, Lodge, T.
1994. South Africa: Democracy and Development in a Post- 
Apartheid Society, African Studies Seminar Paper, Institute 
for Advanced Social Research, University of the 
Witwatersrand, Johannesburg.
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(b) rights.10 The significance of the 99-year leasehold 
rights as a mechanism for the housing policy shift was that 
they provided a much stronger form of tenure than the 
previous rights conferred under Regulations 6, 7 and 8 of
Government Notice R1036 introduced when the Bantu (Urban 
Areas) Consolidated Act was amended in 1968 (see Chapter 6).
However, under this new tenure configuration (99-year 
leasehold), holders of these rights were still precluded 
from owning the land under their houses. The land continued 
to be owned by the state through white municipalities. 
Instead, they were extended rights to own the improvements 
to their houses, including the right to sell these leases to 
any potential purchaser or mortgage them with the financial 
institutions. In this sense the 99-year leases were 'real' 
(marketable) rights, but they still precluded freehold 
ownership.
Holders of Regulations 6, 7 and 8 rights (site permits, 
certificates of occupation and residential permits: see 
Chapter 6) could purchase the 99-year leasehold rights from 
the Administration Boards (the West Rand Administration 
Board (WRAB) for Greater Soweto residents) in respect of a 
surveyed 'erven' (site).11 The amendment of the Bantu 
(Urban Areas) Consolidation Act in 1978 also provided for
10 99-Year Leasehold Scheme, undated and unpublished 
paper, Surveyor General Office, Pretoria, South Africa.
11 Ibid.
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the establishment of registries at the offices of the Chief 
Bantu Affairs Commissioners to process the registration of 
the 99-year leasehold rights. However, these rights were 
precluded from being registrable in accordance with the 
Deeds Registry Act of 1937, with the consequence that they 
remained statutorily ill defined under the provisions of the 
South African law (the Roman-Dutch common law: see Chapter 
6).
To the holders of Regulations 6 and 8 rights (site permits 
and certificates of occupation), this meant that there would 
be no significant change to their housing stock with respect 
to stock transfers (see Chapter 6), except in terms of the 
longevity of the new 99-year leases. The only significant, 
but still partial, change concerned the holders of 
residential permits (Regulation 7 rights) or council tenants 
who purchased 99-year leases. By purchasing the 99-year 
leases council tenants (residential permit holders) were 
being given the right to buy through the transfer of their 
houses from the previous council rented sector to leasehold 
ownership, but they would still not own the land on which 
their houses were situated.
It was in this regard that stock transfers began to be 
effected through the sale of rented houses to council 
tenants (Regulation 7 rights), who were previously entitled 
only to rent their accommodation on a monthly basis from the 
white local authorities. In this respect, the 99-year leases
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represented a significant change to council tenants in 
comparison to the former rental configuration.
However, whilst the 99-year leasehold scheme represented a 
shift from the goal of reducing Africans to the status of 
migrant labour to a recognition of the permanence of urban 
Africans with section 10 (l)(a) or (b) rights in the so- 
called 'white cities', this change remained very divisive 
and perpetuated social divisions as it did not apply to 
those with section 10 (l)(c) and (d) rights, such as the 
hostel dwellers. Holders of lodgers' permits (see Chapter 6) 
were also excluded from the granting of 99-year leasehold 
rights.
Because of the effects of the 99-year leasehold rights and 
the fact that these rights did not represent freehold 
ownership, the 'Great Sale' of council housing resulted in 
failure with only 1,400 units bought in Soweto by 1982.12 
There were several factors to which this failure is 
attributable. First, the majority of council tenants did not 
represent effective demand, hence only a few had access to 
mortgage bonds.13 Second, since the 99-year leasehold did 
not represent freehold title, it was insecure with respect 
to land title. This also served to frustrate and confuse the
12 Mather, C. and Parnell, S. 1990. Upgrading the 
'matchboxes': urban renewal in Soweto, 1976-86. In D.
Drakakis-Smith (ed.), Economic Growth and Urbanization in 
Developing Areas, Routledge, London.
13 Ibid.
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potential private sector involvement in the Greater Soweto 
housing markets.14 Third, Greater Soweto council tenants 
(holders of residential permits) felt that they had already 
paid for these houses in terms of their rental contributions 
over many years.15
Fourth, the sale of council-built housing was administered 
by the government through local authority boards who were 
perceived by residents to be racially discriminatory.16 
Suspicions were reinforced by their experiences with 
particular respect to the previous 30-year leasehold scheme 
which had been repealed and replaced by Regulations 6 and 8 
permits in 1968 when the Bantu (Urban Areas) Consolidated 
act of 1945 was amended (see Chapter 6).
The combination of these factors, including the rapidly 
growing popular urban struggles (see below) encouraged a 
shift in government strategy. The Viljoen Commission was 
appointed by the Government in May 1981 to inquire into 
private sector involvement in township housing. The main
14 Mandy, N. 1984. A City Divided: Johannesburg and 
Soweto, Macmillan, Johannesburg.
15 Personal Interview with Mr Johan Latsky, Senior 
Legal Official, at EFK Tucker Offices, Johannesburg, 26
January 1994. EFK Tucker is law firm which was commissioned
by the Central Witwatersrand Metropolitan Chamber to 
investigate the free transfer of houses with respect to
Greater Soweto, including the technical difficulties of
transferring the stock and potential tenure options. Johan 
Latsky was responsible for writing up the Transfer of Houses 
Report which was published by the CWMC in February 1993.
16 Ibid.
256
findings of the Viljoen Report, which was published in 
October 1981 concerned the need for introducing private 
sector finance for building in the townships.
According to the Report the participation of private sector 
finance was dependant on the Government granting permanent 
rights to urban African residents. The Commission also 
observed the active role that could be played by employers 
in assisting their employees with access to housing.17 The 
implication here was that the involvement of the private 
sector would not only stabilise the growing conflicts 
between labour and capital, but also that black townships 
represented a potential for the extraction of substantial 
profits. It was also within this context that the Chairman 
of the Anglo American Corporation, Gavin Relly remarked,
"On no account, though, should we allow questions of 
citizenship to limit or frustrate the ability of 
black people to participate in the structures of 
economic opportunity and prosperity. Those who do so 
must be given secure tenure and the opportunity to 
own their own homes, develop their communities and 
contribute to the creation of a modern and prosperous 
country."13
Subsequent to the Viljoen Commission's recommendations, 
statutory rights to the 99-year leasehold configuration were 
created by the passing of the Black Communities Development 
Act (BCDA) of 1984. Africans gained the right to
17 Mandy, N. 1984. (14, op.cit.); Mather, C. and
Parnell, S. 1990. (12, op.cit.).
13 Rand Daily Mail 31 August 1983. Cited from Soussan, 
J. 1984. "Recent trends in South African housing policy", 
Area, 16, 3, pp. 201-207.
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"erect under the leasehold in question any building 
or improvements, or to alter or demolish any such 
buildings or improvements, the right to occupy any 
building on site, the right to encumber, by means of 
a mortgage, the leasehold, and the right to dispose 
the leasehold to any competent person, which shall 
include the right to sublet or to bequeath the 
leasehold."19
By 1986 the BCDA had been amended to include 'freehold' 
ownership. The amendment of the BCDA Act in 1986 was also 
introduced as a mechanism for the registration of the 99- 
year leasehold rights in accordance with the Deeds 
Registries Act of 1937.20 But these rights could only be 
converted to freehold ownership if a township register had 
been opened,21 a 'time-consuming' and technically 
expensive process.
Since the townships had not originally been surveyed 
specifically for the purposes of issuing individual title, a 
survey exercise of all Greater Soweto townships was 
undertaken by the Surveyor General's office in Pretoria in 
1984 in order to comply with the registration requirements 
stipulated under the terms of the Land Survey Act of 1927
19 Emdon, E. 1993. "Privatisation of State Housing", 
Urban Forum 4:2, p. 5. Witwatersrand University Press, 
Johannesburg.
20 Personal Interview with the Chief Registrar of
Deeds, Central Government Building, Pretoria, 3 March 1994.
21 Ibid.
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(amended in 1981) and the Deeds Registries Act of 1937.22 
By 1994 (10 years after the introduction of the Black
Communities Development Act) the surveying of and the
opening of township registers for Greater Soweto had still 
not been completed. This delay is blamed on the climate of 
violence in the townships.23
According to the Chief Registrar of Deeds, the concept of a 
deed is based on freehold and leasehold title. It is title, 
and not the deeds, which is registered to guarantee a 
person's 'ownership'.24 It is in this context that the
land registration system in South Africa ensures 'security 
of title' (ownership of the title) to individuals. This in 
turn accounts for why the land registration system in South 
Africa is perceived by others to be amongst the safest in 
the world as it precludes the need for 'title 
insurance',25 Previously, however, this superior form of
registration benefitted mostly the whites.
The inferior forms of property registration for blacks, on 
the other hand, included permits to occupy (as in the case 
of tenure forms discussed above and in the preceding
22 Personal Interview with Mr B. Bezuidenhout, Senior 
Land Surveyor, Office of the Surveyor General, Central 
Government Building, Pretoria, 29 March 1994.
23 Ibid.
24 Personal Interview with the Chief Registrar of Deeds 
(20, op.cit.)
25 Ibid.
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chapter) and traditional and communal forms of property 
registration in the case of the so-called homelands. The 
traditional forms of registration or ownership are not 
equivalent to freehold or leasehold title particularly with 
respect to the adequate protection of rights to occupy.26 
It was only through the passing of the Upgrading of Land 
Tenure Rights Act of 1991 and the amendment of the Deeds 
Registries Act in 1992 that the process of registration 
ceased to be confined to whites and discriminatory. Instead, 
it became an open system and for the first time treated 
black townships as urban areas in the same manner as white 
residential suburbs and urban centres.2-7
The mechanisms established as a result of the 99-year 
leasehold first introduced in 1978, followed by its 
statutory endorsement under the Black Communities Act of 
1984, the subsequent amendment of this Act in 1986, 
including the 'conversion' of previous rights (tenure 
configurations available to township residents before the 
introduction of 99-year leases) into leasehold rights, the 
Upgrading of Land Tenure Rights in 1991 and the amendment of 
the Deeds Registry Act in 1992 created for the first time in 
the history of Greater Soweto (and black townships in 
general), opportunities for the establishment of free 
purchaser and seller housing markets.
26 Ibid.
2-7 Ibid.
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The Regulations 6 (site permits), 7 (residential permits), 8 
(certificates of occupation) and 20 (hostel permits) 
established in terms of Government Notice R1036 under the 
Bantu (Urban Areas) Consolidated Act of 1945 were all 
repealed by the introduction of the Conversion of Certain 
Rights to Leasehold Act of 1988.23 Under this Conversion 
Act, the holders of site permits and certificates of 
occupation (above) who had not purchased the 99-year leases 
from the Administration Boards between 1978 when they were 
first introduced and 31 December 1988, could now freely 
(without being charged a fee) convert their permits into 
leasehold rights. However, to ascertain that they did 
qualify for leasehold title, potential applicants were still 
subjected to various administrative and bureaucratic 
screening mechanisms aimed at establishing their 
identity.29
In similar fashion, council tenants and hostel dwellers 
(holders of residential permits and hostel permits) were 
'upgraded' into local authority lessees.30 However, the 
rights conferred by these rental leases effectively remained 
insecure because of the absence of mechanisms aimed at 
protecting the lessees (tenants). This meant that local 
authorities (the lessors) could continue to evict residents
23 Budlender, G. 1993. Urban Housing: The Legal
Framework, unpublished paper, Legal Resources Centre,
Johannesburg.
29 Ibid.
30 Ibid.
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on a variety of grounds.
Moreover, despite these tenure changes, no mechanisms were 
established to inform the lessees about the nature and 
therefore meaning of the legislative changes affecting their 
occupancy of council housing. The vulnerability of lessees 
(tenants) in the sense that they were unclear as to their 
rights, therefore unable to exercise them effectively 
continued through lack of consumer education. Historically, 
the local government legislative framework under apartheid 
gave immense authoritarian and wide ranging powers to urban 
managers, as there existed no mechanisms for consultations 
between the township controllers and the residents. This 
meant that the only ways through which urban managers had 
direct contact with township residents was when the latter 
presented themselves at the council offices to pay rent, or 
when the former physically directed the various municipal 
police raids in the townships: influx control raids, forced 
removal raids, rent arrears' raids, shebeen raids and 
others.
However, the spatial impacts of the legislative changes 
affecting housing policy (discussed above) began to be 
expressed through the establishment of private housing 
markets in the form of: real stock transfers of state-owned 
housing to private ownership through the sales policy (table 
7.5); the construction of privately built housing with 
private sector finance (see Chapter 8 below); the growth of 
backyard shacks; and informal and squatter settlements (see
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also Chapters 3, 5 and 6). During the 1980s the backyard and 
informal markets grew rapidly in defiance of the urban 
influx control mechanisms. To the reality of African 
urbanisation, the Government responded by introducing a 
White Paper on 'orderly urbanization1 in 1986 which proposed 
to repeal the influx control laws.
However, the 'orderly urbanized' strategy was conceived also 
as an effective indirect control mechanism aimed at 
preventing the development of 'undesirable social 
conditions'.31 Entry into the city would only be granted 
to potential migrants who already had access to 'both a site 
and housing'. That is to say, these potential migrants would 
not only be required to apply for a site or a house, but 
such applications would have to be approved by those local 
authorities on whose areas the sites and houses were 
located, before they were allowed to enter the city.
In this way, the 'orderly urbanized' policy went much 
further than the original influx control laws as control 
mechanism. However, in reality the 'orderly urbanized' 
control mechanism was ineffective as it had very little 
impact on the ground. For example, according to Smith,32 
there were 'some 650,000 informal dwellings' in the
31 Reintges, C. 1992. "Urban (mis)management? A case 
study of the effects of orderly urbanization on Duncan 
Village". In D.M. Smith (ed.), Apartheid City in Transition, 
Routledge, London.
32 Smith, D.M. (ed.) 1992. (31, op.cit.)
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Pretoria, Witwatersrand and Vereeniging (PWV) region alone, 
accommodating more than '2.5 million people in 1989'.
All these changes have had a considerable spatial impact on 
the existing housing stock built originally by the white 
municipalities (the Johannesburg City Council in Soweto, the 
Natives Resettlement Board in Diepmeadow and the Roodeport 
City Council in Dobsonville). To comprehend the nature and 
extent of these changes, it is crucial to understand that 
they did not come about simply as an exercise of goodwill 
from the Government. Instead, there was a combination of 
economic and international factors, sustained and vigorous 
pressure exerted by residents on the formal apparatus of 
apartheid, priority for social stability and other reasoning 
in the minds of white politicians, as well as the 
perceptions that Greater Soweto was becoming ungovernable.
7.4 Rent struggles
During the late 1970s and early 1980s the political 
practices of the Community Councils (introduced in 1977, but 
still under the control of WRAB as explained in the 
preceding chapter), the effects of which were mismanagement 
and economic deprivation continued to shape the township 
built environment in an era during which social movements 
were rapidly growing in support and profile. The 
consequences and impact of the continuity of apartheid local 
government institutions triggered the first organised
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resistance in Greater Soweto in 1980 against rent 
increases.33
Although house rents had remained almost the same since 
1977, site rents had been rising rapidly. By October 1980 
the total rent bill charged on the township households 
(house rent, site rent and service charge) amounted to
R26.45 per month, an increase of 46 per cent from the 1977 
charges (table 7.1). These increases had been imposed on the
residents in accordance with the objectives of creating
adequate sources of revenue for the apartheid local 
government structures. Thus it was believed that these 
increases (table 7.1) would enable the councils in Greater 
Soweto to become financially viable and autonomous.34
But financial viability for the townships in the absence of 
a viable commercial and industrial (property) tax base on 
which assessment rates could be charged, or subsidies from 
the state, or outside financial aid was virtually impossible 
in view of the market distortions which had been established 
under urban apartheid and now firmly entrenched. As has 
already been discussed in the previous chapters, the
policies of the apartheid government from the very beginning 
were aimed at removing Africans from the 'white cities', 
hence the finances of the townships had been firmly rooted
33 Payne, R. (7, op.cit.)
34 Personal Interview with Mr William Loots, Property 
Sales Director, Soweto City Council, 2 February 1994.
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within that framework. Throughout these years residents had 
been paying rents but without reaping any benefits in terms 
of improved infrastractural services. They had also been 
banking their money, paying taxes through the consumption of 
commodities, buying insurances policies and paying 
commission in the city (thus effectively subsidising 
Johannesburg), but the profits from the circulation of this 
money had not been ploughed back into the townships to 
improve the living conditions.
The 1989 study by Planact35 into the causes of The Soweto 
Rent Boycott, commissioned by the Soweto Delegation, found 
that the total amount of money earned by approximately 
300,000 Sowetans working in Johannesburg in 1987 amounted to 
R2 billion. Of this total income, approximately R1.4 billion 
was spent in Johannesburg. This meant that Johannesburg was 
enjoying a net transfer of wealth from Soweto,36 not only 
in terms of the purchasing (consumption) power of Sowetans, 
but also in terms of the exploitation of their labour power 
with particular regard to the total wealth generated in the 
Johannesburg CBD. Because of this transfer of wealth from 
the townships it became possible for the JCC to subsidise 
its domestic white rate payers by a 55 per cent monthly 
rebate, which amounted to R38.7 million during the 1987/88
35 PLANACT, 1989. The Soweto Rent Boycott, A Report by 
PLANACT, Commissioned by the Soweto Delegation, PLANACT, 
Yeoville.
36 Ibid.
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financial year alone.3-7
The full implications of this were that not only were white 
rate payers accorded opportunities for consuming 'fat cat1 
services, but that Sowetans (in addition to subsidising 
these white rate payers) were also paying substantially more 
than the whites for poor services in the townships. Despite 
this continued inequality in the distribution of income, 
township residents found that they were now required to cut 
their insufficient household budgets even further in order 
to pay for non-existent services (table 7.1). That is to 
say, there was no relationship between the rents and service 
charges on the one hand, and the physical provision of 
services on the other hand. It is within this context that 
the housing market distortions can be understood, 
particularly with respect to the absence of 'value for 
money1.
3-7 Ibid.; See also, Swilling, M., Cobbett, W. and 
Hunter, R. 1991. "Finance, electricity, and the rent 
boycott". In M. Swilling, et al, Apartheid City In 
Transition, Oxford University Press, Cape Town.
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Table 7.1: Monthly increases in rent and services charges in 
Soweto, 1977-1986
House Rent 
(R/month)
Site Rent Service Chgs 
(R/month) (R/month)
Total
(R/month)
Dec 1977 3.25 8.00 3.00 14.25
Apr 1978 3.25 9.75 3.00 16.00
Jul 1978 3.25 11.50 3.00 17.75
Aug 1980 3.25 18.85 21.50
Oct 1980 3.25 23.30 26.55
Feb 1981 3.25 27.55 30.80
Oct 1981 3.25 13.32 22.23 38.80
Mar 1983 3.25 13.32 23.73 40.30
Jun 1984 3.25 13.32 29.03 45.60
Dec 1984 3.25 13.32 41.03 57.60
(mid-1986) 3.25 13.32 45.77 62.34
Source: PLANACT 1989. The Soweto Rent Boycott: A Report
Commissioned by The Soweto Delegation, Planact, Yeoville, p. 
40.
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Although most of the houses had been provided with 
electricity between 1979 and 1986 (for the first time since 
townships were established), this electrification had been 
designed to buy off urban protest, rather than improve the 
quality of life for the community. It was not only badly and 
inefficiently installed, but that it also proved to be very 
expensive to the residents. For example, in 1989 Sowetans 
were paying 22 per cent38 in electricity charges more than 
the white residents in Johannesburg. Hence the rapidly 
rising charges fuelled the deep anger of many township 
residents, which is well illustrated by the then leader of 
the Soweto Civic Association (SCA), Dr Nthato Motlana, who 
argued:
"What is needed is a hefty amount from government to 
uplift Soweto. If the whites wish us to live 30km 
away from them, then they must pay for that 
privilege. We did not ask to be put these long 
distances out of town so that services for transport, 
for lights and water are stretched. We should be near 
our places of work as happens all over the world. The 
lower and labouring classes live next to the 
factories, not far away in the suburbs - that's for 
the rich. The Central Business District and the 
industrial areas of Johannesburg are common to all 
inhabitants of the city and rates that everybody pays 
should serve all people. You can't justify our high 
rates for transport and other things by saying it's 
high time Africans paid for their services. How do 
they pay when salaries are not governed by 
productivity and skill but by colour... Our money is 
spent in Johannesburg."39
The lack of sensitivity by the apartheid state to the 
deepening anger felt by the Soweto community was rapidly
38 PLANACT, 1989. (35, op.cit.)
39 Rand Daily Mail, 10 August 1979. Cited from PLANACT,
1989. (35, op.cit. p. 71)
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giving rise to an atmosphere of confrontation. Resistance in 
the form of rent boycotts, organised mass protests and a 
succession of 'stay away1 from work campaigns grew rapidly 
from 1980.40 The deepening urban conflict also prompted 
the SCA to take legal action against the community councils, 
in order to prevent these institutions from evicting those 
residents who were boycotting rent payments. But when the 
court (Appellate Division in Bloemfontein) ruled in favour 
of the councils, the SCA turned its strategy towards 
building mass mobilisation against the apartheid local 
institutions.41 In the face of the rising tide of protest, 
the Government responded by replacing community councils 
with yet new local government structures. However, these too 
were within the ideology of apartheid.
The Black Local Authorities Act of 1982 provided for the 
creation of Black Local Authorities (BLAs) with full 
municipal powers.42 The BLAs were to be elected through a 
popular vote in the townships by residents whose national 
franchise lay in the bantustans. The BLAs were to function 
as mini-bantustan type subordinate structures of the 
apartheid state. In this way, these mini-bantustans (with 
potential powerful black allies of the state) would be used
40 Personal Interviews with Messrs Johan Latsky (15, 
op.cit.); William Loots (34, op.cit.)
41 Payne, R. (7, op.cit.)
42 Shubane, K. 1991. Black local authorities: a 
contraption of control. In M. Swilling, et al. Apartheid 
City In Transition (37, op.cit.)
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as a mechanism for implementing the Government's policies.
The creation of BLAs immediately triggered a response from 
the community, through protests aimed precisely against the 
formation of these mini-bantustan structures. A wide range 
of organisations and civic movements (encompassing trade 
unions, religious and other social groupings) were formed in 
opposition to the introduction of the BLAs.43 The 
emergence of these diverse movements provided opportunities 
for cooperation between these groups aimed at making the 
apartheid system unworkable.
It was out of this cooperation that the Anti-Community 
Council Elections Committee (ACCEC) was formed in 1982 at a 
workshop called by the SCA to coordinate the vigorous 
campaign against the 1983 Black Local Authority 
Elections.44 Although, the elections were able to proceed 
as planned by the Government, the resultant poll in 
registered wards was only 10.7 per cent45 in the whole of 
Greater Soweto. Calls from the ACCEC not to vote, combined 
with the deep seated frustrations felt by the residents 
themselves, appear to have had a considerable impact.
Once established, the BLAs were faced with similar problems 
of financial viability and legitimacy to those which had
43 Ibid.; Payne, R. (7, op.cit.)
44 Payne, R. (7,op.cit.)
45 Shubane, K. 1991. (42, op.cit.)
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characterised the previous forms of township local 
government. Fundamentally, however, the fact that the BLAs 
were established with full municipal powers (see Chapter 6) 
implied also that they were now fully in control of housing 
and local authority land. Financial viability to many BLA 
councillors became confused with the pursuit of personal 
self-interest. Many councillors began to abuse their 
positions through various corrupt practices, for example, 
involving improprieties in land availability agreements 
between councillors and private developer46 (see Chapter 
8).
This only served to fuel the flames of resistance to rent 
increases.4"7 Consequently, protest in the townships spread 
rapidly. Locally, no sooner had the newly elected 
councillors assumed power in the various structures of BLAs 
than township communities started demanding their 
resignation. The murders by the police of the Vaal Triangle 
residents protesting against rent increases in November 1984 
worsened the already deep frustrations of the residents.48 
After these events the rent boycott became part of a larger 
countrywide movement (with more than 60 townships involved). 
Demands from the protestors for the resignation of 
councillors were increasingly being backed by violent
46 See for example, the Sowetan, 14 June 1994.
4-7 Hendler, P. 1991. The housing crisis. In M. 
Swilling, et al (37, op.cit.)
48 Shubane, K. 1991. (42, op.cit.); PLANACT, 1989. (35, 
op.cit.)
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protests.
As the crisis of political legitimacy, financial unviability 
and corruption of BLAs deepened, councillors, municipal 
police, South African policemen, and any persons associated 
with these local government structures and perceived to be 
collaborating with the apartheid system at large were 
targeted and subjected to unprecedented levels of 
violence,49 including the burning down of their homes. 
According to Schlemmer,
"Six councillor were killed in the first seven months 
of 1990. Two attacks on councillors were mounted 
daily, and 87 attacks on houses of councillors 
occurred...From February 1990 to April 1991, 324 BLA 
councillors resigned, 224 as a direct result of 
political pressure in the Transvaal ... In the country 
as a whole well over 100 out of 258 BLAs have 
collapsed and been replaced by Administrators. The 
testimony of councillors reflect fear for their lives 
and the safety of their houses, families and 
businesses.1,50
At the national level the formation of the United Democratic 
Front (UDF) in 1983 (representing more than 700 social and 
labour groups throughout the country)51 heralded the 
emergence of campaigns aimed at rendering South Africa 
ungovernable. From its very formation the UDF became closely 
affiliated to the aims of the African National Congress 
(ANC) through its endorsement of the Freedom Charter
49 Shubane, K. 1991. (42, op.cit.)
50 Schlemmer, L. 1991. Challenges of process and 
policy. In M. Swilling, et al (37, op.cit.)
51 Soni, D.V. 1992. The apartheid state and Black 
housing struggles. In D.M. Smith (ed.), (31, op.cit.)
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principles drawn up by the latter organisation in 1955.52
By linking together the rent-based (consumption classes) 
with labour-based (production classes) struggles the UDF 
succeeded in mobilising community-based mass movements 
against the apartheid state. It also was within this context 
that the historic power of industrial capital, commercial 
capital, commodity capital and state capital became 
increasingly vulnerable as a result of the peaceful 
cessation of labour through national 'work stayaways1 for 
one or more days53 and boycotts of commodities in the 
cities.
As the rent and consumer boycotts, and the rising 
transportation costs, became very heated issues in various 
townships during the mid 1980s, the effect of this popular 
insurrection motivated the exiled ANC and guerilla 
incursions during this period were intensified. Also during 
this period the ANC's international campaigns against the 
apartheid regime grew ever more sharper.54 Its calls 
through external radio broadcasts for township residents to 
intensify the use of violence as a strategy for a 
revolutionary transformation, including calls for the
52 Seekings, J. 1991. Township resistance in the 1980s. 
In M. Swilling, et al (37, op.cit.)
53 McCarthy, J. 1992. Local and regional government: 
from rigidity to crisis to flux. In D.M. Smith (ed.), (31, 
op.cit.)
54 Ibid.
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isolation and targeting of homeland55 puppet regimes, 
increasingly found receptive audiences throughout the 
country.
These campaigns triggered even a more brutal repressive 
response from the Government, which imposed a state of 
emergency and deployed security forces in the townships. 
This phase marked the incorporation of BLAs into the 
security structures employed by the state not only to secure 
control in the townships, but to counter the perceived 
threat of the 'total onslaught1 posed by the exiled 
revolutionary movements. The security strategy was 
manifested through the establishment of Joint Management 
Centres (JMCs) chaired by members of the security 
forces.56
The JMCs became the crucial policy-making body in the 
townships. Under their aegis there was developed a 'total 
strategy' aimed at winning the 'hearts and minds' of 
township residents.57 The JMCs' total strategy involved a 
combination of brutal repression and appeasement through 
superficial upgrading programmes (channelled through the
55 Kane-Berman, J. 1993. Political Violence in South 
Africa, South African Institute of Race Relations, 
Johannesburg.
56 Shubane, K. 1991. (42, op. cit.); Soni, D.V. 1992. 
(51, op.cit.)
57 Soni, D.V. 1992. (51, op.cit.); Marks, R. 1990. (3, 
op.cit.)
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Regional Services Councils)58 but with the underlying 
motives of the Government continuing to remain embedded 
within the realm of controlling, dividing and disempowering 
the township residents.
The JMCs were subordinate structures to the National 
Security Management System (NSMS) chaired by the state 
president,59 whose powers had been strengthened under the 
1983 constitutional changes which provided for the creation 
of a 'tricameral parliament1 for whites, coloureds and 
indians. Under the terms of this constitution, 
responsibility for so-called 'black affairs' was vested in 
the state president.60 It was within this context that the 
security forces became involved in the BLA policy-making 
structures.
In spite of this formidable defensive and offensive security 
network, the detention of over 20,000 community activists in 
1986 alone, and the formation and use of reactionary
58 The Regional Services Councils were established 
during the late-1980s as a mechanism for ameliorating the 
structural economic inequities between the white areas and 
black townships (particularly with regard to the provision 
of services), and also as a means of bringing the townships 
under the full control of the BLAs. For a fuller discussion 
and analysis regarding the role of these services councils, 
see, Humphries, R. 1991. "Whither Regional Services 
Councils?". In M. Swilling, et all (37, op.cit.)
59 Soni, D.V. 1992 (51, op.cit.)
60 This is South Africa, 1992. South African 
Communication Service, Pretoria.
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vigilante groups within the townships,61 the rent boycotts 
continued unabated. Furthermore, the racially-based
tricameral parliament (consisting of whites, indians and 
coloured but excluding blacks) only served to fuel the 
growth of community-based mass movements and accelerated the 
integration of consumption-based and production-based 
struggles. It is within this context that the significance 
of the role played by the Federation of South Africa Trade 
Unions (FOSATU) and its successor, the Congress of South 
African Trade Unions (COSATU)62 is rooted.
In 1986 (10 years after the first uprising) the Soweto rent 
boycott marked a decisive shift from the previous forms of 
residents' demands. Triggered by the killings by the 
security forces of the White City residents in August 1986, 
in an attempt to evict those who were refusing to pay rents, 
the residents of Greater Soweto now demanded the scrapping 
of rent where households had lived for over fifteen years. 
Implicitly, therefore, the residents were demanding the free 
transfer of houses from government-ownership, at no cost to 
them. Other townships within Soweto soon made similar calls. 
Also residents demanded an explanation from the authorities 
as to how rents and service charges were determined.63 In 
other words, they were questioning the relationship between 
the levels of rent demanded and the value of services
61 Seekings, J. 1991. (52, op.cit.)
62 McCarthy, J. 1992. (53, op.cit.)
63 Planact, 1989. (35, op.cit.)
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provided.
By 1989 (three years after the introduction of the state of 
emergency) both the Government and the Soweto Civic 
Association (SCA) were faced with the prospect64 that 
neither side would emerge as a clear victor in this 
conflict.65 This recognition led to a new era of 
negotiations. It was under these changed circumstances that 
the Soweto Peoples' Delegation (SPD) was formed by the SCA 
to start negotiations with the authorities with a view to 
developing both short term measures to end the rent boycott 
and long term strategies for bringing into being the future 
democratic structures of local government.66
These negotiations resulted in the signing of The Greater 
Soweto Accord (GSA) on 24 September 1990, between the SPD, 
the BLAS (councils of Soweto, Diepmeadow and Dobsonville) 
and the Transvaal Provisional Authority (TPA).6V Not only 
did this accord set out a framework for an urban transition 
(see next section): it appears also to have opened the way
for a fundamental shift in the state's housing policy. As 
the official publications stated,
64 Bernstein, A. 1991. The challenge of the cities. In 
M. Swilling, et al (37, op.cit.)
65 Shubane, K. 1991. (42, op.cit.)
66 Coovadia, C. 1991. The role of the civic movement. 
In M. Swilling, et al (37, op.cit.)
67 The Greater Soweto Accord, 24 September 1990.
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"The individual is primarily responsible for his own 
housing; the state should play a direct role in cases 
in which the individual is not in the position to 
satisfy his own housing needs; the primary task of 
the state is to create a necessary environment in 
which the private sector and the individual can 
undertake the provision of housing."68
7.5 The Greater Soweto Accord
The consensus agreement signed between the SPD, TPA and the 
three councils of Greater Soweto (Soweto, Diepmeadow and 
Dobsonville) concerned the ways through which the short-term 
and long-term problems affecting the township built 
environment could be resolved. The short-term problems were 
identified as consisting of rent arrears resultant from the 
continuing rent boycotts, whilst the long-term problems 
concerned the whole basis of apartheid local government. 
Regarding the short-term problems, it was agreed that all 
rent and services charges arrears (which had amounted to 
R516,2 million by 30 June 1990) would be written off by the 
Government through the TPA.69
The TPA (a jurisdictive provincial bureaucracy for the 
Transvaal local authorities which include the three councils 
of Greater Soweto) was brought into these negotiations 
because it had effectively been running the townships 
through the financing of BLAs during the rent boycotts. But
68 See South Africa, 1991/92. Official Yearbook, 
Seventeenth Edition, South African Communications Service, 
Pretoria, pp. 196-197.
69 Greater Soweto Accord (67, op.cit.)
279
as the rent boycotts had continued to grow unabated, its 
funds for financing the BLAs1 deficits were depleting 
rapidly, and because of this it was forced to the 
negotiating table with the representatives of civic 
movements. According to Swilling et al, during this period, 
the TPA's bridging finance to the BLAs was approximately R60 
million per month.'70
In return, the SPD agreed to end the rent and services 
charges boycott, and to advise township residents to resume 
monthly payments based on an interim charge of R23.00 
(beginning in October 1990) and a metered tariff calculated 
at R0,12 per kilowatt hour (Kwh) which was subject to 
discounts on the basis of consumption levels. On this 
formula, higher consumption levels attracted less discounts, 
whilst lower consumption resulted in higher discounts. For 
example, for the consumption of 250 Kwh of electricity at 
33.3 per cent discount, the total bill required would cost 
R20.00 (after RIO.00 had been deducted), whilst 650 Kwh at 
10 per cent discount, the total metered tariff would cost 
R70.00 (after R8.00 reductions). However, there were to be 
no discounts on the consumption of more than 650 Kwh. As far 
as the unmetered consumption of electricity was concerned, a 
flat charge of R33.80 per month (based on assumed 400 Kwh 
monthly consumption units) was agreed.
70 Swilling, M., Cobbett, W. and Hunter, R. 1991. (37, 
op.cit.)
280
It was also agreed that these interim tariffs would remain 
in force until promulgated by the introduction of realistic 
and affordable charges. An interim ceiling charge of R72.50 
per month above which residents would not be required to pay 
was also agreed. Meanwhile, however, the SPD would advise 
the community to pay a uniform rate of R55.00 in respect of 
each dwelling for September 1990 (the very month that the 
accord was signed). This payment was to be made on the basis 
of establishing trust between the councils and the 
community, and also as a ’goodwill gesture' on the part of 
the residents.71
As far as electricity arrears were concerned, it was agreed 
that the parties (signatories to the accord) would assist 
Eskom (Electricity Supply Commission) with information 
campaigns aimed at promoting the efficient use of 
electricity. In addition, the SPD would provide a secure 
environment in Greater Soweto to enable meter readers to 
carry out their work in safety. This would be followed by 
negotiations between the parties and Eskom aimed at 
obtaining ’a rebate on the tariffs charged' in order to 
establish parity between Johannesburg and Greater Soweto 
with respect to its electricity charges on bulk supplies.
On the question of the long-term problems, the accord made 
provisions for the establishment of a Metropolitan Chamber 
for the Central Witwatersrand (CMCW) to serve as an interim
71 The Greater Soweto Accord (67, op.cit.)
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mechanism (inclusive of all major stakeholders in the urban 
housing sector) in formulating and developing practical non- 
racial democratic approaches at the regional and local 
levels. The Metropolitan Chamber was to be established with 
immediate effect after the accord had been signed on 24 
September 1990, but it was not until April 1992 that it was 
established.
No sooner had it been established, than the principal 
signatories to the accord (SPD, the three councils of 
Greater Soweto and TPA), were joined by other major 
stakeholders: the City Council of Johannesburg (JCC),
Central Witwatersrand Local Authorities (CWLAs), Civic 
Associations of the Central Witwatersrand (CACW), 
representatives of the Congress of South African Trade 
Unions (COSATU), National Housing Forum (NHF), political 
parties, for example, the African National Congress (ANC), 
Pan Africanist Congress (PAC), Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) 
and Sofasonke Party (SP). With this inclusive membership, 
the Chamber began to function also as an interim forum 
through which strategies aimed at both the urban transition 
and constitutional transition were formulated and developed.
Under the terms of the Accord, the CWMC was to undertake and 
coordinate the various functions aimed at creating non- 
racial democratic local government structures, and to avoid 
possible duplication of work carried out by existing local 
government bodies as set out by the accord (through which it
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had been established), the CWMC would establish a Joint 
Technical Committee (JTC), charged with the responsibility 
of investigating, making recommendations and developing 
policies with respect to the following: services and
infrastructural upgrading, affordable rates for service 
provision, transfer of rented housing and the establishment 
of a common fiscal base for Greater Soweto and 
Johannesburg.72
To deal with these problems the JTC would in turn establish 
working groups that would investigate and recommend possible 
mechanisms through which the problems could be resolved. The 
final point of agreement between the parties concerned the 
establishment of a Greater Soweto Fund (GSF) which would 
channel funds into community and social development 
projects. Funding for this body would be encouraged through 
voluntary donations from the business community, financial 
institutions and from the general public.73 In turn, the 
councils would also introduce a flat monthly levy of R5.00 
aimed at contributing to the GSF (effected through the 
necessary by-laws soon to be established) in respect of each 
dwelling. The accord was concluded on the understanding that 
the principal parties would strive to resolve potential 
future problems through negotiations and agreement. In this 
regard, none of the signatories to the Accord could act 
unilaterally.
72 Ibid.
73 Ibid.
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By 1991 this accord was on the 'brink of collapse1.
About 50 per cent of township residents were still not 
paying for the services, and consequently the councils were
in arrears again. The amount owed to Eskom had risen to more
than R120 million."74 To deal with this problem of arrears 
the councils and the TPA wanted to increase the services 
charges to the interim monthly ceiling charge of R72.50 
agreed to at the signing. This interim ceiling had been
originally calculated by the councils and the TPA to recoup
the arrears. It effectively represented the actual monthly 
costs of services charges that would have been paid by 
township residents if there had not been a boycott and is 
consistent also with the rate of rent increases shown in 
table 7.1 above.
On this point, the TPA noted that even if all residents had 
been paying their service charges based on the interim 
tariff of R23.00 agreed to by all the parties (SPD, the 
three Greater Soweto councils and the TPA), this would only 
cover 20 per cent of the running costs. But since 50 per 
cent of the residents were not actually paying, this meant 
that the councils were experiencing a financial crisis."75 
As a result, the TPA and the councils wanted higher tariffs. 
But since the SPD was not in favour of these proposed
74 Business Day, 11 September 1991.
75 Transvaal Provincial Administration. News Release by 
Mr Olaus van Zyl, MEC for Institutional Development and 
Negotiations, on the Levying of Economic Rates in the 
Greater Soweto Area, 11 September 1991.
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increases, the TPA and the Greater Soweto councils stated 
that they would be forced to impose these tariff increases 
in seeking to resolve the financial crisis."76
The position of the SPD, on the other hand, was that it 
would not cooperate with these proposed increases because 
the councils were very inefficient with regard to the 
provision of services and had also failed to comply with the 
provisions of the Accord'7'7 that the interim monthly charge 
of R23.00 would remain in force until it was changed by the 
introduction of reasonable tariffs. What this meant was that 
the SPD and the TPA and the councils were interpreting the 
Accord differently.
The SPD demanded that the responsibility for running 
services in the townships should be transferred to the 
Central Witwatersrand Regional Service Council (CWRSC). The 
CWRSC was established in 1987 under the Regional Services 
Act of 1985,v8 specifically to ameliorate the structural 
inequities that existed within the region through the 
provision of services. The important feature of the Regional 
Services Act was its departure from the racially based 
mechanisms of services provision. There were important 
reasons why the SPD demanded the handing over of the running 
of township services to the CWRSC.
76 Ibid.
'7'7 Ibid.
’7a See Humphries, R. 1991. (58, op.cit.)
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The SPD reasoned that since 50 per cent of the residents had 
not paid the interim charge of R23.00 and the separate 
electricity charges agreed to in the accord, the proposed 
increased tariffs would only exacerbate the affordability 
problems faced by the township community. With the low 
incomes of township residents (see Chapter 3, table 3.17 and 
Chapter 6, table 6.4), it was practically impossible for 
many Greater Soweto residents to afford the services charges 
demanded by the local authorities. The increase in the 
consumer price inflation during the late 1980s also
exacerbated the already considerable affordability problems 
of Greater Soweto residents. Between 1985 and 1987, for 
example, the consumer price index rose by 36 per cent.-79 
Between 1990 and 1991 the rate of consumer price inflation 
rose by 15,3 per cent. This increase was blamed on the Gulf 
War.80
The low incomes of many residents in Greater Soweto were 
stretched beyond a point where their very survival was
threatened as a result of rising food prices and
accommodation costs (service charges). This at a time when, 
as stated earlier, the formal sector economy was undergoing 
a structural decline (see also Chapter 8). The absence also 
of a viable industrial base in the townships further
exacerbated the affordability problems of the residents (see
79 Institute For Housing of Southern Africa, March
1987.
80 See Annual Economic Report, 1993.
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figure 7.1). It is not surprising therefore that to date 
many residents cannot even afford to pay R45.00 per month 
for services (table 7.2), and do not, despite several 
threats81 aimed at forcing them to pay.
By demanding that the running of services be handed over to 
the CWRSC who had more resources (raised from business 
levies and other sources within their region of jurisdiction 
effectively the rich), the SPD was advancing a 
redistributive strategy for Greater Soweto. Put another way, 
the SPD had recognised that township local government 
finances had effectively collapsed because of the historic 
economic imbalance between Greater Soweto and Johannesburg. 
In this respect, even if the SPD could have managed to 
persuade all the residents to resume rent payments at the 
proposed higher levels, which clearly it could not, such 
payments would impact very little on the built environment 
because of the damage already done by decades of a highly 
unequal distribution of resources and wealth.
81 Sowetan, 14 June 1994.
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Figure 7.1: Commercial and industrial activity in Greater
Soweto
Commercial Industrial
general dealers tent manufacturers
butchers welders
cobblers motor Mechanics
grocers paint Retailers
undertakers photographers
dairies burglar proofers
tailors bottlers
cafe keepers leatherworks
garages fridge repairs
ice dealers candle makers
meat markets knitters
hair dressers upholsterers
Carpenters printers
dry cleaners panel beaters
fish and chip shops electricians
restaurants glazers
hardware wood and coal merchants
Source: Adapted from Davies, K. Bristow, D. and Associates,
1990.
Table 7.2: What it costs to provide services (each month)
Services Cost Existing Cost
Subsidies after
(Rand) Subsidies
Public Use of Electricity 43.97 16.79 27.18
Water 56.08 35.45 20.63
Sewerage 26.37 23.19 3.18
Refuse 39.72 4.83 34.89
Administration &
Community Services 139.72 134.61 5.15
Total 305.90 214.87 91.03
Of Which You Will Pay 45.00
Source: Central Witwatersrand Metropolitan Chamber, Civic
Centre, Braamfontein, January 1994.
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7.6 The EFK Tucker Inc. Report82
It terms of the Greater Soweto Accord, it was agreed that 
the Joint Technical Committee would appoint a working group, 
the Transfer of Houses Sub-Committee to
1 investigate and report within three months, with 
recommendations on how and when the transfer of the 
rented stock to the lessees and the upgrading of 
existing hostels could be effected."83
In November 1991 the Transfer of Houses Sub-Committee 
commissioned a legal firm, EFK Tucker,84 to undertake the 
transfer of houses investigations. The investigations by 
this legal firm involved workshops with civic associations, 
interviews with local authority officials and the TPA, and 
also an analysis of existing legislation affecting the 
tenure rights of urban Africans. The EFK Tucker report was 
submitted to the Transfer of Houses Sub-Committee on 30 
September 1992, but it was not until 10 February 1993 that 
it was finally adopted by the CWMC.
According to the terms of reference (see above), EFK Tucker 
had been commissioned to undertake investigations and make 
recommendations with respect to the 'transfer of the rented 
stock to the lessees'. This meant that they had to focus on
82 The Content of This Section is Drawn From This 
Report (see footnote 84 below).
83 Greater Soweto Accord (67, op.cit. p. 24)
84 EFK Tucker 1993. Report On The Transfer Of Houses 
Process in The Greater Soweto Area, Central Witwatersrand 
Metropolitan Chamber, Civic Centre, Braamfontein.
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Regulation 7 tenants (holders of residential permits) whose 
tenure rights had been upgraded to lessees of the council 
under the Conversion of Certain Leasehold Rights to 
Leasehold Act of 1988 (as discussed in section 7.3 above).
It will be clear from the earlier discussion (7.3 above) 
that the old site permits and certificates of occupation had 
been legally converted into leasehold rights in terms of the 
Conversion Act. In addition, as has been explained above and 
in the preceding chapter, holders of site permits and 
certificates of occupation (Regulations 6 and 8 rights) 
represented a partially home-owning class which was 
differentiated from holders of residential permits 
(Regulation 7 rights) by the fact that they had either built 
their houses or bought them from the government, but without 
owning the land on which these houses were erected.
Therefore, although the original focus of the EFK had been 
intended to develop the transfer of housing mechanism with 
respect to council lessees (Regulation 7 tenants), it also, 
however, addressed the transfer mechanisms aimed at the 
holders of site permits and certificates of occupation 
(Regulations 6 and 8 rights). This was because under the 
apartheid system the tenure rights conferred in terms of 
site permits and certificates of occupation were 
fundamentally not very different from those of the council 
tenants. Therefore, by including holders of these rights 
within its terms of reference, the Tucker report described
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and recommended the removal of all forms of discriminatory 
tenure forms in order to create consistency in terms of 
fairness and openness.
According to the Tucker report there were many 
inconsistencies regarding the methods used to notify holders 
of site permits and certificates of occupation to convert 
their permits into leasehold rights in terms of the 
Conversion Act. In this respect, the TPA had used the 
cheapest newspaper advertisements (costing some R3,2 
million), but these were inefficient and ineffective in 
reaching the intended beneficiaries. For example, adverts 
had been placed in an Afrikaner newspaper, Die Transvaler 
(which was beyond the reach of the residents), instead of 
the Sowetan. Moreover, the TPA staff (personnel) devoted 
about 75 per cent of their time to placing these adverts in 
the wrong papers. This meant that there was a risk of houses 
being registered to 'wrong' people other than the actual 
permit holders, particularly because of the inadequacy of 
records, some of which were either outdated or had been 
destroyed during the Soweto revolt in 1976.
The Tucker report also found that the procedures used in the 
conversion of site permits and certificates of occupation 
into leasehold rights were not only outdated, but also did 
not incorporate ways of involving the community in order to 
uncover conflicting interests in respect of the transfer of 
a particular dwelling. Put another way, the procedures were
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such that any persons in possession of Regulations 6 and 8 
permits could simply walk into the offices of the Chief 
Bantu Affairs Commissioners and have these permits converted 
into 99-year leases without any questions being asked.
Under apartheid policies (as shown in Chapter 6) the issuing 
of permits was biased in favour of men. Therefore, the 
conversion of site permits and certificates of occupation 
continued the old practices of conferring tenure to men 
rather than women. Other problems included the inadequate 
staffing levels and the inadequate capacity of the 
registration system to handle the conversion process, 
particularly with respect to granting freehold ownership. 
This had resulted in the registration of very few transfers 
in the deeds registries situated in the offices of the Chief 
Bantu Affairs Commissioners. As a result of these 
inconsistencies the report recommended that all changes of 
tenure under the Conversion Act had to cease until the basis 
on which the transfer of all houses in Greater Soweto should 
take place.
The Tucker report also noted problems with respect to the 
sale of housing to the householders. Where there were still 
outstanding loans that had been issued in respect of the 
construction of self-built houses (holders of Regulation 6 
rights or site permits), or in the purchasing of council 
built houses (holders of Regulation 8 rights or certificates 
of occupation), local authorities insisted on the repayment
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of these loans before permits could be converted into 
leasehold rights.
Similar problems with respect to the holders of residential 
permits (Regulation 7 tenants) or council lessees were noted 
by the report. It found that although the old permit system 
had been repealed (as explained in section 7.3 above) by the 
passing of the Conversion Act through which the status of 
the holders of residential permits had been transferred to 
council lessees, local authorities had not complied with the 
provisions of the Act. Instead, local authorities continued 
to cling illegally on to the old permit system. In this 
respect, they had not actually (as discussed in section 7.3 
above) conferred or initiated a process to confer the new 
rights to the council tenants.
In addition, the actual sale of houses was linked to rent 
arrears. Potential buyers (holders of residential permits) 
were required to settle their arrears with the council 
before a sale transfer could be processed. Even in the cases 
of deaths and divorces, the report found that these were not 
registrable (in terms of issuing death and divorce 
certificates) until loan and rent arrears had been settled 
with the local authorities. This meant that the local 
authority records had been deteriorating over a long period 
to the extent where they were now outdated.
Partly as a consequence of non-maintenance of records, the
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whole basis of council administrative and allocation 
procedures had been fraught with corruption and bribery. 
This had been exacerbated also by the fact that the public 
had no access to these records in the same manner as they 
had to the deeds. To deal with this problem, the report 
recommended the replacement of the old administration system 
of records by an interim administrative mechanism which 
included community involvement and participation aimed at 
legitimising the intended transfer of houses project.
According to the Tucker report, local authorities had also 
insisted on the continuance of two specific forms of debt 
that would not be affected by the transfer of houses 
project. These concerned houses that had been built with 
local authority loans during the early 1980s, and loans 
issued in relation to house improvements. These loans been 
raised by local authorities from financial institutions. The 
houses that would be affected by the continuation of these 
debts were situated in the Chiawelo Extension 3, Naledi 
Extension 2 and Pimville housing markets and also within the 
backyard (outbuilding) shack markets (see Chapters 3, 5 and 
6).
The report noted that because of this, the development of 
uniform legal and conveyancing mechanisms through which the 
transfer of houses to the residents could be effected would 
not be possible. However, instead of creating different 
mechanisms for the transfer of housing, the report suggested
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a separation between the administration of debt and the 
conferring of tenure. It specifically recommended that,
"Legal and conveyancing documents and procedures must 
be designed generally to record such security ... 
Administrative systems and procedures would have to 
be designed in such a manner as to always monitor the 
nature of loan debts, so as to ensure that errors are 
not made ... it makes no difference of principle or the 
likely administrative intensity, that the loans are 
only secured in certain circumstances."85
Other recommendations of the report concerned the 
development of institutional support mechanisms aimed at 
informing residents about conventional legal and contractual 
mechanisms in respect to the following: family rights, the
rights of minors, succession rights (including wills where 
possible) to redress the incidence of unfair conflicts, the 
rights of divorcees, and the rights of divorced persons to 
remarry.
Under apartheid there existed no mechanisms through which 
these rights could be protected, hence women, divorcees, 
widows, orphans and others were vulnerable (as explained in 
Chapter 6). The report also found that because of the 
'objective shortage1 of housing in the townships exacerbated 
both by the urban practices of apartheid and acute shortages 
of accommodation, the government-owned houses had come to be 
regarded as family properties by the residents (as stated in
85 See Phase 11, of the Tucker Report, 30 September 
1992, p. 21.
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Chapter 6). Because of this, according to the report, there 
existed a strong need to protect the existing tenure 
conf igurations.
In this context the report recommended the opening of 
township registers and the setting up of the following 
tenure options: renting from local authorities (in terms of 
new bylaws), individual, ordinary ownership, ordinary 
ownership validated by registration of 'family title1 
conditions in accordance with current common law practices, 
and housing associations based on voluntary choice. 
According to the report, these tenure options would provide 
residents with a real choice and hence would also obviate 
the need for a 'hierarchy of titles' developing.
Based on the principle of agreement, families could also 
choose any other form of tenure, whether to become tenants 
of housing associations or to remain local authority 
tenants. They could choose to take transfer of a house 
through one of their number (members) in terms of the 
individual, ordinary ownership, provided this choice was 
based on agreement. The important principle with all the 
four suggested tenure options, according to the report, was 
that it was based on the maximisation of voluntary choice as 
well as being transparent, while at the same time preventing 
the potential exclusion of family members from housing.
Housing associations, on the other hand, would provide
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residents with potential protection against the penetration 
of market forces in the township built environment. Such 
housing associations could either be based on non-ownership 
in terms of voluntary administrative mechanisms, 
particularly where the transferees of houses had come 
together (co-operatives) to form such an association, or 
where the houses are transferred to the ownership of a non­
profit based organisation, or either be based on company or 
trust.
Renting from the new local authorities (which would be 
established after apartheid had been abolished) would also 
protect residents from the 'cut throat1 competition of 
market mechanisms for housing. The advantages noted for 
these two tenure options included the potential of both 
housing associations and local authorities to marshall 
resources (loan finance and donations) earmarked for various 
uses, such as the provision of facilities and amenities. But 
even in this case, the transferees would have to choose 
these tenure options.
Regarding the registration of these tenure options, the 
report saw no need for the amendment of existing 
legislation. According to the report, the conversion of site 
permits and certificates of occupation (Regulations 6 and 8 
rights) into freehold ownership would still be effected 
through the Conversion Act mechanism in terms of a waiver 
and agreement. By not insisting on the rigid application of
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the Conversion Act, but instead insisting on transparency, 
this would legitimate the conversion of houses into freehold 
ownership. Although, for example, freehold ownership would 
be different from renting from a housing association, the 
system of transferring the houses in all the tenure options 
would be based on choice and agreement between the 
stakeholders (family members).
In order to confer the various tenure options (on council 
lessees (Regulation 7 tenants), the report recommended that 
the transfer of houses should be based on 'Chamber 
Agreements', rather than legislation. There were two reasons 
why the report did not recommend legislative mechanisms for 
conferring tenure to Regulation 7 tenants. First, it was 
perceived that this would exacerbate homelessness. This was 
because the provisions of the Conversion Act were 
fundamentally biased in favour of converting the old permits 
into individual leasehold rights as opposed to family 
leasehold rights. This meant that under the existing 
objective shortages of housing, many residents would be 
excluded from housing.
The second reason for preferring Chamber Agreements 
concerned the time scale. The first time registration 
through legislative mechanisms of a vast population of 
residents would take many years, and this would be a 
constraining mechanism on the transfer of housing project in 
the short term. The advantages of the registration of title
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through agreements, on the other hand, would not only speed 
up the process, but would also be capable if successfully 
implemented in Greater Soweto, of flexible application in 
all the black townships of South Africa, thereby obviating 
the need for rigid legislative mechanisms that would prove 
incapable of addressing local problems and actual realities 
in many areas.
Notwithstanding that the transfers of housing would take 
place under Chamber Agreements rather than legislation, such 
transfers would be legally valid in the sense that 
the policy had been designed and agreed to by the 
government, local authorities, grassroots organisations and 
major players in development issues in relation to Greater 
Soweto. But to ensure that the transfer of houses project 
was politically legitimate, credible, transparent and 
sustainable, according to the report, new institutional 
support mechanisms were required which included the 
participation of the community. To this end, the Tucker 
report recommended the establishment of a Housing Bureau 
(HB) which would be accountable to the CWMC through a Chief 
Executive Officer and its management team, which would 
comprise the major signatories to the Greater Soweto Accord.
The HB would also draw its own management team from the 
principal parties to the accord (the TPA, local authorities 
and representatives of social movements). The report 
recommended that the HB would be centrally located with
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thirteen branches located at the existing local offices in 
Greater Soweto. Its functions would be to disseminate 
information, manage the existing records during the interim 
period, effect the transfer of houses in accordance to the 
preferred tenure options of the residents, give advice in 
related transfer issues and resolve potential disputes.
7.7 The sale of housing to council lessees
As has been stated earlier, the sale of housing was 
initiated by several factors which shifted the Government 
towards reforming housing policy in 1978. The concomitant 
shifts in the Government's housing policy during the whole 
of the 1980s have also been explained as resulting from the 
pressure exerted by grassroots campaigns. However, it has 
also been seen that the demand for the transfer of housing 
in Greater Soweto came from grassroots movements.
It will be clear also from the above that it was through the 
pressure from grassroots campaigns (rent boycotts) exerted 
on the local authorities that the demand for the transfer of 
houses was finally conceded as evidenced by the signing of 
the Greater Soweto Accord on 24 November 1994. In turn, it 
was also as a result of the terms of this accord that 
massive work (both technically and socially) with respect to 
the development of mechanisms through which the houses could 
be transferred to the residents, was undertaken by EFK 
Tucker, commissioned by the Transfer of Houses Sub-Committee
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which was managed by the CWMC through the JTC.
The Tucker report was finally submitted on 30 September
1992. Preparations were being made for adopting it when, on
27 November 1992, the Minister of Local Government and 
National Housing, Mr Leon Wessels, announced a 'sales' 
discount on all pre-1983 council-built houses.®6 According 
to the 'sales' discount, Regulation 7 tenants (council 
lessees) who chose to purchase homes would get a book value 
of R7,500 reduction in price if it had been built before 
1983.
Under the 99-year leasehold scheme, prior to the 
introduction of the R7,500 subsidy, council houses were sold 
according to the following formula: the original erection or 
construction cost of a house built before 1960 was 
multiplied by an inflationary replacement factor of 7.7, and 
2.2 for dwellings built since the 1970s. To this total was 
then added the original erection cost to determine the 
replacement value of the house. The replacement value was 
then divided by two, after which the total was again reduced 
by an application of a 'quality rebate' which ranged from 5 
to 13 per cent of the total replacement value for houses
built before 1960, and 20 per cent for houses built since
the 1970s, (see tables 7.3 and 7.4).
®6 NHF News, Newsletter of the National Housing Forum, 
No. 7, March 1994.
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Applying this formula to a Chiawelo house which was built in 
1959 at a cost of R370 multiplied by the replacement factor 
of 7, plus the erection cost of R370 the total replacement 
value would be R2/968. If this amount is then divided by 2 
the total would be Rl/484# and if a rebate of 11 per cent is 
applied, the selling price would be reduced by R160 to 
Rl,320 (see tables 7.3 and 7.4). Using the same calculations 
with respect to a Pimville house built in 1975 at a cost of 
Rl,051, multiplied by the replacement factor of 2.8, the 
overall cost of the house after applying the 20 per cent 
rebate would be Rl,598 (for the erection costs of houses in 
selected townships see table Chapter 5, table 5.5). 
Additional charges (table 7.3) were separated from the 
determination of house prices. Instead, additional charges 
represented a form of tariff for the provision of services.
The differences in the structure of house prices under the 
99-year leasehold scheme are consequences of the financial 
mechanisms used in the construction of the township built 
environment. As explained in Chapter 5 (see table 5.1), 
there were six major types of loan finance used in the 
construction of houses in Greater Soweto: loans from the 
government, loans from the Natives Services Levy Fund, loans 
from mining houses, loans from the Soldiers Housing 
Organisations, loans from the Consolidated Fund, and loans 
from the Capital Development Fund. During the early 1980s, 
local authorities also raised loans from financial 
institutions. The formula used in the calculation of house
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prices therefore took account of parts of the loans that 
were still outstanding.
This also explains why similar 'matchbox' units built during 
the same year (within the same township) varied in price and 
so cost purchasers different amounts when they were sold 
under the 99-year leasehold scheme. This is illustrated well 
in table 7.4 below. Fundamentally, however, as can be seen
also from the data presented in table 7.4, it was the
erection or building cost (see Chapter 5, table 5.5) of a 
unit which determined the house price. Where, for example,
v
the original erection cost was the same, the selling price 
of a unit after the formula (alluded to above and shown in
table 7.3) had been applied, the house prices would be the
same. House prices would also be different where the 
original erection costs were different. As can be seen in 
table 7.4, for example, the explanation for the 
comparatively higher selling prices of some of the units 
found in Chiawelo Extension 3 is that the erection cost of 
these dwellings which were built in 1981, was significantly 
very high at R13,000 per dwelling (see Chapter 5, table 
5.5).
As has been shown also in Chapter 3 (table 3.6), there are 
102,218 units which were constructed by the councils in 
Greater Soweto. Of these, 1,800 units (800 at Chiawelo 
Extension 3, 85 at Pimville, 48 at Molapo Extension, 777 at 
Naledi Extension 1 and 90 at Naledi Extension 2) were built
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Table 7.3: Formula for selling the council-built houses 
under the 99-year leasehold scheme
Erection Cost x Replacement Factor + Erection Cost
Divide by 2 Minus Percentage Quality Rebate
Additional Charges Rand
1) Survey Costs = 95.00
2) Annual Levy = 1.10
3) Water Meter = 198.00
4) Water Deposit = 20.00
Source: Compiled from Soweto Statistics for 1994, and also 
from interviews with officials of the Property Sales 
Department at Soweto City Council.
Table 7.4: House prices of council-built dwellings sold
under the 99-year leasehold scheme in selected townships
Township Lowest House 
Price (Rand)
Highest House 
Price (Rand)
Orlando East 666 1 101
Orlando West 1 320 4 226
Dube 1 320 1 970
Pimville 1 556 3 500
Klipspruit 1 320 1 930
Mofolo 1 558 1 598
Molapo 1 320 1 566
Chiawelo 1 320 16 560
Senaoane 1 320 2 800
Mapetla 1 320 1 598
Tladi 1 320 1 320
Zondi 1 556 1 556
Zola 1 320 1 320
Source: Calculated from Soweto Statistics for 1994. For
Erection Costs of Individual Units, see Chapter 5, table 
5.5.
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between 1980 and 1982 (see Chapter 5, table 5.7). It is the 
erection costs of these relatively new units which are 
significantly higher than the erection costs of the 
remaining 100,218 council housing stock built before 1980. 
The average house prices for all these 102,218 units are 
shown in table 7.4 above. As can be seen from these data 
(table 7.4) the average cost of these units was 
substantially less than they would cost after applying the 
R7,500 discount announced by the Government in 1992.
Since the average house prices for all the 100,218 dwellings 
in Greater Soweto was substantially less than the R7,500, so 
then applying the discount would have the effect that 
purchasers would get their homes free. In this respect they 
would only have to pay for the transfer costs. For houses 
costing more than the 'sales' discount, for example, the 
1,800 houses (see above) built with loans raised by local 
authorities from financial institutions during the early 
1980s, purchasers would be expected to pay the difference 
between the discount of R7,500 and the actual cost of the 
house.
There were a number of problems with the Government's 
initiated offer of a 'sales' discount. First, its 
introduction had been aimed at undermining the gains made by 
the grassroots organisations in Greater Soweto in forcing 
change. These gains had resulted in the establishment of 
local level negotiations between the grassroots movements
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and the local authorities as evidenced by the signing of the 
Greater Soweto Accord. Also, the fact that since the 'sales' 
discount announcement was made during an era in which South 
Africa was rapidly moving towards a negotiated settlement of 
governing was intended by the Government as a mechanism for 
buying votes. This interpretation is corroborated by the 
unilateral unveiling of a R90 billion housing subsidy plan 
by the Minister of Local Government and National Housing, 
Louis Shill, in March 199487 (a month before the first all 
inclusive democratic elections were due to take place).
Second, the subsidy scheme lacked any mechanisms that would
enable local authorities to identify the potential
beneficiaries of the discount policy. That is to say, there
were no clear guidelines to be followed by local authorities 
in identifying the rightful lessees who were entitled to 
benefit from the R7,500 subsidy.ss This lack of
transparent and equitable mechanisms meant that the old 
administrative procedures which pre-dated the Greater Soweto 
Accord would be followed, and the registration of such 
transfers would be processed through the Conversion Act.
Moreover, no procedures were developed to enable the 
residents of unsaleable houses, such as the flats, elephant 
units, row and subdivided dwellings (see table 7.5) to 
benefit from the subsidy scheme. And the subsidy scheme
87 Business Day, 2 March 1994; 22 March 1994.
88 NHF News (86, op.cit.)
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failed to address the needs of those residents who had 
already bought their houses through various financial 
mechanisms: individual finances, private sector loans
(mortgages), and local authority loans. The R7,500 subsidy 
was therefore perceived to be grossly unfair.39
Third, since rent arrears had not been addressed by the 
subsidy mechanism, local authorities would continue to 
demand the payment of municipal debt before the houses could 
be transferred. Because of this, only those with the 
financial means to pay the rent arrears would benefit from 
the subsidy scheme. Fourth, corrupt officials were likely to 
profit from the administration of this discount scheme. 
There were clear dangers too, that the politics of patronage 
which had characterised the community councils and BLAs, and 
which had been eradicated by the rent boycotts, would now 
reemerge.
In turn, this was liable to result in the eviction of the 
rightful tenants and the houses being transferred to other 
persons, as evidenced by three such known cases in Orlando 
East. Here, the rightful tenants were unlawfully evicted by 
certain officials and the houses in question sold to other 
persons for profit.90 However, it is not known how many
39 Crankshaw, 0. and White, C. 1993. The Transfer of 
State-Owned Housing Stock to Private Ownership: A Report to 
Working Group 3, National Housing Forum, Centre for Policy 
Studies, Doornfontein.
90 Interview with Mr William Loots, Property Sales 
Director (34, op.cit.)
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people were evicted as a result of these malpractices by 
corrupt officials in Greater Soweto. Because of the 
multifaceted problems caused by the introduction of the 
R7,500 subsidy scheme, the CWMC requested the Minister of 
Housing to instruct the BLAs to halt any further transfer of 
houses in Greater Soweto. The moratorium on the sale of
houses in Greater Soweto was introduced during mid-1993.
However, there were no legal mechanisms aimed at monitoring 
the moratorium, and it continued to be ignored in practice. 
By 1994 local authorities in Greater Soweto were still 
selling council-built houses.91
The extent of changes in tenure in Greater Soweto from 1978, 
when the 'Great Sale' of council houses was first
introduced, until June 1993, when the moratorium came into 
effect has been shown in Chapter 3. As has been shown in 
Chapter 3 (see table 3.28), there have been substantial 
changes to tenure, with 39.3 per cent of the council-built 
stock already in private hands. The 60.7 per cent (currently 
state-owned) is also in a state of flux, about to be
affected by the free transfer of houses process which began 
implementation in mid-January 1996. After completion, the 
net effect will result in the transfer to private tenure of 
all council-built houses in Greater Soweto. The variations
91 Personal interview with Dudu Nhlapho, Estate Officer 
at Soweto City Council, 8 February 1994. According to Dijdu 
Nhlapho the sale of council housing was still continuing 
usually at the insistence of residents themselves who wanted 
to move elsewhere, or indeed who wanted to buy from another 
person in order to sell to someone else.
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Table 7.5: Houses which present problems with conferring 
private tenure
Submarket
area
Type Number of 
units
Percentage of 
total number of 
units
Mofolo row 188 2.8
Klipspruit row 208 3.0
Jabavu elephant 5 101 75.9
Orlando West elephant 616 9.1
Phiri subdivided 600 8.9
Total 6 713 100
Source: Adapted from Chapter 3, table 3.7.
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in tenure in the 13 local housing markets of Greater Soweto 
are also clearly revealed in Chapter 3, table 3.28. On the 
whole the data shows that in all but two local housing 
markets (Mofolo/Zondi and Dobsonville) it is the rented 
sector which continues to be the dominant tenure.
The fact that 39.3 per cent of the residents were able to 
maintain their payments during the most intense period of 
rent struggles suggests also that these residents might not 
have approved of the rent boycott, or that they supported it 
morally, but because of their vulnerability (particularly 
the older residents) were concerned that they might lose 
their homes. This is illustrated well by the case of a 
certain grandmother who used all her pension paying rent 
without the knowledge of her dependents, who were actually 
responsible for paying rent, but were boycotting payments at 
the time. In this respect, the tenure divisions revealed in 
Chapter 3, table 3.28 might actually be misleading.
While some residents evidently had the financial means to 
pay rent, given that they proceeded to purchase their homes 
from the Government, it is also possible that many of these 
residents felt compelled despite their low-incomes, to use 
whatever savings they had to borrow money from their 
employers, or extended relations, to buy their homes, and 
thereby secure their security in the townships. There might 
also be a substantial number of households who were in a 
position to buy their own homes but decided not to do so as
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a matter of principle. However, as has already been stated 
above (section 7.5), calculations show that the majority of 
Greater Soweto residents simply could not afford the rent 
payments demanded. It appears that many residents were 
pushed to a point where they could only guarantee their 
security of tenure (in terms of gaining the free transfer of 
their houses) through rent struggles.
Eventually they were proved right, because they were serious 
about this tenure security as evidenced by the signing of 
the Accord. Today these residents stand on the threshold of 
owning their homes. In contrast, some of the 39.3 per cent 
of households who bought their homes with mortgage financing 
have since found out that the sums they are obliged to repay 
amount to about thirty times more than the actual cost of 
the houses. Although on average these units cost between 
Rl,320 and R2,000 (see table 7.4), the mortgage costs for
these units are R30,000 on average (see Appendix Al). This
has led to the owners of these houses boycotting mortgage
bond payments (see Chapter 8).
7.8 Housing Bureau
The Housing Bureau (HB), was set up as the institutional 
mechanism for implementing the transfer of houses in Greater 
Soweto. It was finally established in mid-January 1996.92
92 Telephone Interview with Mpho Mokone, Housing 
Officer, Soweto Administration, Western Sub-Structure, 
Greater Johannesburg Metropolitan Council, 29January, 1996.
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Initially, the HB had been envisaged to be fully operational 
and implementing the transfer of houses in March 1994.93 
But this had not happened. The delay was first blamed by 
local authorities on the strike over pay by the Greater 
Soweto municipal workers which took place in March 1994 and 
lasted about six weeks. After the strike had ended the 
property sales department at Soweto City Council envisaged 
the transfer to begin by mid-June 1994.94 But again it had 
not happened. A year later, in June 1995, it was reported in 
The Star that a Housing Transfer Bureau had opened in 
Krugersdorp.95
By July 1995, The Star was reporting that the Greater 
Johannesburg Council was making 'final plans to open the 
first Soweto housing bureau in August'96 1995. As this 
also did not happen, the process was then envisaged to get 
underway by November 1995.9-7 But as in the earlier cases 
it did not happened. This time, it was the dissolution of 
the old apartheid local government structures, funding and 
the training of personnel who would serve in the HB which 
were identified to be delaying the implementation of the
93 Personal Interview with Mr William Loots, Property 
Sales Department, Soweto City Council, 11 February 1994.
94 Personal Interview with Mr William Loots, Property 
Sales Department, Soweto City Council, 11 April 1994.
95 The Star, 16 June 1995.
96 The Star, 5 July 1995.
97 Telephone Interview with Mpho Mokone, Housing 
Officer, 8 September, 1995.
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transfer project. In addition, the whole process of 
advertising posts and interviewing people to serve in the HB 
had been found to be taking longer, hence compounding the 
delay.98
However, on 3 December 1994, the apartheid local government 
authorities were formally abolished with the establishment 
of the Greater Johannesburg Transitional Metropolitan 
Chamber (GJTMC). This body draws its membership from the 
CWMC (which had formerly been established by the Greater 
Soweto Accord) which it replaces. The GJTMC brings together 
the old racially based local councils of Johannesburg, 
Alexandra, Sandton, Roodepoort, Greater Soweto, Ennerdale 
and Lenansia. All these old municipalities were to continue 
to be administered by the GJTMC until the first post 
apartheid local government elections had taken place in 
October 1995.
After the elections the GJTMC would become known as the 
Greater Johannesburg Metropolitan Council (GJMC), consisting 
of seven Metropolitan Sub-Structures (MSSs), namely Western 
MSS, Central Business District MSS, North-Western MSS, 
South-Eastern MSS, South-Western MSS, and North-Eastern MSS. 
As a result of these changes, Soweto and Diepmeadow now fall 
under the Western MSS which include the areas of Noordgesig, 
Devland, Aeroton and Nasrec. Dobsonville, on the other hand,
9S Telephone Interviews with Mr William Loots and Dudu 
Nhlapho, Respectively, Property Sales Director and Senior 
Estate Officer, Soweto City Council, 8 September, 1995.
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is now administered by the North-Western MSS which covers 
the old areas of Roodeport City Council, Doornkop and 
Vlakfontein.99
Because the HB was finally established only in January 1996 
it has not been possible to examine its impact. What is 
known however, is that it was to create its own subsidiary 
body, the Coordination Committee (CC), which would be 
charged with the responsibility of receiving and processing 
applications on a daily basis. The CC would also be 
responsible for assessing applications before they are 
approved by the HB.100 For this purpose the CWMC had 
begun the process (during early 1994) of installing an 
information computer system (recommended by the Tucker 
report) that would handle the transfer of housing 
applications as well as legalising the whole process.101
The CWMC would also handle the appointment of consultants 
and local committees. The HB would appoint adjudication 
officers, approve budgets, manage and monitor the interim 
adminstration of records, disseminate (publicise) 
information regarding the transfer, list names of
99 Metro News, The Newsletter For The People of Greater 
Johannesburg, Greater Johannesburg Transitional Metropolitan 
Council, February 1995; Telephone Interview with Tiny 
Bantsi, Finance Officer, Soweto Administration, Orlando East 
Office, Western Sub-Structure, GJMC, 12 February, 1996.
100 Personal Interview with Mr William Loots (98, 
op.cit.)
101 Ibid.
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applicants, make investigations into housing claims, 
rulings, adjudicate on appeals from residents against the 
CC's decisions and regularly review the transfer process. 
According to the terms set out by the Tucker report, these 
officers are to be drawn from the old BLAs, TPA staff 'with 
experience in housing administration1, and a pool of new 
members from the civics and the community.102
According to the CWMC, these mechanisms should make the 
transfer process more transparent. The CWMC members also 
believed that as this procedure makes provision for appeals 
from residents and adjudications, it therefore makes the 
transfer of housing process 'tight, accountable and 
transparent'.103 Thus potential applicants would need to 
produce documentary evidence of tenancy to demonstrate their 
eligibility. They would also have to demonstrate that they 
are legitimate South African citizens.
As soon as the HB was finally established, it embarked on a 
campaign of notifying and encouraging residents to submit 
their applications. The method of notifying residents 
involves the use of the media; radio, television, newspapers 
and public posters.104 Representatives of community
102 EFK Tucker Report (84, op.cit.)
103 Ibid., Interviews with Johan Latsky (15, op.cit.); 
William Loots (34, op.cit.); Simon Moloko, Assistant Sales 
Housing Director, Diepmeadow Council, 21 June 1994; Transfer 
of Housing Workshop: Paper presented by Erica Emdon, 26 
January, 1994, Planact.
104 Telephone Interview with Mpho Mokone (97, op.cit.)
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groups, for example, the civics are also said to be playing
a role in informing the residents. As a result of these
campaigns, residents are said to have responded positively 
by availing themselves at the local authority offices to 
seek clarification and further information about the
transfer process.105 A budget of R32 million had been
approved early in 1994 by the TPA for the establishment of 
six housing bureaux for the region, with Soweto allocated R6 
million for a period of five years.106
Although the HB is also intended as a mechanism through 
which residents will receive continued advice and assistance 
after all the houses had been transferred, the length of 
time it will take to complete implementation of the transfer 
of houses remains unknown. At the time of writing there are 
also uncertainties concerning the transfer of unsaleable 
houses such as the 'elephant', 'row', subdivided types 
(table 7.5) and flats (see Chapter 3, table 3.8) which are 
perceived to be a problem with respect to granting title. 
These units could only be transferred to the residents in 
terms of sectional title. According to the Tucker report 
granting title on a sectional tile basis to these units 
would prove to be either impossible or expensive.107 In
105 Telephone Interviews with Tiny Bantsi and Mpho 
Mokone, Respectively Finance Officer and Housing Officer, 
Soweto Administration, Orlando East Office and Jabulani 
Office, 12 January, 1996.
106 Emdon, E. 1994. (105, op.cit.)
107 Tucker report (84, op.cit.)
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this respect the Tucker report recommended other mechanisms 
such as housing associations or shared block occupation 
schemes. Crankshaw and White found that local authorities 
were unwilling to investigate the possible mechanisms of 
sectional title transfers.103
Musi, et al, on the other hand, have suggested that these 
houses be modified and upgraded to meet minimum standards of 
housing the poor and the residents would be relocated and 
assisted with suitable accommodation elsewhere.109 
Regarding the subdivided units, Musi, et al, recommended 
that alternative accommodation be found for the relocation 
of two families per unit (there are 600 of these units as 
shown in table 7.5), so that these dwellings are reconverted 
back into 300 semi-detached units housing only two families 
instead of four.110
7.9 Effects of private tenure
Although the free transfer of housing is a new concept in 
South Africa, privatisation of housing has been applied 
elsewhere. In the 1980s in Britain, for example, the state 
through local authorities embarked on a massive sale of
108 Crankshaw, 0. and White, C. 1993. (89, op.cit.)
109 Musi, D.L. et al. 1994. Transfer of Residential 
Property in Greater Soweto: A Report on the Treatment of Row 
Houses "Elephant" Houses and Semi-Detached Houses, Prepared 
for PWV Government, Community Development Branch.
110 Ibid.
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council houses.111 The implications for the elderly and 
poor residents are serious. Thus, they will increasingly 
become disadvantaged through housing as a result of their 
inability to improve their housing conditions. In addition 
because the free transfer policy is not backed up by 
equivalent mechanisms aimed at addressing questions of house 
improvements and quality, the elderly and poor residents are 
likely to be marginalised and trapped in the most 
dilapidated and decaying housing conditions.
This can only result in the perpetuation of the inequalities 
inherent in the housing system under apartheid. Such a 
situation would widen the gap between the comfortably housed 
minority and a growing majority who would be badly housed. 
Although the demand for the transfer of houses was a 
specific demand of (the residents themselves) voiced through 
grassroots campaigns, it is also important to recognise that 
the apartheid state through the local authorities and the 
TPA formally conceded to this demand as a way of breaking 
the rent boycotts.
By conceding to the transfer of houses demand, Government 
had nothing to lose other than displacing the responsibility 
for solving problems of deterioration and dilapidation to
111 There are various publications on housing 
privatisation policies in Britain. See, for example, Heymas, 
C. Privatisation and Municipal Reform. In M. Swilling et al, 
1991. Apartheid City In Transition, Oxford University Press. 
See also, Forrest, R. Privatisation of Collective 
Consumption. In M. Gottdiener and C.G. Pickvance (eds), 
Urban Life in Transition, Sage Publications, 1991.
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the residents themselves. Afterall, these houses were built 
as temporary homes for supposedly transient people. The fact 
that the construction of these houses was financed from beer 
profits and other limited financial mechanisms (discussed in 
Chapter 5) is reflected in their low space and other 
standards. Moreover there had been little expenditure on 
maintenance of these units. Consequently/ the residents 
themselves would have to deal with the problems of upgrading 
and improving the standards of their homes. Those with 
financial means have managed to do so already. However, for 
some of them, opportunities are limited.
It is striking that, while South Africa is in transition or 
changing, including tenure, the low standards of a 
substantial number of the council-built housing stock will 
remain. Such a situation would also further exacerbate the 
profound socio-economic differences through housing between 
the rich and poor, black and white. In the light of rising 
interest rates, consumer prices and unemployment they would 
have no resources to improve their housing conditions.
Many people in Greater Soweto live below the accepted 
minimal living level (MLL).112 Under these circumstances 
the option of selling in order to meet other pressing needs, 
may well appeal to many poor home owners. There is some 
evidence that this is already happening. In fact the 
evidence suggests that the development of a secondary market
112 PLANACT, 1989. (35, op.cit.)
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began simultaneously with the introduction of the sale of 
houses during the early 1980s.
According to the officials at the Soweto City Council it was 
a normal practice for them to pass on the list of households 
about to be evicted for rental arrears to persons interested 
in buying those houses. They would also assist such persons 
to move into the houses they had just bought from the 
council if there were resistance from the evicted 
households. The council was equally aware that some of these 
houses (see average prices in table 7.4) ended up being sold 
by their new owners at between R20 000 to R30 000.113
The transfer policy as presently constituted has 
considerable social implications.1X4 Although intended as 
a mechanism for preventing homelessness, the notion of 
family title appears to favour a 'patriarchal system1 where 
women would be excluded, handicapped and marginalised from 
housing. Historically, under apartheid, houses have always 
been passed from one generation to the next particularly
XX3 Interviews with Estate Officers at Property Sales 
Department, Soweto City Council and Orlando East Council 
Offices, January 1994; See also, Mabin, A, 1991. Effects of 
Privatisation of Housing and Private Markets for Housing, 
Report To Planact, Planact, Yeoville; Mabin, A. and Parnell, 
S. 1983. "Recommodification and Working-Class Home 
Ownership: New Directions For South African Cities?", South 
African Geographical Journal, Vol. 65. No. 2, pp. 148-166; 
Potts, D. and Mutambirwa, C.C. 1991. "High Density Housing 
in Harare: Commodification and Overcrowding", Third World 
Planning Review, 13 (1), pp. 1-24.
1X4 Personal Interview with Mark Feldman, Feldman & 
Associates, PLANACT, 3 December, 1994.
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where the registered tenant had died. Here, children of 
registered tenants could themselves age or even die still 
living with their parents (see Chapter 6).
According to Mr Mafoko,XX5 siblings often competed for 
succession to a house because opportunities for housing 
elsewhere did not exist, unless where possible in the 
lodgers' housing market. Succession and inheritance was also 
patriarchally biased in favour of the youngest male of the 
family. Women, on the other hand were excluded from this 
form of succession because they were expected to leave home 
at a future date when they would be expected to live with 
the family of their husbands.
It will be clear from the above that apartheid policies have 
historically excluded women from tenure, except in 
exceptional circumstances (as shown in the preceding 
chapter) where widows and divorcees with urban 
qualifications and dependent children could qualify for a 
permit. But this used to be an exception and not a rule, 
usually at the discretion of white urban mangers. Therefore, 
by focusing on family title as a vehicle for preventing 
homelessness, the transfer of housing also fails to address 
the potential exclusionary effects of women who would 
continue to be disadvantaged as before. In instances where 
the couple separated or divorced, or indeed where the woman
XX5 Personal Interview with Mr Gladstone Mafoko, 
Assistant Housing Director, Soweto City Council, 23 November
1993.
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was a second wife and the husband had died, it is 
conceivable that the husband's relatives or children from an 
earlier marriage would force her out of the house. 
Conversely, a husband who had earlier on left his wife to 
live with another woman could come back to claim the house 
through the possession of documentary evidence.
It will also be clear from the discussion above on the 
Tucker report that, the only reason why this report did not 
recommended the granting of tenure rights through 
legislation is because family title is legally impossible, 
in that only one person or a married couple should be held 
responsible for such issues as services payments or indeed 
raising a loan for house improvements. Because of this the 
houses are to be transferred in terms of agreement. But this 
appears also to be discriminatory, in that it might actually 
represent an inferior form of rights. The important issue is 
that all owners of a property should be registered, be they 
individuals, a family, a partnership, a company or whatever.
Elsewhere, for example, in Ghana a tenure system of "multi­
occupancy housing permits" exist with respect to room 
rentals in "multi-occupied rental compounds" that are shared 
by about 40 persons.116 Korboe and Tipple have argued 
that this tenure market minimises housing costs for 
residents and has the potential for not excluding residents
116 Korboe, D. and Tipple, A. G. 1993. "A Challenge To 
Tunerian Modelling: Some thoughts On Low-Income Housing From 
Kumasi, Ghana", World Housing Congress, Cape Town, May.
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from housing.1X7 Whereas this form of tenure market only 
relates to multi-occupation, it nevertheless provides
potential opportunities with respect to the free transfer of 
housing policy for black townships. For example, it could 
give family members secured rights to a house through 
legislation. In this way the potential exclusionary effects 
of the free transfer approach could be minimised.
As far as the time frame envisaged is concerned, it is
likely to take several years. There are profound
difficulties that make a speedy completion of this task 
impossible. For example, the whole process of applications, 
rulings, adjudications and appeals will take longer. This 
can be expected as it will involve a considerable number of 
disputes. In addition, the transfer of houses also implies 
that those tenants who were forcibly evicted or removed from 
the townships as a result of influx control measures could
now come to claim back their houses.
In the event of this happening and the consequent disputes, 
there are no mechanisms enshrined within the transfer policy 
for resolving the disputes. The time frame is also likely to
be affected by considerable changes through deaths and
people moving out of certain areas within the townships. In 
addition because this policy is new and untried it can be 
expected to proceed on a trial and error basis. This in turn 
suggests that the Housing Bureau would be engaged with this
Ibid.
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process for many years to come.
7.10 Conclusion
This chapter has shown how during the late 1970s the 
apartheid Government began to distance itself from the 
coercive allocation mechanisms towards the acceptance of 
market forces. Several factors contributed to this shift in 
policy. The growth of militant campaigns after the Soweto 
revolt led the Government to give priority to the objective 
of social stability and also of gaining international 
goodwill.
The changing needs of capital had the effect of encouraging 
the apartheid Government to give priority to the objective 
of recognising the permanence of urban Africans in the 
'white cities'. Thus the participation of private sector 
finance in the townships was dependent on the granting by 
the Government of leasehold rights to urban Africans and the 
introduction of the sale of state-owned dwellings in the 
townships. Housing had thus begun to be viewed not solely 
for the reproduction of the labour force but as a source for 
accumulating profits in the townships.
The rent boycotts and production-based struggles were shown 
to have played a major role in sweeping away the coercive 
mechanisms. This led the Government to concede to the main 
demand of grassroots campaigns, that the council-built
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housing stock be transferred freely to the residents at no 
cost to them. The free transfer of housing mechanism was 
examined and its potential problems (given that it has not 
been tried) analysed.
325
CHAPTER EIGHT
PRIVATE SECTOR FINANCE OF HOUSING PURCHASE
vs.
GRASSROOTS CAMPAIGN IN MEADOWLANDS WEST ZONE 9 
8.1 Introduction
Amongst the most visible changes in the township built 
environment since the mid-1980s has been the appearance of 
housing for the middle-class and elite markets, with the aid 
of private sector finance. The construction of private 
sector housing for the middle class and elite markets 
reflected South Africa's transition from apartheid policies. 
Or to put it another way, members of certain socio-economic 
groups found themselves with sufficient money and borrowing 
power to invest in better housing, and in response to this 
demand a supply came forward.
This chapter examines the implications of the private sector 
finance for house purchase in the townships and places it 
within the context of residents' experiences arising from 
this penetration of financial markets into the township 
built environment. The second section (8.2) begins by 
examining the legislative framework under which financial 
markets have operated. The third section (8.3) explores the 
implications on the involvement of private sector for access 
to housing and affordability. This section also examines the 
limitations that have been placed on private sector finance 
as a result of the bond boycotts mounted by residents. The
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remaining sections (8.4 to 8.6) explore the penetration of 
private sector finance in relation to a case study, from 
Meadowlands West Zone 9, Greater Soweto.
8.2. The legislative framework of private sector finance
The introduction of private sector finance in the townships 
was made possible by the changes in the apartheid 
legislation governing the urban status of African residents 
(the 99-year leasehold scheme discussed in Chapter 7). 
Although mortgage lending became legally possible following 
the introduction of the 99-year leasehold scheme in 1978, it 
was not until 1986, following the amendment of the Black 
Communities Development Act of 1984 (as described in Chapter 
7) that private sector finance became actively involved in 
the Greater Soweto housing markets. This amendment conferred 
security of title with respect to both financial 
institutions and prospective owners. Furthermore, the 
significance of this amendment was that it gave meaning to 
the concept of property ownership, and more importantly 
served as a mechanism for the protection of the leasehold 
rights.
The 99-year leasehold scheme as originally introduced 
represented an inferior system of registration which was not 
very different from the previous forms of registering tenure 
rights (through a process of endorsement at the Bantu 
Affairs Commissioners (BACS) as explained in Chapter 7). The
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BACs were administered by the Department of Constitutional 
Development (DCD) which handled all aspects of land 
registration with respect to the Department of Public Works 
and Land Affairs (comprising various Deeds Registries).1 
Under the BCD Act of 1984, 99-year leases were now 
registrable under the Deeds Registry Act of 1937 (see 
Chapter 7), and leaseholders were given the right to convert 
their 99-year leases to freehold title.2
With the statutory definition of 99-year leases under the 
BCD Act of 1984, it became practicable for townships to be 
exposed to other key agents involved in housing markets, 
such as land surveyors, town planners, engineers, 
geotechnicians, architects, conveyancers, estate agents, 
local authorities, agencies receiving revenue, and the deeds 
office.3 As has already been explained in Chapter 7, it was 
not until the introduction of the Black Communities Act of 
1984 that the surveying of the Greater Soweto was 
undertaken.
Moreover, neither were townships planned, beyond deciding 
layout plans and floor areas of the houses, nor were 
geophysical considerations relating to land suitability 
taken into account when the townships were first established
1 Personal Interview with the Chief Register of Deeds, 
Central Government Building, Pretoria, 3 March 1994.
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid.
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as residential areas.4 From the very beginning, therefore, 
housing market processes in Greater Soweto were 
characterised by the absence of an integrated structure 
comprising of the key agents, surveyors, geotechnicians, 
town planners, engineers and architects. This, of course, is 
not surprising considering the fact that townships were 
designed for transient people. Hence, under these 
conditions, the existence of other key agents such as 
conveyancers and estate agents were unthinkable.
The role of the estate agent is concerned with the marketing 
and selling of properties in an open property market. A 
conveyancer is a specialised lawyer who is of crucial 
importance to the operations of the property industry with 
respect to monitoring and the application of 'substantive 
law to immovable property1. The nature of the property 
market is such that any property transaction will involve 
many parties,5 as a result of which the significance of the 
conveyancer's role will be to manage the transaction 
relationship, for example, (a) between the seller and the 
purchaser; (b) the financial institution to which a house is
4 Lupton, M, and Wolfson, T, 1994. "Low Income Housing 
and the Environment Constraints of Mining on the 
Witwatersrand, South Africa", in Main, H, and William, W, 
Environment and Housing in the Third World Cities, Belhaven 
Press, London; Partridge, T,C, et al, 1993. "Priorities for 
urban Expansion Within the PWV Metropolitan Region: The 
Primacy of Geotechnical Constraints", South African 
Geographical Journal, Vol. 75, No.l, pp. 9-13
5 The Property Law Project, 1994. Conveyancing and 
Property Law: Transforming the Industry for the 21st 
Century, The Property Law Project, Phase 1 Research, Summary 
of Presentation, RSA.
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mortgaged at the time of a transaction, (c) the financial 
institution about to mortgage the same house, (d) the local 
authority from whom a rates clearance certificate must be 
obtained, and finally (e) the receiver of revenue who must 
comply with the transfer provisions in terms of the Transfer 
Duty Act of 1949.6
A delay in any one of these distinct transactions involving,
for example, the time taken in the completion of financial
(
arrangements between the parties concerned, will inevitably 
result in the overall transfer process being drawn out. It 
is also after these transactions have been legally confirmed 
by the conveyancer that they are registered with the Deeds 
Office (DO). The relationship between the conveyancer and 
the DO is therefore of fundamental importance in the South 
African property market. According to the Chief Registrar of 
Deeds (CRD), the process of land registration with respect 
to urban residential areas derives from a general plan to 
establish such areas. Once the state owned land is 'carved 
up' through various seller and buyer market processes, the 
Deeds Office (DO) simultaneously opens up a register to 
effect these transactions relative to the different pieces 
of land.-7
6 Radloff, F.G.T. (undated). The Time Lapse Between 
Sale and Registration of Title: The Legal Profession's View, 
unpublished paper, Obtained by me from the Deeds 
Registration Office in 1994, Central Government Building, 
Pretoria.
v Personal Interview with the Chief Registrar of Deeds 
(1, op.cit.)
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These various pieces of land are referred to as 1 diagrams1, 
'portions' or 'erven'. It is this form of subdivision of 
land that eventually leads to the DO effecting individual 
title, following confirmation of a legal transfer from the 
seller to buyer. But the deeds registrar is not responsible 
should transactions go wrong: for example, in the case of 
fraudulent transactions it is the conveyancer who takes the 
blame. The suggestion here is of a 'unique marriage' between 
the public sector (DO) and the private sector (conveyancing 
profession) working together effectively and efficiently. 
This close reliance between these two sectors also suggests 
a clear division of responsibilities, thus effectively 
establishing checks and balances to the operational 
mechanisms of the title registration system. This accounts 
for why the deeds registration system is claimed by the CRD 
to be among the best in the world.3
Drawing international comparisons, the CRD indicated that 
in Australia, for example, it is the state which specifies 
title guarantee. This Australian approach is perceived to be 
cheaper, according to the CRD, because it involves a high 
degree of state intervention, but it takes a long time to 
process because all the details have to be checked by the 
bureaucracy, and this results in the whole process being 
very expensive. In the United States of America, the whole 
process of title registration is handled by corporate bodies 
(including estate agents), and this is said by the CRD to
8 Ibid.
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result in a substantial number of disputed ownership or 
title deeds cases, necessitating the intervention of the 
judiciary to decide who the property owner actually is.
In comparison, the CRD suggested that in South Africa, title 
registration problems were very rare. As he further 
explained, "throughout my 34 years of service at the deeds 
offices, I can only remember one case of irregularity".9 
This suggests therefore that the only reason why the South 
African title registration system is perceived to be amongst 
the best in the world is simply that it guarantees 'security 
of title1. This is because the South African title 
registration system requires the deeds registrar to comply 
with the prevailing law and there is no need for insurance. 
It is this adherence to law which simplifies title. This 
same law applies also to the leasehold, but with freehold it 
provides security. It is therefore on account of this 
security of title (as the CRD indicated) that financial 
institutions view the deeds registration system with high 
regard.
8.3. Private sector finance for housing purchase
The 'penetration1 of private sector finance in funding house 
purchase in Greater Soweto townships during the mid-1980 
represented a significant shift in the structure of housing 
markets by establishing for the first time market processes
9 Ibid.
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through which housing not only becomes a commodity, but a 
commodity which both residents and financial markets could 
speculate on. With this change it became possible for the 
empty spaces (undeveloped land) to be transformed10 by 
private sector developers into housing commodities, 
produced, financed and exchanged for profit: capital
accumulation.
Suddenly townships became opened up for capital 
accumulation, with the key agents (financial institutions 
and developers) 'rushing for gold' through the construction 
of privately built houses and the provision of various 
financial services. Developers became even more crucial 
agents influencing change in the structure of private 
housing, for not only were they responsible for the 
construction of houses, but at the same time they played the 
role of estate agents by marketing and selling the 
properties before, during and after they had been 
constructed (see case study below). These changes have had 
mixed consequences for the township residents.
First, they are of crucial significance for housing markets 
because it had taken over fifty-five years since the first 
township of Greater Soweto (Orlando East) was established, 
and a further eight years since 1978 (when it became legally 
possible through the introduction of the 99-year leasehold
xo Bond, P. 1990. "Township Housing and South Africa's 
'Financial Explosion': The Theory and Practice in
Alexandra", Urban Forum, Vol. 1, No. 2.
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and the amendment of the Financial Institutions Act)11 for 
these changes to come about. Given the problems associated 
with the 99-year leasehold scheme (discussed in the 
preceding section), the registration of bonds (mortgages) 
from 1978 until 1986 were undertaken by building 
societies.12 The first registration of bonds with the 
deeds registration system (with respect to Greater Soweto) 
took place in 1987, following the amendment in 1986 of the 
Black Communities Development Act of 1984 (see preceding 
section and Chapter 7).
Second, the importance of these changes is rooted within the 
manipulative mechanisms of both the Government and capital. 
The suggestion here is that they were not intended as
mechanisms aimed at the real improvement of residents' 
conditions, but rather as mechanisms for control and
division. This is illustrated well by the fact that it was
during the most intense period of struggles that the 
penetration of housing finance became possible when the 
Bantu Communities Development Act of 1984 was amended in 
1986. Thus, as a social control mechanism, the extension of 
home-ownership through private sector finance would 
eradicate the labour-based struggles by tying the workers to 
their jobs.13
11 Ibid.
12 Personal Interview with the Chief Registrar of Deeds 
(1, op.cit.)
13 Bond, P. 1990. (10, op.cit.)
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In this way, the new owner-occupiers would have a new sense 
of purpose and direction given that owner-occupation had not 
been possible under apartheid) and as a result would develop 
and subsequently embrace home-ownership values. As a 
divisive mechanism between those in employment and the vast 
majority of the poor, the new home-owners would increasingly 
identify with (and also support) the Government's reform 
policies through which they had benefitted.14 In this way, 
the new home-owners would have a stake in the apartheid 
society and 'an interest in its stability".15 The security 
of the Government would guarantee the security of their 
properties.
In turn, the marginalised poor and unemployed would be 
isolated and suppressed by the tripartite alliance of the 
Government, finance capital and the elevated new home-owners 
in the townships. However, despite the increasing 
application of these manipulative and divisive mechanisms, 
the constraining realities of affordability not only 
remained, but have progressively become crucial in 
influencing the operation of housing markets, especially 
affecting the specialised circuits of housing finance 
through bond boycotts and township residents through 
consumer debt, defaults and foreclosures.
14 Unterhalter, E. 1987. Forced Removal, International 
Defence and Aid Fund for South Africa, London.
15 Bond, P, 1990. (10, op.cit.)
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The role of private sector finance for housing is predicated 
(as happens in capitalist countries all over the world) on 
effective demand and also on the basis of a commercial rate 
of return to the financial creditors or investors. Thus it 
is within the context of profitability that the actual role 
of housing finance (as a specialised circuit of financial 
capital) is rooted. Therefore it is the ability to pay for 
housing which is crucial for accessing housing finance. 
Affordability levels, on the other hand, are inherently 
determined by the availability of employment and the level 
of wages offered within the labour market.
Under apartheid, the historic experience of employed 
Africans was characterised by low levels of pay. Africans 
were also likely to experience severe unemployment whenever 
the economy was in crisis. Ironically, housing finance in 
the townships was advanced through the allocation of bonds 
(mortgages) to the residents during the time when South 
Africa's economic base was undergoing a structural decline 
in fixed capital investments.16 Because of this shift 
finance capital began seeking alternative new outlets. 
Financial services began to be targeted at a market where 
approximately 90 per cent of the population could not afford
16 see Steinberg, J. et al. 1992. Contradictions in the 
transition from urban apartheid: barriers to gentrification 
in Johannesburg. In D.M. Smith, (ed), The Apartheid City and 
Beyond, Routledge, London.
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a 'full set of the necessary subsistence goods'.1"7 In this 
respect housing purchase through private sector finance 
could only remain inadequate in that only a relatively few 
township residents could afford to make a contribution to 
their own housing costs. As Wolfson put it.
"The private sector is building houses in a market where 
67 per cent of the population cannot afford a serviced 
site of R6,000, and an estimated 80 per cent cannot 
afford a low-cost formal housing unit (R20,000 including 
the land)."18
Despite these constraining realities the allocation of bonds 
was premised on the conventional end-user lending limit of 
R43,000.19 This limit, which, depending on the cycle of 
the 'cut throat competition' of market forces, was subject 
to rise above R43,000 if mortgage rates rose or if incomes 
fell.20 This illustrates the extent to which private 
sector housing was beyond the reach of the majority of 
township residents. To stimulate demand among those in a 
position to afford private sector financial loans, the 
Government made incentives available: the first-time home
lv Bond, P. 1994. Money, Power and Social Movements: 
the Contested Geography of Finance in Southern Africa. In S. 
Corbridge, et al, Money Power and Space, Basil Blackwell, 
Oxford.
18 Wolfson, T. 1991. Access to urban land. In M. 
Swilling, et al, Apartheid City In Transition, Oxford 
university Press, Cape Town.
19 Oelofse, M. and Van Gass, C. 1992. End-User Finance 
and Subsidies: Unpublished Report Prepared For The National 
Housing Forum, Urban Foundation, Johannesburg.
20 Malpass, P. 1993. "Housing tenure and affordability: 
the British disease". In Hallett, G. (ed), The New Housing 
Shortage: Housing Affordability in Europe and the USA,
Routledge, London.
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buyer interest subsidy scheme. Under this subsidy scheme, 
under which R36,7 million was paid out by 1990,21 a third 
of the mortgage bond payments were paid by the Government 
during the first five years.22
Once the interest subsidy incentives had been input in place 
as a mechanism to induce residents to take up mortgage 
loans, the financial markets (including the Urban 
Foundation) responded in 1989 by introducing the Loan 
Guarantee scheme (a subsidised financial insurance service 
which was largely funded by foreign governments) which was 
designed to reduce the collateral risk borne by financial 
institutions to 65 per cent of the value of houses valued as 
collateral for bonds.23 With this insurance loan fund in 
place, according to the Urban Foundation (UB), it resulted 
also in the
"banking community mobilising an additional R1 billion 
for loans of between R35,000 and R12,500 (conventional 
and starter housing). A further R2 billion committed 
over an initial 3 years is available should the home 
building industry develop sufficient momentum for this 
new market. The initiative has included a loan guarantee 
fund as well as changes to the regulations of home loan 
institutions so making lending to the lower end market a 
profitable business.1124
21 Urban Foundation. Housing For All: Proposals for a 
National Urban Housing Policy, Urban Debate 2010, Policies 
for a New Urban Future Series, No 9, Johannesburg.
22 IHSA, March 1987. Housing in Southern Africa, 
Institute For Housing of Southern Africa, Bryanston.
23 Bond, P. 1990. (10, op.cit)
24 Urban Foundation. Housing for All (21, op.cit. p.
48)
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With these mechanisms now in place, the township housing 
space became overwhelmed by the penetration of financial 
capital. The effect of this transformation is illustrated 
well in tables 8.1, 8.2 and 8.3 below. For example, the 
value of residential plans passed for Greater Soweto in 1986 
was R91,290; R77,858 in 1987; R124,293 in 1988; R95,522 in 
1989; and R60,972 in 1990, over the 5 years a total of 
R449,935 million (table 8.1). In addition, during the period 
1986-1989, the value of residential plans passed with 
respect to additions and alterations to the existing stock 
grew by 27 per cent from R42,115 to R154,050 million (table 
8.2). Furthermore, the value of commercial plans for Soweto 
alone (excluding Diepmeadow and Dobsonville) also increased 
substantially between 1986 to 1991 from Rl,346 to R25,754 
million (table 8.3).
The township space was thus opened up to a credit system in 
which not only were houses bought and sold, but also various 
other financial products (from the consumption of basic 
necessities to the consumption of status pursuits). As the 
data presented in the three tables (8.1, 8.2 and 8.3)
clearly show the money involved in the townships is 
substantial. Added to this, is the amount represented by the 
total value of bonds (mortgages) issued to township 
residents, including the insurance mortgage bond premiums.
According to Bond, 'over RIO billion of housing loans' had 
been registered on the books of the largest commercial banks
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Table 8.1: The value of residential building plans passed
for Greater Soweto, 1986-1990
Year Diepmeadow 
(Rand)
Dobsonville 
(Rand)
Soweto 
(Rand)
Total Value 
(Rand)
1986 13,113,000 8,190,000 69,987,000 91,290,000
1987 27,190,000 4,275,000 46,393,000 77,858,000
1988 24,516,000 22,888,000 76,889,000 124,293,000
1989 9,798,000 25,060,000 60,664,000 95,522,000
1990 11,996,000 25,892,000 23,084,000 60,972,000
Total 86,613,000 86,305,000 277,017,000 449,935,000
Source: Building statistics, 1986-1990.
Table 8.2: The value of additions and alterations to
residential building plans passed for Greater Soweto, 1986- 
1989
Year Diepmeadow 
(Rand)
Dobsonville 
(Rand)
Soweto 
(Rand)
Total Value 
(Rand)
1986 7,791,000 1,695,000 32,629,000 42,115,000
1987 1,782,000 2,091,000 21,069,000 24,942,000
1988 10,147,000 1,194,000 38,910,000 50,251,000
1989 3,530,000 695,000 32,517,000 36,742,000
Total 23,250,000 5,675,000 125,125,000 154,050,000
Source: Building statistics, 1986-1989
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Table 8.3: The value of commercial plans passed for Soweto
(alone), 1986-1991
Year Total Value (Rand) Percentage of 
total value of 
commercial plans
1986 1,346,000
CM•
in
1987 5,643,000 21.9
1988 5,442,000 21.1
1989 1,219,000 4.7
1990 10,158,000 39.4
1991 1,946,000 7.5
Total 25,754,000 100
Source: Building statistics, 1986-1991
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in 1988, with a further 'R30 billion1 registered by other 
financial institutions by 1989.25 Despite the fact that 
these figures are not specifically for Greater Soweto, they 
nevertheless illustrate the extent to which the growth of 
housing loans from the mid-1980s had largely become
dependent on home building and the sale of the council built 
stock in the townships. During this period the white
residential areas were characterised by the 'virtually 
insatiable demand for houses' costing less than R50,000.26
Although, figures for the total number of mortgage bonds 
held by Greater Soweto residents were not available for this 
study, from a few selected townships (Orlando East, Orlando 
West, Dube, Jabulani, Tladi, Naledi and Naledi Extension 1) 
the deeds registry records (which begin in 1987 for the 
whole of Greater Soweto) were examined. They reveal a total 
of 1,945 mortgage bonds costing R68,724,728. These records 
also show that the Perm bank is the leading issuer of bonds 
with 600, followed by Nedperm with 444. The Standard bank 
was the third issuer of bonds with 135, followed by Nedcor 
with 109 and the Allied bank the fifth with 103. The
remainder were issued by various different financial
institutions, including loans linked to pensions (see 
Appendix Al).
25 Bond, P. 1990. (10, op.cit.)
26 Mather, C. and Parnell, S. 1990. Upgrading the 
matchboxes: urban renewal in Soweto, 1976-1986. In D. 
Drakakis-Smith (ed.), Economic Growth and Urbanization in 
Developing Areas, Routledge, London.
342
The cost of these bonds varied widely, from as low as 
1*16,000 granted by the Saambou bank to the highest R74,000 
issued by Nedperm (see Appendix 1). Most of these bonds were 
issued on an interest rate of 19 per cent and were repayable 
over 20 years. The implications for affordability are 
enormous. For example, a loan of R74,000 at an interest rate 
of 19 per cent to be repaid over 20 years amounts to a total 
mortgage bond cost of R281,200. This would represent monthly 
payments of Rl,172 and thus an interest to the lender of 
R14,060 per annum. Therefore, out of the total amount paid 
over a 20 year period, R207,200 would represent the money 
paid in interest with R74,000 amounting to repayment of the 
capital borrowed.
The monthly repayments for a R16,000 loan would be R253 and 
the total loan at the end of a 20 year period would amount 
to R60,800, with R44,800 representing interest and R16,000 
representing the capital borrowed. However, the overall cost 
of these mortgages is greatly reduced if the repayment 
period is reduced from 20 years to 10 years. In this case 
the total bond cost for the R74,000 would amount to R140,600 
(R66,600 payable as interest and R74,000 as capital 
borrowed). In turn the total bond cost for the R16,000 loan 
would be R30,400 (R14,400 paid as interest and R16,000 as 
original capital). What these figures demonstrate is that 
not only was the mortgage interest set at a very high rate, 
but the time scale for the repayment of these loans was 
demonstrably inflated (too long) and thus enabling mortgage
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lenders to nearly treble their profits, although profits 
could still be doubled even at the same monthly repayments 
over a 10 year period instead of a 20 year duration.
Furthermore, it is also noteworthy that the allocation of 
mortgage bonds was targeted at the newly built houses with 
private sector finance, but also the old housing stock which 
was built by the white municipalities (local authorities) 
also became affected through stock transfers from state 
rental to owner-occupation. In this regard the old council- 
built housing stock which previously had represented 
devalorised capital became exposed to a valorisation and 
speculative process of market driven forces unprecedented in 
the history of South African townships.
For example, there are a total of 14,953 houses built since 
the mid-1980s with private sector finance by private 
developers in Greater Soweto (see Chapter 3, table 3.29). Of 
these 33,2 are located in Chiawelo, 13,3 per cent in
Pimville, 13 per cent in Diepkloof, 12,3 per cent in
Dobsonville and the rest are scattered through the other 
local submarkets of Greater Soweto. These units only 
represent 26 per cent of the entire stock in Greater Soweto 
that is now privately owned. As has been shown in Chapter 3,
table 3.28, there are 40,172 old units or 39.3 per cent (out
of a total of 102,018 formerly Government-owned) in Greater 
Soweto that have moved into the owner-occupied sector since 
the introduction of the 99-year leasehold scheme. Not only
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have these units been exposed to mortgage activity begun in 
the mid-1980s, but as table 8.2 also shows, upgrading, 
renovations, repairs and additions to these units represent 
a profitable market in Greater Soweto.
One of the clearest examples of the penetration of financial 
capital into the old council-built housing stock is 
illustrated by the case of Orlando East. Here there are only 
9 newly built units with private sector finance (see Chapter 
3, table 3.28), yet the deeds registry records show that 449 
mortgage bonds amounting to approximately R14 million rands 
have since been allocated with respect to the residents of 
the Orlando East housing market. The average cost of 
mortgages issued to the Orlando East residents is R30,736 
(see Appendix Al, table App.l).
In this way, township residents have been affected by both 
big and small loans which are serviced at higher 
administrative costs in order to upgrade or renovate their 
houses. This in turn has introduced into this market the use 
of either specialised builders in the form of private sector 
developers or small-time local builders. Unfortunately, 
there are no reliable figures available to illustrate the 
extent of upgrading or renovation market.
However, Mather and Parnell27 noted a figure of over 
10,000 units that had been upgraded at an average cost of
27 Ibid.
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approximately 1*2,000 for 1983. These different uses of 
financing mechanisms (the sale of council housing, upgrading 
and additions to existing units, and the construction of 
privately built housing with private sector finance) have 
been very significant in shaping residential differentiation 
in the townships. Yet this residential differentiation does 
not necessarily represent gentrification. According to 
Williams and Smith,
"Gentrification would be impossible in cities where 
there was no well-developed geographical division of 
residential location by class ... In reality 
gentrification as we know it could only appear on the 
agenda after ... the suburbanization process 
accomplished an increasingly acute geographical 
differentiation as part of this expansion. As society 
expanded and restructured, so its spatial manifestations 
changed. The creation of exclusive domains, such as the 
suburbs, meant that gentrif ication became feasible.1128
Whilst it is true that the township housing space was not 
originally assigned to different socio-economic groups, the 
processes of residential differentiation through 
restructuring (upgradings and private sector housing built 
on land infill sites) underway today has limited potential 
of creating exclusive zones within the townships in the near 
future. In this respect, there is residential 
differentiation on a fine scale in that upgraded housing 
units today exist side by side with the old dilapidated 
housing stock. There exists also some small exclusive areas
28 Williams, P. and Smith, N. 1986. From 'renaissance1 
to restructuring the dynamics of contemporary urban 
development. In N. Smith and P. Williams (eds),
Gentrification of the City, p. 206. Allen and Unwin, London.
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housing the elite and middle-class markets such as Diepkloof 
Extension and Protea Glen. Overall, however, residential 
differentiation by socio-economic groups is limited since 
many of the professionals have been unable to move into new 
developments and so remain in the old housing stock.
Some of the houses built with private sector finance are not 
divided by geographical location, instead they too exist 
side by side with the old housing stock. What divides these 
units from the old council built stock is their visual 
characteristics and the fact that they were built with 
private sector finance, as opposed to the financial 
mechanisms (including beer profits) used in the construction 
of the council-built housing stock (see Chapter 5). Also, 
the newly built units have an inside water supply and WC. 
This is as far as the divisions between these units can be 
seriously distinguished.
Some of these units may appear at first glance to represent 
high quality housing but in reality they are nothing more 
than an improved version of the matchbox housing type built 
by the white local authorities in the townships. Not only 
are many of these units of a substandard quality, but in 
many cases the floor space per room is such that many 
township residents have found it difficult (as is shown in 
the Meadowlands case study below) to move furniture into 
some of these units. In the case of bedrooms, some of these 
units would accommodate a double bed and nothing more,
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whereas in the living rooms only a few chairs or 3 piece 
suite fits, after which there is no more space for other 
things, for example, a glass display cabinet.
Furthermore, many of these units have no external space 
which can either be used by residents for outdoor activities 
or as spaces for children to play, and by extension, the 
additions of rooms to existing dwellings. Hence there is 
overcrowding in terms of high density of dwellings per 
hectare and not people per dwelling. In contrast the 
council-built houses are characterised by few buildings per 
hectare (as already discussed) as a result of which the 
growth of outbuildings or backyard shacks became feasible. 
However, the fundamental problem with a substantial number 
of houses built with private sector finance lies in the 
shoddy construction methods used by developers (see 
Meadowlands case study below).
8.4 The 97 Residents1 experience of housing finance
It will be clear from the above that the penetration of 
private sector finance for housing purchase in Greater 
Soweto since the mid-1980s has been substantial. Yet, this 
penetration of finance in the township landscape for house 
purchase also created a range of new problems. These 
problems were triggered by the exploitative practices of 
financial institutions and developers facilitated through 
the absence of any effective mechanisms aimed at protecting
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the consumers, such as by-laws, town planning rules, and 
building standards. To understand what lies beneath the 
surface of the unregulated market mechanisms for housing 
provision in Greater Soweto, the experience of the 97 
Residents of Meadowlands West Zone 9 offers an example of 
the practices of private developers and financial 
institutions.
The construction of houses with private sector finance in 
black residential areas was developer driven. The developer 
single handedly performed all crucial roles such as entering 
into land availability agreements (land allocation, the 
provision of services and the development of the land) with 
the local authorities concerned, finding prospective 
purchasers of the houses during the construction period or 
after the dwellings had been constructed, and arranging 
mortgage bonds for the prospective purchasers with the 
financial institutions. The information that follows is 
primarily drawn from interviews with residents, as well from 
official documentation.
The 97 houses in Meadowlands West Zone 9 were constructed on 
a land infill erven (an empty space which was developed) 
through the construction of dwellings for profit in 1988 by 
Incorporated Building Society (IBS) under the directorship 
of a white private developer. These houses share the same 
geographical location with the old municipal housing stock. 
In terms of the geographical area the only difference is
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that they are separated from the old council stock by a 
street. Both the 97 houses and the old municipal stock are 
affected by the same market externalities such as the poor 
delivery of services, housing shortage, homelessness,
poverty and crime.
It was while the 97 houses were being constructed that the 
developer also began selling them. For this purpose the 
developer set up a caravan office on the new site and 
employed two clerks to process applications, including the
allocation of houses to prospective buyers. Residents were 
not required to fill in the application forms, but were 
simply asked to sign them without having read the contents 
carefully. Thus the incomes of the residents had not been 
ascertained in order to determine their ability to afford 
the houses.
Since the residents were experiencing a desperate need for 
accommodation, they did not take the time and trouble to 
clarify the contents of the application forms. Not only were 
residents not informed about the bond conditions set out in 
the application forms, but they also did not know that by 
filling in these forms they were actually applying for
mortgage bonds. It was only after some of the residents had
received letters from the Natal Building Society (NBS) that 
they began understanding the implications of the application 
forms.
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Armed with the mortgage bond letters from NBS, the residents 
individually challenged the developer's clerks for an 
explanation, but were told that the developer was no longer 
using NBS. Instead the clerks told residents to complete new 
application forms, and this time they were required to pay a 
deposit which varied from R5,000 to R5,300. Although some of 
the residents paid their deposits on the site, others argued 
against this, as they could already foresee problems that 
lay ahead. The payment of deposits served two purposes: 
first, they were a mechanism of ensuring that the houses 
that were being constructed would be protected by the 
prospective purchasers against potential vandalism. Second, 
deposits represented some form of contractual trust between 
the developer and the prospective purchaser. However, there 
are many cases where unscrupulous developers vanished with 
the deposits of prospective purchasers.29
Alternative arrangements were made to enable residents to 
pay their deposits at the IBS offices in Alrode, Alberton. 
It was during this time that residents began noticing 
irregularities regarding the whole process of applications 
and allocations. In mid-June 1988 the suspicions of 
residents were confirmed when they received letters from the 
NBS informing them that it had decided to cut its ties with 
IBS. Almost at the same period they also received letters 
from the developer informing them that IBS had decided to
29 See amongst many such reports, "How one man's dream 
became a nightmare" Sunday Nation, 29 August 1993; "Double 
Loss!", City Press, 12 June 1994.
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change its name to Creative Joint Projects (CJP). Residents 
were told that the IBS had changed its name because of a 
split amongst the directors, who were alleged to have gone 
to Cape Town to start their own building companies.
At the end of June 1988 residents were again told to fill in 
new application forms. This time they were told by the 
clerks that the forms would be forwarded to different banks 
for the approval of bonds (tables 8.5 and 8.6). The 
developer's clerks also allegedly forged signatures of 
residents on various forms, and each time residents raised 
this issue with them they were continuously reminded about 
their desperate need for housing. There were important 
reasons why the residents were desperately in need for 
housing. Of the 97 residents, 88 per cent of them had 
previously been resident elsewhere in Greater Soweto either 
as children of the original holders of site permits, 
certificates of occupation and residential permits or as 
lodgers' within the lodgers' submarket (Regulations 6, 7, 8 
rights and room rentals discussed in the Chapter 6).
The fact that none of these residents had themselves in 
their own right been council lessees (holders of residential 
permits) or partial home-owners (holders of site permits and 
certificates of occupation) illustrates the accessibility 
problems to housing faced by many township residents under 
the previous apartheid policies. This was because of the 
acute housing shortage which had the effect also of
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restricting tenure mobility. Once residents had been housed 
they were likely to remain in that house until they had 
either been forcibly removed for various reasons or had 
died. The other possibility involved the unofficial 
allocation of housing by the original tenants to their 
children, the extended family network (relatives), or even 
friends (particularly where the tenants had moved to live in 
the rural hinterlands), whilst still remaining on the 
records of local authorities as permit holders. There are 
many examples of the prevalence of this form of unofficial 
allocation of housing in Greater Soweto especially where the 
original council tenants still had links with the rural 
areas. Under the various urban influx control mechanisms, 
residents could not easily move out of the established 
tenure markets. Therefore housing markets were characterised 
more by stability than mobility.
It was because of their experience (as described in Chapter 
3) of having to rely on the backyard shack market that 
residents had during the preliminary stage of their entry 
into Meadowlands West Zone 9 decided not to take any action 
against the developer as this would have prejudiced their 
applications. This was because these houses constituted both 
an opportunity for the 97 residents and their families to be 
properly housed in their own right, and to have for the 
first time a claim to property ownership.
Towards the end of July 1988 residents began receiving
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letters from different banks confirming the registration of 
bonds with the deeds office. These letters set out the 
mortgage bond amounts (see table 8.5), insurance and payment 
conditions. Judged by the legislative requirements for the 
registration of mortgage bonds with the deeds office (see 
section 8.2 above), it will be clear that the registration 
of bonds for the 97 residents of Meadowlands West Zone 9, 
precluded their participation. This meant that bonds were 
registered with the deeds office in a paternalistic manner, 
without the knowledge and involvement of the residents 
themselves.
By early August 1988 residents were informed by the 
developer that the company name was to change again, from 
CJP to Group Housing Corporation (PTY) Limited. No reasons 
were given as to why the developer's name was changed again. 
The application forms that were signed by the 97 residents 
had different company names that were being used by the 
developer. This is also illustrated in the deeds registry 
system where the registration of mortgages for some of the 
97 residents appear in the name of Creative Joint Projects 
(CJP) and others under Group Housing Corporation (PTY) 
Limited (GHC).
In this case the white developer appears to have used the 
different company names interchangeably and also handled 
documents of these different companies at all times in his 
dealings with the financial institutions, local authorities
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and within the Greater Soweto building markets. In October 
1988 the first 25 residents gained access to the houses and 
from the moment they unlocked the doors began experiencing 
problems with faulty construction, cracks, falling roofs, 
dampness, drainage and others (see table 8.4). The developer 
then went on the run and was not tracked down until several 
years later.
8.5 The formation of the 97 Residents' Committee
In February 1989, all 97 houses had been occupied. But the 
process of settling down into the new neighbourhood was made 
more difficult by the housing problems that confronted the 
residents. A few residents became aware of retention money 
(R3,000 per property) owed to the developer by the banks. 
This money could only be paid to the developer once banks 
were satisfied that the construction of houses had not only 
been completed, but also that they were of high quality. But 
the banks had not ascertained whether the houses had been 
built to satisfactory standards. Hardly any bank staff 
visited the area, either during the construction period, or 
once the houses had been completed. Such visits should have 
been carried out in order to inspect and value the houses 
and to determine if they were suitable for occupation.
The banks acted differently in white and black areas. In 
white residential areas, the normal practice of banks was to 
ascertain that the developer complied with the building
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standards. Had banks sent their own valuers to carry out 
proper inspections while the houses were being built, they 
would have observed the poor building standards employed by 
the developer. The banks did not verify information by the 
developer. They failed in their duty to identify forged 
signatures in the application forms which were forwarded by 
the developer. They failed to confirm borrowers' incomes, 
and instead relied on the false information that the 
developer gave them so that borrowers would quickly occupy 
the houses.
The 97 residents were therefore adamant the developer had no 
right to receive the outstanding retention money from 
financial institutions. Instead, they demanded access to the 
retention money so that they could do the repairs 
themselves. It was at this juncture that a few residents 
embarked on a door to door campaign, organising and 
inspiring residents to attend a meeting that would address 
their common problems.
The first meeting attended by all the 97 residents was held 
on 28 March 1989. At this meeting a subcommittee of six 
members was selected. The brief of this subcommittee was to 
put together the residents' complaints and forwarding them 
to the developer. At the beginning of April 1989 the 
committee sent various petitions with all the signatures of 
the 97 residents attached. This pressure persuaded GHC, the 
developer, to meet with the 97 Residents' Committee.
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On 1 May 1989 the first meeting between the Residents1 
Committee and GHC was held, but notably absent from this 
meeting was the developer. Nevertheless the representatives 
of GHC present at this meeting agreed to look into the 
residents' problems. The developer's representatives 
proposed that they would first select 16 houses for repairs. 
Once these houses had been repaired they would repair 
another 16 until all repairs to the 97 houses had been 
completed. However, this procedure fell short of residents' 
expectations in that after the first repairs had been done, 
the houses remained in bad shape. According to the 
Residents' Committee, the repairs had not been done 
properly. They noted as an example, one method of dealing 
with defects which entailed plastering walls through the use 
of 'too fine sand as well as too wet a plaster mix'.
Consequently, dissatisfaction from residents continued and 
this led to another meeting with GHC on 16 May 1989, at 
which the developer was present. At this meeting the 
developer personally assured residents that he would attend 
to their grievances. But this did not happen. Instead, a 
week later the chairman of the Residents' Committee 
received a letter from the director of GH, the developer, 
stating that negative remarks were being made about his 
company. He also warned the Committee that unless the 
residents stopped their campaign he would seek legal 
protection from the courts.
357
But rather than intimidating residents, this warning fuelled 
the campaign not only against the developer, but the banks 
and Diepmeadow Council. The residents were also determined 
to prove to the community at large that they would not be 
deterred by threats. When the Residents' Committee informed 
the banks about this situation, even pleading with them to 
withdraw loans from the developer until houses had been 
repaired, but the banks refused to address the problems. 
Moreover, once the developer was on the run the banks were 
not prepared to help in tracing the developer's whereabouts. 
Instead cases emerged where banks issued second bonds on the 
houses without consulting the residents.30 Despite the 
fact that residents did not borrow money from the banks, 
they only realised that they were liable for second bonds 
when they received letters asking them to repay them. Some 
of the residents had legal action taken against them by one 
bank for refusing to pay these second bonds.
The independent valuations which were done by the South 
African Bureau of Standards (SABS) in 199031 (commissioned 
by the Legal Resources Centre on behalf of the residents) 
were ignored by the banks. These valuations revealed serious 
faulty construction problems, including the use of faulty
30 See "Second Bonds - Group Housing: Zone 9,
Meadowlands", 27 may 1991. Letter to Mrs Van Staden, Perm 
Bank, 75 Commissioner Street, Johannesburg, from Mr M 
Zimerman, LA814/MZ/clp, Legal Resources Centre,
Johannesburg.
31 South African Bureau of Standards, Test Report, 6 
December 1990, Legal Resources Centre, Johannesburg.
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Table 8.4: Faulty construction problems in Meadowlands West 
Zone 9
Problems Complaints
No % of 
total 
number of 
complaints
Serious structural defects/cracks in
walls 61 9.9
House foundations very weak 10 1.6
Crack on floors 41 6.6
Major roof leaks and tiles missing 43 6.9
Dampness on walls and ceilings 31 5.0
Ceilings not nailed properly 21 3.4
Paint peeling off walls 34 5.5
Windows rattling and not fitted
properly 48 7.8
Doors poorly fitted/not closing
properly 31 5.0
Internal and external plastering
cracking 25 4.0
Bedroom wall wardrobes not fitted
properly 11 1.7
Kitchen cupboards/sinks/water taps
poorly fitted 18 2.9
Geyser not working 14 2.2
Faulty installation of electricity 26 4.2
External light fittings not provided 17 2.7
Splitting carpets due to improper
fittings 20 3.2
Skirting boards uncompleted 14 2.2
Water pipes leaking 29 4.7
Water drainage pipes exposed/leaking 12 1.9
Sewerage drainage pipes exposed or
leaking 10 1.6
WC leaking and not functioning
properly 17 2.7
Incomplete external beam fittings 18 2.9
Fencing not done 35 5.6
House stands/sites not properly
demarcated 17 2.7
Absence of gutters, stormwater not
flowing away 12 1.9
Total 615 100
Source: Meadowlands West Zone 9 household survey, 1994.
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building materials, cracks, leaking water and improper 
stand/plot demarcations and many others. These valuations 
also put the cost of repairs to be over RIO,000 per property 
examined. Subsequently, the household survey carried out in 
order to inform this study confirmed the persistence of
these problems, which ranged from falling roofs to land
access (table 8.4). Repairs and maintenance costs for the 
residents of Meadowlands West Zone 9 have increased over
time. As table 8.4 reveals, there were 615 cumulative
complaints regarding the poor workmanship of the developer. 
Herein lay the fundamental contradiction in the apartheid 
Government's policy of promoting home-ownership. This policy 
was undermined by the lack of mechanisms aimed at quality 
control (guaranteeing minimum, but decent standards of 
quality) on the part of the Government, and the absence of 
accountability on the part of developers and banks. In 
particular, measures aimed at preventing these malpractices 
and the fall of house prices (value below mortgage debt) 
were not taken into consideration, and neither were there 
effective valuation measures requiring banks to observe 
proper construction methods on houses under bank-financed 
construction.
Furthermore, although the residents had demanded the R3,000 
retentions per property (as discussed above) to enable them 
to fix some of the post occupancy problems, the banks had 
ignored this request, and instead paid this money to the
360
developer.32 It was this intreinsigence which led residents 
to begin to hold banks accountable for the post-occupancy 
problems. It was primarily because of the penetration of 
finance capital channelled through the absence of quality 
control of housing delivery mechanisms (on the part of 
financial institutions and developers), combined with the 
deepening recession, unaffordable monthly repayments and the 
structural shift of the economy that those who had obtained 
mortgage loans were hardest hit. An important element 
adopted by township residents in response to the rising 
affordability problems was to combine together to defend 
themselves through non-payment of mortgage bonds. It is to 
these strategies adopted by residents against the impact of 
the 'financial explosion' in the townships that this chapter 
now turns to find the power of the campaigns. They began 
broadening the campaign by involving the media and other 
groups.
8.6 Broadening the campaign
In early June 1989 the Residents' Committee decided to 
engage other allies in their struggle for justice against 
the developer, the Banks and Diepmeadow Council. They 
devised various strategies, and attempted (initially without 
success) to involve the Meadowlands Civic Association. They
32 See "Complaints Against Group Housing / Perm 
Mortgagors", 2 May 1991. Letter from Mr W Wright/AvdH, 4th 
Floor, Perm Bank, 75 Commissioner Street, Johannesburg to Mr 
Zimerman, LA184/NDB0/M2/ZH, Legal Resources Centre, 
Johannesburg.
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also notified the press and the first of many favourable 
stories on 6 June 1989 ('Meadowlands Town House Owners
Accuse Developers of Shoddy Work') was reported in the Star 
newspaper.33 The committee also sought the assistance of 
the Institute of Public-Interest Law and Research (IPILR. 
The IPILR made various representations to GH on behalf of 
the Residents' Committee but without success.34
The residents' resolve to continue with the campaign 
strengthened. In 1990 the Residents's Committee sought the 
advice of the Legal Resources Centre (LRC). The LRC made 
various representations to the banks on behalf of the 
Residents' Committee/ and with the South African National 
Civic Organisation (SANCO) were able to arrange meetings 
between the banks and the Residents' Committee at various 
times. Some of these meetings have resulted in limited 
concessions. Also in 1990, the Residents' Committee wrote to 
the Witwatersrand Council of Churches requesting assistance 
with funding in order to take court action against Group 
Housing Corporation.35
33 See The Star, 6 June 1989.
34 See for example, "Houses Constructed By Your Company 
In Zone 9 Meadowlands", 20 March 1990. Letter to The 
Director, Group Housing, PO Box 1815, Alberton, from Justice 
Zulu, Institute For Public-Interest Law and Research, 
Gauteng Legal Services Centre, 201 Metro Centre, 266 Bree 
Street, Johannesburg.
35 Letter from the Chairman of the 97 Residents' 
Committee to Wits Council of Churches, 7th Floor, Sanlam 
Centre, Commissioner Street, Johannesburg, 4 May 1990.
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Although the Wits Council of Churches was not in a position 
to help the 97 residents with funding, it nevertheless made 
representations on behalf of the residents. Subsequently, 
three residents (sponsored by the LRC) took court action 
against the developer and were awarded damages totalling 
R50,000, but the developer went underground before settling 
these court judgements.36 The Standard Bank responded in 
February 1991 by promising to look into the residents' 
complaints.3,7 Almost at the same time, the Perm Bank also 
responded and suggested sending its own 'valuer to inspect 
the properties in question', after which a meeting with the 
residents would be arranged to discuss the results.38
Group Housing Corporation responded by seeking legal 
assistance from Roode Van Der Merwe Du Toit, a legal firm. 
In an attempt to clear GHC from any responsibilities 
regarding the post occupancy problems experienced by the 97 
residents, this legal firm blamed both the residents and the 
issuers of mortgage bonds (banks). In a letter dated 4 March 
1991 to the Legal Resources Centre, Roode Van Der Merwe Du 
Toit wrote that Group Housing Corporation was 'no longer
36 New Nation, September 4- September 10, 1992.
37 See "Group Housing", 8 February 1991. Letter from D 
Wentzel, 636-7104, Standard Bank of South Africa, Regional 
Home Loans Office - Witwatersrand, 1st Floor, Standard Bank 
Centre, 6 Simmonds Street, Johannesburg, to
LA184/NDBO/MZ/clp, Legal Resources Centre, Johannesburg.
38 See "Various Clients Perm - Group Housing", 11 
February 1991. Letter from Administration Manager, Mr C,E, 
Pfeffer/Legal, 4th Floor, Perm Bank, 75 Commissioner Street, 
Johannesburg, to LA184/NDBO/MZ/clp, Legal Resources Centre, 
Johannesburg.
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part of the grievances' of the 97 residents,39 the 
financial institutions (banks) had accepted a certificate 
(issued in terms of the Architects Act of 1970) from the 
developer, stating that the 97 houses had been 
satisfactorily completed. The acceptance of the developer's 
certificate resulted in the final payments (including the 
R3,000 retentions per dwelling) being made by the banks to 
Group Housing. As the letter further stated,
" ... taking occupation or possession of the 
dwelling, then, and in such event, the contract ... in 
terms of this agreement shall be regarded as completely 
discharged and the parties hereto agree that it shall 
ipso facto conclusively be presumed that the works 
and/or any extra/or any variation and/or any omission 
has been satisfactorily erected and completed in terms 
of this agreement ... we further would like to stress 
the point that occupation of these dwellings were 
subject to the approval of bonds by various financial 
and building institutions.40
If their interpretation of the law is correct, it will be 
clear from the above that by employing the legal framework 
in the defence of the developer, Roode Van Der Merwe Du Toit 
were exposing the inefficiency and incompetence of the 
financial institutions (banks), who allowed themselves to be 
given a false certificate by the developer, stating that the 
houses had been completed satisfactorily. It is this 
acceptance of the false certificate from the developer, 
which explains why the banks were not willing to help trace
39 See "Group Housing Corporation: Houses Built In Zone 
9 Meadowlands", 4 March 1991. Letter from Roode Van Der 
Merwe Du Toit INC., JAJ MoLLER/rm/11453, 7th Floor, The 
Inner Court, 74-86 Kerk Street, Johannesburg, to
LA814/NDBO/MZ/clp, Legal Resources Centre, Johannesburg.
40 Ibid., p. 2.
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the whereabouts of the developer.
Firstly, the fact that the developer was a white person 
meant that he could be trusted. Secondly, the 97 houses 
(despite their structural defects) represented substantial 
profits to the banks. The evidence of this is contained in 
table 8.5. As can be seen from this data, 77 houses out of 
97 represent a combined total in excess of R4 million. Of 
this total, the Nedperm Bank's share is 31,4 per cent 
(Rl,261 million); Standard Bank with 28,9 per cent (Rl,159 
million); United Bank with 27,9 per cent (Rl,120 million) 
and the rest with less than a R1 million combined (table 
8.5) .
The remaining 20 houses had already been foreclosed, but the 
previous owners continued to occupy the houses (table 8.6). 
The occupants of these 20 houses (table 8.6) withheld their 
mortgage bond payments as a campaign strategy aimed at 
forcing the banks to fix the severe structural problems 
evident in these dwellings. Elsewhere, the banks have 
generally responded to the withholding of mortgage payments 
by selling the houses (without the knowledge of the 
occupants) to other prospective home-owners (without telling 
these prospective owners that the houses are repossessed 
properties).4X
41 See "Perm sold house already occupied", City Press, 
June 1994.
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Table 8.5: Total number and amount of bonds issued and
average bond cost in Meadowlands West Zone 9, 1988-1993
Bank Number
of
bonds
Total amount 
of bonds 
(Rand)
Average cost 
of bonds 
(Rand)
% of 
total 
bond 
amount
FNB 1 45 000 45 000 1.1
ABSA 1 44 000 44 000 1.0
Saambou 8 377 476 47 185 9.4
Nedperm 20 1 261 161 63 058 31.4
Standard 23 1 159 683 50 421 28.9
United 24 1 120 403 46 683 27.9
Total 77 4 007 722 52 048 100
Source: Calculated from the Deeds Registry statistics,
Central Government Building, Pretoria, 1994.
Table 8.6: Total number of houses in possession in
Meadowlands West Zone 9
Bank Number of houses 
in possession
Percentage of 
total houses in 
possession
Standard 2 10.0
ABSA 3 15.0
Nedcor 15 75.0
Total 20 100
Source: Calculated from the Deeds Registry statistics,
Central Government Building, Pretoria, 1994.
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In this case, because the financial institutions (banks) 
have not been able to realise the vacant possession of the 
foreclosed houses even with the use of court orders, the new 
owners would be expected to be responsible for evicting 
those still occupying the dwellings. But because the 
township community would not allow the eviction of those in 
arrears, this has resulted in some residents being killed, 
petrol bombed or the property being destroyed before the new 
owners could occupy it. Moreover, should the new owner fail 
to evict those still occupying the house, he or she would be 
more likely to lose the money paid in the purchasing of the 
dwelling.42
The banks had not concerned themselves with the land 
availability agreements which the developer should have 
signed with Diepmeadow City Council before these houses were 
constructed. Also, the banks had not taken any steps to 
determine whether the application for the construction of 
these houses had been legally approved. In this context, the 
banks had not ascertained whether the developer had a 
building plan (if any) for the construction of the 97 
houses. The banks lacked any mechanisms in black residential 
areas (inspectors and valuers) through which the poor 
construction standards could be monitored and seriously 
addressed when they fell below their (banks) standards.
The attempt by the legal representatives of Group Housing,
42 Ibid.
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Roode Van Der Merwe Du Toit INC. to seek to justify the 
developer's malpractices by blaming the residents for having 
unknowingly (ignorantly) signed the application forms
(contracts in the view of this legal firm) demonstrates 
clearly the extent to which township residents became
exposed to new forms of vulnerability during an era in which 
the Greater Soweto housing markets were in a state of flux. 
Each time the residents were asked to sign application forms 
by the developer's clerks (as discussed above) they were in 
fact signing a standard contract document. According to an 
architect who was commissioned by the Legal Resources Centre 
to inspect, evaluate and prepare a report on the 97 houses 
in Meadowlands West Zone 9, the contract documents
(application forms in the view of 97 residents) were
weighted in favour of the developer.43 The residents had 
no rights whatsoever. As Cruickshank put it,
"There is a specific denial of the Employer retaining 
any amount of the contract sum for rectification of 
defects. Clause 22 allows for arbitration but only at 
the option of the Contractor. Clause 24.9 allows the 
contractor to sue the Employer out of the Magistrates 
Court".44
Legally, therefore, with the enforcement of contracts biased 
in favour of the contractors (developers), there were no 
mechanisms through which the residents could challenge the 
power and malpractices of the developer. This, despite the
43 See "Report On Houses At Zone 9 Meadowlands", 14 
August 1991. Legal Resources Centre, Johannesburg. Prepared 
By I.G.S. Cruickshank, Chartered Architect, Arbitrator and 
Contractural Consultant, 41 Jukskei Drive, Riverclub.
44 Ibid., p. 2.
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fact that one report after another (including two by the 
Standard Bank's Home Loans Office)45 had drawn attention 
to the substandard conditions of the 97 houses in 
Meadowlands West Zone 9. Cruickshank's report noted the 
following defects;
"Areas of plaster popping, sometimes severely, in the 
internal plaster. Severe cracks were evident at 
archways, door lintels internally and at window lintels 
internally and externally. Shrinkage cracks were evident 
in the majority of the walls of all the houses 
inspected. Vertical cracks were evident at the junctions 
of most internal 110 walls with the external 220 walls. 
These cracks were wider at the cornices and ceilings. 
Areas of ceiling showed evidence of water staining due 
to leaking roofs ... The workmanship evident in the 
finishing of the houses was poor and in some cases of 
plastering and installation of windows, unacceptable.
The roofs have not been fixed in accordance with the 
recommendations of the tile manufacturer and 
supplier.1146
Cruickshank's report also put the cost of repairs to be 
between R7,500 for houses with minor defects, and R12,500 to 
R17,500 for those dwellings with serious and major defects. 
However, neither the banks nor the developer were prepared 
to address these problems. Because of this, the residents 
decided to intensify their campaign for justice, and also to 
blacklist the developer. A meeting was held between the 
Diepmeadow City Council (DCC) and the 97 Residents'
45 See "General Review of Meadowlands", 7 March 1991. 
Memorandum; "Group Housing Zone 9 Meadowlands", 18 March 
1991. Memorandum. Respectively Prepared by J.Strydom and 
B.M. Muller, Senior Assessors, Standard Bank, Regional Home 
Loans Office, Witwatersrand, 6 Simmonds Street, 
Johannesburg.
46 "Report on houses at Zone 9 Meadowlands", 
Cruickshank (43, op.cit. p. 2); See also "Ripped off!", New 
Nation, June 11 - June 17 1993; "Cracks Under The facade", 
City Press, 24 October 1993.
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Committee in late August 1992. But this meeting resulted in 
failure as the DCC continued to reaffirm its support for the 
developer.47 At this meeting, according to the New Nation, 
the
"Diepmeadow township manager at first denied any 
knowledge of Group Housing, but later said the council 
would not ask the company to attend to the problems 
residents had with their houses."48
The township manager is also reported to have said that as 
far as the council was concerned, the contract had been 
signed and sealed with Group Housing Corporation, and the 
council was satisfied with the manner in which the developer 
had build the houses in Meadowlands West Zone 9.49 The 
town manager was however not prepared to disclose the 
whereabouts of the developer to the Residents' Committee.
It was this full support and endorsement of the developer's 
building practices by the town manager which led the 
Residents' Committee to begin suspecting the possibility of 
improper land deals between the developer and officials of 
the Diepmeadow City Council. Thus, the Residents' Committee 
could not understand why their campaign aimed at 
blacklisting the developer was continually being undermined 
by the officials of the DCC, given the poor and unacceptable 
workmanship of the developer.
47 See "Diepmeadow council in housing row with 
residents", New Nation, September 4 - September 10 1992.
48 Ibid., p. 4.
49 Ibid.
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Instead, officials of the DCC had continued to allow the 
developer to operate (under different names with the full 
knowledge and collaboration of the DCC officials)50 in the 
Greater Soweto building markets. According to the City 
Press, the developer had
"opened up under other names, including Pentax's Civil 
and Engineering Contractors, and continued building in 
Diepmeadow with the knowledge and support of the 
council."51
The Residents' Committee subsequently tracked down the 
developer and found him building more homes in the 
Diepmeadow area. At this encounter, the developer had 
promised to look again into the problems of the residents, 
but as before, he went on the run. It was not until October 
1993 that the residents heard from the developer, through 
his new legal representatives, Jansen-Potter, Attorneys, 
Notaries & Conveyancers. In a conciliatory letter (but also 
denying full responsibility for the poor building standards 
at Meadowlands West Zone 9) to the residents through the 
Legal Resources Centre, Jansen-Potter wrote,
"Our instructions are that our client had wanted to try 
and assist your client, although he is not legally 
liable for the structural defects in the houses, by 
having his builder inspect the properties to see whether 
he could afford to have his builder repair the defects. 
Our instructions are to point out to you quite clearly 
that this was done to ensure that our client would be 
able to operate in the area, as he was left under the 
distinct impression that if he did not do anything, his 
business would be adversely affected. Our client further
50 See "Piet Smit Sneaks Back", City Press, 17 October
1993.
51 City Press, 5 December 1993.
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instructed us to inform you that he is not prepared to 
accept liability in his personal capacity, for any 
damages that your client may have suffered, and neither 
was it ever his intention or did agree to pay for any 
damages personally.1,52
It appears from the foregoing that the developer was
beginning to feel the pressure exerted on him by the 97 
residents' campaign. Also, as the campaign had gathered 
pace, and the Residents' Committee had begun looking into 
land deals between Diepmeadow City Council and the
developer, it appears that the developer would increasingly 
find it difficult to operate in the building markets of
Greater Soweto. The demands by the Residents' Committee that
the DCC reveal the land availability and services agreement 
with the developer: layout plans, individual house plans,
foundation plans, demarcation plans, water reticulation 
plans and the sewerage plans, represented a significant 
campaigning strategy aimed at uncovering the dynamics that 
lay beneath the relationship between the DCC and the 
developer.
Other charges that the committee made against the DCC 
involved the acceptance of bribes, fraudulent land deals, 
and allocation of land to developers without following legal 
procedures. This concerted pressure against Diepmeadow 
Council resulted in the appointment of a Commission of
52 "Waterman Wesi, Jabulani Malinga, Moses Majola and 
Others -vs- Group Housing Corporation (PTY) Ltd", 25 October 
1993. Letter from Jansen-Potter, Attorneys, Notaries & 
Conveyancers, Mr Jansen/VM, 25th Floor, Carlton Centre, 
Commissioner Street, Johannesburg, to 0 Geldenhuys, 
OHG/ym/LA184, Legal Resources Centre, Johannesburg.
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Inquiry (chaired by Mr P F Colin) by the Transvaal 
Provincial Authority (TPA) to investigate the matter, 
including all other improper land deals53 in Greater 
Soweto. The Colin Commission was subsequently told of 
various unlawful land deals involving officials of the DCC, 
business interests and private developers. It was alleged 
that councillors and high-ranking council officials had 
accepted bribes from both housing and business developers.
These alleged unlawful land transactions, included the 
Diepkloof hostel which had been offered 'for free' to one of 
the companies involved in these land 'scams'.54 The Colin 
commission was also told that the corrupt officials had been 
involved in fraudulent and improper tenders through which 
the highest bid was often overlooked in preference to back­
door dealing with would-be corrupt developers. The white 
developer was alleged to have paid R200,000 in bribes for 
the piece of land in Meadowlands West Zone 9 where he 
subsequently constructed the 97 houses.55
The Colin Commission was also told that no land availability 
and services agreements had been signed between the DCC and 
the developer, and that Meadowlands West Zone 9 had not been
53 "Council to answer for its action" City Press, 5 
December 1993.
54 See "Commission told of bogus Diepmeadow deals", 
Sowetan, 18 May 1994.
55 Ibid.
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legally designed under any legislation.56 It had also not 
been planned and surveyed as a township in accordance to 
prevailing legislation. In addition, no alternative 
documents, or agreements had been signed between the council 
and developer. Moreover, it was also alleged that the layout 
plan that had been sent to the deeds office for the 
registration of bonds had been fraudulently drawn up by the 
developer and DCC.5V This was subsequently confirmed by an 
official53 of the Surveyor General's office in Pretoria 
who supplied evidence in form of a cancelled layout plan for 
Meadowlands West Zone 9 (see figure 8.1).
The Colin commission was further told that there were no 
legal mechanisms (documents or certificates) between the 
developer and the DCC regarding the installation and payment 
of services; water reticulation system, laying of drainage 
pipes, foundation, electrification and sewerage system. It 
was also alleged that the developer had built 97 houses on 
an erven (site) that could only accommodate 87 houses.59 
As a result of this, some of the 97 houses had no access 
point to the immediate street. For these residents, access 
is only possible by passing through a neighbour's stand.
55 Commission of Inquiry, Chaired by P,F, Colin, 19 
April 1994. 'The City Council of Diepmeadow1, New Canada, 
Soweto. Prepared by Transcripts, PO Box 2123, Rivonia.
5V Ibid.
53 Personal Interview with Mr B. Bezuidenhout, Senior 
Land Surveyor, Office of the Surveyor General, Central 
Government Building, Pretoria, 29 March 1994.
59 See Commission of Inquiry (56, op.cit.)
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Figure 8.1: The layout plan drawn by private developer
without approval from office of the surveyor general
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Source: Office of the Surveyor General, Central Government 
Building, Pretoria, 1994.
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They remain effectively landlocked and in house 
imprisonment, they cannot move out or into the house 
(whether going to the city, to work, school or visiting)
without asking their neighbours's permission for passage.
This shows the extent to which the construction of the 97
houses failed to comply with the proper administrative
procedures contained in the Black Communities Development 
Act of 1984 which was subsequently amended in 1986 
(discussed above and in the preceding chapter). The fact 
that the developer was able to construct 97 houses instead 
of 87 (in pursuit of profits), constituted not only a 
violation of the Township Establishment and Land Use 
Regulations of the Black Communities Development Act, but
also a fundamental violation of the human rights of the 97 
residents.
The developer benefitted fully from the sale of these houses 
to the banks, whilst the 97 residents not only remained 
trapped in their poorly demarcated and poorly built houses, 
but also in debt (substantial repairs and mortgages). As far 
as banks were concerned, they continued to deny legal 
liability and maintained that their involvement centred on 
the financing of mortgage bonds and not on the production of 
houses.60 Therefore, they could not possibly have 
concerned themselves with the quality control of the 97
60 See "Sexwale faces row over homes of poor quality", 
Business day, 1 August 1994.
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houses.
The Residents' Committee continued to develop other 
strategies against the developer, banks and Diepmeadow 
Council including seeking assistance from the Soweto Civic 
Association (SCA), and various other local churches, women's 
and youth groups and small business groups. Planact assisted 
the Residents Committee with the development of strategies 
and tactics. Early in 1994 Planact held a workshop with the 
residents and helped to focus their campaign on several 
major demands:
- the banks must deal with 97 Residents' Committee as a 
whole, and not to try to break their unity;
- the banks should not evict the residents;
- repossession of houses by the banks because of non-payment 
should stop immediately;
- banks should write off interest on arrears;
- temporary relief to be given on people who lost their 
jobs;
- the banks must either force the developer Smit to pay for 
the repairs or reduce residents' bonds by the amount 
equivalent to the damages;
- banks should provide banking facilities and services in 
Soweto, so that residents avoid going into town to pay 
their bonds or their savings deposits;
- banks should make contributions to township residents, and 
not only in white areas;
- and that banks should never discriminate ("redline") 
against township residents.
Out of this workshop emerged other strategies. Residents 
then noted that the banks had hired the services of a well- 
known lawyer, Ismail Ayob, who was also Nelson Mandela's 
lawyer. Residents realised that this was due to a shift in 
the power relations, and that the banks were getting more 
nervous about the possibilities of having to meet certain 
demands. The response of residents at another workshop was
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again to strengthen and extend their campaign by involving 
new allies. Suggestions were made that the committee should 
contact and inform the following potential allies about 
their campaign:
- National Environment Awareness Campaign (NEAC)
- Soweto Civic Association (SCA)
- Meadowlands Civic Association (MCA)
- Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU)
- Church Groups
- Stockvelts
- Burial Societies
- National Union of South African Students (NUSAS)
- Informal Settlements' Movements and potential political 
allies
The workshop resolved to attend to persuade both old and new 
potential allies to offer assistance in order to take the 
campaign forward, and very quickly, new allies agreed to 
support the 97 Residents' Committee. The Residents' 
Committee began to request these allies to start considering 
the withdrawal of their bank accounts from targeted banks 
when such a need arose. At this intermediary stage in the 
campaign, with as much as R1 million at stake in the repair 
of the 97 houses, the Residents' Committee appeared 
encouraged that more avenues for demonstrating their case 
were opening, and doors once shut tight by an unresponsive 
private sector and a hostile state may now be forced open. 
In a letter reflecting this new shift in the campaign, to 
Langa Zita, the Witwatersrand Regional Secretary of COSATU, 
the Residents Committee wrote,
"Everyone we talk to tell us that the problems we are 
experiencing are not unusual. Therefore it is in the 
interests of all workers to help us gain a victory. It 
is morally just, and it is financially important for us.
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But if we can set a precedent in this challenge to the 
banks's arrogance, it will be an even greater 
inspiration for many thousands of Wits region workers 
who also need assistance ... If we are able to persuade 
the banks to take responsibility for their mistakes, 
then we will make life easier for many workers. We are 
aware that your unions' bank accounts are in some of the 
banks which we are targeting, and we would like to talk 
with you about whether these accounts can be withdrawn 
and moved elsewhere so as to contribute to our 
campaign."6X
Many letters (similar to the above) were sent to various 
allies and potential allies by the Residents' Committee, 
particularly during the course of 1994. Also, as part of 
maintaining cohesion, including strengthening and motivating 
the 97 residents themselves, the Residents' Committee kept 
them informed of the progress and obstacles to the campaign 
through (apart from workshops) monthly reports. As one such 
report to the 97 residents stated,
"Our campaign for justice is going well, even if we are 
still struggling for justice. But we have accomplished 
several things: the banks realise that they must take us 
seriously and that they cannot break off negotiations 
with us (they hired one of Mandela's lawyers to defend 
themselves!); an independent valuer has looked at some 
of the houses, and we are negotiating with the banks to 
have the banks pay for full valuation; the politicians 
are taking interest and giving us support; we are in 
correspondence with Minister Joe Slovo, with PWV Premier 
Tokyo Sexwale, with PWV Housing Minister Dan Mofokeng, 
and with PWV RDP Commissioner Ben Turok; recently, we 
have been getting very good media coverage; after six 
months of tough negotiations with the banks, with so 
many new faces from their side who must be educated, we 
are now ready to increase the pressure on the 
banks."62
61 See "Langa Zita", 20 April 1994. Letter to Langa 
Zita, Regional Secretary, COSATU, Wits Region, from the 97 
Residents' Committee, 4035 Meadowlands West Zone 9,
Meadowlands.
62 Letter to the 97 Residents from the Residents' 
Committee, 8 September, 1994.
379
Another important theme that runs through all the 
correspondence from the Residents' Committee to the 97 
residents is the persistent and continued reaffirmation of 
the original demands (see figure 8.2 below). However, 
although various negotiations (as stated above) had been 
going on for some time between the Residents' Committee and 
the representatives of the banks, including the banks' 
lawyers (Ismail Ayob and Partners) no progress was seriously 
being made on the specific issue of fixing the defective 
housing problems. As a result of this, the Residents' 
Committee shifted its campaigning strategy towards direct 
action and confrontation with the banks.
On 5 October 1994, the Residents' Committee sent a
memorandum to the managing directors of banks which made
loans in Meadowlands West Zone 9, and which warned that
"Your bank is now a target of community protest". The reason
for this warning, according to the Residents's Committee was
"that your employees responsible for the township 
housing are incompetent and unable to deal with our 
problems. Even though we have had communications with 
them for six years, your employees have simply stopped 
returning our phone calls and letters. The lawyer 
appointed to represent the banks, Ismail Ayob, tells us 
that he will come back to us soon, but after three weeks 
we still hear nothing. We have terrible cracks in our 
houses ... The rain is doing damage to our belongings. 
Houses can fall at any time. The materials are 
defective. The sites were not properly demarcated and we 
have had to break down our walls and move them. These 
are our problems. We want relief. It is only fair that 
those responsible be made to pay."63
63 Memorandum from 97 Residents' Committee to The 
Managing Directors of Banks, 5 October 1994; See also a 
Memorandum from the 97 Residents' Committee calling for 
'mass action' against the Banks, 24 September 1994.
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On 6 October 1994, the officials of the banks confirmed that 
they had received the memorandum from the 97 Residents 
Committee.64 Three days later on the 9th October, all the 
97 residents staged a demonstration outside the headquarters 
of Standard Bank in Johannesburg.6S During this 
demonstration, the 97 residents had quietly removed from the 
bank all the deposit and withdrawal banking slips, including 
all the informative literature (leaflets) on banking, and 
replaced these with their own campaigning leaflets aimed at 
informing the bank customers at large how bad and 
irresponsible their banks actually were (see figures 8.2 and 
8.3 below). When the bank customers arrived at the bank to 
deposit and/or to withdraw their money, there were no 
deposit and withdrawal slips, instead there was an abundance 
of the campaigning leaflets from Meadowlands which customers 
began reading. This caused a lot of inconvenience to many 
customers of the bank and disruption to the bank's normal 
business activity.
64 See Business Day, 6 October 1994.
65 See "Protest outside bank: Refusal to address 
problems has all Meadowlands Zone 9 tenants up in arms", 
City Press, 9 October 1994.
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Figure 8.2: 97 Residents' Committee's grievances and demands
1) The banks failed to carry out proper inspections and 
valuations in Meadowlands Zone 9 while the houses were 
being built. The banks are meant to judge that the money 
they loan to developers is being properly spent on 
building houses. They send valuers to carry out 
inspections while the houses are under construction. But 
the bank valuers were asleep at their jobs. Anyone should 
have been able to judge the building practices were 
inadequate. 2) The banks were very sloppy in approving 
housing bonds to Meadowlands Zone 9 residents. The 
developers gave the banks false information. Some 
signatures of borrowers were even forged on papers given 
by the developers to the banks. When borrowers enquired 
about the forgeries, they were told by the banks they 
should not worry. Income checks were not carried out, and 
the developer lied about the borrowers' incomes so that 
loans would be granted, and that borrowers would take the 
houses off the developer's hands. 3) The banks refused to 
address the problems when they were initially raised by 
the residents. Letters were sent to the banks, even 
requesting that the banks stop giving the developer new 
loans for the project until the houses were repaired. The 
banks failed to respond to the letters. 4) The banks 
failed to help bring the developer. The banks refused to 
respond to requests that they help track down the 
developer, who had fled. 5) Second bonds were issued by 
banks to Meadowlands Zone 9 residents via the developer, 
even though the borrowers did not apply and were not 
aware of these bonds until asked to repay them. A bank 
even took out injunctions against borrowers who refused 
to repay loans they never saw the proceeds from. 6) The 
banks refused to respond to independent valuations by the 
Meadowlands Zone 9 residents. These valuations, carried 
out by SA Bureau of Standards, showed that the damages 
caused to residents - serious cracks, defective material, 
water seepage, faulty plot demarcations and may others - 
are over RIO,000 per property examined. We are sticking 
by our original demands: no evictions by the banks - 
foreclosures (banks taking our houses away because of 
non-payment) must immediately halt - interest on arrears 
must be forgiven - people who lose their jobs must be 
given temporary relief. Banks must either force the 
developer to pay for our problems - or they must price 
down (reduce) our bonds by the amount of the damages, or 
the banks must repair the cracks and faults to our 97 
homes. Banks must provide better services in Soweto, so 
that we don't have to go into town to pay our bonds or 
make our savings deposits - banks must direct community 
contributions to townships, not just white residential 
areas. The banks must never 'redline' or discriminate 
against our community._____________________________________
Source: 97 Residents' Committee, Meadowlands West Zone 9
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Figure 8.3: 97 Residents' Committee's campaigning leaflet
ENJOY TWO MAJOR BENEFITS WITH RIP-OFFBOND
Rip-Offbond is an exciting double trouble homeloan 
available to both new and existing Perm homeloan clients. 
Rip-offbond is more than a homeloan, it's a way of 
stealing money from people. That's because Perm 
understands that once you've bought your home, we don't 
care it falls down on top of you - especially if your 
family is growing. So even if you live in a house with 
huge cracks, we want to take from you any extra money you 
may have, and we will raise the interest rate to higher 
and higher levels so that you are left with nearly 
nothing. Or, making monthly payments to us for which in 
exchange you must live in a terrible environment. Rip- 
Off bond is here to hurt you. If you want to extend or 
improve your home, you may find even more problems.
YOU LOSE ON INTEREST AND YOU LOSE CASH ON CALL
Any additional deposits into Rip-Offbond account will not 
help you solve your housing problems. It's like losing a 
higher return on funds you would normally have left on 
deposit at the bank. If rain comes into your house 
because of the cracks which Perm will not fix, and your 
furniture or clothing is ruined, it's like losing cash on 
call.
HOW TO THROW AWAY YOUR MONEY
Once a month, pay your bond to any Perm branch - we have 
none in the black areas, all in the white areas, so you 
lose money travelling too. Regardless of the amount you 
pay, the homeloan advisor will ignore you and fail to 
solve your problem. You can be secure in the knowledge 
that you are losing money, your house is worth less and 
less, and the job, you can be secure in the knowledge 
that the Perm will rip your house out from under you, and 
the Perm will consider renting you your house back at a 
higher rate even though you have paid to own it for so 
long.
INTERESTED?
Come into your Perm branch - not to be found in any 
township - and talk to one of our friendly homeloan 
advisors to find out if you qualify for a Rip-Offbond. 
Rip-Offbond offers you built-in security. The double 
trouble homeloan: immediate access to big problems 
through your homeloan account and significantly higher 
costs. Perm Banking, A division of Nedcor Bank Ltd (Reg 
No ?????)__________________________________________________
Source: 97 Residents' Committee, Meadowlands West Zone 9
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This would remain part of a campaigning strategy until the 
time of writing, including demonstrations at various other 
banks. The other strategy involved demonstrations at the 
residences of the managing directors of the banks, as well 
as at the junior bank managers, and thus disturbing the 
peace of these neighbourhoods. On 4 September 1995, all the 
97 residents occupied the entire building of the Perm Bank 
at Commissioner Street. This resulted in stoppages to the 
normal banking business for the whole day, during which time 
residents were handing their own campaigning leaflets to the 
bank's customers. It has also resulted in a 'Record of 
Understanding'66 being signed between the Department of 
Housing and the Association of Mortgage Lenders, 
specifically aimed at addressing problems such as those 
experienced by the 97 residents of Meadowlands West Zone 9.
8.7 Conclusion
The most important issue that this chapter has raised is the 
exposure of black residents to the penetration of private 
sector finance in the township built environment. As has 
been stated in the previous chapters, under apartheid 
policies, the vulnerability of township residents was 
manifestly embedded within the urban influx control 
mechanisms. With the changes introduced since the late 1970s 
up until today (particularly as a result of pressure exerted
66 Record of Understanding, 1994. Housing the Nation, 
Department of Housing, Pretoria.
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on the Government and capital by both labour-based and 
consumption-based struggles), township residents have again 
been exploited, this time at the hands of the financial 
markets for housing whose only interest is in the 
accumulation of profits.
This is illustrated by the incompetent quality control of 
all the agents involved in the Meadowlands West Zone 9 
housing market, and in many other Greater Soweto townships. 
The roles of the developer, banks and Diepmeadow Council in 
the provision of housing in Meadowlands West Zone 9 were not 
undertaken in a way that enhances the aspirations of 
potential home-owners. The activities of these major agents 
highlight a lack of understanding that housing is a big 
concern for people.
From the very beginning the developer, banks and Diepmeadow 
Council demonstrated an unsympathetic approach to potential 
black home-owners. This explains why the developer has been 
able to operate in the Greater Soweto housing markets under 
different names with assistance of corrupt officials of 
Diepmeadow Council. Furthermore, the fact that the 97 houses 
were actually registered without the involvement of their 
owners also undermined the perception that the South African 
deeds registry system is amongst the best in the world.
Nevertheless, the residents' response has a determined will 
to win. The struggle by the Residents' Committee for justice
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from these major agents in the Meadowlands housing market, 
demonstrate that certain strategies and tactics employed by 
residents have had limited success. There is no doubt that 
other potential residents' groups (in similar situations) 
will draw important lessons from the 97 Residents' 
Committee. But the battle is still far from being won.
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CHAPTER NINE
CONCLUSION
This chapter draws together the various threads that have 
run through this thesis. The central research question posed 
was to discover why housing markets in Greater Soweto are as 
they today. The central concern of this thesis was to 
explain how the proliferation of tenures (different rights 
in housing and land) has come about since the early 1980s, 
given the dominance of apartheid policies before 1980, which 
had the effect of systematically depriving Africans of 
rights in housing and land.
In order to draw out the explanation for the current housing 
situation in Greater Soweto, notably the proliferation of 
rights in housing and land (tenures), this chapter falls 
into three parts. First, the theoretical approaches 
(reviewed in Chapter 2) are evaluated for what they yield in 
terms of mechanisms at work. Second, the empirical research 
findings are reconsidered. Thirdly, the theoretical and 
empirical research findings are drawn together in 
conclusion.
9.1 Theoretical perspectives
This study has shown in Chapter 2 that theoretical 
perspectives did not yield questions that highlight the 
importance of rights for housing markets, and in particular,
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what was done about rights in Greater Soweto. It is 
noteworthy that virtually all the theoretical models 
(ecological, neo-classical economics, institutional and 
marxist) ignored tenure. However, although not all possible 
mechanisms were covered by these approaches, some of the 
questions about mechanisms which they generated have been 
useful in understanding the current housing situation in 
Greater Soweto. These are considered in turn.
The existence of ecological mechanisms of competition, 
domination, and invasion and succession in Greater Soweto 
was difficult to determine with any confidence. But there 
has been voluntary immigration since the establishment of 
Greater Soweto, of people seeking employment in Johannesburg 
and for other reasons. Most of these people have had no 
choice where to live, except with relatives already housed 
in the limited formal housing, or within the backyards of 
residents1 homes, or squatting in the informal sector.
It is important to recognise that the ecological mechanisms 
are concerned with the immigrants who were coming to the 
city where there already were different housing markets and 
housing types. In contrast, immigrants to Greater Soweto 
created informal shacks where there was land that was not 
barred to them. It was also the demand both from immigrants 
and those living in overcrowded homes within the formal 
council-built housing which created the backyard and 
informal shacks.
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Questions about neo-classical mechanisms revealed very 
little conscious choice making. It was also difficult to 
determine what was valued in terms of trade-offs, for 
example, space demands versus access to the city. The supply 
of backyard and informal shacks (in the virtual absence of 
formal house building) was shown to be influenced by demand 
(from within overcrowded homes, formation of new households 
and new immigrants coming to settle in Greater Soweto). 
Movement was shown to be occurring particularly within the 
backyard sector, where households moved from this sector 
into owner-occupation. Filtering was not highly visible, 
except where the vacated backyard dwellings were occupied by 
other households seeking accommodation.
The decision-making mechanisms suggested by institutional 
approaches were evident in Greater Soweto. It was shown that 
Greater Soweto was established through state violence, and 
the rights in housing and land for Africans were removed. 
This study has shown that at certain stages the development 
of housing was not only influenced but determined by the 
power of the state. The gate-keeping, organising and 
campaigning of urban social movements and class struggle 
mechanisms were uncovered by this study.
This study has shown clearly that not only access to a house 
but also retention of it (staying in it) was depended on the 
exercise of discretion by officials. Thus, these officials 
were more than gatekeepers (which refers to access only) and
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this discretion was often exercised arbitrarily. The housing 
opportunities of Greater Soweto residents were evidently 
constrained. Allocation mechanisms were identified and shown 
to be driven by various influx control measures.
The extent to which Greater Soweto was comprised of housing 
classes is revealed by the current housing situation, 
notably the proliferation of tenures. There was no conflict 
between these housing (tenures) classes. However, the 
usefulness of the concept of housing classes also directs 
attention to residents being simultaneously landlords (for 
example, of backyard rooms/shacks) and council tenants. 
Relations between these housing classes (landlords and 
tenants) were characterised by conflict.
Marxist theories draw attention to mechanisms of provision 
of supply by profit-motivated developers and financial 
institutions. The profit-motivation of developers was shown 
to be evident in terms of the construction and allocation 
(through mortgage bonds) of private sector houses, 
alterations and additions to the council-built stock, and to 
the building of 2-roomed and garage backyard units. The 
involvement of mortgage bond issuers (see Appendix Al) for 
housing is an indication that Greater Soweto is in part 
becoming integrated into the regional Johannesburg housing 
system. This also signifies that they are catering for 
different markets and submarkets. The creation of markets: 
required the availability of de jure and de facto rights, in
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land for formal and informal housing respectively.
There was a strong correlation between the provision of 
housing in Greater Soweto and labour supply. The historical 
provision of the housing stock in Greater Soweto was 
precisely to house a cheap labour force. The development of 
the housing stock was also shown to be directed by the 
authority of the state and local authorities, through 
various financing mechanisms, including loans from the 
private sector.
Urban social movements were identified as comprising various 
squatter movements and grassroots campaigns against 
increases in rents, mortgage bonds, apartheid local 
government structures in Greater Soweto, and low wages and 
working conditions in the work place. The level of the 
pressure exerted by urban social movements against both the 
state and capital was shown to had reached a crisis point in 
the mid-1980s, where Greater Soweto became ungovernable. 
This pressure was both unprecedented and significant: the 
consequence was that residents of Greater Soweto gained 
enforceable and tradeable rights in housing and land.
The mechanisms which were not embraced by theoretical work 
comprised the actions of the apartheid regime: exploitation, 
state violence, forced removals and evictions, pass laws and 
the depriving of Africans of rights in housing and land, 
racial segregation and separate development and influx
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control, all of which had implications for both the labour 
market and housing market.
9.2 Empirical research findings
Chapter 3 of this thesis has shown the existence of the 
proliferation of tenure markets and the associated rights in 
housing and land (enforceable at law and tradeable) in 
present-day Greater Soweto. These rights (in the formal 
council-built housing stock, private sector housing, 
backyard and informal sectors) constituted different 
commodities which were bought and sold or rented, and 
corresponded to distinct markets because of the differences 
in the rights attached to them and enjoyed by households.
Cleavages between tenure markets (sectors) in Greater Soweto 
were also uncovered by this study. They were distinguished 
by distinct supply and demand sectors, different rules of 
entry (access), and different mechanisms for providing 
security to people seeking accommodation. It is within the 
context of these differences that the tenure sectors in the 
Greater Soweto area constitute distinct submarkets which are 
also localised.
In the council-built, subsequently sold sector, households 
headed by a person over 60 years were very heavily over­
represented, while younger households under 30 were 
significantly not represented. In the council rented sector,
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households headed by someone under 40 were under
represented, while those headed by a person over 50 but
under 60 were over-represented. In the backyard sector,
households headed by someone under 40 years but over 30 were
disproportionately over-represented. In the privately built 
(owner-occupied) sector, households headed by someone under 
30 and someone over 60 were under represented, while those 
headed by a person over 40 and under 60 were over­
represented.
There was also evidence of little movement between tenures 
and stability within the tenure sector in the Greater Soweto 
housing markets. In the council-built housing stock, there 
was little movement relative to demand and this had two 
consequences: a) adult children tended to stay in the
present home, and b) when they did set up home it was mostly 
in the backyard sector. One might say that housing markets 
in Greater Soweto are thus characterised more by stability 
of occupation than by movement (although strictly speaking 
these are not comparable).
This study also found that supply was brought forward by 
demand created by shortage. In the backyard and informal 
shacks sectors the demand was characterised by the formation 
of new households: young people, new migrants, the mobile 
employed persons, unemployed and homeless people, perceived 
overcrowding in other housing types and income. The supply 
factors comprised a lump sum to buy materials, labour force
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(the availability of small time builders or assistance from 
relations and friends with the building of the units) and 
the availability of a patch of land at the backyards of 
residents's homes and the availability of funds for building 
these dwellings.
Chapter 4 has shown the historical development of housing 
markets in Greater Soweto, in terms of a progression of 
mechanisms all of which combined to deprive Africans of 
rights in housing and land. Earnings did not allow African 
people to bargain in the housing market. It was also through 
violent mechanisms that urban Africans were not only 
forcibly assigned to different urban settlements from the 
whites many kilometres away from the CBD of Johannesburg, 
but were also excluded from the socio-economic development 
of society as a whole through various national legislative 
and policy mechanisms (shown in Chapter 4) aimed at 
depriving Africans of rights in housing and land, 
employment, education, controlling their movement and so on.
However, the vulnerability of urban Africans (in terms of 
exploitation and removal of rights) did not cease once the 
removals from the city (as described in Chapter 4) had been 
completed, but was actually continued. In the townships the 
lack of other forms of housing remained a critical feature 
of Greater Soweto housing markets from the very beginning. 
African urban dwellers were thus compelled to rent scarce 
council-built housing.
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The financing mechanisms (Native Revenue Account, levies 
from employers and the cheap labour power of African 
building workers) employed in the production of the stock 
were brought out in Chapter 5. These in turn had cost and 
quality implications for the nature of the housing produced, 
which amounted to council-built shacks. It was also shown in 
Chapter 5 that the housing stock in Greater Soweto today was 
fixed in location, heterogeneous and durable: characterised 
by a diversity of house types, differentiated by size, age, 
and quality of the stock. The temporary urban status 
conferred on Africans under apartheid was shown to have had 
an adverse effect on the conception of appropriate house 
spaces (floor size) and standards, as can be seen from the 
specification of elephant, row, subdivided and matchbox 
dwellings.
Chapter 5 also examined the rate of additions to the 
council-built stock. Within this context, it was shown that 
from 1930 until the late 1970s white controlled 
municipalities (local authorities) had a monopoly of housing 
supply in Greater Soweto. It was this monopoly combined with 
the impact of Government policies which restricted the 
supply, thereby contributing to severe housing shortages and 
social problems. However, this monopoly was ended with the 
introduction of other agents from 1980 as evidenced by the 
new forms of housing supply (privately built housing, 
backyard (outbuildings) and informal shack house types. As 
was pointed out, these new supply mechanisms have been the
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sole means of meeting demand given the virtual collapse of 
municipally (local authority) built housing programmes since 
the early 1980s..
Allocation mechanisms to housing and tenure markets were 
examined in Chapter 6. It was shown that access and 
entitlement to housing in all the three key tenure markets 
(site permits, certificates of occupation and residential 
permits) was controlled through the influx control 
mechanisms. Access for those individuals who might have 
desired and could afford entry into the partially owner- 
occupied housing market was restricted by the shortage of 
such housing stock. In turn the persistence of the overall 
housing shortage had the effect of restricting movement 
within and between these segregated tenure markets.
The policy of restricting housing to those with urban influx 
qualifications (given the limited housing stock) meant that 
a fundamental component of the apartheid housing strategy 
excluded many people (who were in Greater Soweto legally) 
from access to formal housing. As a result the only 
opportunities available to many residents until 1980 were 
through renting in the lodgers' market, and from the early 
1980s, in the backyards of residents' homes and in informal 
shacks.
Until the early 1980s, it was within only the lodgers' 
housing market that mobility within the housing structure
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was possible. In the other key tenure markets it was 
impossible for households to move out from one market and to 
get into another. It was also explained that these tenure 
markets were not characterised by any significant divisions 
either in neighbourhood attributes or otherwise. 
Nevertheless, these tenure sectors constituted different 
markets: markets for those in occupation of the houses and 
markets for the newcomers (new demand sector). Within this 
patterning, both council lessees (tenants) and partial home­
owners were exposed to and affected by the same market 
externalities. Moreover, the amount of stock in the partial 
home-ownership market in the whole of Greater Soweto 
(compared to the rented stock) was small.
In Chapter 7 this study explained the shift in the housing 
policy from state-ownership of the housing stock to private 
tenure (through sale and free transfer of council-built 
housing) to the residents. The role played by grassroots 
movements was shown to have contributed significantly to the 
introduction of the sales policy and free transfer of 
housing from the state to private tenure. These urban social 
movements were much more organised, resilient and in a 
stronger position in their campaigns against the Government 
and local authorities, than the earlier squatter movements 
of the 1940s. These urban (grassroots) movements 
increasingly adopted the same violent tactics employed by 
the Government to press home their demands. Perceived 
collaborators and employees of the Government and local
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authorities were targeted by these grassroots movements.
As was explained in Chapter 7, the severe economic 
difficulties during the 1970s affecting South Africa, 
combined with the impact of the Soweto revolt after 1976 
created new mechanisms: the rapid growth of militant urban 
struggles, rent boycotts, the consequent revolutionary 
insurgency campaigns and pressure from overseas against 
apartheid policies. An interest in social stability appears 
to have pressured the Government to concede to the demands 
of urban social movements.
The introduction of 99-year leases, despite being designed 
within the urban influx control mechanisms, represented a 
significant shift from the previous policy of conferring 
temporary urban status only upon Africans. The significance 
of 99-year leases being that Africans were effectively 
granted permanent rights of abode in the so-called 'white 
cities'. They were also granted enforceable and tradeable 
leasehold rights in housing and land. The transfer of houses 
to private ownership has the potential to allow the further 
development of rental markets (through subdivisions and the 
growth of backyard houses).
Already, as was also explained in Chapters 7 and 8, a 
feature of contemporary 'residential differentiation' in the 
Greater Soweto housing markets is precisely upgradings 
through alterations, total rebuilding and additions to the
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council-built housing stock by those owners with the means 
to facilitate this development. The other element of 
residential differentiation is expressed through the 
construction of houses with private sector finance for the 
middle-class and elite markets.
As was shown in both Chapters 7 and 8, the upgrading of poor 
quality housing in Greater Soweto today offers substantial 
profits for the lenders (banks and other financial 
institutions). For example, between 1986 and 1989 the 
residential building plans that were passed in relation to 
additions and alterations to the existing council built 
housing stock were well in excess of R154 million (see 
Chapter 8, table 8.2), a figure many times the combined 
total expenditure on the construction of all the council- 
built dwellings and the provision of infrastructure and 
services in Greater Soweto since townships were first 
established in the early 1930s.
The context in which housing in the townships has become 
open to a credit system where houses are bought and paid for 
over an extended period was also examined in relation to the 
Meadowlands West Zone 9 case study. In Chapter 8, the 
formation of housing-linked money markets (Africans as 
consumers) was illustrated through the development of the 
bond housing market shown in the Appendix A1 Chapter. There 
were thus connections between this form of housing market 
and the employment situation of residents, particularly
399
evident when the levels of bond repayments and interest 
rates are considered and analysed.
The reforms once in place allowed other factors to operate: 
the profit motive of developers and financial institutions 
and the role played by grassroots campaigns in claiming back 
property and housing rights. In this context it was shown in 
Chapter 8 that financial markets had freedom to exploit 
purchasers due to the lack of transparency and enforceable 
contracts. As a result, the aspiring home-owners were again 
exposed to new forms of vulnerability, this time at the 
hands of financial institutions, private developers and 
local authorities.
The response of the residents on discovering the poor 
building standards (cracked houses) and the associated 
problem of 'negative equity1 was also examined in Chapter 8. 
This response took the form of the 97 Residents' Committee 
campaign for social justice against the banks, developers 
and Diepmeadow City Council. This in turn had resulted in 
the main allegations of improper land deals and corrupt 
practices between officials of Diepmeadow City Council and 
developers being upheld by the commission of inquiry.
9.3 Theoretical and empirical research implications
It will be clear from the above and also from the preceding 
chapters that none of the perspectives of housing markets
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reviewed in Chapter 2 (ecological, neo-classical economics, 
institutional and marxist) can fully explain the existence 
and complexity of present day housing markets in Greater 
Soweto. However, the mechanisms are changing, for example, 
there is less urban management today in the allocation 
process but more allocation through market forces and 
individual choices.
The important conclusion for this study is that the 
proliferation of tenures (different rights in housing and 
land) is explained by the interaction of social, economic 
and political factors within which the mechanisms operate. 
There are a number of factors at work such as: a) the
existence of a patch of land in which the construction of 
informal/squatter settlements has become a reality, b) .the 
existence of backyards in residents' homes in which 
rooms/shacks can be built, a) the existence of finance 
capital seeking investments outlets, d) the dependency of 
the economy for its efficient functioning on a settled 
labour force and the pressure exerted on the state and 
capital by urban social movements (grassroots campaigns)
This study has examined and portrayed the housing markets in 
Greater Soweto in a way that brings out the complexity of 
their formation and operation. There is evidence throughout 
this study for the central hypothesis that the current 
housing situation in Greater Soweto has come about via a 
multiplicity of social, economic and political mechanisms.
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It is the interaction of these mechanisms, and between 
population, housing and employment, which fully explains the 
proliferation of tenures (rights in housing and land) and 
the associated markets in finance capital, building, 
materials and labour.
In conclusion, this study has documented different methods 
(means) by which the residents of Greater Soweto (and 
Africans across South Africa) have managed to get their 
rights back. The findings of this study have also been 
presented in ways in which others have not appreciated. It 
is hoped that by throwing light on the nature of the 
township built environment, this study makes a contribution 
into the understanding of Greater Soweto housing markets and 
the process by which residential differentiation comes about 
as a variety of tenures becomes available.
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APPENDIX A1
MORTGAGE BONDS IN SELECTED HOUSING MARKETS, 1987-1993
SA Perm South African Perm Bank
FNB First National Bank
ABSA African Bank of Southern Africa
AA Corp Anglo American Corporation
JHB MUN PF Johannesburg Municipality Pension Fund
NBS Natal Building Society
LLA Liberty Life Assurance
JMSPF Johannesburg Municipality Second Pension Fund
Table A.l: The Orlando East Mortgage Bond Housing Market
Bank No. of 
Bonds
Total Bond 
Cost 
(Rand)
Average 
Bond Cost 
(Rand)
% Of Total
Bond
Amount
SA Perm 131 4,194,092 32,015 30,4
Nedperm 122 4,169,603 34,177 30,2
Nedcor 44 1,264,804 28,745 9/2
FNB 13 576,741 44,364 4,2
Standard 18 732,175 40,676 5,3
ABSA 8 280,000 35,000 2,0
Saambou 5 190,585 38,117 1,4
Mercantile 36 606,487 16,846 4,3
Allied 26 560,508 21,558 4,0
United 5 164,075 32,815 1,2
JMPF 12 442,472 36,872 3,2
AA Corp 4 70,763 17,690 0,5
Other 25 548,456 21,938 3,9
Total 449 13,800,761 30,736 100
Source: Calculated from the 1993 Report on Properties in
Johannesburg, Deeds Registry System, Central Government 
Building, Pretoria.
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Table A.2: The Orlando West mortgage bond housing market
Bank Number of 
Bonds
Total 
Amount of 
Bonds 
(Rand)
Average 
Cost of 
Bonds 
(Rand)
% of Total
Bond
Amount
Nedperm 43 1,621,298 37,704 26,6
SA Perm 46 1,639,174 35,634 26,9
Nedcor 5 143,693 28,738 2,3
FNB 16 757,714 47,457 12,4
Standard 14 708,116 50,579 11,6
United 8 183,851 22,981 3,0
Mercantile 7 183,000 26,142 3,0
JHB Mun PF 3 120,119 40,039 1,9
Other 27 727,588 26,947 11,9
Total 169 6,084,553 30,003 100
Source: Calculated from the Deeds Registry System (op.cit.)
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Table A.3: The Dube mortgage bond housing market
Bank No. of 
Bonds
Total 
Amount of 
Bonds 
(Rand)
Average 
Cost of 
Bonds 
(Rand)
% Of Total
Bond
Amount
SA Perm 53 1,367,361 25,799 14,7
Nedperm 45 1,977,043 43,934 21,2
Nedcor 6 321,127 53,521 3,4
FNB 19 913,516 48,079 9,8
Standard 30 1,125,200 37,506 12,0
AA Corp 9 321,750 35,750 3,4
Mercantile 7 161,000 23,142 1,7
Allied 26 778,515 29,942 8,3
United 24 568,781 23,699 6,1
JMPF 5 245,602 49,120 2,6
Other 38 1,520,018 40,000 16,3
Total 262 9,299,913 35,499 100
Source: Calculated from the Deeds Registry System (op.cit.)
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Table A.4: The Jabulani mortgage bond housing market
Bank Number of 
Bonds
Total 
Amount of 
Bonds 
(Rand)
Average 
Cost of 
Bonds 
(Rand)
% of Total
Bond
Amount
Nedperm 57 2,199,470 38,587 19,5
SA Perm 100 4,037,908 40,379 35,9
Nedcor 32 165,128 5,160 1,4
FNB 9 270,600 30,066 2,4
Standard 47 2,020,577 42,991 17,9
Allied 29 980,452 33,809
00
United 9 270,133 30,015 2,4
ABSA 5 170,530 34,106 1,5
AA Corp 8 231,380 28,922 2,0
JHB Mun PF 10 341,155 34,155 3,0
Other 16 539,893 33,743
00
Total 322 11,227,226 34,867 100
Source: Calculated from the Deeds Registry System, op.cit.
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Table A.5: The Tladi mortgage bond housing market
Bank Number of 
Bonds
Total 
Amount of 
Bonds 
(Rand)
Average 
Cost of 
Bonds 
(Rand)
% of Total
Bond
Amount
Nedperm 40 2,965,056 74,264 34,0
SA Perm 93 2,847,377 30,616 32,6
Nedcor 3 161,619 53,873 1/8
FNB 6 429,598 71,599 4,9
Standard 11 454,068 41,278 5,2
Mercantile 6 117,950 19,658 1/3
Allied 9 460,263 51,140 5,2
United 11 287,851 26,168 3,3
AA Corp 5 107,000 21,400 1,2
Other 25 883,313 35,332 10,1
Total 209 8,714,095 41,694 100
Source: Calculated from the Deeds Registry System, op.cit.
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Table A.6: The Naledi mortgage bond housing market
Bank Number of 
Bonds
Total 
Amount of 
Bonds 
(Rand)
Average 
Cost of 
Bonds 
(Rand)
% of Total
Bond
Amount
Nedperm 84 3,461,009 41,202 42,6
SA Perm 78 2,197,317 28,170 27,0
Nedcor 9 263,863 29,318 3,2
FNB 5 179,612 35,922 2,2
Standard 13 528,500 40,653 6,5
Mercantile 11 229,497 20,863 2,8
NBS 3 111,400 37,133 1/3
AA Corp 3 102,000 34,000 1/2
JHB Mun PF 12 458,349 38,195 5,6
Other 16 578,537 36,158 7/1
Total 234 8,110,084 34,658 100
Source: Calculated from the Deeds Registry System, op.cit.
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Table A.7: The Naledi Extension 1 mortgage bond housing 
market
Bank
Nedperm 53 2,466,489 46,537 21,4
SA Perm 99 3,198,550 32,308 27,8
Nedcor 10 310,478 31,047 2,7
FNB 21 1,421,181 67,675 12,3
Standard 20 947,758 47,387
OO00
Allied 13 448,714 34,516 3,9
ABSA 7 272,682 38,954 2,3
United 27 695,058 25,742
oVO
NBS 19 637,075 33,530 5,5
JHB Mun PF 7 237,577 33,939 to > o
Other 24 852,535 35,522 7,4
Total 300 11,488,097 38,293 100
Source: Calculated from the Deeds Registry System, op.cit.
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Table A.8: The Mofolo Central mortgage bond housing market
Bank Number of 
Bonds
Total 
Amount of 
Bonds 
(Rand)
Average 
Cost of 
Bonds 
(Rand)
% of Total
Bond
Amount
Nedperm 43 1,275,360 29,659
IT)**
00rH
SA Perm 51 1,393,445 27,322 20,2
Nedcor 11 525,527 47,775 7,6
FNB 19 884,614 46,558 12,8
Standard 10 316,718 31,671 4,5
United 12 292,941 24,411 4,2
Mercantile 5 107,121 21,424 1,5
African
Bank 7 382,577 54,653 5,5
JHB Mun PF 8 472,017 59,002 6,8
AA Corp 4 184,000 46,000 2,6
Other 20 1,059,041 49,452 15,3
Total 190 6,893,361 36,280 100
Source: Calculated from the Deeds Registry System, op.cit.
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Table A.9: The Mofolo South mortgage bond housing market
Bank Number of 
Bonds
Total 
Amount of 
Bonds 
(Rand)
Average 
Cost of 
Bonds 
(Rand)
% of Total
Bond
Amount
Nedperm 30 1,585,692 52,856 43,8
SA Perm 28 795,123 28,397 21,9
Nedcor 4 81,384 20,346 2,2
FNB 2 61,769 30,884 1,7
Standard 12 550,487 45,873 15,2
Allied 2 81,850 40,925 2,3
NBS 3 75,689 25,229 2,0
JHB Mun PF 3 131,506 43,835 3,6
Other 8 252,131 31,516 6,9
Total 92 3,615,631 39,300 100
Source: Calculated from the Deeds Registry System, op.cit.
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Table A.10: The Mofolo North mortgage bond housing market
Bank Number of 
Bonds
Total 
Amount of 
Bonds 
(Rand)
Average 
Cost of 
Bonds 
(Rand)
% of Total
Bond
Amount
Nedperm 20 887,174 44,358 13,3
SA Perm 66 2,081,836 31,542 31,3
Nedcor 5 103,800 20,760 1/5
FNB 12 622,362 51,863 9,3
Standard 8 389,000 48,625 5,8
ABSA 6 311,000 51,833 4,6
Allied 9 300,158 33,350 4,5
United 16 463,917 28,994 6,9
Mercantile 4 137,279 34,319 2,0
African
Bank 13 649,144 49,934 9,7
AA Corp 4 123,000 30,750 1/8
JHB Mun 
P .Fund 6 299,225 49,870 4,5
Other 7 271,354 38,764 4,0
Total 176 6,639,249 37,723 100
Source: Calculated from the Deeds Registry System, op.cit.
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Table A.11: The Moroka North mortgage bond housing market
Bank Number of 
Bonds
Total 
Amount of 
Bonds 
(Rand)
Average 
Cost of 
Bonds 
(Rand)
% of Total
Bond
Amount
Nedperm 11 386,747 35,158 39,6
SA Perm 17 313,043 18,414 32,0
Standard 2 60,000 30,000 6,1
JHB Mun PF 2 69,650 34,825 7,1
Other 7 146,917 20,988 15,0
Total 39 976,357 25,034 100
Source: Calculated from the Deeds Registry System, op.cit.
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Table A.12: The Pimville Zone 1 mortgage bond housing market
Bank Number of 
Bonds
Total 
Amount of 
Bonds 
(Rand)
Average 
Cost of 
Bonds 
(Rand)
% of Total
Bond
Amount
Nedperm 20 608,687 30,434 18,9
SA Perm 37 989,689 26,748 30,8
Nedcor 3 82,532 27,510 2,5
FNB 6 273,644 45,607
in00
Standard 8 246,800 30,850 7,6
Allied 6 224,668 37,444 7,0
NBS 5 138,245 27,649 4,3
JMPF 3 135,480 45,160 4,2
Other 14 506,189 36,156 15,7
Total 102 3,205,934 31,430 100
Source: Calculated from the Deeds Registry System, op.cit.
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Table A.13: The Pimville Zone 2 mortgage bond housing market
Bank Number of 
Bonds
Total 
Amount of 
Bonds 
(Rand)
Average 
Cost of 
Bonds 
(Rand)
% of Total
Bond
Amount
Nedperm 11 392,276 35,661
r-00
SA Perm 39 1,345,575 34,501 30,1
FNB 3 118,758 39,586 2,6
Standard 16 826,862 51,678 18,5
Allied 15 689,605 45,973 15,4
United 10 340,860 34,086 7/6
ABSA 6 201,008 33,501 4,5
JMPF 3 157,220 52,406 3,5
AA Corp 4 100,000 25,000 2,2
Other 10 294,022 29,402 6,5
Total 100 4,466,186 44,661 100
Source: Calculated from the Deeds Registry System, op.cit.
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Table A.14: The Pimville Zone 3 mortgage bond housing market
Bank Number of 
Bonds
Total 
Amount of 
Bonds 
(Rand)
Average 
Cost of 
Bonds 
(Rand)
% of Total
Bond
Amount
Nedperm 26 991,119 38,119 37,2
SA Perm 28 806,607 28,807 30,3
Nedcor 3 143,030 47,676 5,3
FNB 6 214,818 35,803 8,0
Standard 3 142,535 47,511 5,3
LLA 3 111 050 37,016 4/1
Other 12 252,138 21,011 9,4
Total 81 2,661,297 32,855 100
Source: Calculated from the Deeds Registry System, op.cit.
416
Table A.15: The Pimville Zone 4 mortgage bond housing market
Bank Number of 
Bonds
Total 
Amount of 
Bonds 
(Rand)
Average 
Cost of 
Bonds 
(Rand)
% of Total
Bond
Amount
Nedperm 18 968,934 53,829 9,5
SA Perm 25 1,151,035 46,041 11,3
Nedcor 3 160,000 53,333 1/5
FNB 12 860,588 71,715 00
Standard 35 1,954,583 55,845 19,2
Allied 21 717,777 34,179 7,0
United 20 573,572 28,678 5,6
NBS 79 2,835,599 35,893 27,8
AA Corp 5 245,706 49,141 2,4
JMPF 4 218,100 54,525 2,1
Other 11 486,803 44,254 4,7
Total 233 10,172,697 43,659 100
Source: Calculated from the Deeds Registry System, op.cit.
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Table A.16: The Pimville Zone 5 mortgage bond housing market
Bank Number of 
Bonds
Total 
Amount of 
Bonds 
(Rand)
Average 
Cost of 
Bonds 
(Rand)
% of Total
Bond
Amount
Nedperm 34 2,110,892 62,085 16,7
SA Perm 61 1,532,822 25,128 12,1
Nedcor 9 251,178 27,908 1,9
FNB 35 1,648,050 47,087 13,0
Standard 49 2,958,498 60,377 23,4
ABSA 9 278,446 30,938 2,2
Allied 14 452,978 32,355 3,5
United 17 483,114 28,418
00CO
NBS 35 907,468 25,927 7,2
AA Corp 7 202,000 28,857 1,6
African
Bank 6 317,000 52,833 2,5
JMPF 10 316,620 31,662 2,5
LLA 7 217,500 31,071 1,7
Other 32 919,238 28,726 7,2
Total 325 12,595,804 38,756 100
Source: Calculated from the Deeds Registry System, op.cit.
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Table A.17: The Pimville Zone 6 mortgage bond housing market
Bank Number of 
Bonds
Total 
Amount of 
Bonds 
(Rand)
Average 
Cost of 
Bonds 
(Rand)
% of Total
Bond
Amount
Nedperm 62 3,046,442 49,136 10,2
SA Perm 183 8,735,972 47,737 29,4
FNB 27 1,482,884 54,921 4,9
Standard 258 13,266,070 51,418 44,6
Allied 9 350,644 38,960 1/1
United 10 308,091 30,809 1,0
JMPF 11 317,580 28,870 1/0
NBS 6 305,580 50,930 1/0
AA Corp 4 113,304 28,26 0,3
African
Bank 4 189,310 47,327 0,6
Other 36 1,572,825 43,689 5,2
Total 610 29,688,702 48,670 100
Source: Calculated from the Deeds Registry System, op.cit.
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Table 18: The Klipspruit mortgage bond housing market
Bank Number of 
Bonds
Total 
Amount of 
Bonds 
(Rand)
Average 
Cost of 
Bonds 
(Rand)
% of Total
Bond
Amount
Nedperm 33 1,737,733 52,658 20,2
SA Perm 68 1,868,199 27,473 21,7
Nedcor 3 104,768 34,922 1,2
Standard 23 1,162,629 50,549 13,5
ABSA 5 191,576 38,315 2,2
Allied 11 284,213 25,837 3,3
United 10 391,619 39,161 4/5
NBS 27 1,503,354 55,679 17,5
Transnet 3 206,500 68,833 2,4
JMPF 8 421,590 52,698 4,9
AA Corp 4 132,000 33,000 1,5
Other 15 585,862 39,057 6,8
Total 210 8,590,043 40,904 100
Source: Calculated from the Deeds Registry System, op.cit.
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Table A.19: Protea mortgage bond housing market
Bank Number of 
Bonds
Total 
Amount of 
Bonds 
(Rand)
Average 
Cost of 
Bonds 
(Rand)
% of Total
Bond
Amount
Standard 14 990,197 70,728 12,3
Nedperm 10 890,176 89,017 11,0
FNB 22 1,493,994 67,908 18,6
NBS 43 3,277,382 76,218
COo
Allied 27 1,017,319 37,678 12,6
JMSPF 3 84,500 28,166 1,0
Other 4 273,699 68,424 3,4
Total 96 8,027,267 83,617 100
Source: Calculated from the Deeds Registry System, op.cit.
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Table A.20: Protea South Extension 1 mortgage bond housing
market
Bank Number of 
Bonds
Total 
Amount of 
Bonds 
(Rand)
Average 
Cost of 
Bonds 
(Rand)
% of Total
Bond
Amount
Perm 45 3,232,732 71,838 35,3
United 51 2,672,425 52,400 29,2
Nedbank 34 2,545,961 74,881 27,8
FNB 4 272,350 68,087 2,9
Other 6 410,910 68,485 4,4
Total 142 9,134,553 64,326 100
Source: Calculated from the Deeds Registry System, op.cit.
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Table A.21: Protea North mortgage bond housing market
Bank Number of 
Bonds
Total 
Amount of 
Bonds 
(Rand)
Average 
Cost of 
Bonds 
(Rand)
% of Total
Bond
Amount
Nedperm 95 5,830,815 61,377 7,7
Nedcor 16 1,152,030 72,001 1,5
FNB 177 10,569,007 59,711 14,1
Standard 309 17,561,061 56,831 23,4
Allied 192 11,216,732 58,420 14,9
ABSA 41 2,518,067 61,416 3,3
Saambou 76 4,557,916 59,972 6,0
NBS 160 14,459,476 90,371 19,3
JMSPF 81 3,654,812 45,121
00
Other 35 3,291,822 94,052 4,4
Total 1,182 74,811,738 63,292 100
Source: Calculated from the 1993 Report on Properties in
Johannesburg, Deeds Registry System, Central Government 
Building, Pretoria.
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APPENDIX A2
Household Survey in Orlando West and Meadowlands West Zone 9
This survey is purely an academic exercise, which is aimed 
at informing on the dynamics of the housing situation in 
Greater Soweto. I would appreciate all the assistance that 
you are willing to offer by spending a few minutes of your 
time with me answering the following questions.
Survey Number.........  Date of call..................
Interviewer..........................
Township.............................
House Type...........................
Tenure...............................
The Head of Household
Age.............
Sex.............
Occupation........................
SECTION 1
I would like to ask you a few questions about your housing 
situation.
1. What year was your house built?..........................
2. When did you first occupy this house?....................
3. How many rooms does your house have?.....................
4. Do you have an inside toilet?............................
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5. How many people live permanently on this house?
6. How many are children under 15?................
7. How many are adults over 60?...................
SECTION 2
I would now like to ask you about your employment and income 
situation.
8. Are you employed?........................................
9. If yes, what is your occupation?.........................
1. Where do you work?...................................
10. How much do you take home, eg, wages, salary or profit?.
11. What is your income from other sources, eg, pension?....
12. Are you self employed?..................................
13. If yes, what is the nature of your business?...........
14. How much is your income per day................... or per
week.................... or per month?...................
15. If you are not employed, do you receive any assistance
from government?.........................................
1. If yes how much per month............................
16. What employment skills do you possess?..................
17. If you are unemployed and you do not have informal 
employment, how do you meet your living expenses?......
SECTION 3
I am now interested in knowing about your housing situation.
18. Do you own this house?.................................
19. If yes, 1) did you buy it outright?.....................
Or 2) you bought it through a bank loan or bond?...
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20. If you bought your house outright, how much did you 
pay?.....................................................
21. How did you raise the money to buy this house outright?.
22. If you bought your house through a bank loan or bond, 
how much does your bond cost?...........................
23. Which bank gave you a loan?.............................
24. How much do you pay a month?............................
25. Do you own any other house?.............................
26. If yes, how many?.......................................
27. If so, why do you own more than one house?..............
1. Owners, do you receive any subsidy from government?..
2. If yes, how much?.....................................
3. In your view, what would you say are the advantages
of owning a house?...................................
28. Do you rent your accommodation? ....................
29. If yes, from who?.......................................
30. How much rent do you pay per month?.....................
1. Tenants, do you receive any subsidy from government?.
2. If yes, how much?....................................
3. What would you say are the advantages of renting?....
31. If you don't pay rent, why not?.........................
SECTION 4.
I would now like to ask you about your housing history.
32. How long have you lived here?......................
33. Where did you live before?.........................
34. Why did you move?..................................
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35. Have you lived in more than one area/place/house?
1. First house, 1) Area/township.................
2) Type of house.................
3) Year in which you moved in....
4) Year in which you moved out...
5) Why did you move?............
2. Second house, 1) Area/township................
2) Type of house...............
3) Year in which you moved in...
4) Year in which you moved out..
5) Why did you move?...........
3. Third house, 1) Area/Township.................
2) Type of house.................
3) Year in which you moved in....
4) Year in which you moved out...
5) Why did you move.............
SECTION 5
I would also like to ask you about the problems you are 
experiencing with your house.
36. What sorts of problems are you experiencing?
1).................................................................
2)......................................................
3 )........................................................
4 ).............................................. ..........
5 )........................................................
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6).
7).
8).
9).
10)
SECTION 6
I would like to know where you were born.
37. Where you born in Soweto?..........................
1. If yes, how long ago?...........................
2. If not, when did you first move in.............
3. From where did you come?........................
38. Finally, is there a place in Soweto where you would 
rather live?........................................
1. If yes, where?..................................
2. And, why?........................................
Thank you very much for your cooperation.
For Control Purposes
1. Number of substitutions........ ...................
2. Reasons for substitutions..........................
3. How substituted....................................
4. Original address...................................
5. Substituted address................................
428
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Achtenberg, P. & Marcuse, P. 1983. Toward Decommodification 
of Housing: A Political Analysis and a Progressive Program. 
In H. Chester (ed.), America's Housing Crisis, Routledge & 
Kegan Paul, Boston.
Allen, J. & Hamnett, C. (eds), 1991. Housing and Labour 
Markets: Building the Connections, Unwin Hvman, London.
Amis, P. and Lloyd, P. (eds), 1990. Housing Africa's Urban 
Poor, Manchester University Press, Manchester.
Appelbaum, P. & Gilderbloom, J.I. 1986. Supply-Side 
Economics and Rents: Are Rental Housing Markets Truly
Competitive? In R.G. Bratt, et al, Critical Perspectives on 
Housing, Temple University Press, Philadelphia.
Atkinson, D. 1991. One-city initiatives. In M. Swilling, R. 
Humphries and K. Shubane (eds), Apartheid Citv in 
Transition, pp. 271-289. Oxford University Press, Cape Town.
Badenhorst, M.S. 1993. Housing Provision in a Post-Apartheid 
Society: A Quantitative Review of Constraining Realities. In 
21st IAHS. World Housing Congress. 10-14 May, Cape Town.
Ball, M. & Kirwan, R. 1975. The Economics of an Urban 
Housing Market. Centre for Environmental Studies, London.
Ball, M., et al, 1988. Housing and Social Change in Europe 
and the USA, Routledge.
Bassett, K. and Short, J.R. 1980. Housing and residential 
structure: Alternative approaches, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 
London.
Beavon, K.S.O. 1982. Black Townships in South Africa: Terra 
Incognita for Urban Geographers. South African Geographical 
Journal. Vol. 64, No.l, 3-20.
Beavon, K. & Rogerson, C. 1990. Temporary trading for 
temporary people: the making of hawking in Soweto. In D.
Drakakis-Smith (ed.), Economic Growth and Urbanization in 
Developing Areas, pp. 263-286. Routledge, London & New York.
Beavon, K.S.O. 1992. The post-apartheid city: hopes,
possibilities, and harsh realities. In D.M. Smith (ed.), The 
Apartheid Citv and Beyond: Urbanization and Social Change in 
South Africa, pp. 231-242. Routledge, London.
Bernstein, A. 1991. The challenge of the cities. In M. 
Swilling, et al, op.cit. 322-333.
Bond, P. 1993. Housing Crisis in Zimbabwe: What Lessons for 
South Africa. IFAA Occasional Papers. No. 9, Johannesburg.
429
Bond, P. 1990. The New US Class Struggle: Financial Power 
vs. Grassroots Populism, Capital and Class # 40, Spring.
Bond, P. 1991. Alternative Politics in the Inner City: The 
Financial explosion and the campaign for community control 
of capital in Baltimore. In M. Keith and A. Rogers (eds), 
Hollow Promises: Rhetoric and Reality in the Inner Citv, 
Mansell, London.
Bond, P. 1990. Township Housing and South Africa's 
'Financial Explosion': The Theory and Practice of Financial 
Capital in Alexandra. Urban Forum. Vol. 1, No. 2, 
Witwatersrand University Press, Johannesburg.
Bond, P. and Swilling, M. 1992. World Bank Financing For 
Urban Development: Issues and Options for South Africa, 
Urban Forum. 3.2, Witwatersrand University Press, 
Johannesburg.
Bond, P. 1993. Economic Origins of Black Townships in 
Zimbabwe: Contradictions of Industrial and Financial Capital 
in the 1950s and 1960s. Economic Geography. Vol. 69, No. 1, 
Clark University, Massachusetts.
Bond, P. 1994. Money, Power and Social Movements: the
Contested Geography of Finance in Southern Africa", in 
Corbridge, S. et al, Money. Power and Space, Basil 
Blackwell, Oxford.
Bond, P. 1996. Policies That Contradict The RDP. National 
Institute For Economic Policy Briefing Paper. Johannesburg.
Bovaird, A., Harloe, M. and Whitehead, C.M.E. Private Rented 
Housing: Its Current Role. Journal of Social Policy. 14. 1, 
1-23.
Bozzoli, B. (ed.), 1979. Labour. Townships and Protest.
Ravan, Johannesburg.
Bozzoli, B. 1981. The Political nature of a Ruling Class. 
Capitalism and Ideology in South Africa 1890-1933. Routledge 
& Kegan paul, London.
Blowers, A. et al, 1982. Urban Change and Conflict: An
Interdisciplinary Reader, The Open University Press, London.
Bourne, S.B. and Hitchcock, J.R. (eds), 1978. Urban Housing 
Markets: Recent Directions in Research and Policy.
University of Toronto Press, Toronto.
Bristow, D. et al, 1989. Black Towns of the PWV. Davies, 
Bristow & Associates, Durban.
Bristow, D. et al, 1990. Black Towns of the PWV. Davies, 
Bristow & Associates, Durban.
430
Budlender, G. 1993. Urban Housing: The Legal Framework. 
Legal Resources Centre, Johannesburg.
Byrne, D. 1986. Housing and Class in the Inner City. In P. 
Malpass (ed.), The Housing Crisis, Croom Helm, London, pp. 
151-173.
Castells, M. 1977. The Urban Question, Edward Arnold, 
London.
Castells, M. 1978. Citv. Class and Power. Macmillan, London.
Carr, W.J.P. 1990. Soweto. South African Institute of Race 
Relations, Johannesburg.
Cleary, S. 1993. International Financial Institutions.
Public Services International.
Cloete, F. 1991. Greying and free settlement. In M.
Swilling, et al, op.cit. 91-107.
Coovadia, C. 1991. The role of the civic movement. In M. 
Swilling, et al, op.cit. 334-349.
Corbett, P. 1992. Post-apartheid housing policy. In D.M.
Smith (ed.), op.cit. 255-265.
Cox, K.R. and Johnston, R.J. (eds), 1982. Conflict. Politics 
and the Urban Scene. Longman, London.
Crankshaw, O. et al, 1992. The road to 'Egoli1: urbanization 
histories from a Johannesburg squatter settlement. In D.M. 
Smith (ed.), op.cit. 136-146.
Crankshaw, O. and White, C. 1993. The Transfer of State- 
Owned Housing Stock to Private Ownership: A Report to
Working Group 3. National Housing Forum. Centre for Policy 
Studies, Doornfontein.
Croeser, G. 1991. Autonomy in local authority finance. In M. 
Swilling, et al, op.cit. 139-150.
CWMC 1993. Greater Soweto Transfer of Houses Project: Report 
to Transfer of Houses Task Team (prepared bv E.F.K. Tucker 
Inc.). Central Witwatersrand Metropolitan Chamber, 
Johannesburg.
Davenport, R. 1991. Historical background of the apartheid 
city to 1948. In M. Swilling, et al, op.cit. 1-18.
Davies, D. 1993. Social rights may have negative 
consequences. South African Labour Bulletin. Vol. 17, No. 4
431
Davies, G.W. 1978. Theoretical Approaches to Filtering in 
the Urban Housing Market. In L.S. Bourne and J.R. Hitchcock, 
(eds), Urban Housing Markets: Recent Direction in Research
and Policy, University of Toronto Press, Toronto.
Davies, R. et al, 1984. The Struggle for South Africa: A
Reference Guide to Movements. Organisations and
Institutions, Vol. 1, Zed Books Ltd, London.
De Loor, J.H. 1992. Housing in South Africa: Proposals on a 
policy and strategy. Government Printer, Pretoria.
Dewar, D. 1992. Urbanization and the South African city: a 
manifesto for change. In D.M. Smith (ed.), op.cit. 243-254.
Dubow, S. 1987. Race, civilisation and culture: the
elaboration of segregation discourse in the inter-war years, 
pp. 71-94. In S. Marks and S. Trapido, (eds), The Politics 
of Race, Class and Nationalism in Twentieth Century South 
Africa, Longman, London.
Duncan, T.L.C. 1971. Measuring Housing Quality: A study of
Methods, Occasional paper No. 20, Centre for Urban and 
Regional Studies, The University of Birmingham.
Eberhuat, J.L. 1949. Survey of Housing and Family Conditions 
in Orlando Township (with special reference to housing 
needs), MA dissertation, Witwatersrand University.
Eckstein, S. 1990. Poor people versus the state and capital: 
anatomy of a successful community mobilization for housing 
in Mexico City. International Journal of Urban Regional 
Research. Vol. 14, No. 2. pp. 274-295.
Ecoplan 1979. Development Guidance for Soweto Council and 
Diepmeadow Council. Ecoplan, Pretoria.
Emdon, E. 1993. Privatization of State Housing: With Special 
Focus on the Greater Soweto Area. Urban Forum, 4:2, pp. 1-
13. Witwatersrand University Press, Johannesburg.
Forrest, R. 1991. The Privatization of Collective 
Consumption. In M. Gottdiener and C.G. Pickvance (eds), 
Urban Life in Transition, Urban Affairs Annual Reviews. Vol. 
39, Sage Publications.
Forrest, R. and Murie, A. 1991. Housing markets, labour 
markets and housing histories. In J. Allen and C. Hamnett 
(eds), Housing and Labour Markets: Building the Connections. 
Unwin Hyman, London.
Freund, B. 1988. The African Worker. Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge.
432
Giddens, A. 1971. Capitalism and modern social theory: an 
analysis of the writings of Marx, Durkeim and Weber. 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Gibson, M. 1986. Housing Renewal: Privatisation and Beyond. 
In P. Malpass (ed.), op.cit. pp. 86-124.
Giliomee, H. and Schlemmer, L. (eds), 1985. Up Against the 
Fences: Poverty, passes and privilege in South Africa, St 
Martin's Press, New York.
Goldberg, M.A. 1983. The Housing Problem: A Premier on
Housing Markets. Policies and Problems, University of 
British Columbia Press, Vancouver.
Government Gazette 1994. White Paper on Reconstruction and 
Development, Vol. 353, No. 16085, Parliament of the Republic 
of South Africa, Cape Town.
Government Gazette 1994. White Paper: A New Housing Policy 
and Strategy for South Africa, Vol. 354, No. 16178, 
Department of Housing, Pretoria.
Hallett, G. (ed.) 1993. The New Housing Shortage: Housing 
Affordability in Europe and USA, Rout1edge, London.
Hamnett, C. 1994. Restructuring Housing Finance and the
Housing Market. In S. Corbridge, et al, Money, Power and
Space, Blackwell, Oxford.
Hanlon, J. 1994. Making People-Driven Development Work, A 
report of the Commission on Development Finance formed by 
the South African Civic Organisation, Planact, Johannesburg.
Harloe, M. and Lebas, E. (eds), 1981. Citv, class and
capital, Edward Arnold, London.
Harvey, D. 1979. Social Justice and the Citv, Edward Arnold, 
London.
Harvey, D. 1985. The Urbanization of Capital, Basil
Blackwell, London.
Harvey, D. 1989. The Urban Experience, Basil Blackwell, 
London.
Harvey, D. 1990. The Condition of Postmodernitv, Basil 
Blackwell, Oxford.
Hendler, P. 1987. Capital Accumulation and conurbation: 
Rethinking the Social Geography of the 'Black Townships'. 
South African Geographical Journal. Vol. 69, No. 1, 60-85.
Hendler, P. 1991. The housing crisis. In M. Swilling, et al, 
op.cit. 197-217.
433
Heymas, C. 1991. Privatisation and municipal reform. In M. 
Swilling, et al, op.cit. 151-173.
Hlophe, S.S. 1977. The Crisis of Urban Living Und^r 
Apartheid Conditions: A Socio-Economic Analysis of Soweto.
Journal of Southern African Affairs, Vol. 11, No. 3, 343- 
354.
Humphries, R. 1991. Whither Regional Services Councils? in 
M. Swilling, et al, op.cit. 78-90.
IHSA 1987. Housing in Southern Africa, Institute for Housing 
of Southern Africa, Bryanston.
Jones, S. and Muller, A. 1992. The South African Economy 
1910-90. Macmillan, London.
Karn, V. et al, 1986. Growing Crisis and Contradictions in 
Home Ownership. In P. Malpass (ed.), op.cit. pp. 122-150.
Khosa, M.M. 1992. Changing state policy and the Black ta*i 
industry in Soweto. In S.M. Smith (ed.), op.cit. 182-192.
Knox, P. 1982. Urban Social Geography, Longman, London.
Lamarche, F. 1976. Property development and the economic 
foundations of the urban question. In C.G. Pickvance (ed.), 
Urban Sociology: Critical Essays, Tavistock, London, pp. 85- 
118.
Legassick, M. 1975. Capital Accumulation and Violence in. 
South Africa. Economy and Society,3:3. pp.251-291.
Lemon, A. (ed.) 1991. Homes Apart, David Philip, Cape Town.
Lewis, P.R.B. 1966. A 'city' within a City - The Creation of 
Soweto. South African Geographical Journal. 48: 45-85.
Lipton, M. 1985. Capitalism and Apartheid, South Africa, 
1910-1986, Wildwood House.
Lodge, T. 1983. Black Politics in South Africa since 1945, 
Longman, London.
Lojkine, J. 1976. Contribution to a Marxist theory of 
capitalist urbanization. In C.G. Pickvance (ed.), op.ci^ 
pp. 119-146.
Mabin, A. 1991. Effects of Privatisation of Housing and of 
Private Markets for Housing, Report to Planaci, 
Johannesburg.
Mabin, A. and Parnell, S. 1983. Recommodification aiid^ 
Working Class Home Ownership: New Directions for South'.
African Cities. South African Geographical Journal. 65: 143- 
66.
434
Mabin, A. 1991. The dynamics of urbanization since 1960. In 
M. Swilling, et al, op.cit. 33-47.
Mabin, A. 1992. Dispossession, exploitation and struggle: an 
historical overview of South African urbanization. In D.M. 
Smith (ed.), op.cit. 13-24.
Maharaj, B. 1993. Post-Group Areas: Residential
Desegregation Trends in South African cities. In 21st IAHS. 
World Housing Congress, 10-14 May, Cape Town.
Malpass, P. and Murie, A. 1990. Housing Policy and Practice. 
Macmi11an, London.
Mandy, N. 1991. Local government finance and institutional 
reform. In M. Swilling, et al, op.cit. 119-138.
Mandy, N. 1989. Research Report: Johannesburg and Soweto, 
Centre for Policy Studies, Graduate School of Business, 
University of the Witwatersrand.
Mandy, N. 1984. A Citv Divided: Johannesburg and Soweto, 
Macmillan, Cape Town.
Marks, S. and Rathbone, R. (eds), 1987. Industrialisation 
and Social Change in South Africa: African class formation, 
culture and consciousness 1870-1930, Longman, London.
Marks, S. and Trapido, S. 1987. The Politics of Race. Class 
& Nationalism in Twentieth Century South Africa, Longman, 
London.
Mashabela, H. 1988. Townships of the PWV. South African 
Institute of Race Relations, Johannesburg.
Mashile, G.G. and Pirie, G.H. 1977. Aspects of Housing 
Allocation in Soweto. South African Geographical Journal. 
59, 2, pp. 139-149.
Mather, C. and Parnell, S. 1990. Upgrading the 'matchboxes': 
urban renewal in Soweto, 1976-86. In D. Drakakis-Smith 
(ed.), op.cit. 238-250.
Mears, R.R. 1993. Demographic Characteristics of the 
Population in Greater Soweto, unpublished paper, Vista 
University, Soweto.
McCarthy, J. 1991. Class, race and urban local 
relationships. In M. Swilling, et al, op.cit. 258-270.
McCarthy, J. 1992. Local and regional government from 
rigidity to crisis to flux. In D.M. Smith (ed.), op.cit. 25-
36.
435
Moroney, S. 1982. Mine quarters: the differential
stabilisation of the Witwatersrand workforce, 1900-1920. In
S. Marks and R. Rathbone, (eds), op.cit. 259-269.
Morris, P. 1980. Soweto: A Review of Existing Conditions and 
Some Guidelines for Change, Urban Foundation, Johannesburg.
Murie, A. and Forrest, R. 1980. Housing Market Processes and 
The Inner Citv. Centre for Urban and Regional Studies, 
University of Birmingham.
Newburger, H.B. 1989. Discrimination by a Profit-Maximizing 
Real Estate Broker in Response to White Prejudice. Journal 
of Urban Economics. 26: 1-19.
Parnell, S. 1992. State intervention in housing provision in
the 1980s. In D.M. Smith (ed.), op.cit. 53-64.
Parnell, S.M. 1991. The ideology of African home-ownership: 
the establishment of Dube, Soweto, 1946-155. South African 
Geographical Journal, Vol. 73, No. 2, 69-76.
Parnell, S. 1988. Racial Segregation in Johannesburg: The
Slums Act, 1934-1939. South African Geographical Journal, 
Vol. 70, No. 2, 112-126.
Parnell, S.M. and Pirie, G.H. 1991. Johannesburg. In Lemon, 
A. (ed.), o p . c i t. 129-145.
Partridge, T.C., Wood, C.K. and Brink, A.B.A. 1993. 
Priorities for Urban Expansion within the PWV Metropolitan 
Region: The Primacy of Geotechnical Constraints. South
African Geographical Journal. Vol. 75, No. 1, pp. 9-13.
Payne, R. (undated), The Social History of Soweto, paper
prepared for IDASA, Urban Research Services, Braamfontein.
Pickvance, C.G. (ed.), 1976. Urban Sociology: Critical
Essays. Tavistock, London.
Pigott, M.J.D. (1985), Townships for African Workers: A 
Study of State Intervention in South Africa. 1945-1965. 
unpublished doctoral thesis, School of Oriental and African 
Studies, University of London.
Planact 1989. The Soweto Rent Boycott. A report by Planact 
commissioned by The Soweto Delegation, Yeoville.
Planact 1990. Greater Soweto Accord. Planact, Yeoville.
Planact 1993. Report on the Soweto Development Corporation, 
Planact, Yeoville.
Posel, D. 1991. Curbing African urbanization in the 1950s 
and 1960s. In M. Swilling, et al, op.cit. 19-32.
436
Potts, D. and Mutambirwa, C.C. 1991. High-Density Housing in 
Harare: Commodification and Overcrowding. Third World
Planning Review. 13:1, pp. 1-24.
Proctor, R.M. 1976. Class Struggle, Segregation and the 
City: A History of Sophiatown 1905-1940. In B. Bozzoli
(ed.), op.cit. 49-89.
Quigley, J.M. 1978. Housing Markets and Housing Demand: 
Analytic Approaches. In L.S. Bourne and J.R. Hitchcock 
(eds), Urban housing Markets: Recent Directions in Research 
and Policy, University of Toronto Press, Toronto.
Randolph, B. 1991. Housing markets, labour markets and 
discontinuity theory. In J. Allen and C. Hamnett (eds),
Housing and Labour Markets: Building the Connections, Unwin 
Hyman, London.
RDP 1994. A Basic Guide to the Reconstruction and
Development Programme, African National Congress,
Johannesburg.
Reconstruct 1993. A Work in Progress supplement. Issue no. 
15, Urban Sector Network, Braamfontein.
Reconstruct 1994. A Work in Progress supplement. Issue no. 
17, Urban Sector Network, Braamfontein.
Reintges, C.M. 1990. Urban movements in South African black 
townships. International Journal of Urban and Regional
Research, Vol. 14, No. 1.
Robinson, J. 1992. Power, space and the city: historical 
reflections on apartheid and post-apartheid urban orders. In 
D.M. Smith (ed.), op.cit. 292-302.
Rogerson, C. 1990. Consumerism, the state, and the informal 
sector: shebeens in South Africa's Black townships. In D. 
Drakakis-Smith (ed.), op.cit. 287-303.
Rogerson, C.M. 1992. The absorptive capacity of the informal 
sector in the South African city. In D.M. Smith (ed.), 
op.cit. 161-171.
Rose, A. 1978. The Impact of Recent Trends in Social Housing 
Policies. In L.S. Bourne and J.R. Hitchcock (eds), Urban 
housing markets: Recent Directions in Research and Policy, 
University of Toronto Press, Toronto.
SAIRR 1993. Race Relations Survey 1992/93. South African 
Institute of Race Relations, Johannesburg.
SAIRR 1967. Soweto - Johannesburg's African Citv. (An 
address given to the Natal Region of the SAIRR in 1967 by E. 
Hellmann), South African Institute of Race Relations, 
Johannesburg.
437
Saunders, P. 1990. A Nation of Home Owners, Unwin Hyman, 
London.
Saunders, P. 1981. Social Theory and the Urban Question, 
Hutchinson, London.
Seekings, J. 1991. Township resistance in the 1980s. In M. 
Swilling, et al, op.cit. 290-308.
Seekings, J. 1988. Why was Soweto Different: Urban
Development, Township Politics and the Political Economy of 
Soweto, 1977-1984, African Studies seminar Paper, African 
Studies Institute, University of the Witwatersrand.
Schlemmer, L. 1991. Challenges of process and policy. In M. 
Swilling, et al, op.cit. 350-374.
Shubane, K. 1991. Black local authorities: a contraption of 
control. In M. Swilling, et al, op.cit. 64-77.
Simon, D. 1992. Cities, Capital and Development: African
Cities in the World Economy, Belhaven Press, London.
Simons, J. and Summons, R. 1983. Class & Colour in South 
Africa 1850-1950. International Defence and Aid Fund for 
Southern Africa, London.
Smith, D.M. (ed.), 1992. The Apartheid Citv and Beyond:
Urbanization and Social Change in South Africa, Rout1edge, 
London.
Smith, W. 1970. Housing: The Social and Economic Elements. 
University of California Press, Berkerly.
Smith, S.J. 1989. The Politics of Race and Residence. Policy 
Press, Oxford.
Soni, D.V. 1992. The apartheid state and Black housing 
struggles. In D.M. Smith (ed.), op.cit. 39-52.
Soussan, J. 1984. Recent trends in South African housing 
policy. Area. 16, 3, pp. 201-207.
Stadler, A.W. 1979. Birds in the Cornfields: Squatter
Movements in Johannesburg 1944-1947. In B. Bozzoli (ed.), 
op.cit. 19-48.
Steinberg, J. et al, 1992. Contradictions in the transition 
from urban apartheid: barriers to gentrification in
Johannesburg. In D.M. Smith (ed.), op.cit. 266-279.
Suckling, J. and White, L. 1988. After Apartheid. Africa 
World Press, New Jersey.
Swilling, M., Humphries, R. and K. Shubane 1991. Apartheid 
Citv in Transition. Oxford University Press, Cape Town.
438
Tipple, A.G. 1994. The Need For New Urban Housing in Sub- 
Saharan Africa: Problem or Opportunity. African Affairs. 
Vol. 93, No. 373, pp. 587-608.
Turrell, R. 1982. Kimberley: labour and compounds, 1871-
1888. In S. Marks and R. Rathbone (eds), op.cit. 45-76.
Unterhalter, E. 1987. Forced Removal, International Defence 
and Aid Fund for Southern Africa, London.
Urban Foundation 1990. Housing for All: Proposals for a
National Urban Housing Policy, Johannesburg.
Urban Foundation 1992. The Urban foundation Annual Review.
Johannesburg.
Whitehead, D. 1974. The UK Housing Market. Saxon House & 
Lexington Books, England and U.S.A.
Denning, S.M. 1993. An Economic Perspective on South Africa, 
Southern Africa Department, The World Bank, Washington.
Warde, A. 1990. Production, consumption and social change: 
reservations regarding Peter Saunders' sociology of
consumption. International Journal of Urban and regional 
Research. Vol. 14, No. 2, pp. 228-248.
Weicher, J.C. and Thibodeau, T.G. 1988. Filtering and
Housing Markets: An Empirical Analysis. Journal of Urban 
Economics. 23: 21-40
Wolfson, T. 1991. Access to urban land. In M. Swilling et 
al, op.cit. 231-257.
Wolpe, H. 1975. Capitalism and cheap labour-power in South 
Africa: from segregation to apartheid. Economy and Society. 
1. pp. 425-455.
van Onselen, C. 1982; 1987. Studies in the Social and
Economic History of the Witwatersrand 1886-1914. Two Volumes 
(New Babylon & New Nineveh), Longman, London.
439
